Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
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Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States

AI Summary. European immigrants who arrived with nearly no wealth converged to similar wealth levels as earlier European settlers within a few generations, while Black, Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican households remained substantially behind, indicating that initial wealth gaps do not uniformly predict long-run inequality across all groups.

Brian Marein Wake Forest University
Date Posted:
June 30, 2026
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Except possibly at the very top of the distribution which SIPP cannot measure, the wealth of “new” Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the US has fully caught up with “old” immigrants. Wealth converges quickly once earnings inequality vanishes.

Does initial wealth explain persistent inequality across immigrant groups?

Core argument: By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.

Inferring the determinants of long-run inequality from group-level data is complicated by the arrival of 30 million Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850 to 1924), who are by construction included in average white wealth despite having no direct claim to the wealth accumulated by earlier Americans. By1920, nearly half of white adults were either foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Using the United States Immigration Commission Reports (commonly known as the Dillingham Commission Reports), I document that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth. [Thus] a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage. Northwestern Europeans comprised the overwhelming majority of earlier immigrants, dating back to the initial European settlement of North America, while Southern and Eastern Europeans predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. If initial wealth disadvantages persisted across generations, one would expect households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry to possess less wealth than those of Northwestern European ancestry, since their families arrived later and started with substantially fewer resources. In fact, they do not. On average, they are wealthier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.
  2. European immigrants arrived at the turn of the twentieth century with nearly zero wealth, yet their descendants’ wealth distributions converged.
  3. White ancestry groups exhibit nearly identical wealth distributions by 1980–1990 despite staggered arrival times spanning 270+ years, while Black, Cuban.

Related Articles:

  • The Myth of Nordic Mobility: Social Mobility Rla — Social mobility in Denmark and Sweden is far lower than conventional measures indicate, with family background determining educational outcomes almost as strongly as in 19th-century England. Generous public education funding and income compression have only modestly reduced the role of family in shaping children's outcomes.
  • 00 to 2022 — Gregory Clark @PNASNews finds that social status in England was strongly correlated across generations between 1600 and 2022, consistent with a theory of…
  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility — Raj Chetty @OppInsights finds that a white child born into the bottom household income quintile in 1992 had a 29.7% chance of remaining there, up from 24.9% in…
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Immigration
    • Mobility/Assortative Mating
Previous articleJune 30, 2026AI: The ROI Runway Could Be Long Outside the Tech SectorSløk notes there are no signs of rising profit margins outside of the tech sector; AI’s ROI runway outside the tech sector may be long, creating a divergence between “front-loaded valuations today and a much slower cash flow reality.”Next articleJune 30, 2026What’s at Stake for Beef as Flesh-Eating Screwworm Cases Exceed Two DozenThe US has now confirmed more than two dozen screwworm infections. At ~86mm the US cattle herd is at its lowest level since 1951, and beef prices are near record highs.
Showing 155 database articles primarily about Inequality

The Rise Of The Deserving Rich

AI Summary. Billionaire wealth from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has reached an all-time high, with fairly earned wealth now accounting for half of total billionaire wealth globally, while wealth from politically connected industries has declined since 2021.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
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An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Does self-made wealth now dominate billionaire fortunes globally?

Core argument: For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.
  2. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth—spanning gambling, construction, defence, raw materials, and inheritance—rose modestly from 2001 to 2014 but has declined in absolute terms since 2021.
  3. Inherited wealth, though typically lawfully held, represents a policy failure in wealth distribution, as heirs’ fortunes reflect birth advantage rather than competitive value creation.

Related Articles:

  • AI is the Democratic Party’s Next Villain — Anti-AI rhetoric is emerging in Democratic fundraising messaging at the same adoption rate that anti-billionaire language showed in 2019, driven by the party's progressive wing and framed not as a jobs or safety concern but as an extension of billionaire power.
  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Inequality is mostly the result of an increasing premium on returns from risk and high-skilled labor ushered in by technological disruption and the feedback…
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Another Reason the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes!

AI Summary. A shift of ~$200bn in worker pay into corporate profits as stock-based compensation could explain roughly one-third of the long-run decline in labor's share of income, as stock ownership allows high earners to receive tax-preferred pay recorded as profits rather than wages.

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick The Everywhere Millionaire
Date Posted:
July 1, 2026
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Database
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Important

Zidar & Zwick suggest about one‑third of the post‑1970s drop in labor’s share is due to stock‑based pay to workers, in addition to the one‑third they already attribute to pass‑through income. That leaves only around one‑third for genuine shifts in technology, power, etc.

Does tax-preferred stock compensation explain the labor share decline?

Core argument: $200bn in missing labor compensation since the late 1970s drives roughly one-third of the labor share decline, reflecting tax-advantaged stock.

In our data for 2017, after adjustments for the rise of pass-throughs, we report employee compensation of $7.2 trillion and corporate value added of $12.2 trillion. The unadjusted corporate profits number (which excludes partnership profits) is $1.7 trillion. If we could find around $200 billion of “missing” labor compensation, that would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s. Thus, if workers owned a bit above 10% of those corporate profits via stock compensation, then that would cover the difference. Distributing this amount across the top 10% of public company employees, of which there are 4.2 million, this ownership would imply an additional $40,000 or so in pay. The aggregate numbers are thus quite plausible in terms of how much pay might have shifted to corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. $200bn in missing labor compensation since the late 1970s drives roughly one-third of the labor share decline, reflecting tax-advantaged stock.
  2. Top 10% of public company employees ($40k additional implicit pay via equity ownership) concentrate gains that would equal $200bn aggregate.
  3. $12.2tn corporate value added vs. $7.2tn employee compensation reveals labor’s shrinking claim on output, as tax-preferred equity arrangements redirect worker.

Related Articles:

  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.
  • Human Capitalists — Equity Based Compensation ~45% Of Total Comp Of High-Skilled Labor, Including It In Labor Share Cuts Decline of Labor Share Since The 1980’s By 60%.
  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US income distribution is non-wage income, primarily derived from private business profits, according to @MatthewSmith…
  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

The Great $110 Trillion Wealth Transfer Won’t Happen Any Time Soon

AI Summary. Bequeathable wealth in the U.S. rose from 256% to 424% of GDP between 1997 and 2021, with 97% of that increase concentrated in households headed by someone 55 or older. The wealthiest 10% of that age group drove 75% of the total gain, meaning inherited wealth is becoming increasingly concentrated

Rachel Louise Ensign and James Benedict Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
May 5, 2026
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Database

The age at which Americans are inheriting money has risen. According to Federal Reserve surveys, btw 1998 and 2010, Americans in their late 50s were most likely to report receiving an inheritance; by 2013–2022, that age had ticked up to the mid 60’s.

Will the concentration of inherited wealth impact economic equality?

Core argument: Bequeathable wealth surged to 424% of GDP in 2021 from 256% in 1997, with 97% of gains concentrated in households.

Fed data [indicates] that what is known as the bequeathable wealth rose from 256% of gross domestic product in 1997 to 424% in 2021, the last year of available data. A staggering 97% of that increase was due to wealth gains in households where the head of household was 55 or older. Older Americans may keep accumulating wealth, especially if the stock market keeps rising. But some will spend it on living costs and expensive long-term care, leaving less for heirs. When they die, many will leave their money to their spouses, who are often in their same generation. This year, around $1.3 trillion is expected to be passed onto spouses, compared with about $2 trillion to heirs in Gen X and younger generations, according to projections from research firm Cerulli Associates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bequeathable wealth surged to 424% of GDP in 2021 from 256% in 1997, with 97% of gains concentrated in households.
  2. The wealthiest 10% of households age 55+ captured 75% of total bequeathable wealth gains since 1997, resulting in widening inequality.
  3. Boomers accumulated $1tn+ in wealth during Q4 alone, outpacing all other generational groups, as stock and business valuations drive outsized.

Related Articles:

  • A Preliminary Report on Taxing the Great Wealth Transfer: Revenue and Distributional Effects of Taxes on Estates, Inheritances, and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death — Bequeathable wealth/GDP has risen from 256% to 424% over 1997- 2021, but the current estate tax law yields ~$0 revenue. @BrookingsInst researchers propose an…
  • Is Inherited Wealth Bad? — Existing data show ~80% of private wealth in early 20th-century Europe was inherited. In France and Sweden that fell to ~40% by 1975, but has since risen. In…
  • How To Get Rich in 2025 — As baby boomers die, inheritances as a share of US output are over 10% which is just off a post-WW II high. For every $100 paid in wages, the dead leave behind…
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Has Generational Progress Stalled? Income Growth Over Five Generations of Americans

AI Summary. Generational income growth in the United States has slowed across five successive generations, with each cohort earning less relative to the previous one by their late 30s.

Kevin Corinth and Jeff Larrimore Demography
Date Posted:
April 23, 2026
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As measured by the 36–40 cohort across generations, Americans’ real market income has continued to rise but at a slower pace. Accounting for taxes and transfers partially offsets the slowdown in the growth of market income.

Core argument: Income growth for Americans in their late 30s declined 50% from the Silent Generation (born 1928–1945) to Millennials (born 1981–1996).

We zoom in on a focal age range in peo­ple’s late 30s—an age at which we observe the five gen­er­a­tions from the Greatest Generation (born 1901–1927) through the Millennial Generation (born 1981–1996)—and assess both whether gen­er­a­tional prog­ress is positive and the extent to which the rate of growth is speeding up or slowing down. Focusing first on median market income, there are two notable takeaways that apply for both the individual/couple and the household sharing units.The first is that generational progress has clearly slowed since the Baby Boom Generation, although it remains positive. Second, despite the perception that slowing generational progress is a recent phenomenon, the substantial slowdown did not start with Millennials but began a generation earlier with Generation X. Looking at the patterns formed in household market income by generation, the income of Baby Boomers in their late 30s was 31% above that for similarly aged adults in the Silent Generation. Progress slowed substantially for Generation X—their incomes increased by 10% relative to Baby Boomers—and then ticked up for Millennials, whose incomes rose by 15% relative to Generation X. Although market income is an important indicator of progress, it does not reflect the full set of resources that individuals have available for consumption. The slowdown in generational progress is softened when accounting for taxes and transfers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Income growth for Americans in their late 30s declined 50% from the Silent Generation (born 1928–1945) to Millennials (born 1981–1996).
  2. Wage growth deceleration across five generations results in widening inequality, with top earners capturing disproportionate income gains while median earners.
  3. Workforce participation shifts and wage stagnation for Millennials vs. prior generations lead to delayed wealth accumulation and reduced intergenerational economic.

Related Articles:

  • The American Dream Is Not a Coin Flip, and Wages Have Not Stagnated — .@swinshi argues that 72% of 40-year-olds exceed their parents’ family income excluding government benefits, using his preferred inflation measure and…
  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility — Raj Chetty @OppInsights finds that a white child born into the bottom household income quintile in 1992 had a 29.7% chance of remaining there, up from 24.9% in…
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking in terms of political and policy views is strongly associated with lower levels of intergenerational upward mobility. @S_Stantcheva…
  • Inequality
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Why Higher Pay Hasn’t Made Young Adults Feel Richer

AI Summary. Mass university attendance has shifted graduates from economic elite to economic norm, meaning most earn above average in absolute terms but fall short of their own expectations relative to peers.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:
April 20, 2026
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John Burn-Murdoch argues that the expansion of higher education has worsened the relative economic status of both graduates and non-graduates. “The average graduate shifts from being the elite to the norm,” and the non-graduate is “ever more disadvantaged.”

Why Do Young Adults Feel Less Wealthy Despite Higher Earnings?

Core argument: One in three graduates earns below expectations despite only 10% in lowest quartile, drives perception of economic decline among credential.

The expansion of higher education, while well intentioned and clearly beneficial in many aspects, has upset the balance between expectations and outcomes. The dynamic I’m talking about here is a much broader phenomenon [than the erosion of the graduate wage premium]. As more and more people go to university, the average graduate shifts from being among the economic elite to being the norm, placing them much further down the socio-economic pecking order than graduates of yesteryear. The result is that even though today’s young adults, and graduates in particular, are over-represented in the top quartile of the earnings distribution, they are also far more likely to be at the bottom than the top for earnings relative to reasonable expectations. In both the UK and US, even though only 10% of graduates are in the lowest earnings quartile, one in three is in the bottom bracket for earnings relative to expectations. As a larger share of youngsters go to university, those who don’t are an ever more disadvantaged slice of their generation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. One in three graduates earns below expectations despite only 10% in lowest quartile, drives perception of economic decline among credential.
  2. University expansion shifted graduates from economic elite to norm, results in steeper relative earnings disappointment vs. prior generations.
  3. Non-graduates face widening disadvantage as degree-holding cohorts expand, leads to increased inequality within young adult earnings distribution.

Related Articles:

  • The Middle Class Is Shrinking Because of a Booming Upper-Middle Class — An absolute measure (2.5 to 5x the poverty line) shows that the share of American families in the middle class fell from 35% to 31% btw 1979 and 2024, as…
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  • Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force — A sharp and steady decline in the GCT scores of Marine Corps officers occurred btw 1980 and 2014. 96% of this is explained by the widening (and weakening) of…
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
    • Wages/Income

The K-Shaped Economy’s Defining Statistic Has Some Problems

AI Summary. Consumer spending in the United States has become increasingly concentrated among the highest earners over the past three decades, driven by wealth effects — the tendency for rising asset values to boost spending among those who hold the most assets.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:
April 7, 2026
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Database

Moody’s claim that the top 10% of Americans by income drove 45.8% of consumer spending in 2025 may be overstated. After taxes, the income share of the top 10% is only ~30–37%. But top earners also had big wealth gains, and “wealth effects are important.”

Core argument: Wealthy households’ rising share of consumer spending over 35 years is more certain than precise percentage estimates.

“I feel more confident in the historical trajectory than I do in the actual levels,” said Mark Zandi, keeper of the spreadsheet that churns out its quarterly consumer spending estimates. “I wouldn’t die on the hill of the top 10% accounting for 45% of the spending, but I would fight hard that the share that’s going to folks in the top 10%, top 20% has risen significantly and consistently over the past 30, 35 years.” The method Zandi uses to estimate consumer spending combines data on asset holdings by income from the Federal Reserve’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances with data on asset flows from its quarterly Financial Accounts of the US. The idea to merge the two originally came from then Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan in the late 1990s.“My understanding is he actually sketched it out on a napkin on an airplane flight,” said economist Dean Maki, who along with his Fed colleague Michael Palumbo was charged with making Greenspan’s idea operational and using it, in 2001, to estimate the “wealth effect” on consumer spending during the 1990s stock market boom. “One thing I learned from doing that research back when I was at the Fed was that wealth effects are important,” said Maki, now chief economist at asset manager Point72. “They were an important driver of consumer spending then and they still are today.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wealthy households’ rising share of consumer spending over 35 years is more certain than precise percentage estimates.
  2. Asset price fluctuations significantly drive consumer spending patterns, making wealth effects critical to economic forecasting.
  3. Income inequality’s impact on spending concentration has grown consistently, reshaping the economy’s demand structure.

Related Articles:

  • Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending — Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.
  • K-Shaped Economy? — Using internal Stripe payment data, Tedeschi finds that spending growth of households in low-income zip codes has outpaced that of households in high-income…
  • What’s Missing in the Fed’s Data about Ultrarich Portfolios — Federal Reserve wealth data overstates the role of public stocks in top portfolios because private corporations and private equity funds are counted alongside publicly traded shares, making the ultra-wealthy appear more like stock market investors than business owners.
  • Inequality
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
  • Workforce
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