“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
Research on international trade beyond headline deficit figures, including specialization, tariffs, industrial policy, supply chains, productivity, wages, and consumer gains. Coverage examines how trade reshapes firms, workers, and national economies.
AI Summary.Countries that become dependent on increasingly uneconomic investment have found adjustment difficult, as in Japan, where average GDP growth fell from about 5% to under 1% after 1991 and its share of global manufacturing fell by nearly 60%. Rebalancing requires a larger role for consumption, and absent a sharp rise in consumption growth, it occurs through slower production growth.
Michael PettisChina Financial Markets
Date Posted:
Pettis argues that China faces the same dilemma as Japan after 1991: reducing uneconomic investment requires consumption to become a larger source of demand. But raising household income may undermine manufacturing competitiveness, while China’s higher debt limits its ability to cushion the adjustment.
How costly is rebalancing away from dependence on uneconomic investment?
Core argument: Japan’s average GDP growth fell from around 5% in the decade before 1991 to under 1% in the decade after, while its share of global GDP fell by nearly half between 1991 and 2008.
Every country that has become excessively dependent on increasingly uneconomic investment has found it difficult to begin an adjustment that its leaders knew was necessary. Japan in the 1980s, Brazil in the 1970s, and the Soviet Union in the 1960s all faced versions of this problem. The Japanese experience shows how costly that adjustment can be. Rebalancing meant for Japan, and means for China, increasing the role of consumption in driving GDP growth, and if an economy cannot rebalance through a sharp increase in consumption growth – and historical precedents suggest that this is extremely unlikely – it must, almost by definition, rebalance through slower growth in production. This is especially difficult when the international competitiveness of manufacturing depends on the same distribution of income that constrains consumption. Raising the role of consumption, in that case, requires raising household income relative to production, but this automatically reduces the cost advantages on which manufacturing depends.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Japan’s average GDP growth fell from around 5% in the decade before 1991 to under 1% in the decade after, while its share of global GDP fell by nearly half between 1991 and 2008.
Japan’s share of global manufacturing fell by nearly 60% over the broader period, illustrating how costly adjustment can be for an economy dependent on increasingly uneconomic investment.
Rebalancing means raising consumption’s role in driving GDP growth, and since historical precedents suggest a sharp increase in consumption growth is extremely unlikely, China would rebalance through slower growth in production.
Related Articles:
Two Asian Giants, One Economic Trap— China's combined public and private debt is estimated at about 300% of GDP, and an updated "Japanisation" index indicates China has scored as more Japanised than Japan for the past five years. Analysts attribute the 1.7% yield on 10-year Chinese government bonds to weak credit demand, with investors parking cash in government debt.
Why Global Imbalances Matter— Countries running persistent trade surpluses, such as China, Germany and Japan, have built their economies around an excess supply of tradeable goods and services, leaving them dependent on deficit countries to absorb it. That dependence gives deficit countries bargaining power and exposes surplus countries to pressure to expand domestic demand.
Is China’s High-Quality Investment Output Economically Viable?— China's technological progress and infrastructure do not refute claims of overinvestment, since overinvestment often produces real physical assets and technological gains yet still counts as overinvestment when it generates less real value than the resources, subsidies, and transfers it consumes. When such losses are capitalized, assets are carried above their real economic value.
AI Summary.China's leadership interprets weak consumption, slow household income growth, rising unemployment, persistent deflation, and growing external surpluses as acceptable costs of a development model that equates growth with capital accumulation and technology deployment. In this view, higher wages, consumption, and services follow naturally once productive industries mature.
Oliver Melton and Logan WrightForeign Affairs
Date Posted:
Oliver Melton and Logan Wright note that Zhongnanhai’s push to expand production amid weak consumer demand is entrenching deflation. The current leadership, they argue, views some deflation as a feature of “hard-won efficiency gains” and is not concerned about growing reliance on foreign demand.
Does China view weak consumption and deflation as acceptable development costs?
Core argument: China’s leadership sees the same data—rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but draws different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response.
The party is sticking to this path because the leadership believes it is working. It sees the same troubling data—including rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but it has reached wildly different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response. China’s worldview treats development as equivalent to capital accumulation and sees productivity as determined by the control and deployment of technology. It posits that the growth of the service sector, higher wages, and higher consumption are the consequences of that physical underlying foundation—they follow naturally in later stages of the development process once the productive industries have flourished. The resulting structural imbalance that weakens household income growth, the service sector, and public services was thus not an accident; in China’s economic development theory, this is seen as self-discipline that will pay off with more rapid long-term development.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China’s leadership sees the same data—rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but draws different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response.
China’s economic worldview treats development as equivalent to capital accumulation and productivity as determined by the control and deployment of technology, with service-sector growth, higher wages, and higher consumption following once productive industries have flourished.
The structural imbalance weakening household income growth, the service sector, and public services is treated in China’s economic development theory not as an accident but as self-discipline that will pay off with more rapid long-term development.
Related Articles:
The Future, Made In China— China's economy runs on parallel tracks: a property crash, a booming high-tech manufacturing sector, and university graduates trained for traditional white-collar jobs entering a labor market geared toward advanced manufacturing. Researchers at Stanford and Harvard found a swing from optimism to pessimism, with about 28% of citizens expecting living standards to improve.
China Sees Nearly 10% Decline In Marriages in 2026 So Far, Foreshadowing Lower Birth Rate— China recorded 4.648m marriage registrations in the first nine months of the year, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a nearly 10% decline that points to a full-year drop. Marriages peaked at 13.469m in 2013 and have generally trended downward since, with divorce registrations at 2.082m.
The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism— About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
AI Summary.The share of Canadian trade going to the US has fallen to its lowest level in more than 30 years, driven by US tariffs, consumer boycotts, and a Canadian government push to double non-US exports. The US remains Canada's largest trading partner, 8x the size of the European Union.
Joseph PolitanoApricitas Economics
Date Posted:
Canada has made real progress decoupling from the US. The US share of Canada’s goods trade has fallen to ~56%, its lowest in more than 30 years. Excluding energy, it has dropped from ~58% before Trump’s tariffs to ~52%. Still, the US remains roughly 8x as large a trading partner as the EU, and the structural ties “make significant decoupling painful and difficult.”
Is Canada reducing its trade reliance on the US?
Core argument: The share of Canadian trade flows headed to the US has fallen to its lowest level in more than 30 years, with both US import and export shares dropping significantly since 2025.
Canada is increasingly decoupling from the US economy—the share of Canadian trade flows headed to the US has fallen to the lowest level in more than 30 years, with both US import and export shares dropping significantly since 2025. Trump’s trade war, consumer boycotts, and a formal Canadian government push to boost non-US trade have all reduced the country’s economic reliance on its southern neighbor. In 2025, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney set a goal of doubling the country’s non-US exports over the next decade, saying that “many of our former strengths based on close ties to America have become our vulnerabilities.” Today, he is already halfway to achieving that goal, with Canada’s non-US exports up more than 40% over the last twelve months alone. Yet this still leaves America as far-and-away the country’s largest trading partner, 8 times as big as the second-place EU. The structural factors that made the US-Canada trade relationship so valuable also make significant decoupling painful and difficult.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The share of Canadian trade flows headed to the US has fallen to its lowest level in more than 30 years, with both US import and export shares dropping significantly since 2025.
Canada’s non-US exports rose more than 40% over twelve months, leaving Prime Minister Mark Carney halfway to his 2025 goal of doubling non-US exports within a decade.
The US remains Canada’s largest trading partner by far, eight times the size of the second-place EU, and the structural factors behind that relationship make significant decoupling painful and difficult.
Related Articles:
How Canada Is Responding to American Mercantilism— US tariffs as high as 35% on certain goods not compliant with the US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement have coincided with falling Canadian exports, weaker business confidence and investment, a softening labor market, and a contraction in Canadian output. Canada has responded by aiming to double non-US exports within 10 years, expanding fiscal spending and deregulation, and keeping monetary policy loose.
Share of Young Canadians Living with Parents Doubled, Study Says— Statistics Canada reports 16.3% of millennials aged 25 to 39 lived with their parents in 2021, compared with 8.2% of baby boomers at the same age in 1991, with the pattern most pronounced in expensive cities. Homeownership among 25-to-39-year-olds was 49.9%, down from about 56% for baby boomers and Gen Xers at that age.
A “Heat Dome” of Immigration— Canada has adopted some of the most aggressive immigration policies in the OECD, adding 1.273m residents in a year to reach a population of 41m — proportionally equivalent to the US admitting more than 10m immigrants annually. Canadians are increasingly angry as housing prices soar, sprawl expands, and traffic worsens.
AI Summary.An index of how closely China's export basket resembles that of advanced economies fell from 2007 to 2013 as advanced economies cut basic manufactures such as wood and textiles, then rose steeply, driven by greater similarity in chemicals and machinery. Greater overlap signals greater potential for trade conflict.
Benn Steil and Yuma SchusterCouncil On Foreign Relations
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
China’s export basket increasingly overlaps with that of advanced economies. By CFR’s measure, the export similarity index has risen ~6pp since 2007, driven by growing overlap in chemicals since 2016 and in machinery and transport equipment, notably EVs, since 2023.
Are Chinese and advanced economy exports becoming more alike?
Core argument: The advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures lowered the export similarity index with China by about two points by 2009, and combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013.
The index measures how closely China’s export basket resembles that of the advanced economies. Broadly, the more similar the baskets become relative to 2007, the greater the potential for immediate trade conflict. The index fell from 2007 to 2013, as the advanced economies reduced wood, textiles, and other basic manufactures as a share of their exports. The orange bars show the advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures, which lowered the index by about two points by 2009—and, combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013. That downward tug, however, is no longer enough to offset upward pressures elsewhere. Those pressures have been in two categories—in chemicals since 2016, and machinery since 2023. As shown by the black line, they have driven the steep rise in the index value.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures lowered the export similarity index with China by about two points by 2009, and combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013.
Upward pressures in chemicals since 2016 and machinery since 2023 have driven a steep rise in the index measuring how closely China’s export basket resembles that of the advanced economies.
The more China’s and the advanced economies’ export baskets resemble each other relative to 2007, the greater the potential for immediate trade conflict, and the downward tug from advanced-economy exits from basic manufactures no longer offsets upward pressures elsewhere.
Related Articles:
How to Fight an Economic War— China earned about $3.4bn from exporting rare-earth elements and magnets in a year, while the U.S. Geological Survey estimates a 30% disruption to U.S. supply of the rare-earth element neodymium alone would cut U.S. GDP by 2.2%, over $600bn. This asymmetry gives Chinese export controls their leverage.
Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push— Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026— The authors argue China's official growth figures are inconsistent with ten consecutive quarters of deflation, estimating that real GDP is around 11% below official levels, with most of the adjustment in investment. That would imply a drop of roughly 9 percentage points in China's share of global investment, helping explain its export surge.
AI Summary.The offshore renminbi market has grown substantially, driven largely by settlement and financing of China-linked goods trade rather than by a deep set of offshore renminbi assets for investors. The renminbi's share of global foreign exchange reserves remains at 2–3%, with smaller economies allocating more than larger ones.
Martin RasmussenMoney: Inside and Out
Date Posted:
China’s RMB is becoming considerably more important in international trade and finance. ~30% of Chinese goods trade is now settled in RMB, and an estimated 80% of Chinese trade finance credit is RMB-denominated. Yet the RMB share of global FX reserves remains stuck at 2 to 3%.
What is driving the offshore renminbi market's growth?
Core argument: The RMB’s share of global FX reserves remains stuck at 2–3%, while the simple average and median allocations exceed the asset-weighted average, indicating smaller economies allocate more to the CNY than larger economies do.
After being broadly flat for five years, cumulative outbound transfers of RMB began to increase sharply in 2022, from $689bn in Q4-2021 to $1,749bn in Q2-2026. We can, however, conclude that the share of goods trade that is settled in RMB has risen from around 15% during 2018-2021 to around 30% now. RMB-denominated trade credit has continued to increase quickly, and our estimates suggest that around 80% of Chinese trade finance credit is now denominated in RMB, up from around one-quarter just a few years ago. In short, as banks haven’t been able to rely on overseas RMB deposits to fund the increase in their overseas RMB loans, they have used their onshore balance sheets. One area where the RMB has not made much progress is its share of global FX reserves, which remains stuck at 2-3%. Yet the simple average and median allocation are higher than the asset-weighted average, and this tells us that smaller economies are allocating more to the CNY than larger economies [i.e.the asset-weighted average gives greater weight to countries with larger reserves, so its lower value indicates that larger reserve holders tend to allocate a smaller proportion of their reserves to RMB].
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The RMB’s share of global FX reserves remains stuck at 2–3%, while the simple average and median allocations exceed the asset-weighted average, indicating smaller economies allocate more to the CNY than larger economies do.
Offshore RMB market growth has been driven largely by China-linked goods settlement and the financing of goods trade, leaving RMB internationalisation mostly trade-driven and without a deep, diverse set of CNH assets for investors to recycle into.
Observable offshore RMB balance-sheet components — offshore deposits, CNH bonds, official RMB holdings and other readily visible RMB assets — do not appear large enough to fully explain the increase in net outbound RMB transfers.
Related Articles:
What’s the Renminbi Got to Do With it?— China's export growth accelerated after its currency depreciated, which the author argues is evidence that exchange rate moves, not just domestic demand, drive its trade surplus. Because Chinese domestic demand growth no longer pulls in imports, the author contends there is no realistic path to balanced trade without a stronger renminbi.
Renminbi Internationalization Gets A Stronger Political Mandate— China's renminbi internationalization appears to have re-accelerated after nearly a decade of limited progress, supported by a persistently strong balance of payments and an appreciating currency. The renminbi has already displaced the dollar as the dominant currency for Chinese trade credit, and may benefit as historical US allies reconsider their dollar allocations.
A New Driver of China’s De-Dollarization— Chinese banks have shifted their trade financing toward the renminbi, which now accounts for 72% of the roughly $250bn of Chinese trade credit extended since 2017, up from 17% of about $150bn during 2017-2021. The dollar share of Chinese trade credit is falling, and dollar trade credit provision may be negative.
AI Summary.China is expanding export controls to cover additional types of drones and their parts and technologies, components of dredgers such as mud pumps and cutterheads, and some tunnel boring machines. China's Commerce Ministry classified the items as having an obvious military-civil dual-use nature, and China accounts for roughly 70% of the global digger market.
Josh XiaoBloomberg
Date Posted:
China is expanding export controls to cover more drones and machinery, such as components of dredgers and tunnel boring machines, which have “an obvious military-civil dual-use nature.”
Is China extending export controls to more drones and heavy machinery?
Core argument: China’s Ministry of Commerce will impose export controls from November 18 on additional drone types, parts and technologies, dredger components including mud pumps and cutterheads, and some tunnel boring machines not previously covered.
China is imposing export controls on more drones and machinery. [The expanded] curbs include new types of drones — plus parts and technologies — as well as components of dredgers including mud pumps and cutterheads. Also added to the list are some types of tunnel boring machines, which hadn’t previously been subject to export controls. Boring machines can be used to construct underground tunnels for hardened military infrastructure. China accounts for some 70% of the global market in diggers, and is home to leading producers like China Railway Engineering Equipment Group, whose shield products are used in 36 countries including Denmark and France. Its top competitors include Germany’s Herrenknecht AG. Dredgers are useful for building naval facilities and China is also a major producer in that industry. Rivals in the market include Netherlands-based Royal IHC NA.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China’s Ministry of Commerce will impose export controls from November 18 on additional drone types, parts and technologies, dredger components including mud pumps and cutterheads, and some tunnel boring machines not previously covered.
China’s Commerce Ministry classified the restricted items as “having an obvious military-civil dual-use nature,” and said it notified in advance countries with which Beijing maintains an export control dialogue.
China accounts for some 70% of the global digger market and is home to China Railway Engineering Equipment Group, whose shield products are used in 36 countries, with competitors including Germany’s Herrenknecht AG.
Related Articles:
EU to Remove Sanctions on Chinese Firm to Save ASML Supplier— The European Union plans to lift sanctions on a Chinese entity to secure the removal of Chinese countersanctions on Sindlhauser, a small German precision-manufacturing and coating firm in ASML's supply chain that depends on Chinese rare earths and critical minerals and is at risk of closing if the measures remain.
China Found World’s Pain Point on Trade – and Will Use It Again— China's export permitting system for rare earths and other critical minerals is detailed enough that Beijing is developing a granular understanding of where every kilogram it produces ends up and why. Bottlenecks emerged as China slowed approvals for magnets containing even minuscule amounts of seven rare earths, alongside limits on sales of the raw elements.
How to Fight an Economic War— China earned about $3.4bn from exporting rare-earth elements and magnets in a year, while the U.S. Geological Survey estimates a 30% disruption to U.S. supply of the rare-earth element neodymium alone would cut U.S. GDP by 2.2%, over $600bn. This asymmetry gives Chinese export controls their leverage.
AI Summary.Reduced Chinese supply raises costs for American and European consumers and firms quickly, while reduced American and European demand forces China to offset the hit through added fiscal and credit expansion. The decisive question is which side can sustain its leverage longer: the US and Europe tolerating higher prices and supply disruption, or China tolerating a faster-rising debt burden.
Michael PettisChina Financial Markets
Date Posted:
Pettis argues that in the short term, China has an advantage vis-à-vis the US and EU due to rare earth export controls and other supply constraints, but over the long term, the US and the EU have “greater capacity to constrain demand for Chinese goods because of the relative sizes of their domestic markets.”
How does trade leverage differ between China and Western economies?
Core argument: Reduced Chinese supply raises costs for American and European consumers and firms immediately, while reduced American and European demand initially forces China to compensate through additional fiscal and credit expansion.
Reduced Chinese supply raises costs for American and European consumers and firms immediately. Reduced American and European demand forces China to compensate through additional fiscal and credit expansion. Each side can impose meaningful costs on the other, but their leverage operates on different time scales. China can disrupt American and European supply relatively quickly. The US and Europe can disrupt Chinese production in ways that can be offset short term but become progressively harder to manage. A temporary agreement can reduce immediate costs and may be economically valuable to both sides, but it does not eliminate the underlying problem. The question is not which side has more leverage, but which side can sustain its leverage as the adjustment unfolds — whether the US and Europe can tolerate higher prices and supply disruption longer than China can tolerate an acceleration in its debt burden.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Reduced Chinese supply raises costs for American and European consumers and firms immediately, while reduced American and European demand initially forces China to compensate through additional fiscal and credit expansion.
The United States and Europe can disrupt Chinese production in ways China can offset in the short term but that become progressively harder to manage.
A temporary agreement can reduce immediate costs and may be economically valuable to both sides, but it does not eliminate the question of whether the United States and Europe can tolerate higher prices and supply disruption longer than China can tolerate an accelerating debt burden.
Related Articles:
China Is Making Trade Impossible— Interviews with Chinese economists, technologists and business leaders yielded no clear answer to what products China would want to buy from the rest of the world in future, beyond commodities, luxury goods and higher education. The author argues China sees nothing it cannot eventually make better and cheaper itself, undermining trade as a two-way exchange.
Surging China Exports Push Trade Surplus Toward Fresh Record— China's exports rose 36% from a year earlier and imports 31%, widening its monthly trade surplus to almost $134bn and putting the annual surplus on track to exceed the $1.2tn record. High-tech shipments jumped almost 64%, which Bloomberg Economics estimates accounted for about half of total export growth.
Economic Size and Economic Power— By manufacturing value added China has the world's largest manufacturing sector, with the US and European Union roughly co-equal and individually smaller; netting out intra-EU trade, the EU is the largest exporter of goods and services and the US a distant third. The author argues all three are vulnerable to weaponized interdependence, with China apparently least so.
AI Summary.China's combined public and private debt is estimated at about 300% of GDP, and an updated "Japanisation" index indicates China has scored as more Japanised than Japan for the past five years. Analysts attribute the 1.7% yield on 10-year Chinese government bonds to weak credit demand, with investors parking cash in government debt.
Joe Leahy and Leo LewisFinancial Times
Date Posted:
GS finds China more “Japanised” than Japan itself. Housing starts are down 78% from their peak, public and private debt has risen to ~300% of GDP, while 10-year government bonds yield just 1.7%. Zhongnanhai hopes export strength will offset weakness in China’s domestic demand.
Is China now more "Japanised" than Japan itself?
Core argument: China’s total public and private debt is around 300% of GDP, according to Capital Economics calculations, closing in on Japanese levels.
[Japanisation is the process by which an economy becomes trapped in prolonged stagnation, characterized by deficient domestic demand, persistent deflationary pressure, exceptionally low interest rates, and an inability to restore vigorous growth through conventional monetary policy, typically following a collapse in property prices]. According to Goldman Sachs, an updated version of the Japanisation index — a gauge originally devised by the late economist Takatoshi Ito — shows that for the past five years, China has been consistently more “Japanised” than Japan itself. Just as it did in Japan, demand for debt has slowed markedly in China since the real estate bust. [At the same time], at around 300% of GDP, according to calculations by Capital Economics, China’s total public and private debt is closing in on Japanese levels.The ultimate sign of China’s weak credit demand is the 1.7% yield on 10-year government bonds, which Nomura’s Richard Koo describes as “absolutely ridiculous.” Third-quarter year-on-year GDP growth of 4.5%, announced this week, was driven substantially by export growth.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China’s total public and private debt is around 300% of GDP, according to Capital Economics calculations, closing in on Japanese levels.
Goldman Sachs reports that an updated Japanisation index, originally devised by economist Takatoshi Ito, shows China has been consistently more “Japanised” than Japan itself over the past five years.
Up to 10.6% of China’s adult population had overdue loans last year, against about 7.8% a year earlier, according to Gavekal Dragonomics analyst Xiaoxi Zhang, while Nomura’s Richard Koo calls the 1.7% yield on 10-year government bonds “absolutely ridiculous”.
Related Articles:
Record Influx Of University Graduates Pushes China’s Youth Unemployment Rate To 18.9%— China's urban unemployment rate for 16- to 24-year-olds excluding students reached 18.9%, the highest since the statistics agency revised its methodology to exclude students. A record influx of university graduates is entering a job market weighed down by weak domestic demand and growing adoption of artificial intelligence.
The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism— About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
China’s Growth Machines— The United States generates almost twice as much economic output per dollar invested as China, the opposite of what would be expected from a mature developed economy versus a fast-growing economy catching up. The gap points to overexuberance in Chinese investment.