“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Research on immigration, labor supply, wages, employment, skills, entrepreneurship, demographics, assimilation, and public finance across countries. Coverage compares overall economic gains with effects that vary by worker, region, and time horizon.
AI Summary.In Spain, immigrant households work less, earn less, pay less in taxes, and are more likely to use social assistance than native households at every level of education. Non-EU-origin households are almost three times as likely to receive social assistance, with 6% of highly educated non-EU households receiving it versus 4.4% of all native households.
Nicholas EberstadtAmerican Enterprise Institute
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Eberstadt argues immigration at scale may not postpone the crisis of the European welfare state. In Spain, non-EU immigrant households are ~3x more likely to receive social assistance than natives at every education level, and draw larger amounts when they do.
Do immigrant households in Spain use more social assistance than natives?
Core argument: At every educational level, non-EU-origin households in Spain are almost three times as likely as native Spanish households to receive government social assistance, and average social assistance follows the same pattern.
Spain’s immigrants work less, earn less, pay less in taxes, and use more social assistance benefits. Maybe the nostrum that mass immigration is helping postpone the crisis of the European welfare state needs to be examined more carefully. Immigrant households are much more likely to utilize social program benefits than Spanish nationals, regardless of educational attainment. At every educational level, non-EU-origin households are almost three times as likely to be taking government social assistance as native Spaniards; so too average social assistance. Hardly less noteworthy: The incidence of social assistance, and average benefits per household, for high-education non-EU households (6%) is higher than for native Spanish households of all educational backgrounds (4.4%) even though most Spanish natives lack higher education.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
At every educational level, non-EU-origin households in Spain are almost three times as likely as native Spanish households to receive government social assistance, and average social assistance follows the same pattern.
High-education non-EU households in Spain take social assistance at a 6% rate, above the 4.4% rate for native Spanish households of all educational backgrounds, even though most Spanish natives lack higher education.
Spain’s immigrants work less, earn less, pay less in taxes, and use more social assistance benefits, which invites closer examination of the claim that mass immigration is helping postpone the crisis of the European welfare state.
Related Articles:
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
Quo Vadis, Hispania? Part One— Official Spanish data show births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 over the first quarter of the 21st century—less than 0.5% of Spain's population at the start—while immigration accounted for 98% of the country's population growth, the largest increase of any European Union member. Deaths have exceeded births since 2015.
Quo Vadis Hispania? Part Two— Spain's first- and second-generation immigrant population totals at least 12mm—nearly 9.5mm immigrants and over 2.5mm descendants—out of a population of roughly 49mm. The authors estimate over a third of Spain's under-40 population and nearly two-fifths of children under 5 are immigrants or the children of immigrants.
AI Summary.Domestic migration has historically added about 0.5% a year to the population of reliably Republican counties while reliably Democratic counties lost 0.6%, with international migration showing the reverse pattern. Internal Revenue Service data show the fastest-growing Republican counties draw many newcomers from Democratic and competitive areas, and Republican support in those faster-growing counties has weakened.
Economist StaffThe Economist
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An Economist analysis of more than 3,000 US counties finds that in reliably GOP counties, annual deaths now exceed births by 0.4 per 1k residents, while in reliably Democratic counties, births exceed deaths by 2.8 per 1k. Population growth in the GOP counties is largely driven by internal migration.
How is domestic migration reshaping politics in Republican counties?
Core argument: Domestic migration has historically added about 0.5% a year to the population of reliably Republican counties while subtracting 0.6% a year from reliably Democratic ones.
Our number crunching shows that domestic migration has historically boosted the population of reliably Republican counties by about 0.5% a year, while reliably Democratic ones have lost 0.6%. The opposite is true of international migration, which has historically added 0.5% a year to solid-blue counties, compared with just 0.1% in solid-red ones. Data from the IRS show that the fastest-growing red counties draw an unusually large share of newcomers from politically unfriendly territory. In 2022-23 more than 20% came from solid-blue places and around 40% from competitive ones. This may already be affecting voting patterns. Before 2016, fast-growing red counties leaned more Republican than slower-growing ones. That has now flipped: slower-growing red counties lean more Republican, and GOP support in faster-growing ones has weakened.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Domestic migration has historically added about 0.5% a year to the population of reliably Republican counties while subtracting 0.6% a year from reliably Democratic ones.
International migration has historically added about 0.5% a year to solid-blue counties versus just 0.1% in solid-red ones, reversing the pattern of domestic migration.
Internal Revenue Service data show that in 2022-23 more than 20% of newcomers to the fastest-growing red counties came from solid-blue places and around 40% from competitive ones.
Related Articles:
Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave— County-level mapping of net domestic migration within the United States shows some counties gained net movers equal to 10% or more of their 2020 population while others lost an equivalent share, excluding international moves.
Americans Are Done With Being Put in Racial Boxes— Immigration from Asia and Latin America has been the chief driver of rising US diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is far more common among Hispanic and Asian Americans, and rising among Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, leaving more people outside single racial categories.
The Great “Transfer”-mation— Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
AI Summary.An analysis of authors at a leading AI research conference finds China is the largest originating source of elite AI talent, with its share of researchers holding Chinese undergraduate degrees rising 11 percentage points to 57%, while the US share fell to 13%. The US remains a net importer of AI researchers, gaining 2,145 while China lost 1,729.
Damien Ma and Binyi YangCarnegie Endowment for International Peace
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Surveying education/employment histories of authors at the Neural Information Processing Systems conference, Ma and Yang infer China educated 57% of elite AI talent as of 2025, versus 13% for the US. Yet the US gained 2,145 researchers y/y while China lost 1,729.
Does China produce the most elite AI talent while America attracts it?
Core argument: Damien Ma and Binyi Yang find China’s share of elite AI talent, defined by undergraduate degrees earned in China, rose 11 percentage points to 57% in 2025 versus 2022, while the U.S. share fell to 13%.
[Using a methodology based on paper authors from the Neural Information Processing Systems conference (NeurIPS) Damien Ma and Binyi Yang find] China has established a commanding lead as the largest originating source of elite AI talent globally. Compared to 2022, the share of Chinese-origin AI talent, defined as those who received undergraduate degrees in China, increased 11 percentage points to 57% in 2025, while the U.S. share fell to 13%. The United States remains a magnet for global AI talent, particularly Chinese talent. Despite U.S.-China tensions, among AI researchers working in the United States, the 2025 share of those holding undergraduate degrees from China rose by 4 percentage points. When it comes to brain gain vs. brain drain, the United States saw a net gain of +2,145 researchers in 2025 while China registered a net loss of -1,729 researchers.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Damien Ma and Binyi Yang find China’s share of elite AI talent, defined by undergraduate degrees earned in China, rose 11 percentage points to 57% in 2025 versus 2022, while the U.S. share fell to 13%.
Among AI researchers working in the United States, the share holding Chinese undergraduate degrees rose 4 percentage points in 2025, despite U.S.-China tensions.
The United States recorded a net gain of 2,145 AI researchers in 2025, while China registered a net loss of 1,729, under Ma and Yang’s methodology based on NeurIPS paper authors.
Related Articles:
China Lures Home Its Top AI Talent From Silicon Valley— Elite artificial intelligence researchers have left US firms including Google DeepMind and OpenAI for Chinese companies such as ByteDance, Tencent, and Alibaba. Three China- and San Francisco-based headhunters say they relocated more than 30 US-based researchers to China over 12 months, up from low single digits the prior year.
China and the Future Of Science— China graduates about 5x as many medical and biomedical students as the US each year, 7x as many engineers, and nearly double the number of science and engineering PhDs, while one-sixth to one-fifth of US science and engineering graduates are themselves Chinese. One study found returning Chinese scientists lead-author 2.5x more papers than peers who stay in the US.
Why Europe Produces Nobel Prize Winners but Not Elon Musks— Europe trains more engineering graduates per capita than China and more STEM PhDs than any region outside the United States, yet the only EU-born companies to reach $100bn market value in the past fifty years, Spotify and BioNTech, listed on US exchanges. Europe captures 6% of global AI startup funding versus 61% for the United States.
AI Summary.Spain's first- and second-generation immigrant population totals at least 12mm—nearly 9.5mm immigrants and over 2.5mm descendants—out of a population of roughly 49mm. The authors estimate over a third of Spain's under-40 population and nearly two-fifths of children under 5 are immigrants or the children of immigrants.
Nicholas EberstadtAmerican Enterprise Institute
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Spain’s population of first and second generation immigrants from Latin America (~5.7mm), and Morocco or other African countries (~2.4mm), accounts for nearly one sixth of Spain’s population. There are ~37mm native Spaniards.
How large is Spain's first- and second-generation immigrant population?
Core argument: Spain's first- and second-generation immigrant population totals at least 12 million—almost 9.5 million immigrants and over 2.5 million descendants—out of a population of roughly 49 million at the start of 2025.
Spain’s first and second-generation immigrant population comprises at least 12 million—almost 9.5 million immigrants and over 2.5 million of their descendants. [Spain’s population was ~49mm at the starts of 2025.] Over a third of Spain’s under 40 population are now first or second generation immigrants. And our numbers suggest that nearly two-fifths of Spain’s children under 5 are the children of immigrants, or immigrants themselves. Since our method misses second-generation immigrants not living with their parents, the absolute and relative size of Spain’s mass migration population is likely somewhat greater than we estimate.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Spain's first- and second-generation immigrant population totals at least 12 million—almost 9.5 million immigrants and over 2.5 million descendants—out of a population of roughly 49 million at the start of 2025.
Over a third of Spain's under-40 population are first- or second-generation immigrants, and the estimates suggest nearly two-fifths of children under 5 are immigrants or the children of immigrants.
Because the estimating method misses second-generation immigrants not living with their parents, Spain's mass migration population is likely somewhat larger in both absolute and relative terms than the figures indicate.
Related Articles:
Quo Vadis, Hispania? Part One— Official Spanish data show births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 over the first quarter of the 21st century—less than 0.5% of Spain's population at the start—while immigration accounted for 98% of the country's population growth, the largest increase of any European Union member. Deaths have exceeded births since 2015.
Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain— Spain has been the world's fastest-growing large advanced economy and, by Financial Times analysis, accounted for one in four of the 11.1mn jobs added across the European Union, with roughly 70% going to immigrants according to the think-tank Funcas. Spain's fertility rate of 1.1 births per woman is the EU's lowest after Malta.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
AI Summary.Official Spanish data show births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 over the first quarter of the 21st century—less than 0.5% of Spain's population at the start—while immigration accounted for 98% of the country's population growth, the largest increase of any European Union member. Deaths have exceeded births since 2015.
Nicholas EberstadtAmerican Enterprise Institute
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Btw 2000 and 2025, ~98% of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration. In 2024, about one-third of babies born in Spain had a foreign-born mother.
Has immigration accounted for nearly all of Spain's population growth?
Core argument: Immigration accounted for 98% of Spain's population growth between 2000 and 2025, according to official Spanish data.
Without immigration, Spain’s population would have stagnated in the first quarter of the 21st century. According to official Spanish data, births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 for the 2000-2025 period (2025 numbers still provisional)—or less than one half of 1% of Spain’s 2000 population. Thanks to its robust immigration inflows, however, Spain registered more population growth than any other EU country between 2000 and 2025. Virtually all (98%) of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration during those years. And since deaths have exceeded births in Spain since 2015, any future growth would have to come entirely from additional immigration.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Immigration accounted for 98% of Spain's population growth between 2000 and 2025, according to official Spanish data.
Spain's births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 over 2000–2025, with 2025 figures still provisional, less than one half of 1% of Spain's 2000 population.
Spain registered more population growth than any other EU country between 2000 and 2025 on the strength of immigration inflows, and with deaths exceeding births since 2015, any future growth would have to come entirely from additional immigration.
Related Articles:
European Stagnation Is Real— Comparing the United States, France, and Germany at current purchasing power parity prices shows the European economies roughly constant relative to America since 2000, but current-price measures miss output gains in sectors where prices fall, such as software. The author argues constant-price comparisons, the standard approach for growth over time, reveal greater European stagnation.
Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain— Spain has been the world's fastest-growing large advanced economy and, by Financial Times analysis, accounted for one in four of the 11.1mn jobs added across the European Union, with roughly 70% going to immigrants according to the think-tank Funcas. Spain's fertility rate of 1.1 births per woman is the EU's lowest after Malta.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
AI Summary.Immigration from Asia and Latin America has been the chief driver of rising US diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is far more common among Hispanic and Asian Americans, and rising among Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, leaving more people outside single racial categories.
Justin FoxBloomberg
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Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.
Are immigration and intermarriage making single racial categories obsolete?
Core argument: Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.
The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.
Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than among Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, though rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups as well.
A growing share of Americans does not fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category the U.S. government defines, as recent immigrants follow earlier generations in becoming Americans.
Related Articles:
Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World?— An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States— Historical records indicate immigrants arriving in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century came with almost no wealth, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, who arrived later with fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry.
America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide— Current Population Survey estimates indicate America's foreign-born population surpassed 50m for the first time and exceeded 15% of the national population, above the prior peak of 14.8% recorded in 1890. Mass immigration during that earlier wave was associated in contemporary opinion with widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less-skilled native-born men, and sweeping national restrictions followed.
AI Summary.The surge of baby boomers, women, and immigrants entering the US labor force between 1960 and 1980 was difficult for the economy to absorb, and young workers' wages fell sharply after peaking in the early 1970s. The author argues those entrants kept occupying jobs and suppressing demand for new workers until retirement.
Steven RugglesProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”
How does a large influx of workers affect young workers' wages?
Core argument: Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.
Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.
Decennial labor-force entries alone misstate labor-market competition, because baby boomers, newly employed women, and immigrants kept occupying jobs and stifling demand for new workers until their retirements, a process still in progress.
An index of employment competition measuring cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a percentage of the current decade's working-age population is offered as a better gauge of relative cohort size, with young workers' wages already showing an uptick.
Related Articles:
Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy— A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox— Aging populations create structural incentives to automate, and the argument is that demographic change could become one of the strongest long-run drivers of artificial intelligence deployment. Technology-producing economies may benefit twice, offsetting their own labor shortages while exporting automation, robotics, and AI to other aging societies.
Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish?— US labor force participation among women aged 25-54 has reached all-time highs, exceeding its previous 1999 peak, yet remains over 4 points below Europe's level and nearly 6 points below Japan's. About 3.5m prime-age American women are neither working nor looking for work, without children at home or husbands, compared with roughly 7m such men.
AI Summary.Historical records indicate immigrants arriving in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century came with almost no wealth, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, who arrived later with fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry.
Brian MareinWake Forest University
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Except possibly at the very top of the distribution which SIPP cannot measure, the wealth of “new” Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the US has fully caught up with “old” immigrants. Wealth converges quickly once earnings inequality vanishes.
Do initial wealth disadvantages among immigrant groups persist across generations?
Core argument: Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, whose families arrived later and with substantially fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry, contrary to what persistent initial wealth disadvantages would predict.
Inferring the determinants of long-run inequality from group-level data is complicated by the arrival of 30 million Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850 to 1924), who are by construction included in average white wealth despite having no direct claim to the wealth accumulated by earlier Americans. By1920, nearly half of white adults were either foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Using the United States Immigration Commission Reports (commonly known as the Dillingham Commission Reports), I document that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth. [Thus] a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage. Northwestern Europeans comprised the overwhelming majority of earlier immigrants, dating back to the initial European settlement of North America, while Southern and Eastern Europeans predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. If initial wealth disadvantages persisted across generations, one would expect households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry to possess less wealth than those of Northwestern European ancestry, since their families arrived later and started with substantially fewer resources. In fact, they do not. On average, they are wealthier.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry, whose families arrived later and with substantially fewer resources, are on average wealthier than those of Northwestern European ancestry, contrary to what persistent initial wealth disadvantages would predict.
Roughly 30 million Europeans arrived during the Age of Mass Migration, spanning about 1850 to 1924, and by 1920 nearly half of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet all are included in average white wealth.
The United States Immigration Commission Reports, known as the Dillingham Commission Reports, indicate that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth, so a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage.
Related Articles:
The Myth of Nordic Mobility: Social Mobility Rla— Correcting for measurement error by using relative rather than absolute correlations among relatives, the authors estimate that educational intergenerational mobility in Denmark and Sweden is much lower than conventionally measured, with parent-child and sibling correlations much higher. They argue Nordic education spending and income compression have at best modestly reduced families' role in children's educational outcomes.
00 to 2022— Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
