AI Summary. Countries with high debt and low productive capacity face the greatest adjustment costs when trade imbalances unwind. If the U.S. reduces its trade deficit while China maintains surpluses, a politically fragmented Europe risks absorbing larger deficits by default, accelerating deindustrialization and weaker growth.

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Pettis suggests that if the US reduces its trade deficit while China maintains huge surpluses, a politically fragmented Europe will likely end up absorbing larger deficits, driving reduced competitiveness, deindustrialization, and weaker growth.

Will Europe bear the cost of global trade rebalancing?

Core argument: Nations where debt has risen without a corresponding expansion in productive capacity face the steepest adjustment costs when global trade imbalances correct, making fiscal and industrial composition the primary vulnerability indicators.

The eurozone is the world’s third-largest economy and its second-largest source of demand, it has economic power at its disposal, but [likely not] the political ability to exercise this power, given its fragmented policymaking institutions and the often divergent interests of its member states. If the United States is able to reduce its trade deficit and expand its share of global manufacturing while China resists an equivalent contraction in its surpluses, a politically divided Europe could be forced to take on larger deficits almost by default. The costs could include deindustrialization, rising debt, and weaker growth. This process may have begun already.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nations where debt has risen without a corresponding expansion in productive capacity face the steepest adjustment costs when global trade imbalances correct, making fiscal and industrial composition the primary vulnerability indicators.
  2. As the world’s third-largest economy and second-largest source of demand, the eurozone holds meaningful economic leverage in trade rebalancing but fragmented policymaking and divergent member-state interests severely limit its ability to deploy that power.
  3. If the U.S. shrinks its trade deficit while China resists equivalent surplus contraction, a politically divided Europe risks absorbing larger deficits by default, with deindustrialization, rising debt, and weaker growth as the likely consequences.

AI Summary. China's inflation-adjusted exchange rate has fallen sharply, giving Chinese manufacturers price discounts of 32% in electric vehicles, 38% in refrigerators, and 53% in shoes relative to foreign competitors. Persistent gaps of this magnitude indicate the yuan is significantly undervalued in real terms.

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A GS analysis shows that Chinese manufacturers’ costs are 32% lower than those of their competitors, reflecting an artificially depressed yuan and price increases abroad due to supply chain disruptions and fiscal stimulus.

Is China's currency undervaluation distorting global manufacturing competition?

Core argument: China’s inflation-adjusted yuan exchange rate has plummeted since the pandemic, as goods prices fell domestically while rising in developed markets due to stimulus and supply-chain disruptions, creating a structural competitiveness advantage that nominal exchange rates have not corrected.

Goldman Sachs economists Kamakshya Trivedi and Hui Shan show goods prices have fallen in China since the pandemic while rising in developed markets because of stimulus and supply-chain disruptions. This means the inflation-adjusted yuan exchange rate has plummeted. This has increased China’s competitiveness. Goldman compared costs experienced by manufacturers in China, such as New Balance in shoes and Tesla in electric vehicles, with their costs elsewhere, and prices of Chinese companies, such as appliance manufacturer Haier, to foreign peers such as Siemens. China’s price discount is 32% in electric vehicles, 38% in refrigerators and 53% in shoes. In theory, such gaps should not persist if the yuan is fairly valued.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China’s inflation-adjusted yuan exchange rate has plummeted since the pandemic, as goods prices fell domestically while rising in developed markets due to stimulus and supply-chain disruptions, creating a structural competitiveness advantage that nominal exchange rates have not corrected.
  2. Goldman Sachs economists document Chinese price discounts of 32% in electric vehicles, 38% in refrigerators, and 53% in shoes versus foreign peers—gaps that economic theory holds should close if the yuan were fairly valued.

AI Summary. Canada is preparing long-term domestic support measures for businesses harmed by US tariffs, designed to sustain the economy through a prolonged trade dispute with no near-term resolution expected.

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US-Canada trade talks broke down over the weekend. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a forthcoming domestic aid package in an effort to help the Canadian economy manage the fallout from a protracted trade war with the US.

Can Canada sustain its economy through years of US trade conflict?

Last week, US-Canada talks broke down, and Washington levied 50% tariffs on a range of goods. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, elected last year on a platform to resist Donald Trump’s declared aim to make the country the 51st state, responded with a speech announcing truly reciprocal tariffs. There will be one-for-one retaliation with 50% levies. The world is raising its economic drawbridges. That’s profoundly negative, and continues the long descent from an order of cooperation and open markets. In the short term, we’ll see who can take the most pain. There’s no reason to expect a repetition of the Liberation Day swoon, but for investors it will still hurt.

AI Summary. China's broad subsidies keep ~30% of industrial companies alive despite negative producer prices, flooding global markets with cheap manufactured goods that erode domestic manufacturing in importing countries.

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Cembalest notes according to Chinese data, ~30% of Chinese industrial companies are “unprofitable zombies” that survive due to broad-based subsidies; for example, 58% of new Chinese bank loans are extended at or under its prime rate of 3%.

Does subsidizing unprofitable factories harm global manufacturing more than domestic growth?

Core argument: ~30% of Chinese industrial companies operate as unprofitable zombies sustained by state subsidies that dwarf those of any other economy, preventing the capacity reduction that negative producer prices would otherwise force.

Normally, a prolonged period of negative industrial producer prices would lead to competition and reduced capacity. Not in China, however; instead, ~30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable zombies that survive due to a broad-based subsidy approach that dwarfs the rest of the world. Countries that experienced large increases in manufactured imports from China also experienced slowdowns in domestic manufacturing. From 2021 to 2024, as Chinese imports to the ASEAN region increased, every ASEAN country except for Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos experienced a decline in their manufacturing share of GDP.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. ~30% of Chinese industrial companies operate as unprofitable zombies sustained by state subsidies that dwarf those of any other economy, preventing the capacity reduction that negative producer prices would otherwise force.

AI Summary. Industrial policy that boosts tradable output creates upward pressure on domestic prices and appreciates the real exchange rate, but consumption suppression can offset both effects and shift the current account toward surplus. Targeting the nominal exchange rate alone cannot correct external imbalances without accompanying changes in domestic saving and demand.

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Industrial policy that stimulates exports also raises domestic spending. To generate a current-account surplus, it must be paired with forced saving, financial repression, or related features of the Chinese model.

Does industrial policy address external imbalances without changing domestic demand?

Core argument: Industrial policy that boosts tradable output without suppressing consumption generates nontradable goods shortages, driving domestic price levels higher and appreciating the real exchange rate, ultimately worsening the current account balance.

Consider the example of policy directives to boost tradable output through the use of quantity targets. [This] creates a lopsided economy, resulting in a shortage of nontradable goods. To restore balance, the price of domestic nontradable goods would rise, increasing the overall price level and appreciating the real exchange rate, as the model-based simulations in Figure 9 show. However, these side-effects of the policy can be reversed by suppressing consumption, for instance through forced saving policies. In this case, reduced aggregate demand contains the rapid rise in nontradable prices and overall inflation. A sufficient degree of consumption repression can fully reverse the fall in saving and appreciation of the real exchange rate that would otherwise occur, subdue the relative nontradable price increase, and turn the current account balance effect from negative to positive. A policy that would seek to appreciate the nominal exchange rate of surplus countries without a change in the underlying drivers of saving and investment would only result in stronger domestic deflationary pressures. In this sense, focusing on the nominal exchange rate alone risks overstating its ability to correct external imbalances without accompanying changes in domestic demand and saving.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Industrial policy that boosts tradable output without suppressing consumption generates nontradable goods shortages, driving domestic price levels higher and appreciating the real exchange rate, ultimately worsening the current account balance.
  2. Consumption repression paired with tradable-sector expansion neutralizes inflationary pressure on nontradable prices, reverses real exchange rate appreciation, and shifts the current account balance from deficit to surplus.
  3. Nominal exchange rate appreciation in surplus economies, absent changes in underlying saving and investment drivers, produces domestic deflationary pressure without correcting external imbalances.

AI Summary. China's currency is undervalued by 20–35%, based on a current account surplus of 4–6% of GDP once gold imports and misreported investment income are accounted for.

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Properly accounting for imports of gold and chips, China’s current account surplus is ~6% of GDP. Using the IMF formulation, Setser argues this implies the renminbi is undervalued btw 30–35%.

Is China's currency undervalued enough to distort global trade?

Core argument: China’s current account surplus of ~4% of GDP sits 3 percentage points above IMF norms, implying ~20% currency undervaluation—rising to 30–35% once gold imports (1.5% of GDP) and an unexplained $125 billion investment income deficit on $4 trillion in net assets are corrected.

China’s current account surplus is now reported to be around 4% of GDP—or 3 percentage points higher than what the IMF estimates it should be. That works out, using the IMF’s own calculations, to an undervaluation of roughly 20%. If adjustments are made for China’s surging gold imports (1.5% of GDP in Q2) and its obviously misreported investment income balance (China reports a deficit of $125 billion on $4 trillion in net assets, something that no one—the IMF included—can explain) the current account surplus would rise to around 6 percent of GDP and the estimated undervaluation would increase to between 30 and 35%. The upward adjustment to China’s surplus should not be controversial: the customs surplus excluding gold is now an incredible 7% of China’s GDP, the services deficit is only 1% of GDP and a long history of surpluses should lead to a positive net foreign asset position and thus external investment income (as in Korea, Taiwan and Japan).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China’s current account surplus of ~4% of GDP sits 3 percentage points above IMF norms, implying ~20% currency undervaluation—rising to 30–35% once gold imports (1.5% of GDP) and an unexplained $125 billion investment income deficit on $4 trillion in net assets are corrected.
  2. China’s customs surplus excluding gold reached 7% of GDP against a services deficit of only 1% of GDP, making the reported headline surplus a material understatement of external imbalance.
  3. China’s $4 trillion net foreign asset position should generate positive investment income—as it does in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan—yet China reports a $125 billion deficit, a statistical anomaly the IMF cannot explain.

AI Summary. China's manufacturing trade surplus, excluding gold and semiconductors, is close to 7% of GDP — an exceptionally large figure for the world's second-largest economy.

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Properly accounting for imports of gold and chips, China’s goods surplus grew $80B in H1 2026, Setser finds. China’s surplus expanded to ~7% of GDP in Q2, “an absolutely massive number for an economy as big as China.”

Does China's true manufacturing surplus remain larger than official figures suggest?

Core argument: China's manufacturing goods surplus, stripped of gold and semiconductor imports, continues to rise, with the underlying goods surplus approaching 7% of GDP — an exceptionally large external imbalance for an economy of China's scale.

The easiest way to see what is happening is just to focus on the manufacturing surplus without gold and chips. It keeps on rising. In fact, without the 1.5 pp of GDP in gold imports in q2, the goods surplus would be close to 7% of GDP -- an absolutely massive number for an economy as big as China.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's manufacturing goods surplus, stripped of gold and semiconductor imports, continues to rise, with the underlying goods surplus approaching 7% of GDP — an exceptionally large external imbalance for an economy of China's scale.
  2. Gold imports alone depress China's reported goods surplus by roughly 1.5 percentage points of GDP, masking the true magnitude of structural excess production relative to domestic demand.

AI Summary. The average U.S. tariff rate stands at 11.1% and is set to rise to 11.8% by year-end, with current tariff policy estimated to raise consumer prices by 0.7% and generate $1.9tn in revenue over ten years, net of drag on economic output.

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The US’s average statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1% and is set to rise to 11.8% by the end of year. John Iselin projects that the current regime will raise ~$1.9T in revenue over 10 years.

Are rising tariffs worth the consumer price increases they generate?

Core argument: The average U.S. statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1% and is projected to reach 11.8% by year-end as scheduled increases take effect, with current-law tariffs estimated to raise $1.9 trillion over ten years before accounting for GDP drag.

As of July 24th, the average statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1% after falling by about 0.3pp when Section 122 tariffs expired and were replaced with new tariffs under Section 301. Under current law, which includes several scheduled tariff increases in the coming months, this figure is set to be 11.8% by the end of this year. We estimate the ultimate consumer price impact of current-law tariff policy to be about 0.7%. Over the next ten years, we estimate that current-law tariffs will raise about $1.9 trillion. These numbers are somewhat lower, though, after taking into account the negative impact of tariffs on GDP.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The average U.S. statutory tariff rate stands at 11.1% and is projected to reach 11.8% by year-end as scheduled increases take effect, with current-law tariffs estimated to raise $1.9 trillion over ten years before accounting for GDP drag.
  2. Current-law U.S. tariff policy carries an estimated 0.7% consumer price impact, and the ten-year $1.9 trillion revenue projection declines in net terms once tariffs' negative GDP effects are incorporated.