Does financial repression offer governments a hidden path to debt reduction?
Core argument: Financial repression delivered an estimated 90.7 percentage points of GDP in British debt reduction between 1945–55, dwarfing contributions from surprise inflation (20.3 pts) and primary surpluses (3.9 pts).
Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds—the opposite of what standard risk premium models would predict (Figure 1a). At postwar peaks, relative yields fell to about −4% in Britain as debt neared 250% of GDP and −3% in the US; Japan later repeated the pattern (Figures 1b–d). Fiscal repression makes banks captive bond buyers; monetary repression places low-return reserves on their balance sheets (Table 1). Both indicators peaked after WWII, fell with liberalisation, and rose after the GFC (Figure 4). Repression contributed an estimated 90.7 percentage points of GDP to British debt reduction in 1945–55, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation and 3.9 from primary surpluses (Table 3; Figure 11). Cumulative savings averaged 9.8 points of GDP across advanced economies in 2008–20 (Table 3).






