“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
AI Summary.US inflation data showed the 11-month rate rising from the prior month and the 13-month rate exceeding 4%, with trimmed-mean and median measures of underlying inflation both pointing to a sharp monthly increase not attributable to oil prices. Food inflation and services inflation excluding housing also moved higher.
John AuthersBloomberg
Date Posted:
Headline CPI was running at 4.1% over 13 months and 3.7% over 11 months as of October, ~2x the Fed’s target rate. John Authers: “These figures make abundantly obvious why voters were so angry when they went to the polls last week.”
Is underlying inflation accelerating beyond what oil prices explain?
Core argument: The 13-month inflation rate topped 4% and the 11-month rate from November rose versus the prior month, with year-on-year comparisons unavailable because the government shutdown cancelled the October inflation report.
Year-on-year data aren’t available because the government shutdown nixed an inflation report for last October. But the 11-month inflation rate, from November, showed a rise on last month, while the 13-month rate topped 4%. Month-on-month measures of core inflation — the trimmed mean excluding outliers, and the median — both also suggested that October saw a sharp increase that could not be attributed to oil prices. Food inflation, which has grown politically sensitive in recent years, and services inflation excluding shelter — a number dubbed “supercore” by former chairman Jerome Powell — also moved higher.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The 13-month inflation rate topped 4% and the 11-month rate from November rose versus the prior month, with year-on-year comparisons unavailable because the government shutdown cancelled the October inflation report.
Month-on-month core inflation measures, the trimmed mean excluding outliers and the median, both suggested a sharp October increase that could not be attributed to oil prices.
Food inflation and the "supercore" measure of services inflation excluding shelter, dubbed by former chairman Jerome Powell, both moved higher.
Related Articles:
Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections— An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
Sticky Wage Norms and the Real Wage Cost of Unexpected Inflation— Firms set nominal wage increases by round-number rules—about 42% of increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number—and these rules rose only from about 2.7% to 3.5% as inflation peaked near 7%, contributing to falling real wages for job stayers.
The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly— Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
AI Summary.US consumer prices excluding food and energy rose 0.3% from the prior month, topping estimates for a third straight month, while overall prices rose 0.4% as costs of essentials climbed broadly. On a three-month annualized basis, core inflation ran at 3.75%, the most in more than two years, and 2.69% annualized over six months.
Mark NiquetteBloomberg
Date Posted:
Headline CPI rose .4% m/m in October, while Core CPI rose .3% m/m. Since January, headline CPI is up 3.3%, while average hourly earnings are up 2.3% – an ~1% drop in real wages, driven mostly by food and energy.
Is core inflation accelerating faster than forecasters expected?
Core argument: Core CPI excluding food and energy rose 0.3% from the prior month, topping estimates for a third straight month, while overall prices jumped 0.4% as the cost of essentials climbed across the board, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
The consumer price index, excluding food and energy, rose 0.3% from a month earlier, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, topping estimates for a third straight month. Overall prices jumped 0.4% as the cost of essentials climbed across the board. The BLS didn’t publish year-over-year changes because data collection was interrupted last October during the government shutdown. Economists estimated after the release that core inflation would have been around 2.8% if the data were available, which would have been the highest since May. Through October, the core CPI index was up 3.75% on a three-month annualized basis — the most in more than two years — and 2.69% on a six-month annualized basis, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Core CPI excluding food and energy rose 0.3% from the prior month, topping estimates for a third straight month, while overall prices jumped 0.4% as the cost of essentials climbed across the board, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
The core CPI index was up 3.75% on a three-month annualized basis through October, the most in more than two years, and 2.69% on a six-month annualized basis, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics didn't publish year-over-year changes because data collection was interrupted during the government shutdown, and economists estimated after the release that core inflation would have been around 2.8%, which would have been the highest since May.
Related Articles:
Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections— An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
Sticky Wage Norms and the Real Wage Cost of Unexpected Inflation— Firms set nominal wage increases by round-number rules—about 42% of increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number—and these rules rose only from about 2.7% to 3.5% as inflation peaked near 7%, contributing to falling real wages for job stayers.
The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly— Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
AI Summary.An opinion essay argues that a burst artificial intelligence investment bubble would cause a recession followed by a slow, jobless recovery, as recessions driven by private-sector overreach respond poorly to monetary stimulus. It contends a 4% federal funds rate and political gridlock limit both monetary and fiscal responses.
Paul KrugmanKrugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
Through the early 1980s, US recessions were effectively engineered by the Fed to curb inflation. Later recessions reflected private-sector overreach; two of the three followed burst bubbles, and recoveries were slow because rate cuts are less able to revive spending after a bust. Monetary policy may thus be ill-suited to offset a collapse of the AI bubble.
How would an AI investment bust affect recession and recovery?
Core argument: Paul Krugman cites Bernstein and Cummings’ estimate that an AI bust would deliver a negative shock three times larger than the dot-com bust, noting AI-related tech spending and stock market valuations as shares of GDP exceed 1990s boom levels.
The Nixon, Ford, and Volcker recessions resulted from deliberate Fed tightening to curb high inflation, pushing interest rates to very high levels. Since the 1980s, however, inflation has been much less of a problem. Why, then, have recessions continued? Because of private-sector overreach: overenthusiastic companies and lenders taking excessive risks. The 1990–91 recession followed overinvestment in commercial real estate, fueled by runaway lending by newly (and disastrously) deregulated S&Ls. The 2001 recession followed the collapse of the 1990s tech bubble. The 2007–09 recession, the worst since the Depression, followed the bursting of a housing bubble fueled by effectively unregulated “shadow banks.” If another recession comes soon, AI-industry overreach may be responsible. Tight-money recessions are easy to end: the Fed can simply lower rates and loosen credit. But after a burst bubble, lower rates may not revive borrowing and spending, even before rates hit zero [though in two of the three busts rates did indeed hit zero]. Fiscal stimulus is a heavier lift.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Paul Krugman cites Bernstein and Cummings’ estimate that an AI bust would deliver a negative shock three times larger than the dot-com bust, noting AI-related tech spending and stock market valuations as shares of GDP exceed 1990s boom levels.
Krugman argues that recessions caused by private-sector overreach (1990–91, 2001, 2007–09) produce prolonged jobless recoveries, unlike the V-shaped rebounds after Fed tight-money recessions (1969–70, 1973–75, 1980–82), and places an AI bust in the second category.
Krugman states that the 4% federal funds rate limits the monetary response compared with the dot-com bust, when the Fed cut rates 5.5 percentage points from 6.5% to 1%, while political gridlock forecloses fiscal stimulus for at least two years.
Related Articles:
Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected— The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
Financing the AI Buildout— The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
US Labor Productivity Increases at Fastest Pace in a Year— US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
AI Summary.An alternative inflation gauge tracking millions of prices across 87% of the consumer price basket puts headline inflation at 4.4% versus the official 3.7%, but its trimmed mean at 2.2%. The data indicate price increases are concentrated in energy, airfares, and computers rather than broad-based, with tariffs producing one-time increases.
Anna Wong, Troy Durie, Daniel Ripperger-Suhler, Joshua Danial, et al.Bloomberg
Date Posted:
A Bloomberg analysis of real-time prices finds price pressures are more localized now than they were in the 2022 inflation, with the current wave largely driven by the datacenter buildout and the spike in oil prices; e.g. motor fuel is up 39.9% y/y and laptops more than 57%.
Is US inflation driven by a few categories rather than broadly?
Core argument: The Bloomberg Price Project’s trimmed mean, computed across over 30,000 individual products, places underlying inflation at 2.2% through October, below the Cleveland Fed’s 2.7% reading, even as its headline September figure of 4.4% exceeds the official CPI’s 3.7.
The BPP’s trimmed mean shows the underlying pace of inflation at 2.2% through October. That’s already close to the Fed’s 2% target and below the 2.7% reported by the Cleveland Fed, whose data run through September. The tens of thousands of products tracked in the BPP make it possible to pinpoint the drivers of inflation more precisely. When the Fed was hiking rates in big steps in 2022, the data show price pressures across a broader range of categories. This year, the BPP data show only a narrow group of goods driving most of the increases — primarily those related to the AI boom and the war-fueled spike in the cost of oil.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The Bloomberg Price Project’s trimmed mean, computed across over 30,000 individual products, places underlying inflation at 2.2% through October, below the Cleveland Fed’s 2.7% reading, even as its headline September figure of 4.4% exceeds the official CPI’s 3.7.
Motor fuel is up 39.9% year-over-year through late October, with the war in Iran cited as the primary cause, while airline tickets are up 31.3%, with budget carriers accounting for the bulk of that increase.
AI-related demand for memory chips has pushed laptop prices up 57.5% and desktop prices up nearly 20%, while the Bloomberg Price Project finds Trump’s import levies produced a one-time price increase rather than persistent inflation pressure.
Related Articles:
U.S. Inflation Not Getting (Much) Worse, or Better, but Consumers are Fine— U.S. underlying inflation has been remarkably stable for several years at a rate modestly above pre-pandemic levels, and the author argues it will not return to the Federal Reserve's 2% target without deliberate policy action. Consumer spending remains strong, with core retail sales running about 7% annually, roughly 2 percentage points above the 2017–2019 average.
Demand-Driven Inflation— Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022— Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
AI Summary.U.S. underlying inflation has been remarkably stable for several years at a rate modestly above pre-pandemic levels, and the author argues it will not return to the Federal Reserve's 2% target without deliberate policy action. Consumer spending remains strong, with core retail sales running about 7% annually, roughly 2 percentage points above the 2017–2019 average.
Matt KleinThe Overshoot
Date Posted:
Klein observes that recent benchmark revisions to retail sales and inventories suggest that inventories from 2023 to the present have been larger than previously thought– suggesting less risk of shortages, but also less willingness to draw down inventories to cushion supply and demand shocks, allowing larger swings in prices.
Will inflation return to target without deliberate policy action?
Core argument: U.S. CPI rose 0.65% month-over-month in September (8.1% annualized) and PPI for final demand rose 1.34% (17.4% annualized), the fastest since March 2022, while CPI excluding volatile categories ran at 3.0–3.5% annualized.
The big takeaway is that the dollars spent at “nonstore retailers” (e-commerce) and “food services and drinking places” had been overstated by about 12% each, while retailers’ inventories, particularly at “building materials, garden equipment, and supplies dealers” and “general merchandise stores” were revised up. Until the revisions, it had seemed as if retailers were, in the aggregate, running down their inventories and operating with levels of stock that were as tight as during the run on goods in the pandemic and great reopening. Put another way, retailers might have been limiting consumer inflation in the near-term, while creating the risk of larger price increases in the future. The revised numbers suggest less imminent risk of a sudden spike in prices due to inventories running out. But the new data also imply that retailers were not as willing to run down their inventories in response to spikes in demand or disruptions to supply as we had previously thought. In other words, they were not willing to adjust their buffers in order to moderate swings in prices.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
U.S. CPI rose 0.65% month-over-month in September (8.1% annualized) and PPI for final demand rose 1.34% (17.4% annualized), the fastest since March 2022, while CPI excluding volatile categories ran at 3.0–3.5% annualized.
Matthew Klein argues underlying U.S. inflation has been stable for several years at a rate modestly above pre-pandemic levels, with no “immaculate” disinflation to the Federal Reserve’s 2% target without deliberate policy action.
Benchmark revisions cut nonstore retailer and food services sales from 2018 onward by roughly 12% each, leaving the inventory-to-sales ratio flat since 2023 at 2018–2019 levels, with total and core retail sales running about 7% annually.
Related Articles:
Demand-Driven Inflation— Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
The Fed Finally Gets It— Federal Reserve officials' assessed risks to their employment and price stability mandates had tended to move together rather than inversely, suggesting common forces were driving both. That pattern has now shifted, with officials more optimistic on growth and employment and less concerned about downside risks than before the pandemic.
What Six Years of Inflation Mean for the Midterms— US consumer prices have risen almost 29% over the past six years, about 3x the pace of the prior six years, and on average prices have risen faster than wages over that period.
AI Summary.US consumer prices rose 3.7% year over year in September, up from 3.4% in August and above economists' 3.6% forecast, with core prices excluding food and energy up 2.6%. Prices rose faster than average hourly earnings, which increased 3%, meaning many Americans' real incomes are falling.
Konrad PutzierWall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Inflation accelerated in September, rising to 3.7% annualized from August’s 3.4%. Real average hourly earnings fell .7% year over year.
Is inflation accelerating faster than wages, cutting real incomes?
Core argument: U.S. consumer prices rose 3.7% in September from a year earlier, the Labor Department said, up from August’s 3.4% and above the 3.6% expected by economists surveyed by The Wall Street Journal.
Consumer prices were up 3.7% in September from a year earlier, the Labor Department said Wednesday, hotter than August’s gain of 3.4%. That was above the 3.6% rise expected by economists surveyed by The Wall Street Journal. Core prices excluding food and energy rose 2.6%, above forecasts for a 2.5% increase. Month over month, core prices rose by 0.3%, surprising economists who had expected a 0.2% increase. High prices have been a political flashpoint for Americans, who have grown fed up with five years of inflation. Prices rose much faster in September than average hourly earnings, which increased 3% from a year earlier. That means many Americans are seeing their real incomes fall.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
U.S. consumer prices rose 3.7% in September from a year earlier, the Labor Department said, up from August’s 3.4% and above the 3.6% expected by economists surveyed by The Wall Street Journal.
Core prices excluding food and energy rose 2.6% year over year in September, above forecasts of 2.5%, and 0.3% month over month against expectations of 0.2%.
September prices rose much faster than average hourly earnings, which increased 3% from a year earlier, meaning many Americans are seeing real incomes fall.
Related Articles:
Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections— An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
Sticky Wage Norms and the Real Wage Cost of Unexpected Inflation— Firms set nominal wage increases by round-number rules—about 42% of increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number—and these rules rose only from about 2.7% to 3.5% as inflation peaked near 7%, contributing to falling real wages for job stayers.
The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly— Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
AI Summary.An artificial intelligence investment boom that is insensitive to interest rates is drawing capital, electricity and labor away from rate-sensitive sectors such as housing and autos, which the author argues will force the Federal Reserve to hold rates higher for longer. The durable fix is expanding power, chip and infrastructure supply.
Torsten SløkApollo
Date Posted:
Sløk warns the rate-insensitive AI buildout has triggered unbalanced growth in the US economy by crowding out capital, electricity, and labor from vulnerable sectors like housing and autos.
Does a rate-insensitive AI boom force the Fed to keep rates higher?
Core argument: The AI boom’s insensitivity to interest rates is draining capital, power and labor from rate-sensitive sectors such as housing and autos, producing a “Dutch disease” dynamic in the US economy.
AI's rate-insensitive boom is draining capital, power and labor from vulnerable sectors like housing and autos. Trapped between inflation driven by the AI boom and weakness in rate-sensitive industries, the Fed will have to keep interest rates higher for longer. Because monetary policy cannot resolve this sectoral imbalance, the only durable fix is expanding the supply of power, chips and infrastructure.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The AI boom’s insensitivity to interest rates is draining capital, power and labor from rate-sensitive sectors such as housing and autos, producing a “Dutch disease” dynamic in the US economy.
Caught between AI-driven inflation and weakness in rate-sensitive industries, the Federal Reserve will have to hold interest rates higher for longer.
Monetary policy cannot resolve the imbalance between AI and rate-sensitive sectors, leaving expansion of the supply of power, chips and infrastructure as the only durable fix.
Related Articles:
Financing the AI Buildout— The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
AI Set to be Largest CapEx Cycle Ever … and Soon Majority Externally Financed— Hyperscaler and data-center investment is tracking toward $1.5tn annually by 2030, which in real terms would exceed the 2005-06 housing boom, the 1990s fiber peak, and the 1882 railroad peak combined. External debt and equity are projected to fund close to 90% of the buildout, making it dependent on credit markets.
The Macro Implications of the AI Capex Boom— Artificial intelligence capital spending is estimated to add roughly 1.4 percentage points to US growth in one year and about 1.5 points the next, comparable to business investment's contribution during the tech bubble. A material part of that estimate reflects profits at Nvidia and a few other chipmakers that are unlikely to be recycled back into the economy.
AI Summary.The gap between French and German 10-year government bond yields exceeded 140 basis points, up from 40–50 basis points, which the author attributes to political choices favoring pensioners over bondholders, including a suspended pension reform leaving the minimum retirement age near 62. French over-65s hold higher average incomes than working-age people.
Hanno LustigThe Two Cents
Date Posted:
France has signaled that pensioners are the senior claimants on government revenues. In 2026, private investors must absorb net bond issuance equal to 7.5% of GDP, after years when ECB purchases exceeded issuance.
Why has France's borrowing cost gap with Germany widened?
Core argument: The French OAT-Bund 10-year spread exceeded 140 basis points in mid-2025, up from 40–50 basis points between 2022 and June 2024, which Lustig attributes to political decisions prioritizing pensioners over bondholders.
France’s 10-year spread over Germany has risen above 140bp, from 40–50bp before mid-2024. France has repeatedly signaled that pensioners are senior claimants on government revenues: pension reforms have been weakened or reversed, while governments trying to restrain pension spending have fallen. The minimum retirement age is now 62 years and 9 months, and French over-65s have higher average incomes than the working-age population. Meanwhile, ECB purchases exceeded French net bond issuance in five years from 2015–22, so private investors were net sellers of French bonds; in 2026 they must absorb net issuance equal to 7.5% of GDP. The 10-year (r-g) gap has swung from −3.9pp in October 2020 to +1.9pp. French insurers and pension funds’ share of negotiable government debt has fallen from about 25% in 2014 to under 11%, while nonresidents’ share has risen to 57.5%.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The French OAT-Bund 10-year spread exceeded 140 basis points in mid-2025, up from 40–50 basis points between 2022 and June 2024, which Lustig attributes to political decisions prioritizing pensioners over bondholders.
France’s legal minimum retirement age remains frozen at 62 years and 9 months for men — the lowest in the Eurozone except Bulgaria — after Prime Minister Lecornu suspended the 2023 pension reform, and French over-65s hold higher average incomes than the working-age population.
French insurers and pension funds’ share of France’s negotiable state debt fell from about 25% in 2014 to under 11%, non-residents hold 57.5% of OATs, and private investors are projected to absorb 7.5% of GDP in net issuance in 2026.
Related Articles:
Soaring Yields Find Europe’s Weak Spot— A rapid rise in long-term US Treasury yields has highlighted vulnerabilities elsewhere, notably France, where risks are elevated. Because France is in the euro zone, any crisis there would extend to the currency area, and European stocks have sold off alongside a weakening euro.
France Seeks To Rein In Pensions And State Salaries In 2027— France plans to narrow its budget deficit to 5% of GDP by cutting state spending, capping increases to pensions and civil servant salaries, and raising taxes. Deteriorating public finances have left France borrowing at higher interest rates than Italy and Greece, with 10-year bond yields reaching their highest since 2002.
Global Debt Report 2026— Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.