“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Who’s Ahead in the Global AI Talent Race?

Damien Ma and Binyi Yang Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Date Posted:: September 23, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Surveying education/employment histories of authors at the Neural Information Processing Systems conference, Ma and Yang infer China educated 57% of elite AI talent as of 2025, versus 13% for the US. Yet the US gained 2,145 researchers y/y while China lost 1,729.

[Using a methodology based on paper authors from the Neural Information Processing Systems conference (NeurIPS) Damien Ma and Binyi Yang find] China has established a commanding lead as the largest originating source of elite AI talent globally. Compared to 2022, the share of Chinese-origin AI talent, defined as those who received undergraduate degrees in China, increased 11 percentage points to 57% in 2025, while the U.S. share fell to 13%. The United States remains a magnet for global AI talent, particularly Chinese talent. Despite U.S.-China tensions, among AI researchers working in the United States, the 2025 share of those holding undergraduate degrees from China rose by 4 percentage points. When it comes to brain gain vs. brain drain, the United States saw a net gain of +2,145 researchers in 2025 while China registered a net loss of -1,729 researchers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Damien Ma and Binyi Yang find China’s share of elite AI talent, defined by undergraduate degrees earned in China, rose 11 percentage points to 57% in 2025 versus 2022, while the U.S. share fell to 13%.
Among AI researchers working in the United States, the share holding Chinese undergraduate degrees rose 4 percentage points in 2025, despite U.S.-China tensions.
The United States recorded a net gain of 2,145 AI researchers in 2025, while China registered a net loss of 1,729, under Ma and Yang’s methodology based on NeurIPS paper authors.

Quo Vadis, Hispania? Part One

Nicholas Eberstadt American Enterprise Institute

Date Posted:: August 25, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Btw 2000 and 2025, ~98% of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration. In 2024, about one-third of babies born in Spain had a foreign-born mother.

Without immigration, Spain’s population would have stagnated in the first quarter of the 21st century. According to official Spanish data, births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 for the 2000-2025 period (2025 numbers still provisional)—or less than one half of 1% of Spain’s 2000 population. Thanks to its robust immigration inflows, however, Spain registered more population growth than any other EU country between 2000 and 2025. Virtually all (98%) of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration during those years. And since deaths have exceeded births in Spain since 2015, any future growth would have to come entirely from additional immigration.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Immigration accounted for 98% of Spain's population growth between 2000 and 2025, according to official Spanish data.
Spain's births exceeded deaths by barely 200,000 over 2000–2025, with 2025 figures still provisional, less than one half of 1% of Spain's 2000 population.
Spain registered more population growth than any other EU country between 2000 and 2025 on the strength of immigration inflows, and with deaths exceeding births since 2015, any future growth would have to come entirely from additional immigration.

Four Ways Europe’s Big Immigration Experiment Has Changed Spain

Barney Jopson, Alan Smith and Irene de la Torre Arenas Financial Times

Date Posted:: May 7, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Spain’s foreign-born population grew from ~5% to ~20% in less than 25 years. Since 2020, ~25% of the 1.1mm new jobs created in the EU were Spanish, and ~70% were filled by immigrants. At 1.1 births/woman, Spain has the second-lowest birth rate in the EU.

Over the past two years, Spain has been the world’s fastest-growing large advanced economy and an engine of EU job creation. Since 2020, it has been responsible for one in four of the 11.1mn new jobs added across the bloc, according to FT analysis. Roughly 70% of those have gone to immigrants, according to Funcas, a think-tank, which has examined the period since 2019. Spain’s unemployment rate remained the second highest in the EU at 10.3% in March. Juan Félix Huarte, chair of Uriel Investments, whose businesses range from waste management to renewables, says immigrants have become vital for the country’s economy for two underlying reasons. One is Spain’s fertility rate of 1.1 births per woman, the lowest in the EU after Malta and little more than half the rate of 2.1 needed to maintain demographic stability. “The Spanish, unfortunately, don’t have children. We have pets, but we don’t have children,” Huarte says. The other reason, he says, is that many young Spaniards are disinclined to take arduous jobs: “We’re getting society far too used to government assistance, to grants, to support from the state.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Spain accounted for one in four of the 11.1mn jobs added across the EU since 2020, according to FT analysis, and has been the world's fastest-growing large advanced economy over the past two years.
Roughly 70% of Spain's job gains since 2019 have gone to immigrants, according to the think-tank Funcas, while Spain's unemployment rate stood at 10.3% in March, the second highest in the EU.
Spain's fertility rate of 1.1 births per woman is the lowest in the EU after Malta and little more than half the 2.1 needed for demographic stability, which Uriel Investments chair Juan Félix Huarte cites as one reason immigrants are vital to the economy.

How Does Immigration Shape Average Labor Productivity? Evidence from the CPS

Serdar Ozkan and Nicholas Sullivan Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Date Posted:: March 31, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Labor productivity increased 8.2% over the 2023–2025 period, while a CPS-based measure of worker quality has stayed within 1% of its Q1 2023 level, despite significant changes in the immigrant-intensity of the labor force over the period.

On net, the U.S. workforce became meaningfully more immigrant-heavy from 2023 to 2024 and then partially reversed, all within a three-year window. Despite these compositional changes, our CPS-based worker quality index barely moved. It hovered within less than 1% of its first quarter 2023 level throughout the entire period, while BLS nonfarm business productivity climbed 8.2% over the same span. Why would swings in workforce composition leave average productivity nearly unchanged? Two reasons. First, the shifts in employment shares by place of birth, while noticeable, are small in absolute terms. Even with a 1pp rise in the U.S. employment share of lower-productivity, Latin American-born workers moved the needle on aggregate worker quality only modestly—far less than the roughly 8% productivity gain recorded by the BLS over the period. Second, not all immigrants are less productive than U.S.-born workers. Central American immigrants—who accounted for the largest single increment of the foreign-born workforce share—earn wages that fall about 25% below the U.S.-born average. In isolation, their growing employment shares put modest downward pressure on average productivity. But workers arriving from Europe, Asia, and other high-income regions display the opposite pattern: Their predicted wages exceed the U.S.-born average by about 20%, reflecting higher educational attainment and more highly compensated occupations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The authors' CPS-based worker quality index stayed within less than 1% of its first quarter 2023 level across the three-year period, while BLS nonfarm business productivity rose 8.2% over the same span.
A 1 percentage point rise in the U.S. employment share of lower-productivity Latin American-born workers shifted aggregate worker quality only modestly, far less than the roughly 8% productivity gain recorded by the BLS.
Central American immigrants, the largest single increment of the foreign-born workforce share, earn wages about 25% below the U.S.-born average, while workers from Europe, Asia, and other high-income regions have predicted wages about 20% above it.

With Less Immigration, Urban Growth Slowed in 2025

Jed Kolko Jed Kolko Substack

Date Posted:: March 26, 2026
Is Database:: Database

As immigration slowed in 2025, large urban counties’ growth continued to slow relative to that of suburban, rural and smaller urban counties. Domestic migration continued to consist of moves from expensive counties to more affordable suburban areas.

Urban counties grew more slowly than suburban counties, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas in 2025. All types of counties grew more slowly in 2025 than in 2023 and 2024 because immigration fell. However, the slowdown was especially sharp for urban counties. The only other years this century when urban counties lagged all other types of places were in 2020-2022, when people moved out of cities during the pandemic, and in 2003-2006, when the housing bubble boosted housing construction in outlying suburban areas and drew new residents from cities. (This is based on vintage 2025 Census population estimates, released this morning.) Domestic migration is driven more by affordability, with people leaving expensive urban counties for more affordable suburban areas and smaller communities.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Urban counties grew more slowly in 2025 than suburban counties, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas, according to vintage 2025 Census population estimates.
All county types grew more slowly in 2025 than in 2023 and 2024 because immigration fell, with the slowdown especially sharp for urban counties.
The only other years this century when urban counties lagged all other place types were 2020–2022, amid pandemic moves out of cities, and 2003–2006, when housing-bubble construction in outlying suburbs drew residents from cities.

The H-1B Wage Gap Really Is That Large

George Borjas City Journal

Date Posted:: March 11, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Responding to He and Ozimek’s claim that his paper overstates the wage gap, Borjas argues “H-1B workers should be compared to native workers in the year when they will be earning the bulk of the salary, not in the year when they were awarded the visa.”

The table summarizes the results of both my analysis and that of He-Ozimek. The first row reports a 14.1% wage gap estimated using H-1B wage data from the FY2021-FY2024 lotteries and the 2023 American Community Surveys (ACS), as I did in my original paper, [controlling for] age, gender, education, geography, and occupation. These numbers are inflation-adjusted, as the NBER paper notes. Row 2 presents the results implied by the He-Ozimek research design, which suggest a smaller wage gap, depending on the exact specification. There is, however, a fundamental error in that design. He-Ozimek calculate the H-1B wage gap by comparing the wage of the FY2024 lottery winners with the wage of natives in the 2023 ACS. H-1B workers should be compared to native workers in the year when they will be earning the bulk of the salary, not in the year when they were awarded the visa. The FY2024 H-1B lottery was conducted in March 2023. The actual employment of H-1B recipients begins after their H-1B status is approved and after the federal fiscal year begins on October 1, 2023; the earliest that FY2024 recipients could actually start earning was in the last quarter of 2023.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The author estimates a 14.1% H-1B wage gap using H-1B wage data from the FY2021–FY2024 lotteries and the 2023 American Community Survey, controlling for age, gender, education, geography, and occupation, with figures inflation-adjusted.
The He-Ozimek research design implies a smaller H-1B wage gap depending on specification, but the author identifies a fundamental error in comparing FY2024 lottery winners' wages with native wages in the 2023 ACS.
The FY2024 H-1B lottery was conducted in March 2023, and recipients could not begin earning until the last quarter of 2023 at the earliest, after H-1B approval and the October 1, 2023 start of the federal fiscal year.

How 250 Years Of Immigration Shaped America

Economist Staff Economist

Date Posted:: March 4, 2026
Is Database:: Database

At 15.8%, the foreign-born population of the US is above its ~15% previous peak in 1890. That prior peak gave way under immigration restrictions such as the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and the Immigration Act of 1924.

After periods of high immigration, restrictions have tended to follow. In 1890 the foreign-born share of America’s population reached nearly 15% (a threshold that would not be surpassed until the mid 2020s). The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 banned Chinese labourers from immigrating to America for ten years, the first federal law to restrict immigration explicitly based on race or nationality. In 1924 Congress capped annual arrivals from Europe to just 2% of each nationality’s population residing in America at the time of the 1890 census, and banned immigration from Asia outright. These quotas suppressed immigration for 40 years and prevented America from accepting thousands of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Europe. By 1970 America’s foreign-born population had fallen to around 5%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

America's foreign-born population share reached nearly 15% in 1890, a threshold not surpassed again until the mid-2020s, before falling to around 5% by 1970.
Congress in 1924 capped annual European arrivals at 2% of each nationality's population residing in America at the 1890 census and banned Asian immigration outright, suppressing immigration for 40 years and preventing America from accepting thousands of Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Europe.
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 barred Chinese labourers from immigrating to America for ten years, the first federal law to restrict immigration explicitly on the basis of race or nationality.

Surveying education/employment histories of authors at the Neural Information Processing Systems conference, Ma and Yang infer China educated 57% of elite AI talent as of 2025, versus 13% for the US. Yet the US gained 2,145 researchers y/y while China lost 1,729.

Does China produce the most elite AI talent while America attracts it?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Btw 2000 and 2025, ~98% of Spain’s population growth was due to immigration. In 2024, about one-third of babies born in Spain had a foreign-born mother.

Has immigration accounted for nearly all of Spain's population growth?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Spain’s foreign-born population grew from ~5% to ~20% in less than 25 years. Since 2020, ~25% of the 1.1mm new jobs created in the EU were Spanish, and ~70% were filled by immigrants. At 1.1 births/woman, Spain has the second-lowest birth rate in the EU.

How has immigration driven Spain's economic and job growth?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Labor productivity increased 8.2% over the 2023–2025 period, while a CPS-based measure of worker quality has stayed within 1% of its Q1 2023 level, despite significant changes in the immigrant-intensity of the labor force over the period.

Does a more immigrant-heavy workforce lower average labor productivity?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

As immigration slowed in 2025, large urban counties’ growth continued to slow relative to that of suburban, rural and smaller urban counties. Domestic migration continued to consist of moves from expensive counties to more affordable suburban areas.

Does lower immigration slow urban county growth more than elsewhere?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Responding to He and Ozimek’s claim that his paper overstates the wage gap, Borjas argues “H-1B workers should be compared to native workers in the year when they will be earning the bulk of the salary, not in the year when they were awarded the visa.”

How large is the wage gap between H-1B and native workers?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

At 15.8%, the foreign-born population of the US is above its ~15% previous peak in 1890. That prior peak gave way under immigration restrictions such as the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and the Immigration Act of 1924.

Do periods of high immigration tend to be followed by restrictions?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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