Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High?

AI Summary. US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards, estimated at 7.6% versus a post-1949 high of 8.2%, while employee pay as a share of non-financial corporate gross value added has fallen from 66% to 56%. One argument holds that subdued demographic growth leads companies to prioritize maximizing margins over expanding capacity.

Tan Kai Xian Gavekal
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate profits may not mean revert due to increased automation as the workforce shrinks relative to the economy.

Does slower population growth push companies to maximize profit margins?

Core argument: US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins were estimated at 7.6% in the first quarter of 2026, just below the post-1949 high of 8.2% set in the second quarter of 2021.

US corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards. In the first quarter of 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, only just below the post-1949 high of 8.2% reached in the second quarter of 2021. The second-quarter earnings season has also begun strongly, according to FactSet data. Employee remuneration as a share of gross value added for US non-financial corporate businesses declined from 66% in the fourth quarter of 2001 to 56% in the first quarter of 2026. [Will Denyer argued] "When strong demographic growth powers rapid demand growth, companies concentrate on expanding capacity and sales—on growing along with the growing market. That means they tend to focus less on their margins—less on getting the biggest profit they can out of every dollar of revenues. In contrast, when demographic growth is subdued, and hence there is less potential demand growth, companies are not so bent on expanding capacity as fast as they can, and are far more interested in squeezing the maximum possible margin from every dollar of sales."

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins were estimated at 7.6% in the first quarter of 2026, just below the post-1949 high of 8.2% set in the second quarter of 2021.
  2. Employee remuneration as a share of gross value added for US non-financial corporate businesses fell from 66% in the fourth quarter of 2001 to 56% in the first quarter of 2026.
  3. Will Denyer argued that strong demographic growth leads companies to prioritize expanding capacity and sales, while subdued demographic growth pushes them to squeeze the maximum possible margin from every dollar of sales.

Related Articles:

  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of gross domestic income fell to 51%, the lowest since records began in 1947, while profits' share rose to 12.1%, the highest since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages are up 3% since the end of 2019, compared with a 50% rise in profits.
  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The share of US national income paid to workers fell 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching a post-war low. The authors find this decline stems mainly from changes within industries rather than shifts in activity across sectors, following cyclical patterns seen in earlier recessions.
  • End of an Era: The Coming Long-Run Slowdown in Corporate Profit Growth and Stock Returns — The authors estimate that declining interest and corporate tax rates accounted for over 40% of real corporate profit growth from 1989 to 2019, while falling risk-free rates explain the entire expansion in price-to-earnings multiples. Real earnings before interest and taxes grew slightly more slowly than in 1962–1989, at 2.2% versus 2.4% per year.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Investment
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleJuly 22, 2026US 30-Year Yield Raises Alarm in Longest Run Above 5% Since 2007So far this year, the US 30-year has traded beyond 5% for 27 days ~19% of trading days, the most since 2007.Next articleJuly 22, 2026Who Will Win The War Of Neo-Mercantilists?Martin Wolf estimates that under reasonable assumptions, China should be earning ~$100B annually on her $4T of foreign assets. Yet, China shows an unexplained negative net income of around $125bn on its net foreign asset position.
Showing 247 database articles primarily about Financial Markets

Earnings Will Be Spectacular. It May Not Be Enough

AI Summary. Corporate profit margins, long regarded as one of the economy's most reliably mean-reverting series, have risen continuously so far this century. Measured through the national income accounts used in calculating GDP, profits now take a larger share of the economy than on the eve of the 1929 crash.

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:
October 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Since 2000, post-tax corporate profits as a share of GDP have trended upward across cyclical setbacks and are now near an all time high, above their 1929 level.

Have corporate profit margins stopped reverting to the mean?

Core argument: Corporate profits measured in the National Income and Product Accounts take a larger share of the U.S. economy than on the eve of the 1929 Great Crash.

Throughout the 20th century, profit margins were regarded as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy. So far this century, however, margins have done nothing but rise. Measured with the National Income and Product Accounts, part of the GDP calculation, profits are currently taking a bigger share of the economy even than on the eve of the Great Crash in 1929. The series comes with a lag, so we can assume the profit share on this basis is comfortably at a record by now.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profits measured in the National Income and Product Accounts take a larger share of the U.S. economy than on the eve of the 1929 Great Crash.
  2. Profit margins were regarded throughout the 20th century as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy, yet so far this century they have done nothing but rise.
  3. The National Income and Product Accounts profits series comes with a lag, so the profit share on this basis can be assumed to be comfortably at a record.

Related Articles:

  • US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits — US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The share of US national income paid to workers fell 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching a post-war low. The authors find this decline stems mainly from changes within industries rather than shifts in activity across sectors, following cyclical patterns seen in earlier recessions.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards, estimated at 7.6% versus a post-1949 high of 8.2%, while employee pay as a share of non-financial corporate gross value added has fallen from 66% to 56%. One argument holds that subdued demographic growth leads companies to prioritize maximizing margins over expanding capacity.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

The Bond Market Reckoning Has Only Begun

AI Summary. The gap between French and German 10-year government bond yields has widened at a pace matched only during the euro zone sovereign debt crisis. France and the UK have less room than the US to close deficits with tax increases, as tax revenues equal 43.9% of GDP in France and 35.3% in the UK versus 25.2% in the US.

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The spread between 10-year French OATs and German Bunds has widened at a pace seen only during the eurozone sovereign-debt crisis. John Authers warns that France “satisfies all the classic conditions for a major debt crisis.”

Do high tax burdens limit France and the UK's deficit options?

Core argument: The spread of 10-year French OATs over German Bunds has risen at a pace matched only during the worst days of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and 2012, fueling talk of a second crisis centered in Paris.

Only in the worst days of the euro zone’s sovereign debt crisis, in 2011 and 2012, has the [spread of 10-Year French OATS over German Bunds] risen so fast. Talk of a second euro-zone crisis, this time with an epicenter in Paris, is growing, and it’s easy to see why. Why is this more of a problem for France and the UK? Beyond their deficits, they also shoulder much higher tax burdens than the US. Tax revenues are 25.2% of GDP in the US, the lowest of the major developed economies - but 35.3% in the UK and 43.9% in France. It’s hard to imagine after decades of tax-cutting, but a US politician could deal with the deficit fairly easily with a tax hike. It’s not clear that option is open to French lawmakers, even if they could somehow persuade voters to go along with them. The populist politicians of left and right, who currently look well placed in next year’s presidential elections, are in any case unlikely to try.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The spread of 10-year French OATs over German Bunds has risen at a pace matched only during the worst days of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and 2012, fueling talk of a second crisis centered in Paris.
  2. Tax revenues equal 25.2% of GDP in the US, the lowest among major developed economies, versus 35.3% in the UK and 43.9% in France, leaving American politicians more room to close the deficit with a tax hike.
  3. Populist politicians of left and right, currently well placed for France’s presidential election, are unlikely to attempt tax increases to address the deficit.

Related Articles:

  • French PM to Freeze Emmanuel Macron’s Pension Reform Until 2027 — France's prime minister said he would suspend the plan to raise the retirement age to 64 until the next presidential election, while asking parties to agree on other savings. He outlined a €30bn package of spending cuts and tax rises to cut the deficit to 4.7% of national output from 5.4%.
  • Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong? — An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
    • Taxation
  • GDP
  • Politics

Foreign Capital Flows Into US Stocks Hit Record As Appetite For Debt Fades

AI Summary. Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US stocks and investment fund shares over 12 months, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Foreign demand for US debt securities moved in the opposite direction, falling to a net $188bn in the second quarter from $314bn in the first.

Michael Taffe and George Steer Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Foreign investors bought a record net $426B of US equities and fund shares in Q2, up 62% y/y, part of a record $942B in the 12 months through July. Overseas investors bought a net $188B of US debt securities in Q2, down from $314B in Q1.

Are foreign investors shifting from US debt into US stocks?

Core argument: Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985.

Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, accelerating a shift in overseas investment towards American stocks and away from debt. The flows represented the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares by foreign investors jumped to $426bn in the second quarter, up 62% from the same period in 2025, and surpassing the previous quarterly record of $299bn in 2022, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Foreign demand for US debt moved in the opposite direction. Overseas investors bought a net $188bn of US debt securities in the second quarter, down from $314bn in the first.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985.
  2. Net foreign purchases of US equities and investment fund shares reached $426bn in the second quarter, up 62% from the same period in 2025 and above the prior quarterly record of $299bn in 2022, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
  3. Overseas investors bought a net $188bn of US debt securities in the second quarter, down from $314bn in the first.

Related Articles:

  • World’s Unusually High Dollar Exposure Risks Fueling Selloff — Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure, the lowest share since at least 2015. With some of the largest holders of US assets carrying little protection against a weaker dollar, the currency is at risk of steeper declines if sentiment turns.
  • Foreign Investors Prefer US Stocks To Treasuries As Debt Worries Grow — International flows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP over a year, overtaking flows into US Treasuries at 2% of GDP for the first time this century outside brief episodes during the Covid-19 pandemic and after the global financial crisis, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit

De-reservification, Not De-dollarization

AI Summary. Much of the official-sector inflow into the U.S. now comes from investors who are not traditional reserve managers, and those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar and toward risk assets rather than Treasuries. The author argues this shift in the global investor base helps explain why Treasuries trade at a discount while the dollar retains a premium.

Brad Setser and Alex Etra Council on Foreign Relations
Date Posted:
September 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The stock of global dollar reserves has been roughly stable over the past decade. The world is not moving away from the dollar: dollar assets are shifting from official holdings of Treasurys towards private and quasi-sovereign holdings of risk assets.

Why do Treasuries trade at a discount while the dollar keeps premium?

Core argument: Most official-sector inflows into the U.S. come from investors who are not classic reserve managers, and those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar, so any real de-dollarization would likely begin among these investors.

Most of the current flow into the US from the “official” sector is coming from investors who are not classic reserve managers. Those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar, at least for now. Any real de-dollarization would likely occur first among these investors. Put differently, the dollar’s global role is increasingly as a source of returns, not a source of safety. The foreign bid, private and public, is for risk, not for Treasuries. It is currently fashionable in some circles to point to the diminution of the “convenience yield” on Treasuries even while the U.S. dollar continues to enjoy such a privilege. But the shift in the global investor base and their apparent portfolio preference for U.S. risk assets in lieu of Treasuries may help explain the divergence between the convenience yield on Treasuries and the convenience yield on the USD.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Most official-sector inflows into the U.S. come from investors who are not classic reserve managers, and those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar, so any real de-dollarization would likely begin among these investors.
  2. The dollar’s global role is increasingly as a source of returns rather than safety, with the foreign bid, private and public, directed at risk assets rather than Treasuries.
  3. The shift in the global investor base toward U.S. risk assets in lieu of Treasuries may help explain the divergence between the convenience yield on Treasuries and that on the dollar, and suggests the “profit dollar” is likely trading at a historical premium.

Related Articles:

  • Financial Innovation and the International Monetary System — The dollar accounts for 59% of cross-border payments messaged through SWIFT, far ahead of the euro's 14%, and its share of foreign exchange turnover has risen gradually to about 90% of the 200% total since 2010. Official holdings of U.S. Treasuries have leveled off near $4tn while foreign private holdings rose from $1tn to over $5tn.
  • Foreign Investors Prefer US Stocks To Treasuries As Debt Worries Grow — International flows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP over a year, overtaking flows into US Treasuries at 2% of GDP for the first time this century outside brief episodes during the Covid-19 pandemic and after the global financial crisis, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.
  • World’s Unusually High Dollar Exposure Risks Fueling Selloff — Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure, the lowest share since at least 2015. With some of the largest holders of US assets carrying little protection against a weaker dollar, the currency is at risk of steeper declines if sentiment turns.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Monetary Policy

Foreign Investors Prefer US Stocks To Treasuries As Debt Worries Grow

AI Summary. International flows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP over a year, overtaking flows into US Treasuries at 2% of GDP for the first time this century outside brief episodes during the Covid-19 pandemic and after the global financial crisis, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.

Emily Herbert and Ian Smith Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 15, 2026
Is Database:
Database

International net flows into US equities reached 2.8% of GDP in the year through June, exceeding net inflows into Treasuries of 2% of GDP. Outside brief episodes during the pandemic and the aftermath of the GFC, this is the first time this century that equity inflows have surpassed Treasury inflows.

Are foreign investors now buying more US stocks than Treasuries?

Core argument: Foreign inflows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP in the year to June, overtaking Treasuries at 2% of GDP, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.

International flows into US stocks reached 2.8% of US GDP on average in the year to June, overtaking Treasuries — at 2% of GDP — for the first time this century outside brief episodes in the Covid-19 pandemic and the aftermath of the global financial crisis, according to analysis of US Treasury data by Deutsche Bank. The change reflects the ever-growing lure of the US stock market, with the S&P 500 on track for a fourth straight year of double-digit gains. Powering the rally has been vast AI investment, which is driving profit margins to new highs, according to FactSet data stretching back to 2009.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign inflows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP in the year to June, overtaking Treasuries at 2% of GDP, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.
  2. Deutsche Bank’s analysis marks the first time this century that foreign equity flows have exceeded Treasury flows, outside brief episodes during the Covid-19 pandemic and the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
  3. The S&P 500 is on track for a fourth straight year of double-digit gains, powered by vast AI investment that is driving profit margins to new highs, according to FactSet data stretching back to 2009.

Related Articles:

  • World’s Unusually High Dollar Exposure Risks Fueling Selloff — Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure, the lowest share since at least 2015. With some of the largest holders of US assets carrying little protection against a weaker dollar, the currency is at risk of steeper declines if sentiment turns.
  • Foreigners Rebuff ‘Sell America’ and Buy a Net $1.6 Trillion in Assets — Treasury Department data show overseas investors bought a net $1.55tn of long-term US financial assets, up from $1.18tn the prior year, including $720bn in equities and just under $409bn in Treasury notes and bonds. China was a net seller of $208.6bn, with its Treasury holdings ending at $683.5bn.
  • The Global Balance Sheet 2026: Imbalance And Divergence — Only 20% of global household wealth growth came from net new investment in real assets such as machinery, housing, infrastructure and intellectual property, down from a 30% average over the prior quarter century. Nearly 60% came from asset prices rising faster than inflation and negative net worth in other sectors.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

Interest Rates and Stock Prices: An Old Debate Resurfaces!

AI Summary. An estimate of the intrinsic 10-year US Treasury rate, built from actual inflation and real economic growth, far exceeded the actual 10-year Treasury rate after inflation surged, and that gap has since narrowed to roughly 4.75% actual versus 5.41% intrinsic.

Aswath Damodaran Musing on Markets
Date Posted:
September 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Damodaran’s “intrinsic” 10-year Treasury rate—calculated as US real GDP growth plus inflation—has broadly tracked the nominal 10-year Treasury yield since 1962. As of early September 2026, the 10-year yield of ~5% was 41bp below his 5.41% intrinsic-rate estimate.

Do long-term Treasury rates line up with inflation and growth fundamentals?

Core argument: As of September 2026, the US 10-year Treasury rate stood at 4.75% while the intrinsic 10-year rate was 5.41%, a gap of 66 basis points.

[The graph shows] the actual inflation rates and real GDP growth rates for the US, going back to 1962, and [the implied] intrinsic 10-year treasury rate (the cumulative column) and actual 10-year treasury rate each year. When inflation surged in 2022, interest rates went up, but since the rates that I am tracking are long term rates, the intrinsic risk free rate vastly exceeded the actual rate that year, but the difference has narrowed over time, and almost dissipated by September 2026 (when the US 10-year treasury bond rate was [5%] and and the intrinsic ten-year rates yielded 5.41%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. As of September 2026, the US 10-year Treasury rate stood at 4.75% while the intrinsic 10-year rate was 5.41%, a gap of 66 basis points.
  2. When inflation surged in 2022, the intrinsic risk-free rate vastly exceeded the actual 10-year Treasury rate, and that difference has narrowed since.
  3. The intrinsic 10-year Treasury rate is built from actual US inflation and real GDP growth rates going back to 1962 and compared against the actual 10-year Treasury rate each year.

Related Articles:

  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • US 30-Year Bonds Erase Gains From Treasury’s Buyback Surprise — US Treasuries erased nearly all gains that followed the Treasury Department's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, with the 30-year yield rising above 5.27% and the 10-year touching 4.71%. The reversal signals the move has done little to ease concern about surging government debt.
  • Annual Economic Report — Public debt in advanced economies has risen steadily, limiting governments' ability to cushion higher energy prices. Cyclically adjusted primary deficits averaged 1.9% of GDP in advanced economies since 2022 versus 1.1% over the two preceding decades, and 1.8% in emerging markets versus 0.1% from 2000–2019.
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy
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