Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences

AI Summary. The author argues that a slowdown in artificial-intelligence capital spending would remove a stimulus that has been masking weakness, colliding with overcapacity, falling prices, refinancing needs and weaker labor income. On this view the main risk is deflationary, transmitting through investment, employment, consumption, credit, housing and asset prices at once.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:

Kedrosky argues that the “inevitable transition” from the current inflationary AI-buildout regime to a new regime in which AI-driven productivity gains exert deflationary pressure is “where the real macro risk lies.”

Would an AI spending slowdown create deflationary rather than inflationary risk?

Core argument: The author argues the dangerous phase arrives when the AI capex boom slows, removing stimulus just as overcapacity, falling prices, refinancing needs and weaker labor income hit together, with a refinancing wall waiting in 2028.

If AI investment has been masking underlying weakness, a slowdown removes the stimulus just as overcapacity, falling prices, refinancing needs and weaker labor income hit together. A refinancing wall sits waiting in 2028. Failure is over-determined. This moment sits at the intersection of the four forces that have produced the most consequential boom-bust cycles in Western economic history: loose credit, government policy, technology, and real estate. There are, as a result, myriad catalysts, each with a low probability of happening, but which collectively guarantee collapse. That is why the principal risk is deflationary rather than inflationary. An AI bust could transmit through capex, employment, consumption, credit, housing, and asset prices simultaneously.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues the dangerous phase arrives when the AI capex boom slows, removing stimulus just as overcapacity, falling prices, refinancing needs and weaker labor income hit together, with a refinancing wall waiting in 2028.
  2. The principal risk from an AI bust is deflationary rather than inflationary, according to the author, because it could transmit simultaneously through capex, employment, consumption, credit, housing, and asset prices.
  3. The author places this moment at the intersection of loose credit, government policy, technology, and real estate — the four forces behind the most consequential boom-bust cycles in Western economic history — and sees a plausible decade of Japan-style balance recession with fiscal stimulus constrained by massive deficits.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • AI Set to be Largest CapEx Cycle Ever … and Soon Majority Externally Financed — Hyperscaler and data-center investment is tracking toward $1.5tn annually by 2030, which in real terms would exceed the 2005-06 housing boom, the 1990s fiber peak, and the 1882 railroad peak combined. External debt and equity are projected to fund close to 90% of the buildout, making it dependent on credit markets.
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