“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Research on unemployment, labor-force participation, job finding, worker flows, vacancies, and people outside the labor market. The archive tracks cyclical weakness, structural change, demographic differences, and policy effects.
AI Summary.Across 12 middle-income countries, call-center employment grew in line with other white-collar office work before the spread of AI chatbots but has since stagnated or declined even as other white-collar jobs held up. The authors argue this divergence makes artificial intelligence's role hard to dismiss.
Caelan Wilkie-RogersRevelio Labs
Date Posted:
A Revelio Labs analysis finds global call center employment is now 5.3% under its December 2023 peak. Call center employment started diverging from other white collar work in middle income countries around November 2022, when ChatGPT was released.
Is AI reducing call center employment in middle-income countries?
Core argument: Across 12 middle-income countries, call-center employment showed sluggish growth or outright declines after ChatGPT’s release, while other white-collar office and administrative roles remained fairly robust.
Across the 12 middle-income countries, the pattern is recognizable: in the pre-ChatGPT era, call-center headcount generally kept pace with other office and administrative, "white-collar" roles. In the post-ChatGPT era, we see sluggish growth or outright declines in call centers—even as the rest of white-collar work looks fairly robust. So, although we cannot observe which firms replace people with chatbots, this divergence in headcounts between call centers and the rest of their labor markets makes AI’s potential role in this trend hard to wave off. Moreover, call centers’ high-volume, scripted work is exactly the profile the International Labour Organization flags as most exposed in these countries. The industry is shrinking because hiring slowed, not because separations picked up.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Across 12 middle-income countries, call-center employment showed sluggish growth or outright declines after ChatGPT’s release, while other white-collar office and administrative roles remained fairly robust.
Before ChatGPT, call-center headcount in these 12 middle-income countries generally kept pace with other office and administrative employment.
The ILO flags high-volume, scripted work—the profile of call-center jobs—as most exposed in these middle-income countries, though which firms replace workers with chatbots cannot be observed.
Related Articles:
AI’s Most Exposed Industry Keeps Hiring— Call center employment in the Philippines has reached nearly 2m workers and has grown every year since 2016, including through the artificial intelligence boom. As AI lowers the cost per customer interaction, companies are buying more of these services rather than fewer — an example of Jevons paradox.
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
The Early Impacts of AI on Employment among Recent College Graduates— An expanded unemployment measure for young college graduates — including those outside the labor force who report wanting a job — averaged 10.4% in the most recent summer, the highest of the five summers compared and 0.3 percentage points above the prior high. Estimated associations with occupational AI exposure are positive but not statistically significant.
AI Summary.Measuring AI-driven job losses in the arts is difficult because media firms are reticent about their AI use and the effects are hard to separate from factors like Hollywood consolidation, offshoring of content production, and the shift to social media creators. All subsectors of the digital arts industry are losing jobs while in-person entertainment continues to grow.
Joseph PolitanoApricitas Economics
Date Posted:
The US has lost more than 200,000 jobs in “creative” industries – notably TV and movies – since mid 2022. “The clearest evidence of AI’s influence is just that all subsectors of the digital arts industry are losing jobs, while in-person entertainment is still growing at a healthy pace.”
Is it hard to measure AI's job losses in the arts?
Core argument: All subsectors of the digital arts industry are losing jobs while in-person entertainment continues to grow at a healthy pace, which the author presents as perhaps the clearest evidence of AI’s influence.
Proving the exact amount of AI-driven job loss in the arts is extremely difficult. [U.S. creative industries have nevertheless lost more than 200,000 jobs over four years, including roughly 50,000 in the last year. Movie and TV employment alone has fallen by more than 100,000, nearly one-third of the sector, while publishing has lost more than 70,000 jobs]. The effects of AI are hard to disentangle from other factors currently affecting arts businesses, like consolidation in Hollywood, offshoring of content production, or the continued displacement of traditional media providers in favor of social media creators. Yet perhaps the clearest evidence of AI’s influence is just that all subsectors of the digital arts industry are losing jobs, while in-person entertainment is still growing at a healthy pace.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
All subsectors of the digital arts industry are losing jobs while in-person entertainment continues to grow at a healthy pace, which the author presents as perhaps the clearest evidence of AI’s influence.
Media firms disclose little about their AI use, both to avoid public backlash and to preserve the legal basis for their copyrights, leaving the exact amount of AI-driven job loss in the arts extremely difficult to prove.
AI’s effects on arts businesses are hard to disentangle from consolidation in Hollywood, offshoring of content production, and the displacement of traditional media providers by social media creators.
Related Articles:
The Jobs Apocalypse Is Postponed. An AI Jobs Boom Is Here— Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, including electrical contracting and equipment manufacturing, has risen roughly 320,000 above what broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists have added about 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall.
AI is the Democratic Party’s Next Villain— Mentions of billionaires in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled to a peak above 20% of all emails sent and have held near 15%, making anti-billionaire messaging a mainstay. Anti-AI populism remains far smaller and is entering Democratic rhetoric not as a jobs or safety issue but as something billionaires are building.
Forget AI. The California Job Market Is Powered By Healthcare— California's healthcare sector drives its job growth despite the state having the sixth-youngest population by share aged 65 or older and residents reporting fewer chronic conditions than almost anywhere else. State policy is one plausible partial explanation: expanded Medicaid coverage, including for undocumented residents, cut the uninsured share to 5.9%, while spending per enrollee is rising faster than enrollment.
AI Summary.An expanded unemployment measure for young college graduates — including those outside the labor force who report wanting a job — averaged 10.4% in the most recent summer, the highest of the five summers compared and 0.3 percentage points above the prior high. Estimated associations with occupational AI exposure are positive but not statistically significant.
Robert Fairlie and Jane WuNational Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
For American college graduates aged 22 to 25 and not in school, summer unemployment was 7.3% in 2026, versus 7.1%, 6.3%, 7.8%, and 7.2% in 2022–25. These are ordinary seasonal peaks, with no evidence of an upward trend. A broader measure tells a similar story.
Is AI raising unemployment among recent college graduates?
Core argument: On the expanded unemployment measure including “sidelined” young college graduates, the June–August average was 10.4% in 2026, compared with 9.4% in 2022, 9.3% in 2023, 10.1% in 2024 and 9.4% in 2025.
Figure 2b displays the seasonal comparison for our expanded unemployment measure, which includes young college graduates who are “sidelined,” those not officially defined as being in the labor force but nonetheless report “wanting a job.” Averaging over June, July and August, the expanded measure was 10.4% in 2026, compared with 9.4% in 2022, 9.3% in 2023, 10.1% in 2024 and 9.4% in 2025. Summer 2026 is the highest of the five summers under this definition, although it exceeds the previous high by only 0.3 percentage points. The expanded measure thus indicates a larger increase relative to 2025, while also showing that high rates in the summer are not unique to 2026. The coefficient estimates of interactions between summer 2026 and both measures of occupational AI exposure are positive, but not statistically significant. The point estimate of the interaction with occupational teleworkability is positive but difficult to separate cleanly from AI exposure (Tables 4-6).
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
On the expanded unemployment measure including “sidelined” young college graduates, the June–August average was 10.4% in 2026, compared with 9.4% in 2022, 9.3% in 2023, 10.1% in 2024 and 9.4% in 2025.
Summer 2026 is the highest of the five summers on the expanded measure but exceeds the prior high by only 0.3 percentage points, indicating high summer rates are not unique to 2026.
Coefficient estimates of interactions between summer 2026 and both measures of occupational AI exposure are positive but not statistically significant, and the positive point estimate for occupational teleworkability is difficult to separate cleanly from AI exposure.
Related Articles:
Graduating into Disruption: Labor Market Outcomes for AI-Exposed College Majors— College graduates in the majors most exposed to artificial intelligence show statistically significant employment declines following the arrival of AI chatbots, with the most-exposed 10% of majors down about 5 percentage points and the seventh and eighth deciles down about 2 points. The authors note flat pre-2020 trends and precise timing argue against alternative explanations such as uneven post-pandemic recovery.
The Jobs Apocalypse Is Postponed. An AI Jobs Boom Is Here— Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, including electrical contracting and equipment manufacturing, has risen roughly 320,000 above what broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists have added about 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall.
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence— Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
AI Summary.China faces three options as external demand weakens: shift a larger share of national income to households so consumption absorbs more output, keep relying on investment despite weak returns, or let production and growth slow. The first requires substantial changes in income distribution and saving incentives; the second risks more debt and excess capacity; the third implies higher unemployment.
Michael PettisChina Financial Markets
Date Posted:
“Beijing cannot choose whether China will adjust; one way or another, it will.” Pettis warns Zhongnanhai against postponing rebalancing with another round of debt-financed investment “despite increasingly weak returns.”
What choices does China face as external demand weakens?
Core argument: China faces three options: shift a larger share of national income to households so consumption absorbs more output, keep relying on investment despite weak returns, or allow production and growth to slow.
What it can choose is how painful that adjustment will be. If weaker external demand is met by encouraging more borrowing and domestic investment, regardless of whether that investment is economically justified, China risks postponing the inevitable. China therefore faces the same basic choice Japan confronted, but with deeper imbalances and less accommodating global conditions. It can shift a larger share of national income toward households and allow consumption to absorb more of what the economy produces; or it can continue relying on investment, despite increasingly weak returns; or it can allow production and growth to slow. The first choice requires a substantial change in the domestic distribution of income and the incentives to save. The second risks still more debt and excess capacity and, ultimately, a more painful adjustment. The third implies higher unemployment and weaker growth.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China faces three options: shift a larger share of national income to households so consumption absorbs more output, keep relying on investment despite weak returns, or allow production and growth to slow.
China confronts the same basic choice Japan faced, but with deeper imbalances and less accommodating global conditions, and can choose only how painful the adjustment will be.
Meeting weaker external demand with more borrowing and domestic investment, regardless of whether it is economically justified, risks further debt and excess capacity and a more painful adjustment, while slower growth implies higher unemployment.
Related Articles:
The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism— About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push— Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
Record Influx Of University Graduates Pushes China’s Youth Unemployment Rate To 18.9%— China's urban unemployment rate for 16- to 24-year-olds excluding students reached 18.9%, the highest since the statistics agency revised its methodology to exclude students. A record influx of university graduates is entering a job market weighed down by weak domestic demand and growing adoption of artificial intelligence.
AI Summary.Federal Reserve officials' assessed risks to their employment and price stability mandates had tended to move together rather than inversely, suggesting common forces were driving both. That pattern has now shifted, with officials more optimistic on growth and employment and less concerned about downside risks than before the pandemic.
Matt KleinThe Overshoot
Date Posted:
About half of Fed officials now forecast that at the end of 2028 short rates will be “at least as high as they are now.” The underlying reason, Klein proposes, is not supply shocks but a persistent shift in the perceived balance of risks between inflation and unemployment.
Have central bankers' employment and inflation risk assessments stopped moving together?
Core argument: From mid-2022 until now, Fed officials’ assessments of risks to the employment mandate and the price stability mandate tended to move together, consistent with judging that the forces driving unwelcome inflation also threatened the jobs outlook.
From mid-2022 until now, Fed officials seem to have judged that all of the forces responsible for unwelcome inflation also threatened the outlook for jobs. That would explain why their assessment of the risks to the employment mandate and to the price stability mandate tended to move together [see “Aligned Mandate” in gallery]. If “normal” factors such as consumers’ access to credit or businesses’ appetite to invest were driving things, the perceived risks to the inflation and employment mandates would be uncorrelated, or even move inversely to each other. That shift has finally happened. In fact, Fed officials are now more bullish on growth and employment—and less concerned about downside risks—than they have been since before the pandemic. The latest data on private sector balance sheets, borrowing, and asset purchases can help explain why.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
From mid-2022 until now, Fed officials’ assessments of risks to the employment mandate and the price stability mandate tended to move together, consistent with judging that the forces driving unwelcome inflation also threatened the jobs outlook.
Fed officials are now more bullish on growth and employment, and less concerned about downside risks, than they have been since before the pandemic.
If normal factors such as consumers’ access to credit or businesses’ appetite to invest were driving the economy, perceived risks to the inflation and employment mandates would be uncorrelated or move inversely, a shift that has now happened.
Related Articles:
Just Waiting for Disinflation is Not Enough— About 52% of consumer price index components are rising at least 3% year-over-year, down from 73% at the peak but above the 32% average from 2000 to 2020, and such breadth measures track actual inflation closely. Weighting components by spending shares makes the current episode resemble milder past inflation accelerations rather than the largest ones.
The Diesel Shock Is a Core Inflation Shock— The US Gulf Coast diesel crack spread cleared $100 per barrel for the first time on record, against a normal range of $15 to $30. Because diesel is an intermediate input embedded in the delivered cost of nearly every physical good, the author argues the increase migrates with a lag into core goods and services inflation.
Weeks Before the Midterms, Almost Everything Is Getting More Expensive— Wage gains have trailed inflation for five months, and consumer prices are 27% higher than at the start of 2021. The "misery index," the sum of the inflation and unemployment rates, stands at 7.5, up from 6.7 a year earlier.
AI Summary.China's urban unemployment rate for 16- to 24-year-olds excluding students reached 18.9%, the highest since the statistics agency revised its methodology to exclude students. A record influx of university graduates is entering a job market weighed down by weak domestic demand and growing adoption of artificial intelligence.
Xinyi WuSouth China Morning Post
Date Posted:
China’s youth unemployment (16–24) climbed to 18.9% in August, a level which it had previously hit last summer. 12.7 million new university graduates entered the workforce this summer, ~4% more than last year.
Is a record wave of graduates pushing China's youth unemployment higher?
Core argument: China’s urban unemployment rate for 16–24-year-olds excluding students rose to 18.9% in August from 17.9% in July, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
China’s urban youth unemployment rose last month, as a record influx of university graduates struggles to find work in a job market weighed down by weak domestic demand and the growing adoption of artificial intelligence. The jobless rate for those aged 16 to 24, excluding students, rose to 18.9% in August from 17.9% in July, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics. This figure, as well as the identical number from August last year, represents the highest reading since Beijing revised its calculation methodology to exclude students in 2023, following a peak of 21.3% under the old rubric reported in June of that year.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China’s urban unemployment rate for 16–24-year-olds excluding students rose to 18.9% in August from 17.9% in July, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
A record influx of university graduates is struggling to find work in a Chinese job market weighed down by weak domestic demand and the growing adoption of artificial intelligence.
The 18.9% reading, matching August of the previous year, is the highest since Beijing revised its methodology in 2023 to exclude students, after a 21.3% peak under the old measure in June of that year.
Related Articles:
The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism— About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
Social Media in China Is Getting Really Dark— Posts across Chinese social media platforms including RedNote, Douyin and Weibo describe low wages, scarce jobs, falling property values and fear about the future, with some users turning hardship into dark humor or mocking official propaganda. The volume of pessimistic and sarcastic posts is striking given that China's internet censorship has grown more ruthless over the past decade.
China’s Great Jobs Squeeze— China's "flexible employment" — a loosely defined official category spanning part-time work, self-employment, and new work forms — is estimated at 320mn people, up from 280mn a year earlier, with more than 53mn working as food delivery or ridesharing drivers. Analysts argue this reflects broad labour-market weakness, as low aggregate demand weakens workers' bargaining power.
AI Summary.AI adoption has risen to 22.4%, with labor market effects visible but narrow: employment drags appear in marketing, graphic design, customer service, and some tech occupations, offset by 209k in added data center-exposed construction jobs. Corporate layoffs attributed to AI totaled 113k year-to-date, including 11k in a single month.
Sarah Dong and Joseph BriggsGoldman Sachs
Date Posted:
While finding a “slight positive correlation between AI adoption and unemployment among younger workers,” GS argues AI’s impact on the labor market remains “narrow.” The technology sector’s share of total employment continues to decline relative to its pre-2022 trend.
Is AI's labor market impact still narrow as adoption rises?
Core argument: AI adoption rose to 22.4%, with labor market effects remaining visible but narrow, concentrated in marketing, graphic design, customer service, and some tech occupations.
AI’s labor market impact remains visible but narrow. We continue to observe employment drags in specific industries where AI-use cases have been established such as marketing, graphic design, customer service, and some tech occupations. However, this is offset by construction job growth in data center-exposed categories, which is up 209k since 2022 (relative to broader construction employment trends). The tech share of total employment continues to decline relative to the pre-2022 trend. The correlation between AI adoption and broad labor market slack measures remains limited but has strengthened in recent months. Corporate layoffs attributed to AI affected 11k employees in June, bringing the 2026 YTD total to 113k.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
AI adoption rose to 22.4%, with labor market effects remaining visible but narrow, concentrated in marketing, graphic design, customer service, and some tech occupations.
Construction employment in data center-exposed categories is up 209k since 2022 relative to broader construction employment trends, offsetting employment drags in industries with established AI use cases.
Corporate layoffs attributed to AI affected 11k employees in June, bringing the 2026 year-to-date total to 113k, while the correlation between AI adoption and broad labor market slack measures remains limited though it has strengthened in recent months.
Related Articles:
Graduating into Disruption: Labor Market Outcomes for AI-Exposed College Majors— College graduates in the majors most exposed to artificial intelligence show statistically significant employment declines following the arrival of AI chatbots, with the most-exposed 10% of majors down about 5 percentage points and the seventh and eighth deciles down about 2 points. The authors note flat pre-2020 trends and precise timing argue against alternative explanations such as uneven post-pandemic recovery.
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence— Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
AI Summary.College graduates in the majors most exposed to artificial intelligence show statistically significant employment declines following the arrival of AI chatbots, with the most-exposed 10% of majors down about 5 percentage points and the seventh and eighth deciles down about 2 points. The authors note flat pre-2020 trends and precise timing argue against alternative explanations such as uneven post-pandemic recovery.
Cody Orr, Lee Tucker and Lawrence WarrenU.S. Census Bureau
Date Posted:
A Census Bureau analysis of 29% of recent US college grads ranked majors by AI exposure using pre-ChatGPT occupational patterns. After ChatGPT’s November 2022 release, employment fell across the top 4 exposure deciles, with the top decile down 5pp compared to the bottom 6 deciles.
Are graduates in AI-exposed majors seeing employment declines?
Core argument: Employment for graduates in the most AI-exposed decile of college majors declined by an average of five percentage points relative to 2022 after ChatGPT’s release, with statistically significant declines of about two percentage points for deciles seven and eight.
In the quarters prior to 2020, the event study coefficients are usually statistically indistinguishable from zero across all deciles. Post-ChatGPT, there is a small to moderate decline in employment relative to the control group across the top four deciles with a particularly large effect for the tenth decile. For deciles seven, eight, and especially ten, these are statistically significant declines: an average of two percentage points for deciles seven and eight and five percentage points for decile ten relative to 2022. Decile nine also shows evidence of statistically significant declines, but this might reflect reversion to long-run trends rather than a negative effect of AI. Employment effects are clearly most acute among the most-exposed decile of majors. The relatively fat pre-trends and precise timing help to rule out some alternative explanations, such as heterogeneity in the post-pandemic recovery or the effects of a tight labor market in the reference period.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Employment for graduates in the most AI-exposed decile of college majors declined by an average of five percentage points relative to 2022 after ChatGPT’s release, with statistically significant declines of about two percentage points for deciles seven and eight.
Event study coefficients were usually statistically indistinguishable from zero across all exposure deciles in the quarters before 2020, with small to moderate employment declines concentrated in the top four deciles afterward.
Flat pre-trends and the precise timing of the employment declines help rule out some alternative explanations, such as heterogeneity in the post-pandemic recovery or a tight labor market in the reference period, while decile nine’s decline may reflect reversion to long-run trends.
Related Articles:
Looking for the Ladder— The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence— Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era— The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
