China

Economic and policy analysis of China, including growth, trade, industrial policy, finance, demographics, technology, security, and relations with the United States and Europe. Coverage draws together data and competing views on China’s global role.

AI Summary. The United States generates almost twice as much economic output per dollar invested as China, the opposite of what would be expected from a mature developed economy versus a fast-growing economy catching up. The gap points to overexuberance in Chinese investment.

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The US generates ~2x as much output per dollar of capital as China. Rivaton and Southwood argue that relentless competition among Chinese subnational governments, who account for ~85% of public expenditure, drives industrial growth at the cost of reduced capital efficiency.

Does China get less economic output per dollar invested than America?

Core argument: The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.

Overexuberance is visible in economic data. Interest rates that banks pay to depositors are capped, giving banks artificially cheap capital. Entrepreneurs may be backed to attempt extremely unlikely, borderline schemes. The capital efficiency ratio measures how much output a country gets out of the capital stock it has invested – how many dollars of GDP a country can buy with a dollar of investment. The United States gets almost twice as much economic output out of every dollar it invests as China does, precisely the opposite of what we would expect from a developed country with a mature economy versus a rapidly growing country playing catch up.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.
  2. China’s capital efficiency inverts the expected pattern, in which a rapidly growing catch-up economy would extract more output per dollar of investment than a mature developed economy.
  3. Overexuberance is visible in Chinese macroeconomic data, with China’s investment generating less economic output per dollar than that of the United States.

AI Summary. Goldman Sachs estimates that artificial intelligence–related stocks account for 57% of Chinese equity trading turnover and that nearly $5tn in AI-related market value has been created, including $2tn from new listings. China also holds dominant shares of the physical supply chain, including 97% of humanoid robot shipments, 75% of electric vehicle production, and 90% of rare-earth refining.

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China accounts for 77% of global token usage, but only 22% of token spending, according to a GS analysis. Kedrosky notes, “This is what widespread AI adoption at low prices looks like. And it is the channel through which Chinese competition will pressure prices elsewhere.”

How large is AI's footprint in Chinese markets and supply chains?

Core argument: AI-related stocks account for 57% of trading turnover in Chinese equities, and Goldman estimates almost $5 trillion in AI-related market value has been created since the DeepSeek moment, including $2 trillion from IPOs.

AI-related stocks now represent 57% of trading turnover in Chinese equities. Since the DeepSeek moment, Goldman estimates almost $5 trillion in AI-related market value has been created, including $2 trillion from IPOs. AI dominates Chinese equity markets even more than it does U.S. markets. It's a one-factor world. China shipped 97% of humanoid robots in the first half of 2026. Alongside China’s 75% share of EV production and 80% of battery production, China basically owns the physical side of AI and AI-adjacent technologies. The industrial base behind the AI buildout is already concentrated in China: 60% of global transformer production capacity, 60% of PCB and optical-module production, 77% of new foundry capacity, and 90% of rare-earth refining. There are more than 880 AI-related companies focused mainly on China’s domestic market, with $3.2 trillion in market value. To put it in context, this is nearly half the total market of the Nasdaq at the peak of the dot-com frenzy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. AI-related stocks account for 57% of trading turnover in Chinese equities, and Goldman estimates almost $5 trillion in AI-related market value has been created since the DeepSeek moment, including $2 trillion from IPOs.
  2. China shipped 97% of humanoid robots in the first half of 2026, alongside a 75% share of EV production and 80% of battery production.
  3. China holds 60% of global transformer production capacity, 60% of PCB and optical-module production, 77% of new foundry capacity, and 90% of rare-earth refining, concentrating the industrial base behind the AI buildout.

AI Summary. China's credit to the nonfinancial sector—corporate, government and household borrowing—topped 300% of gross domestic product, 60 percentage points above its end-2019 level and larger than in the US, according to the Bank for International Settlements. The International Monetary Fund estimates broad Chinese government debt, including local financing vehicles, reached 127% of GDP, up from 98% in 2020.

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Credit to the Chinese nonfinancial sector was over 300% of GDP in 2025, 60pp above its 2019 level, driven by borrowing and slower GDP growth. It has risen by more than $43T since late 2012.

How much has China's debt risen relative to GDP?

Core argument: China’s credit to the nonfinancial sector topped 300% of GDP last year, 60 percentage points above end-2019 and far above the U.S. level, according to the Bank for International Settlements.

Last year, China’s credit to the nonfinancial sector—a broad measure of corporate, government and household borrowings—topped 300% of gross domestic product, 60 percentage points higher than at the end of 2019 and now far bigger than in the U.S. It has jumped by more than $43 trillion since Xi took office in late 2012, according to the Bank for International Settlements. China’s government says its debts are under control. Central government borrowings were only around 30% of GDP in recent years, small compared with federal debts in the U.S. A broader gauge of overall Chinese government debt—including official local borrowings as well as the debts of these local government financing vehicles—ballooned to an estimated 127% of GDP last year, according to the International Monetary Fund, up from 98% in 2020.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China’s credit to the nonfinancial sector topped 300% of GDP last year, 60 percentage points above end-2019 and far above the U.S. level, according to the Bank for International Settlements.
  2. Chinese nonfinancial-sector credit has risen by more than $43 trillion since Xi Jinping took office in late 2012, according to the Bank for International Settlements.
  3. The International Monetary Fund estimates broad Chinese government debt, including official local borrowings and local government financing vehicles, reached 127% of GDP last year, up from 98% in 2020, while central government borrowings were around 30% of GDP.

AI Summary. China's export growth accelerated after its currency depreciated, which the author argues is evidence that exchange rate moves, not just domestic demand, drive its trade surplus. Because Chinese domestic demand growth no longer pulls in imports, the author contends there is no realistic path to balanced trade without a stronger renminbi.

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China’s export growth accelerated following the RMB’s depreciation in 2022, underscoring the role of exchange rates as a factor in external adjustment. Since rising domestic demand no longer lifts imports, Setser argues, reducing China’s trade surplus will require a stronger RMB.

Does balancing China's trade require a stronger currency?

Core argument: China requires a 1.5 percentage point contribution from net exports to growth each year, putting it on a collision course with trading partners absent a currency correction that supports more balanced trade even without trade restrictions.

The best evidence that exports responded to changes in the currency, and not simply to changes in the path of China’s internal demand, is the acceleration in China’s export growth after the RMB’s depreciation over the course of 2022. Those who believe the path of internal demand is critical to rebalancing and that exchange rate moves are secondary need to explain how an acceleration in domestic demand would, on its own, lead China’s external accounts to adjust. One important, stylized fact about China is that domestic demand growth is no longer feeding over to import growth (ex-gold, that is). Bottom line: China, which needs a 1.5 percentage point contribution from net exports every year, is on a collision course with its trading partners without a currency correction that provides the basis for more balanced trade even in the absence of trade restrictions. And there isn’t a realistic path towards balance that doesn’t involve a stronger RMB; there aren’t, as Paul Krugman once put it, immaculate transfers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China requires a 1.5 percentage point contribution from net exports to growth each year, putting it on a collision course with trading partners absent a currency correction that supports more balanced trade even without trade restrictions.
  2. The acceleration in China’s export growth following the renminbi’s depreciation over 2022 is the best evidence that exports responded to the currency rather than to the path of China’s internal demand.
  3. Domestic demand growth in China no longer feeds through to import growth, excluding gold, and no realistic path toward external balance avoids a stronger renminbi.

AI Summary. China has extended travel restrictions on top artificial intelligence and chip talent to their spouses and children, who must now obtain government approval before going abroad even for short trips. The requirement broadens existing curbs on the movement of influential technology entrepreneurs, researchers and executives.

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Beijing has expanded overseas travel restrictions for top AI professionals to include their families. While not an outright ban, foreign travel will now require state approval.

Is China extending travel approval requirements to tech talent's families?

Core argument: China now requires spouses and children of certain AI and chip executives whose work is deemed paramount to state security to obtain Beijing’s approval before traveling abroad, even for short trips, according to people familiar with the matter.

Government agencies have recently begun to share the wider restrictions with affected people, which include prominent startup founders as well as the heads of strategically important companies in AI-related fields. Direct relatives such as spouses and children of certain AI and chip executives, whose work is considered paramount to state security, are now required to obtain approval from Beijing before going abroad even for short trips. That marks a broadening of existing curbs on the freedom of movement of China’s most influential tech talent. While not an outright ban on travel, the new requirement is likely to exert a further chilling effect on a tech sector already facing unprecedented curbs. China has restricted foreign travel for top AI professionals in private firms such as Alibaba and DeepSeek since earlier this year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China now requires spouses and children of certain AI and chip executives whose work is deemed paramount to state security to obtain Beijing’s approval before traveling abroad, even for short trips, according to people familiar with the matter.
  2. The restrictions extend to prominent startup founders and heads of strategically important companies in AI-related fields, broadening existing curbs on the movement of China’s entrepreneurs, researchers and executives.
  3. China has restricted foreign travel for top AI professionals at private firms such as Alibaba and DeepSeek since earlier this year, and the new family requirement is likely to exert a further chilling effect on the tech sector.

AI Summary. China faces three options as external demand weakens: shift a larger share of national income to households so consumption absorbs more output, keep relying on investment despite weak returns, or let production and growth slow. The first requires substantial changes in income distribution and saving incentives; the second risks more debt and excess capacity; the third implies higher unemployment.

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“Beijing cannot choose whether China will adjust; one way or another, it will.” Pettis warns Zhongnanhai against postponing rebalancing with another round of debt-financed investment “despite increasingly weak returns.”

What choices does China face as external demand weakens?

Core argument: China faces three options: shift a larger share of national income to households so consumption absorbs more output, keep relying on investment despite weak returns, or allow production and growth to slow.

What it can choose is how painful that adjustment will be. If weaker external demand is met by encouraging more borrowing and domestic investment, regardless of whether that investment is economically justified, China risks postponing the inevitable. China therefore faces the same basic choice Japan confronted, but with deeper imbalances and less accommodating global conditions. It can shift a larger share of national income toward households and allow consumption to absorb more of what the economy produces; or it can continue relying on investment, despite increasingly weak returns; or it can allow production and growth to slow. The first choice requires a substantial change in the domestic distribution of income and the incentives to save. The second risks still more debt and excess capacity and, ultimately, a more painful adjustment. The third implies higher unemployment and weaker growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China faces three options: shift a larger share of national income to households so consumption absorbs more output, keep relying on investment despite weak returns, or allow production and growth to slow.
  2. China confronts the same basic choice Japan faced, but with deeper imbalances and less accommodating global conditions, and can choose only how painful the adjustment will be.
  3. Meeting weaker external demand with more borrowing and domestic investment, regardless of whether it is economically justified, risks further debt and excess capacity and a more painful adjustment, while slower growth implies higher unemployment.

AI Summary. East Asian economies accumulated large US dollar and euro reserves by building export machines based on undervalued currencies, a strategy one analyst argues has run its course. He contends China should revalue aggressively and return to market-determined prices, since the resulting accounting losses reflect real losses already incurred.

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Charles Gave argues that East Asia’s post-1997 model of undervalued currencies, which has generated >5T in FX reserves, has run its course. His prescription is aggressive China-led revaluation to shift purchasing power toward Asian consumers.

Should China revalue its currency aggressively and let markets set prices?

Core argument: Gave argues that East Asia’s strategy of building export machines on undervalued currencies to accumulate large US dollar and euro reserves has run its course.

To accumulate their huge reserves of US dollars and euros, [East Asia] built formidable export machines based on undervalued currencies. [Gave sees] only one solution: to return to market-determined prices as quickly as possible. As the leading economy in the region, China should bite the bullet and say the time has come to revalue aggressively. Yes, Asia will take accounting losses. But that does not greatly matter; the actual losses have already been taken a long time ago.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gave argues that East Asia’s strategy of building export machines on undervalued currencies to accumulate large US dollar and euro reserves has run its course.
  2. Gave sees a return to market-determined prices as quickly as possible as the only solution, with China, as the region’s leading economy, revaluing aggressively.
  3. Gave contends that the accounting losses Asia would take on revaluation do not greatly matter because the actual losses were taken long ago.

AI Summary. A projection estimates China gains about $1.13tn in annual export value by 2030 relative to baseline while the rest of the world loses about $5.1tn, including $2.25tn for the G7. The authors attribute the net global decline to trade shifting toward Chinese goods whose export prices keep falling.

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China’s share of global exports by volume is on track to rise from 20% in 2025 to 28% by 2030. Yet China’s rising export share may depress the total value of global exports as lower-priced Chinese goods displace more expensive exports from other countries.

Do China's export share gains reduce global export values?

Core argument: The projection has China gaining roughly $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses about $5.1 trillion.

The net result of our projection would suggest that China gains around $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses around $5.1 trillion, with the G7 accounting for $2.25 trillion of those potential losses alone. This implies that China’s export share gains effectively destroy overall global trade values relative to the status quo due to continued declines in export prices. Regardless of which assumptions are used, China’s export share gains appear to reduce global total potential export values, because trade patterns are shifting toward Chinese goods that are declining in price.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The projection has China gaining roughly $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses about $5.1 trillion.
  2. The G7 accounts for $2.25 trillion of the projected $5.1 trillion in export value losses borne by countries outside China.
  3. China’s export share gains appear to reduce global total potential export values regardless of the assumptions used, because trade patterns shift toward Chinese goods whose prices continue to decline.