Do trade deficit countries hold bargaining power over surplus countries?
Core argument: Surplus countries face external and internal pressure to expand domestic demand and so reduce deflationary pressure on trading partners, as happened to the US in the 1920s, Japan in the 1980s, and China after the 2007–09 financial crisis.
Surplus countries are not in as controlling a position as one might suppose. One source of weakness is that they will be subject to pressure (external and internal) to expand domestic demand (as was the US in the 1920s) and so reduce deflationary pressure on their partners. Exactly that happened to Japan in the 1980s and to China after the financial crisis of 2007-09. The implication is that deficit countries, while ostensibly in a weaker position, have power, too. Yes, credit to them can be cut off. But countries with structural surpluses of savings over investment and so external surpluses (such as China, Germany and Japan) have built their economies around excess supply of tradeable goods and services. Suddenly losing these may inflict a slump. Moralists in surplus countries complain about the profligacy of deficit countries. But they need them.

