Edward Conard

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  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
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America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide

Nicholas Eberstadt and Patrick Norrick American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
June 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database

The US foreign-born population reached 51.4mm, or 15.4% of the population in 2024, Nicholas Eberstad notes, surpassing the prior peak of 14.8% set in 1890.

In 2024, according to CPS estimates, America’s total foreign-born population surpassed the 50 million mark for the first time. No less significant, the CPS series indicates that the foreign-born now exceed 15% of the national population for the first time since such figures were first collected (in the 1850 census). The previous high water mark for percentage of foreign-born was in 1890—during what we might call America’s first wave of mass immigration, when the fraction peaked at 14.8%. The immigration restrictions enacted in the 1920s reflected the deep unpopularity of mass immigration at that time among influential political constituencies. Strong anti-immigration sentiment had been evident in America since at least the 1890s; sweeping national restrictions on immigration were very nearly enacted in 1905. Mass immigration was associated in the contemporary mentality with the widening income and wealth gaps and depressed wages for less skilled native-born men that characterized the First Gilded Age. It is a reminder that stringent curbs on immigration have occurred in the USA before.

Related Articles:

  • Foreign-Born Number and Share of U.S. Population at All-Time Highs in January 2025 — The US foreign-born population rose by 8.3mm between 2021–2025 per Census Bureau data—the largest 4-year gain on record. The total reached 53.3mm, or 15.8% of…
  • U.S. Immigrant Population in 2023 Saw Largest Increase In More Than 20 Years — A @pewresearch analysis finds the immigrant population of the US increased by 1.6mm in 2023 to a record 47.8mm. Their 14.3% share of the population is…
  • and — A @pewresearch analysis finds the immigrant population of the US increased by 1.6mm in 2023 to a record 47.8mm. Their 14.3% share of the population is…
  • The Demographic Outlook: 2025 to 2055 — A @pewresearch analysis finds the immigrant population of the US increased by 1.6mm in 2023 to a record 47.8mm. Their 14.3% share of the population is…
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Family/Marriage
Previous articleMay 30, 2025A Detailed Look at Trump's Car TariffsThere is no such thing as an “all-American” car, as the import content often exceeds 70%. Citing the 25% “chicken tax” on truck imports imposed in 1964, Joseph Politano speculates that car tariffs may prove “more durable than most of Trump’s tariffs.”Next articleJune 2, 2025The U.S. Loses Most International Graduates It Trains. That Problem is About to Get Worse.Only 37% of international graduates earning BA’s, master’s, or PhD’s btw 2012 and 2021 remain in the US. Roughly 90% of Chinese STEM PhD graduates do remain in the U.S. long-term, though that is subject to changes contemplated by the Dept of State.
Showing 68 database articles primarily about Immigration

Quo Vadis, Hispania? Part One

AI Summary. Spain's population growth between 2000 and 2025 was almost entirely (98%) driven by immigration, as natural population increase (births minus deaths) was negligible; since deaths have exceeded births since 2015, all future population growth depends entirely on continued immigration.

Nicholas Eberstadt American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
August 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2000 and 2025, ~98% of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration. In 2024, about one-third of babies born in Spain had a foreign-born mother.

Does Spain's future population depend entirely on immigration?

Core argument: Spain’s natural population balance turned negative in 2015, making immigration the sole driver of any future population growth.

Without immigration, Spain’s population would have stagnated in the first quarter of the 21st century. According to official Spanish data, births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 for the 2000-2025 period (2025 numbers still provisional)—or less than one half of 1% of Spain’s 2000 population. Thanks to its robust immigration inflows, however, Spain registered more population growth than any other EU country between 2000 and 2025. Virtually all (98%) of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration during those years. And since deaths have exceeded births in Spain since 2015, any future growth would have to come entirely from additional immigration.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Spain’s natural population balance turned negative in 2015, making immigration the sole driver of any future population growth.
  2. without continued inflows, Spain’s population will shrink.

Related Articles:

  • European Stagnation Is Real — Six large American technology companies are worth more than all European stock markets combined, and the wealth they generate flows primarily to American households through equity ownership and high wages rather than to European workers or investors.
  • Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain — Spain's recent economic growth and job creation have been driven largely by immigration, with roughly 70% of new jobs since 2019 going to immigrants. This reliance reflects a fertility rate of just 1.1 births per woman — the lowest in the EU after Malta — and a domestic workforce increasingly
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Nicholas Eberstadt warns that depopulation will stress families as smaller families “become ever less able to bear weight—even as the demands that might…
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain

AI Summary. Spain's recent economic growth and job creation have been driven largely by immigration, with roughly 70% of new jobs since 2019 going to immigrants. This reliance reflects a fertility rate of just 1.1 births per woman — the lowest in the EU after Malta — and a domestic workforce increasingly

Barney Jopson, Alan Smith and Irene de la Torre Arenas Financial Times
Date Posted:
May 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Spain’s foreign-born population grew from ~5% to ~20% in less than 25 years. Since 2020, ~25% of the 1.1mm new jobs created in the EU were Spanish, and ~70% were filled by immigrants. At 1.1 births/woman, Spain has the second-lowest birth rate in the EU.

How Has Immigration Driven Economic Growth in Spain?

Core argument: Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain.

Over the past two years, Spain has been the world’s fastest-growing large advanced economy and an engine of EU job creation. Since 2020, it has been responsible for one in four of the 11.1mn new jobs added across the bloc, according to FT analysis. Roughly 70% of those have gone to immigrants, according to Funcas, a think-tank, which has examined the period since 2019. Spain’s unemployment rate remained the second highest in the EU at 10.3% in March. Juan Félix Huarte, chair of Uriel Investments, whose businesses range from waste management to renewables, says immigrants have become vital for the country’s economy for two underlying reasons. One is Spain’s fertility rate of 1.1 births per woman, the lowest in the EU after Malta and little more than half the rate of 2.1 needed to maintain demographic stability. “The Spanish, unfortunately, don’t have children. We have pets, but we don’t have children,” Huarte says. The other reason, he says, is that many young Spaniards are disinclined to take arduous jobs: “We’re getting society far too used to government assistance, to grants, to support from the state.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain.
  2. Since 2020, it has been responsible for one in four of the 11.1mn new jobs added across the bloc, according.
  3. Roughly 70% of those have gone to immigrants, according to Funcas, a think-tank, which has examined the period since 2019.

Related Articles:

  • Euro Area Outlook 2026: Cyclical Boost, Structural Drag, Unchanged Rates — GS forecasts overall Euro area real growth of 1.4% in 2026 Q4/Q4 as fiscal expansion in Germany is offset by the ongoing China Shock, which GS forecasts will…
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The world’s 2024 total fertility rate (TFR) was likely ~2.17, below the replacement rate of 2.21, notes Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, intensifying…
  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — An EC study of European competitiveness finds that EU gross value-added per hour worked increased by 0.7%/year from 2000-19, vs. 1.2%/year in the US. “Europe…
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Unemployment/Participation

How Does Immigration Shape Average Labor Productivity? Evidence from the CPS

Serdar Ozkan and Nicholas Sullivan Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Date Posted:
March 31, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Labor productivity increased 8.2% over the 2023–2025 period, while a CPS-based measure of worker quality has stayed within 1% of its Q1 2023 level, despite significant changes in the immigrant-intensity of the labor force over the period.

On net, the U.S. workforce became meaningfully more immigrant-heavy from 2023 to 2024 and then partially reversed, all within a three-year window. Despite these compositional changes, our CPS-based worker quality index barely moved. It hovered within less than 1% of its first quarter 2023 level throughout the entire period, while BLS nonfarm business productivity climbed 8.2% over the same span. Why would swings in workforce composition leave average productivity nearly unchanged? Two reasons. First, the shifts in employment shares by place of birth, while noticeable, are small in absolute terms. Even with a 1pp rise in the U.S. employment share of lower-productivity, Latin American-born workers moved the needle on aggregate worker quality only modestly—far less than the roughly 8% productivity gain recorded by the BLS over the period. Second, not all immigrants are less productive than U.S.-born workers. Central American immigrants—who accounted for the largest single increment of the foreign-born workforce share—earn wages that fall about 25% below the U.S.-born average. In isolation, their growing employment shares put modest downward pressure on average productivity. But workers arriving from Europe, Asia, and other high-income regions display the opposite pattern: Their predicted wages exceed the U.S.-born average by about 20%, reflecting higher educational attainment and more highly compensated occupations.

Related Articles:

  • An AI Productivity Boom? Don’t Count Your (Productivity Data) Chickens — Martha Gimbel notes that it will be hard to untangle potential AI-driven productivity gains from compositional gains as lower-skilled immigrants are removed…
  • Macroeconomic Implications Of Immigration Flows In 2025 And 2026: January 2026 Update — Brookings estimates that in 2025, net immigration to the US was btw -10,000 and -295,000, and will be btw 185,000 and -925,000 in 2026. They estimate that…
  • Trump’s Immigration Crackdown Fails to Deliver Jobs for US-Born Workers — While immigration may have been negative in 2025, the native-born unemployment rate is now 4.7%, up from 4.3% in January 2025. The labor force participation…
  • Immigration
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment
  • Workforce

With Less Immigration, Urban Growth Slowed in 2025

Jed Kolko Jed Kolko Substack
Date Posted:
March 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

As immigration slowed in 2025, large urban counties’ growth continued to slow relative to that of suburban, rural and smaller urban counties. Domestic migration continued to consist of moves from expensive counties to more affordable suburban areas.

Urban counties grew more slowly than suburban counties, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas in 2025. All types of counties grew more slowly in 2025 than in 2023 and 2024 because immigration fell. However, the slowdown was especially sharp for urban counties. The only other years this century when urban counties lagged all other types of places were in 2020-2022, when people moved out of cities during the pandemic, and in 2003-2006, when the housing bubble boosted housing construction in outlying suburban areas and drew new residents from cities. (This is based on vintage 2025 Census population estimates, released this morning.) Domestic migration is driven more by affordability, with people leaving expensive urban counties for more affordable suburban areas and smaller communities.

Related Articles:

  • Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave — Btw 2020 and 2024, 3.7% of California’s 2020 population moved out of state. The population of the “Texas Triangle” – the Dallas…
  • The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056 — CBO forecasts US population growth over the next decade will be 0.3% annually. Starting in 2030, net immigration will be the sole driver of population growth…
  • New Population Estimates Show Historic Decline in Net International Migration — New Census estimates suggest the overall US population grew by 1.8mm or .5% btw July 2024 and July 2025. Net migration was 2.7mm in 2024 and 1.3mm in 2025…
  • Immigration
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

The H-1B Wage Gap Really Is That Large

George Borjas City Journal
Date Posted:
March 11, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Responding to He and Ozimek’s claim that his paper overstates the wage gap, Borjas argues “H-1B workers should be compared to native workers in the year when they will be earning the bulk of the salary, not in the year when they were awarded the visa.”

The table summarizes the results of both my analysis and that of He-Ozimek. The first row reports a 14.1% wage gap estimated using H-1B wage data from the FY2021-FY2024 lotteries and the 2023 American Community Surveys (ACS), as I did in my original paper, [controlling for] age, gender, education, geography, and occupation. These numbers are inflation-adjusted, as the NBER paper notes. Row 2 presents the results implied by the He-Ozimek research design, which suggest a smaller wage gap, depending on the exact specification. There is, however, a fundamental error in that design. He-Ozimek calculate the H-1B wage gap by comparing the wage of the FY2024 lottery winners with the wage of natives in the 2023 ACS. H-1B workers should be compared to native workers in the year when they will be earning the bulk of the salary, not in the year when they were awarded the visa. The FY2024 H-1B lottery was conducted in March 2023. The actual employment of H-1B recipients begins after their H-1B status is approved and after the federal fiscal year begins on October 1, 2023; the earliest that FY2024 recipients could actually start earning was in the last quarter of 2023.

Related Articles:

  • The H-1B Wage Gap, Visa Fees, and Employer Demand — Adjusting for worker quality, H1-B holders earn ~16% less than peers (software developers ~26% less). With H1-Bs capped at 85k, excess demand means a $150k fee…
  • The Flawed Paper Behind Trump’s $100,000 H-1B Fee — He/Ozimek dispute Borjas’ finding that H1-B workers are underpaid. A “temporal mismatch” between the native sample and the H-1B sample means “effectively…
  • Immigration
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

How 250 Years Of Immigration Shaped America

Economist Staff Economist
Date Posted:
March 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

At 15.8%, the foreign-born population of the US is above its ~15% previous peak in 1890. That prior peak gave way under immigration restrictions such as the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and the Immigration Act of 1924.

After periods of high immigration, restrictions have tended to follow. In 1890 the foreign-born share of America’s population reached nearly 15% (a threshold that would not be surpassed until the mid 2020s). The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 banned Chinese labourers from immigrating to America for ten years, the first federal law to restrict immigration explicitly based on race or nationality. In 1924 Congress capped annual arrivals from Europe to just 2% of each nationality’s population residing in America at the time of the 1890 census, and banned immigration from Asia outright. These quotas suppressed immigration for 40 years and prevented America from accepting thousands of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Europe. By 1970 America’s foreign-born population had fallen to around 5%.

Related Articles:

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  • U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Reached a Record 14 Million in 2023 — Pew estimates the unauthorized immigrant population was 14mm in 2023, or 4.1% of the population. They also estimate that in January 2025, 53mm immigrants…
  • Switzerland To Vote On Plan To Cap Population At 10mn — Switzerland will hold a vote on a proposal that would cap the country’s population at 10mm people. 27% of the country’s 9.1mm people are foreign…
  • Immigration
  • Politics
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    • Demographics
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