Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

Macro Roundup

Econ Summary Highlights Debate

Thursday, September 10, 2026

AI Summary. Firms' wage-setting norms are sticky, rising only from 2.7% to 3.5% even as inflation peaked near 7%, causing real wages for workers who stayed in their jobs to fall systematically. By the time inflation subsided, the median firm's wage rule had converged to ~3%, roughly matching inflation.

Erik Hurst, Christina Patterson, Nela Richardson, and Ye Liv Wang University of Chicago
Date Posted:

ADP microdata from 2016–25 suggest firms set wages according to “wage norms” ~ invariant to inflation. The 2020–21 inflation surge mechanically reduced real wages. By the end of 2025, 34% of incumbent workers’ real wages were lower than in 2020.

Do sticky wage norms systematically reduce real wages during inflation spikes?

Core argument: Firm-level modal wage rules peaked at 3.5% in 2022–2023 against roughly 7% inflation, meaning nominal rigidity systematically eroded real wages for job stayers throughout the inflationary episode.

Roughly 42% of all nominal wage increases below 6% were within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number [Figure 6]. Figure 9 plots the employment-weighted average modal wage change across firms (solid line) alongside inflation rate (dashed line) from 2016 through 2025. In the pre-pandemic period, firm-level wage rules were relatively stable at a median of 2.7%, modestly above the rate of inflation. Beginning in 2021, inflation rose sharply, peaking at approximately seven percent in 2022. The average modal wage change also rose, reaching a peak of 3.5% in 2022 and 2023. By 2025, the median firm had a wage rule granting increases of three percent, roughly in line with inflation. The stickiness of firms’ wage rules in the face of inflationary pressure contributed to the systematic fall in real wages for job stayers. Evidence from Belgium [which has strong wage indexation], suggests that declining real wages, rather than inflation itself, helps explain the persistence of depressed consumer sentiment during the 2021–2024 period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Firm-level modal wage rules peaked at 3.5% in 2022–2023 against roughly 7% inflation, meaning nominal rigidity systematically eroded real wages for job stayers throughout the inflationary episode.
  2. The median firm’s modal wage increase converged to 3% by 2025—matching inflation rather than exceeding it—marking a reversal from the pre-pandemic norm of 2.7% modestly above price growth.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Prime-age (25–54) and older (55–64) employment rates in Europe exceed those in the U.S., disproving the claim that European welfare systems suppress work. Higher-welfare northern European countries tend to have higher employment rates than lower-welfare southern ones.

Chris Giles Financial Times
Date Posted:

Despite Europe’s high social spending relative to the US, Chris Giles notes that prime-age adult (25–54) labor force participation in the Eurozone has overtaken that of the US, and there has been a dramatic convergence in the LFP of older workers.

Does European welfare actually discourage work?

Core argument: Prime-age adults (25–54) and older workers (55–64) both achieve higher employment rates in Europe than in the U.S., refuting the premise that generous welfare systems suppress labor force participation.

It does not matter whether you use EU or Eurozone data, prime-age adults (between 25 and 54) in Europe are more likely to be in work than those in the US. Older people (between 55 and 64) also have higher employment rates in Europe. Younger people (between 15 and 24) are more likely to have a job in the US, but that results from Europeans educating themselves for longer. The proportion of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe. So welfare is not stopping work. More than that, the higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, although there is convergence within the Eurozone. Spain, in particular, has enjoyed rapid improvements.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Prime-age adults (25–54) and older workers (55–64) both achieve higher employment rates in Europe than in the U.S., refuting the premise that generous welfare systems suppress labor force participation.
  2. The U.S. records a higher share of young people (15–24) not in education, employment, or training than Europe, indicating that lower U.S. youth employment reflects weaker human capital investment, not stronger labor markets.
  3. Within Europe, higher-welfare northern economies consistently outperform lower-welfare southern ones on employment rates, though intra-Eurozone convergence is underway, led by rapid gains in Spain.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. U.S. Treasury yields have surged to multi-decade highs across maturities, with the 30-year yield reaching levels not seen since 2007 and the 10-year approaching 5%. Rising oil prices are driving inflation expectations, pushing markets to price in near-certain Federal Reserve rate hikes within months.

Elizabeth Stanton Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The 10-year Treasury yield rose 9bp to 4.92%, and the 30-year rose to ~5.35%. The increase in yields stoked demand at today’s 30-year auction, which cleared at 5.308%.

Are higher oil prices forcing the Fed to abandon its rate-cut plans?

Core argument: The 30-year Treasury yield reached its highest level since 2007 and the 10-year hit 4.93%, its highest since November 2023, as an oil-driven inflation surge pushed traders to price a Fed rate hike at 70% odds for next week.

Yields on US government debt rose to fresh multiyear highs — stoking demand for an auction of 30-year bonds. Treasury yields rose by five to 12 basis points across maturities, with the 30-year benchmark reaching levels last seen in 2007. The selloff lured investors to a $22 billion auction of 30-year bonds, which drew historically strong demand. The new securities were awarded at 5.308%, nearly three basis points lower than their yield in pre-auction trading just before the bidding deadline, meaning that bidders at higher yield levels missed out. Investor demand was so strong that a record low 2.2% of the sale went to Wall Street dealers. The auction’s 5.308% result was 2.7 basis points lower than the market level going in, the second-biggest negative gap on record in the past five years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 30-year Treasury yield reached its highest level since 2007 and the 10-year hit 4.93%, its highest since November 2023, as an oil-driven inflation surge pushed traders to price a Fed rate hike at 70% odds for next week.
  2. The $22 billion 30-year bond reopening carried an indicated yield of ~5.35%, exceeding every 30-year auction result back to 2001 and signaling a structural repricing of long-duration U.S. sovereign risk.
  3. The two-year note yield surpassed 4.5% for the first time since 2024, with markets fully pricing a Fed hike by October rather than December, compressing the expected tightening timeline by two months.

Related Articles:

  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — CBO projects a deficit of 5.8% of GDP in 2026, unchanged from 2025. Outlays, at 23.3% of GDP, will exceed their 50-year mean by 2.1pp; revenue of 17.5% is just…
  • America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t — The safety premium that investors historically paid for US government bonds over equivalent alternatives has compressed toward zero and, at longer maturities, reversed — with global investors now pricing foreign government bonds as safer than US Treasurys.
  • How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence? — A 0.5% annual productivity growth boost would reduce publicly held federal debt by 39% of GDP over 30 years, cutting roughly half of the projected rise from 101% to 175% of GDP, through higher tax revenue, slower spending growth relative to GDP, and debt dilution that outweighs higher borrowing costs.

AI Summary. Long-term interest rates have risen 45–79 basis points across major economies, with the AI investment boom—not fiscal or monetary policy—driving the surge in demand for capital. A comparable IT spending wave in the late 1990s coincided with even higher long-term rates despite low inflation and a budget surplus.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:

Noting long-term yields have risen across advanced economies, Krugman argues increased yields over the last 6 months “may not have much to do with policy at all,” but are more likely due to “the surge in demand for funds as a result of the AI boom.”

Is artificial intelligence investment driving up global borrowing costs?

Core argument: Bruegel finds 30-year sovereign yields rose 45–79 bps across the U.S., Germany, France, Italy, the U.K., and Japan in the six months to Aug. 28, with the U.S. at 58 bps, suggesting a global demand-for-capital driver rather than U.S.-specific fiscal policy.

What [has been] driving interest rates higher [in the six months to August 28]? The European think tank Bruegel notes “US, German, French, Italian, UK, and Japanese 30-year yields [all] rose by 45-79 basis points in the six months to 28 August, with the US in the middle at 58bp.” It may not have much to do with policy at all, [but is instead due to] the surge in demand for funds as a result of the AI boom. We are in the midst of a surge in spending on IT that is on track to be even bigger than the boom of the late 1990s, [when] long-term rates were even higher then than they are now, even though inflation was low and we had a budget surplus.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bruegel finds 30-year sovereign yields rose 45–79 bps across the U.S., Germany, France, Italy, the U.K., and Japan in the six months to Aug. 28, with the U.S. at 58 bps, suggesting a global demand-for-capital driver rather than U.S.-specific fiscal policy.

Related Articles:

  • Bessent’s Upsized Buybacks Get Hit by Treasury-Market Reality — The U.S. Treasury tripled its debt buyback program to $6bn in longer-dated securities, but markets sold off anyway, pushing 10-year yields to their highest level since 2023.
  • Rising Bond Yields Are Good, Actually — Higher interest rates remain low relative to nominal income and spending growth of ~7% annually, making current rate levels benign rather than restrictive. Elevated rates help reallocate spending away from consumption and housing toward productive investment, or attract foreign capital to fund that shift.
  • Don’t Draw The Wrong Conclusion From Treasury Yields — Rising long-term bond yields reflect higher expected short-term interest rates over the next decade, not concerns about government debt sustainability, as both inflation expectations and the risk premium for holding long-term bonds have remained stable.

AI Summary. Deep-tech investment outside AI has exceeded $150bn since early 2024, surpassing the $133bn invested across the entire prior decade. Falling valuations for traditional software companies and outsized returns from early bets on capital-intensive ventures are pushing investors toward riskier, science-driven deals.

Tim Bradshaw Financial Times
Date Posted:

Since the start of 2024, more than $150B of venture capital has been invested into non-AI “deep tech” firms whose products are rooted in significant engineering advances, exceeding the $133B invested in such firms btw 2010 and 2019.

Are investors abandoning software for capital-intensive science bets?

Core argument: Deep-tech investment excluding AI exceeded $150bn since early 2024, surpassing the entire $133bn deployed across the prior decade (through end-2019), as falling valuations for traditional software push venture capital toward capital-intensive scientific bets.

The AI boom is fuelling a resurgence in ambitious “moonshot” bets, as early SpaceX backers’ huge returns and falling valuations for traditional software companies force tech investors to embrace riskier and more capital-intensive dealmaking. Excluding the giant sums ploughed into AI start-ups, global investment in “deep tech” — companies whose products are rooted in big scientific or engineering advances — has exceeded $150bn since the start of 2024, more than the $133bn in the entire decade to the end of 2019, according to Dealroom. This year’s deep-tech investments have not yet surpassed 2021’s peak, which was propelled by battery and electric vehicle deals for the likes of Rivian and Northvolt — many of which turned sour, highlighting the risks involved in moonshot dealmaking.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Deep-tech investment excluding AI exceeded $150bn since early 2024, surpassing the entire $133bn deployed across the prior decade (through end-2019), as falling valuations for traditional software push venture capital toward capital-intensive scientific bets.
  2. The 2021 deep-tech peak — driven by battery and electric vehicle deals including Rivian and Northvolt — has not yet been surpassed, and the subsequent losses from those deals underscore the capital destruction risk inherent in moonshot dealmaking.

Related Articles:

  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Btw 1985-2021 the capital intensity of the American economy was relatively flat as a rise in intangible investment was offset by a decline in tangible…
  • Public to Private Equity in the United States: A Long-Term Look — Global venture capital returns are highly skewed: 62% of deals lose money, more than half lose 50–100% of invested capital, but fat-tailed outliers drive overall returns. This pattern mirrors historical whaling voyages, where payoffs were similarly variable and driven by rare outsized outcomes.
  • Gross and Net US Investment — Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment merely replaces depreciating assets. The shift toward faster-depreciating information technology assets requires larger gross investment increases to achieve any given gain in productive capital per worker.

Wednesday, September 9, 2026

AI Summary. The Current Population Survey systematically understates income receipt, with nearly half of measured variables showing downward bias of 40% or more when benchmarked against administrative tax and program records. Bias is modest for Social Security programs (under 15%) but exceeds 40% for pensions, unemployment insurance, and food stamps.

Bruce Meyer, Nikolas Mittag, Derek Wu, Anthony Tatarka, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:

CPS reports of receipts in dollar terms are 40–60% below administrative benchmarks for income sources such as SNAP and pensions. Linked records show most of the gap comes from recipients reporting no receipt at all, not underestimating amounts.

Does survey data systematically undercount household income sources?

To directly measure bias in survey estimates, we calculate the difference between the weighted survey estimate and the survey target constructed from published totals [TSE or total survey error], using public-data adjustments for intentional coverage differences for average dollars received and the recipient share of the population across our income sources. Figures 1 and 2 summarize TSE in the CPS from 1984 to 2022, expressed as a share of the survey target for our measures of recipients (seven income sources) and dollars (eight income sources). In levels, TSE is almost always negative for both recipients and dollars (with SSI dollars an exception in recent years), indicating that survey means are systematically biased downward. For nearly half of the variables the bias is 40% or more. Yet, there is substantial heterogeneity across income sources. TSE tends to be more modest for SSA programs (specifically OASDI and OASI, for which the net bias is below 15% for recipients and dollars), while it is much larger for income sources such as pensions, UI, and SNAP (for which the net understatement exceeds 40%).

Related Articles:

AI Summary. The U.S. Treasury tripled its debt buyback program to $6bn in longer-dated securities, but markets sold off anyway, pushing 10-year yields to their highest level since 2023.

Greg Ritchie and Alex Harris Bloomberg
Date Posted:

The 10-year Treasury yield rose to ~4.85%, its highest level since 2023, after the Treasury announced a planned buyback of $6B, less than many market participants had expected, despite being 3x the size of the previous operation.

Does buying back more debt actually reduce market anxiety about deficits?

Core argument: The Treasury’s $6 billion buyback of 10–20-year securities — triple the $2 billion initially signaled — failed to suppress borrowing costs, with the 10-year yield rising 5 basis points to 4.83%, its highest level since 2023.

The US Treasury tripled the initial size of its next buyback of longer-dated government debt, in an announcement that was met with initial disappointment by investors. The Treasury Department said it will buy up to $6 billion of outstanding securities set to mature in the 10- to 20-year sector. It’s the first such operation under an expanded buybacks program that showcases Secretary Scott Bessent’s resolve to stem the recent rise in borrowing costs. The new figure is triple the amount initially communicated to investors of $2 billion. Treasuries extended an earlier decline after the release, with the yield on 10-year notes up about 6 basis points to 4.85% as of 11:35 a.m. in New York — their highest level since 2023.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Treasury’s $6 billion buyback of 10–20-year securities — triple the $2 billion initially signaled — failed to suppress borrowing costs, with the 10-year yield rising 5 basis points to 4.83%, its highest level since 2023.
  2. Investor disappointment with Secretary Bessent’s expanded buyback program indicates that fiscal-trajectory concerns are outpacing the Treasury’s ability to manage long-end yields through open-market operations.

Related Articles:

  • Bessent’s Bond Gains Wiped Out as Treasury Yields Jump Again — A Treasury buyback program that briefly suppressed long-term government borrowing costs has been fully reversed by renewed global bond selling, with 30-year yields back at 5.27% and 10-year yields ~10 basis points higher than before the intervention.
  • America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t — The safety premium that investors historically paid for US government bonds over equivalent alternatives has compressed toward zero and, at longer maturities, reversed — with global investors now pricing foreign government bonds as safer than US Treasurys.
  • Rising Bond Yields Are Good, Actually — Higher interest rates remain low relative to nominal income and spending growth of ~7% annually, making current rate levels benign rather than restrictive. Elevated rates help reallocate spending away from consumption and housing toward productive investment, or attract foreign capital to fund that shift.

AI Summary. Japan's era as a reliable source of cheap borrowing is ending as interest rates rise, unwinding decades of low-rate financial assumptions.

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:

Authers pictures Japan exiting its ultra-low rate regime that helped drive the real effective yen to ~ half its 1990 level. Higher yields should curb yen carry, raise demand for Japanese assets, and force the “world …to do without Japanese funding.”

Is Japan's cheap money era finally coming to an end?

Core argument: Japan’s decades-long role as the world’s low-cost funding source is unwinding as rising interest rates erode the carry-trade economics that made yen borrowing the default strategy across global markets.

For decades, finance has treated Japan as the exception to all rules. While the rest of the world surged and collapsed, Japan trudged on with minimal interest rates and sluggish growth — a safe place to borrow money cheap, through any number of elaborate trades. Last week’s news that Norway’s Norges Fund, one of the biggest sovereign wealth pools, was reallocating its fixed income portfolio in a way that likely shifts from Treasuries to Japanese bonds prompted speculation that more international money would move back to Tokyo and its newly competitive yields. Overnight rates are now forecast to go up by a full percentage point over the next 12 months, to 1.9%, following a shift in perception of the economy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan’s decades-long role as the world’s low-cost funding source is unwinding as rising interest rates erode the carry-trade economics that made yen borrowing the default strategy across global markets.
  2. The shift in Japan’s monetary regime forces investors to reprice risk across asset classes that were structured around the assumption of perpetually near-zero Japanese rates.

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AI Summary. AI-driven data-center expansion and related professional hiring have added roughly 1.05m jobs above trend since 2022–2023, spanning electrical contracting, equipment manufacturing, software development, and data science. The job gains exceed what broader construction, manufacturing, and professional employment trends would predict.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The Economist estimates that so far the AI boom has created ~1mm new jobs in the US, exceeding their estimate of ~200,000 layoffs attributed to AI since mid-2023.

Is artificial intelligence creating a genuine employment boom or temporary hiring surge?

Core argument: AI-linked demand has generated roughly 730,000 above-trend jobs in engineering, software development, and data science since 2022, substantially outpacing near-term displacement effects.

[We] tracked five industries at the heart of the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing. Since 2023 employment in them has risen by roughly 320,000 more than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Not all of those jobs owe their existence to AI—grid upgrades and other factory building matters too. [We also] tracked employment in professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—and compared their growth since 2022 with professional employment overall. These roles have added roughly 730,000 jobs above trend in recent years. AI will not have created every single one of them. But it has almost certainly created quite a few.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. AI-linked demand has generated roughly 730,000 above-trend jobs in engineering, software development, and data science since 2022, substantially outpacing near-term displacement effects.
  2. Data-centre construction has added approximately 320,000 above-trend jobs across electrical contracting and equipment manufacturing since 2023, with grid upgrades and broader factory-building contributing alongside AI demand.

Related Articles:

  • The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era — S. 575 between 2022 and 2026, the first sustained decline in relative demand for college-educated labor in four decades. AI exposure in white-collar occupations accounts for roughly 28% of that drop, as wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-AI-exposure jobs where college graduates are concentrated.
  • Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Young workers in the most AI-exposed occupations face an employment shortfall ~19% below less-exposed peers, driven by reduced hiring rather than job losses, and concentrated in roles where AI replaces rather than complements human tasks.
  • Looking for the Ladder — The downtick in hiring in AI-exposed occupations started 6 months prior to the release of ChatGPT, and is “perfectly” aligned with the start of Fed rate hikes…

AI Summary. S. facilities, targeting 10,000 units annually by 2028 at mid-six-figure euro prices — a fraction of the $4m–$6m cost of comparable Tomahawk missiles. Lower unit cost enables large-scale barrages to saturate hardened targets such as weapons factories and military bases.

Laura Pitel Financial Times
Date Posted:

Covenant, a defense start-up, is opening manufacturing facilities in the US, Germany, and Israel to manufacture its new deep-strike munition at scale, with a production target of 5,000 annually at its US and German sites in 2028.

Can cheaper missiles enable more effective saturation attacks on hardened targets?

Core argument: Covenant’s Anthem missile, priced in the mid-six-figure euro range, costs roughly 10–25x less than a Tomahawk ($4mn–$6mn), enabling saturation-barrage tactics that offset its smaller 250kg warhead through sheer volume.

Covenant aims to produce 1,000 Anthem missiles a year at each of its German and US plants in 2027, and 5,000 a year at each site from 2028. [Anthem] would cost in the “mid six-figure” euros — a fraction of the price of Tomahawks, which are sold to overseas governments for roughly $4mn-$6mn apiece. Covenant declined to state the range of the Anthem but [Covenant's CEO] said the concept was partly a response to a German-British plan to jointly develop “deep precision strike” weapons with a range of more than 2,000km. Anthem will carry a warhead weighing up to 250kg half the 450kg payload of a Tomahawk. But Covenant said the lower cost and ability to be produced at scale would allow militaries to fire large barrages of the missiles to “saturate” targets such as weapons factories or military bases.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Covenant’s Anthem missile, priced in the mid-six-figure euro range, costs roughly 10–25x less than a Tomahawk ($4mn–$6mn), enabling saturation-barrage tactics that offset its smaller 250kg warhead through sheer volume.
  2. Covenant targets production of 1,000 Anthem missiles per year at each of its German and U.S. plants by 2027, scaling to 5,000 per site annually by 2028, with €130mn in orders already booked.

Related Articles:

Tuesday, September 8, 2026

AI Summary. New York City's top 1% captured nearly two-thirds of real income growth between 2019 and 2024, versus under 40% nationally, driven by capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wages.

Jonathan Siegel and Jason Bram Office of the New York City Comptroller
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Is capital income concentration widening faster in major cities than nationally?

Core argument: Nearly two-thirds of New York City’s real income growth from 2019–2024 accrued to the top 1%, versus under 40% nationally, driven by faster-rising capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wage divergence.

Between 2019 and 2024, the New York City’s income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than the nation's, and nearly two-thirds of the real income growth over the period accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally. The result also holds when volatile capital gains are excluded. Real median income fell over the period, and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat. Adjusted for local prices (but not for transfer programs), the purchasing power of income for the lower 90% of New Yorkers is close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally. The divergence at the top is predominantly a story of non-wage income. Wage and salary income shows a much milder widening, and occupational wage data that exclude bonuses show base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than in higher-wage ones, and within many occupational groups wages are converging rather than growing more unequal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly two-thirds of New York City’s real income growth from 2019–2024 accrued to the top 1%, versus under 40% nationally, driven by faster-rising capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wage divergence.
  2. The bottom 90% of New York City earners hold purchasing power roughly one-fifth below their national counterparts after adjusting for local prices, even before accounting for transfer programs.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Global student performance in mathematics and reading has declined sharply since 2018, with reading scores falling 14 points and math scores falling 9 points between 2022 and 2025 alone.

OECD Staff Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database

Mean OECD math and reading scores fell roughly 25 PISA points—about a year of schooling—between 2018 and 2025, alongside reduced motivation and engagement and increased carelessness, exemplified by a near-doubling of “hasty readers.”

Are global education systems failing to teach core skills?

Core argument: The share of “hasty readers” — students giving fast, incorrect responses — nearly doubled from 7% in 2018 to 11% in 2025, with math showing a parallel rise between 2022 and 2025, signaling deteriorating effort and engagement rather than pure skill loss.

In math, performance remained close to the 2003 level up to 2018, then dropped sharply btw 2018 and 2025. Mean performance dropped by 9 score points in mathematics and about 14 score points in reading btw 2022 and 2025. Over the 2018-2025 period, the largest drops [in reading] were among the most advantaged 25% of socio-economic status, and the socio-economic gap with the most disadvantaged students reduced somewhat, by 11 points, on average across 35 OECD countries. In mathematics, the share of disadvantaged students scoring below proficiency Level 2 increased in previous cycles and remained high in 2025; among advantaged students, the share scoring below proficiency Level 2 increased, reaching 18% in 2025, about 4pp. Students’ reports of their motivation for learning and engagement with school also declined between 2022 and 2025. The proportion of “hasty readers” – those who gave fast and incorrect responses – increased by about five percentage points, on average, from almost 7% in 2018 to 11% in 2025. Analyses for math, also show an increase in the proportion of hasty responses between 2022 and 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of “hasty readers” — students giving fast, incorrect responses — nearly doubled from 7% in 2018 to 11% in 2025, with math showing a parallel rise between 2022 and 2025, signaling deteriorating effort and engagement rather than pure skill loss.
  2. Among the most advantaged quartile of students, the share scoring below math proficiency Level 2 reached 18% in 2025, up approximately 4 percentage points, indicating that academic decline is no longer concentrated among disadvantaged populations.

Related Articles:

AI Summary. Non-college workers ages 22–34 are experiencing historically low unemployment relative to their own two-decade range, outperforming college-educated peers on that relative measure. College graduates still hold an absolute advantage, with a 2.7% unemployment rate versus 4.7% for high-school-only workers.

Theo Francis and Ray Smith Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
Is Database:
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In 2026, the 12-month moving-average unemployment for college-educated 22–34-year-olds is above its post-2003 mean, while the rate for non-college peers is historically low. Prime-age college grads still have lower unemployment than those with no degree.

Is the job market finally tightening for workers without degrees?

Core argument: Non-college workers ages 22–34 are experiencing one of their strongest job markets in two decades, with unemployment rates near historic lows relative to their own 2003–present range, outperforming their college-educated peers on that relative measure.

The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades. To gauge how the job market has shifted for each cohort, [Gad Levanon, Burning Glass’s chief economist] compared current unemployment rates for the different groups with their own range of unemployment rates since 2003. The analysis included data through July. By that measure, the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers, including those in construction and on manufacturing lines, and manual-service workers. It is [however] still easier to find a job with a college degree. The unemployment rate for degree-holders in their prime working years—ages 25 to 54—averaged 2.7% for the 12 months ending in July - well below the 3.6% rate for workers with just some college education, and 4.7% for people with a high-school diploma only.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Non-college workers ages 22–34 are experiencing one of their strongest job markets in two decades, with unemployment rates near historic lows relative to their own 2003–present range, outperforming their college-educated peers on that relative measure.
  2. On an absolute basis, a college degree still confers a significant labor-market advantage: prime-age degree-holders averaged 2.7% unemployment versus 3.6% for some-college workers and 4.7% for high-school-only workers over the 12 months ending July.

Related Articles:

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AI Summary. Chinese social media is saturated with viral posts about low wages, job scarcity, falling property values, and economic despair, despite increasingly aggressive censorship. The volume of pessimistic and satirical content surviving China's censorship apparatus signals the depth of public anxiety about the economy.

Li Yuan New York Times
Date Posted:

Attitudes expressed on Chinese social media are increasingly negative. Given that the “censorship apparatus still controls the internet,” the increasingly negative online sentiment, much of it about “economic despair,” is “striking,” Li Yuan remarks.

Is China's censorship failing to contain economic despair online?

Core argument: Viral feeds on RedNote, Douyin, and Weibo are saturated with posts about meager wages, scarce jobs, and falling property values, signaling that economic despair has become the dominant register of Chinese social media.

Across RedNote, Douyin, Weibo and other popular platforms, you can scroll endless posts about meager wages, scarce jobs, falling property values and fear about the future. Some turn their hardships into dark humor. Others hijack official posts and hashtags and turn propaganda into spectacles of mockery. China’s internet censorship has grown increasingly ruthless over the past decade. That makes the sheer volume of the pessimistic posts and sarcastic comments all the more striking. When [Li Yuan opened her] RedNote in recent weeks, [she] was surprised to find that the first 30 or so posts were nearly all about economic despair, many with hundreds or thousands of likes. The suggested searches could be even gloomier. “Is there a future for employment in China?” read one.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Viral feeds on RedNote, Douyin, and Weibo are saturated with posts about meager wages, scarce jobs, and falling property values, signaling that economic despair has become the dominant register of Chinese social media.
  2. Chinese citizens are hijacking official hashtags and propaganda posts to stage public mockery, converting state messaging into vehicles for dissent despite a decade of increasingly ruthless censorship.

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