Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube
  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
  • Mentions 521
  • Primary focus 253
For whatever topics you select (currently: Financial Markets):
Choose search scope

Your importance filter 'Database' shows fewer articles.

Remove filters to see full article counts

Foreign Capital Flows Into US Stocks Hit Record As Appetite For Debt Fades

AI Summary. Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US stocks and investment fund shares over 12 months, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Foreign demand for US debt securities moved in the opposite direction, falling to a net $188bn in the second quarter from $314bn in the first.

Michael Taffe and George Steer Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Foreign investors bought a record net $426B of US equities and fund shares in Q2, up 62% y/y, part of a record $942B in the 12 months through July. Overseas investors bought a net $188B of US debt securities in Q2, down from $314B in Q1.

Are foreign investors shifting from US debt into US stocks?

Core argument: Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985.

Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, accelerating a shift in overseas investment towards American stocks and away from debt. The flows represented the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares by foreign investors jumped to $426bn in the second quarter, up 62% from the same period in 2025, and surpassing the previous quarterly record of $299bn in 2022, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Foreign demand for US debt moved in the opposite direction. Overseas investors bought a net $188bn of US debt securities in the second quarter, down from $314bn in the first.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985.
  2. Net foreign purchases of US equities and investment fund shares reached $426bn in the second quarter, up 62% from the same period in 2025 and above the prior quarterly record of $299bn in 2022, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
  3. Overseas investors bought a net $188bn of US debt securities in the second quarter, down from $314bn in the first.

Related Articles:

  • World’s Unusually High Dollar Exposure Risks Fueling Selloff — Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure, the lowest share since at least 2015. With some of the largest holders of US assets carrying little protection against a weaker dollar, the currency is at risk of steeper declines if sentiment turns.
  • Foreign Investors Prefer US Stocks To Treasuries As Debt Worries Grow — International flows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP over a year, overtaking flows into US Treasuries at 2% of GDP for the first time this century outside brief episodes during the Covid-19 pandemic and after the global financial crisis, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
Previous articleSeptember 25, 2026The Biggest Hot Potato In HistoryCharles Gave argues that East Asia’s post-1997 model of undervalued currencies, which has generated >5T in FX reserves, has run its course. His prescription is aggressive China-led revaluation to shift purchasing power toward Asian consumers.Next articleSeptember 28, 2026This AI Moment: The House View, Q4 2026Kedrosky argues that the “inevitable transition” from the current inflationary AI-buildout regime to a new regime in which AI-driven productivity gains exert deflationary pressure is “where the real macro risk lies.”
Showing 253 database articles primarily about Financial Markets
Currently filtering by:
  • Remove 'Database'

Can The AI Boom Make Enough Money To Sustain Itself?

AI Summary. The Economist estimates artificial intelligence needs roughly $3tn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to earn a conventional return, a figure other analysts have also reached. That equals almost a tenth of the roughly $35tn in total worker compensation across rich OECD countries.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
November 12, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The Economist calculates that the US data center buildout needs ~$3T in revenue by 2030 to offer a competitive ROI. That amounts to ~18% of US annual labor compensation inclusive of health care or ~10% of labor compensation across the OECD.

How much revenue does the AI buildout need to pay off?

Core argument: The Economist calculates that AI needs roughly $3trn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to deliver a conventional rate of return.

The Economist calculates that AI needs around $3trn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to offer a conventional rate of return. Other analysts, including Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh of Columbia Business School and a duo at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, have reached similar figures. To put that number into perspective, all compensation for all workers—wages, plus perks like health insurance—adds up to around $16.5trn in America, or $35trn across the OECD, a club mostly of rich countries. So AI would need to lay claim to almost a tenth of today’s rich-world wages for the data-centre boom to pencil out. Of course, that could happen in a more benign fashion if the entire economy grows swiftly—and AI evangelists do also expect dramatic growth from here.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Economist calculates that AI needs roughly $3trn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to deliver a conventional rate of return.
  2. The $3trn figure amounts to almost a tenth of the roughly $35trn in total worker compensation across the OECD, which compares with about $16.5trn in America alone.
  3. Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh of Columbia Business School and a pair of researchers at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research have reached similar revenue figures, while AI evangelists expect dramatic economic growth from here.

Related Articles:

  • Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected — The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
  • Why Does Our 2030 Revenue Hurdle Differ From Consensus? — Azhar and Gildea put AI infrastructure’s 2030 revenue hurdle at $910B, versus $2.9T from Van Nieuwerburgh and $2.4T in Bernstein–Cummings’ middle case. Using…
  • No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector — Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

The Stock Market’s Read On The Midterms, In Its Winners And Losers

AI Summary. Stocks rose broadly after a sweeping Democratic win in midterm elections, with health insurers tied to the Affordable Care Act and solar companies gaining while data-center firms and companies linked to Trump and Musk fell. The move reflects the increment beyond already-priced-in Democratic victories, from greater certainty and a larger-than-expected margin.

Jason Furman Econvitals
Date Posted:
November 5, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Furman notes that between election day and Wednesday’s close there were broad-based gains for the solar sector and health companies, particularly those with close ties to the ACA, even though substantial, while less dramatic, Democratic victories in the House and Senate were already priced in. [Note: Today saw technology stocks plunge, pushing the S&P 500 down ~4% and the Nasdaq down ~5%]. 

How do stock winners and losers reveal expected election policy impacts?

Core argument: The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections, and the composition of winners and losers indicates what the market expects the policy impact to be.

The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections. Perhaps more interesting, and more telling, was the composition, which shows what the market thinks the policy impact of the election will be: health companies (especially ones like Centene, with close ties to the Affordable Care Act) and solar companies were up, while data-center companies and Trump- and Musk-related companies were down. And remember, Democratic victories were already priced in, so this is just the additional increment from greater certainty as well as the larger-than-expected magnitude. 

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections, and the composition of winners and losers indicates what the market expects the policy impact to be.
  2. Health companies with close ties to the Affordable Care Act, such as Centene, and solar companies rose after the midterms, while data-center companies and Trump- and Musk-related companies fell.
  3. Democratic victories were already priced into the stock market, so the post-election move reflects only the added increment from greater certainty and the larger-than-expected magnitude.

Related Articles:

  • Now You Can See Everything — Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won, putting an estimated 37.5 GW of planned capacity at risk of a pause and another 15 GW subject to conditions such as grid cost-sharing, water limits, and ended tax incentives. The 37 GW expected in 2027, 75% already under construction, is largely unaffected.
  • How Americans Voted in 2026 — Estimates of US voter behavior combine interviews with 26,706 voters nationally, re-interviews with more than 7,000 voters after they cast ballots, precinct- and county-level results, validated turnout for 44% of voters, and state voter registration files.
  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Politics

This Time Would Have To Be Very Different. Part II

AI Summary. Holding US corporate free cash flow at its record 15% share of gross value added and keeping valuation multiples fixed implies a real expected return of about 5.3%, below what US corporate capital has historically delivered. Earning the historical average would require that cash flow share to keep rising, a bet on capital gaining at labor's expense.

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents
Date Posted:
November 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

If the free cash flow of the entire US corporate sector were to hold at its record ~15% share of corporate value added, corporations would return only ~5.3% over the next decade. To earn the historical mean return, FCF would have to keep rising, implying a structural transformation favoring capital at labor’s expense.

Do record corporate cash flows still imply below-average expected stock returns?

Core argument: Holding the multiple fixed, a 3.26% free cash flow yield plus the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ 4.58% projected nominal GDP growth and 2.5% inflation implies a real expected return of roughly 5.3% on US corporate debt plus equity.

At a CAPE of 40.7 US stocks look extremely expensive, and expected returns are low, especially compared to TIPS yields. Plugging in today’s numbers, you back out an expected real return of around 3% over the next decade, compared to a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.6%. Now, instead of an investor holding a single share, we could look at an investor who owns the entire corporate sector, all equity, bonds, and other liabilities. This investor acquired a claim to FCF, the total amount of cash that can be paid out to its owners, including bondholders: gross corporate value added left after paying workers, the government, and investment expenditure. This FCF is now about 15% of corporate value added. Earnings minus FCF is net investment; corporations have invested less. Its FCF yield is 3.26%, vs. 3.21% since 1952. That delivers an approximate real expected return of 5.3%, below what US corporate capital has historically delivered.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Holding the multiple fixed, a 3.26% free cash flow yield plus the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ 4.58% projected nominal GDP growth and 2.5% inflation implies a real expected return of roughly 5.3% on US corporate debt plus equity.
  2. The 5.3% real return assumes free cash flow stays at its record 15% of gross value added indefinitely, and still falls below what US corporate capital has historically delivered.
  3. Earning the historical average return requires the free cash flow share of value added to keep climbing, a bet on a structural transformation of US capitalism favoring capital at the expense of labor.

Related Articles:

  • This Time Would Have To Be Very Different — The cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 stands at 40.7, implying an earnings yield of 2.46% and, combined with an estimated 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth, a real expected return near 3% a year. Against a 2.75% inflation-protected 10-year Treasury yield, that leaves an equity premium of roughly 25 basis points, assuming the elevated multiple holds.
  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • A Macroeconomic Perspective on Stock Market Valuation Ratios — The authors argue that a decline in labor's share of US corporate value added, combined with weak corporate investment, mechanically raises valuation-to-earnings ratios even without changes in expected returns or growth. They find corporate enterprise value rose alongside an equal-sized increase in free cash flow's share of value added.
  • Reconciling Macroeconomics and Finance for the U.S. Corporate Sector: 1929 to Present — Using integrated U.S. macroeconomic and financial accounts, the authors find that fluctuations in expected cash flows to corporate owners, rather than expected rates of return, have been the dominant driver of swings in U.S. corporate market valuations. They attribute most valuation fluctuations to changes in the share of corporate output flowing to owners as pure rent.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

This Time Would Have To Be Very Different

AI Summary. The cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 stands at 40.7, implying an earnings yield of 2.46% and, combined with an estimated 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth, a real expected return near 3% a year. Against a 2.75% inflation-protected 10-year Treasury yield, that leaves an equity premium of roughly 25 basis points, assuming the elevated multiple holds.

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

At 40.7, CAPE is nearing its December 1999 peak of 44.2. For the S&P 500 to beat TIPS over the next decade, today’s near-record P/E multiple must persist for ten years, or real earnings must grow more than 5.8% a year—a pace exceeded in only two decades since 1880: the 1920s and 2010s.

How much do stock valuations offer over inflation-protected Treasuries?

Core argument: The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.

The CAPE is currently trading at 40.7, which is close to an all-time high. You’re paying close to 41 times annual earnings when you buy the S&P 500. The implied earnings yield is only 2.46%. According to AQR, a reasonable estimate for real earnings growth (on a per share basis) is 1.8% per annum. If you plug in today’s numbers, you end up with a real expected return of around 3% per year for U.S. equity. That’s a surprisingly low number. When you compare it to the 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, you’re left with a razor-thin equity premium. The stock market will only yield an extra 25 basis points per annum over the next, say, 10 years to compensate you for taking on equity risk. You might think this is a very conservative estimate, but it’s actually not, because we’re implicitly assuming that the CAPE stays at 40.7 over the next 10 years. That’s quite a lofty multiple. Even casual eyeball econometrics suggests that that’s not a great assumption, because the price-earnings ratio tends to revert back to its mean.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.
  2. Combining the 2.46% earnings yield with AQR’s estimate of 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth yields a real expected return of roughly 3% per year for U.S. equity.
  3. Against a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, U.S. equities offer an equity premium of about 25 basis points per year, an estimate that assumes the CAPE stays at 40.7 for a decade despite the price-earnings ratio’s tendency to revert to its mean.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Circularity in AI Shows Up in Token Spending Too

AI Summary. Payment-data analysis finds 80% of the largest corporate AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, indicating that much token spending is funded by venture capital rather than earnings. If AI payoffs are slow, venture returns could suffer and a funding pullback could weaken demand for computing power.

Torsten Slok Apollo
Date Posted:
October 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to Ramp data, 80% of firms in the top 1% of AI spending are VC-backed, compared with just 13% of firms at the median. This suggests that the largest purchasers of AI computing capacity rely heavily on venture capital rather than internally generated earnings.

Is venture capital funding most corporate AI token spending?

Core argument: Ramp data show 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, suggesting the largest buyers of compute are funding token spending with venture capital rather than organic earnings.

Ramp data show that 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are VC-backed, compared with only 13% of the median spender, suggesting that the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending, as the startups buying the most compute are paying for it with venture capital rather than organic earnings. If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, VC returns would come under pressure, since the capital funding today’s token spending would have little to show for it, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Ramp data show 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, suggesting the largest buyers of compute are funding token spending with venture capital rather than organic earnings.
  2. Ramp’s data on the venture backing of the heaviest AI spenders suggest the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending.
  3. If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, venture capital returns would come under pressure, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.

Related Articles:

  • Slowing Token Spend Shows Compute Demand Isn’t Unlimited — Demand for computing power appears highly price-sensitive, with modest increases in token prices pushing buyers to cut usage or switch to cheap open-source alternatives, undercutting claims that demand is unlimited. Return on invested capital at the five largest cloud providers is declining as invested capital grows faster than the earnings it generates.
  • AI Capex, Required Revenues, And What’s Priced In The AI Trade — Goldman Sachs projects the largest US hyperscalers' capital spending reaches $1.2tn in 2027 and $1.4tn in 2028, with growth decelerating, and estimates they need roughly $300bn in annual AI revenues to break even. AI infrastructure stocks have de-rated, with hyperscalers at their smallest recorded premium to the median S&P 500 company.
  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Revenue Per Worker Is Up. Are Firms Getting a Larger Share?

AI Summary. Publicly listed firms' profit margins were roughly flat through the 2010s, with gross margins growing about 0.4% a year from 2010 to 2019, then turned up: average gross margins rose from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025, and operating margins from 16% to 18%.

Jeremy Pearce Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
October 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Nonfarm business output per hour grew 2.2% annually between 2019 and 2025, up from 1% in 2010–19. Among public firms, growth in real revenue per worker accelerated from 0.7% to 2.2%. Operating margins rose from 16% to 18% of sales (2.4% annual growth).

Have corporate profit margins risen after a flat decade?

Core argument: Average operating margins rose from about 16% of sales in 2019 to 18% in 2025, growth of 2.4% a year, after being roughly flat through the 2010s.

A profit margin is profit divided by sales: the share of each sales dollar the firm keeps after paying its costs. The gross margin subtracts the direct cost of production (cost of goods sold), while the operating margin also subtracts overhead (selling, general, and administrative expense, which in Compustat typically includes R&D). If productivity gains were flowing to firms’ profits, margins should show it. Through the 2010s margins were flat: gross margins grew about 0.4% a year from 2010 to 2019, and operating margins were roughly flat. Both then turned up: on average, gross margins went from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025 (1.3% growth per year), and operating margins from 16% to 18% (2.4% growth per year). Part of the gains surfaced with wider profit margins: on a reasonable baseline, the operating margin rose over 2% a year from 2019 to 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average operating margins rose from about 16% of sales in 2019 to 18% in 2025, growth of 2.4% a year, after being roughly flat through the 2010s.
  2. Average gross margins increased from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025, growth of 1.3% a year, up from about 0.4% a year over 2010–2019.
  3. On a reasonable baseline, the operating margin rose over 2% a year from 2019 to 2025, indicating part of the productivity gains surfaced as wider profit margins.

Related Articles:

  • Higher Utilisation Explains The Recent Surge In Productivity Growth — Measured total factor productivity growth is estimated to come almost entirely from higher input utilisation rather than underlying efficiency gains, based on a method that infers unobserved capital and labour utilisation from movements in hours per worker. On this evidence, recent productivity gains reflect "working harder" rather than "working smarter.
  • Have We Entered an Era of High Productivity Growth? — Labor productivity has grown solidly while the San Francisco Federal Reserve's total factor productivity index, which adjusts for the equipment and technology workers use, has grown modestly, suggesting gains so far reflect better tools rather than broader advances. A regime-switching model puts the probability of a high-productivity regime at 57% using labor productivity and 21% using total factor productivity.
  • Why Wages And Productivity Look Set To Diverge Further — In the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from productivity growth, with productivity pulling ahead. US labor productivity, measured as real GDP per hour worked, is more than 5x its 1947 level while real hourly compensation is only about 3x, and median wage growth lags even further behind.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Investment
© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms