“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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In MAGA-Land People Are Dying Faster Than They Are Being Born

Economist Staff The Economist

Date Posted:: October 1, 2026

An Economist analysis of more than 3,000 US counties finds that in reliably GOP counties, annual deaths now exceed births by 0.4 per 1k residents, while in reliably Democratic counties, births exceed deaths by 2.8 per 1k. Population growth in the GOP counties is largely driven by internal migration.

Our number crunching shows that domestic migration has historically boosted the population of reliably Republican counties by about 0.5% a year, while reliably Democratic ones have lost 0.6%. The opposite is true of international migration, which has historically added 0.5% a year to solid-blue counties, compared with just 0.1% in solid-red ones. Data from the IRS show that the fastest-growing red counties draw an unusually large share of newcomers from politically unfriendly territory. In 2022-23 more than 20% came from solid-blue places and around 40% from competitive ones. This may already be affecting voting patterns. Before 2016, fast-growing red counties leaned more Republican than slower-growing ones. That has now flipped: slower-growing red counties lean more Republican, and GOP support in faster-growing ones has weakened.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Domestic migration has historically added about 0.5% a year to the population of reliably Republican counties while subtracting 0.6% a year from reliably Democratic ones.
International migration has historically added about 0.5% a year to solid-blue counties versus just 0.1% in solid-red ones, reversing the pattern of domestic migration.
Internal Revenue Service data show that in 2022-23 more than 20% of newcomers to the fastest-growing red counties came from solid-blue places and around 40% from competitive ones.

Falling Fertility: The Changing Value of Freedom, Fulfillment, and Family

Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros Onofri National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: September 2, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Intended fertility fell in every Generations and Gender Survey country, from 28% to 21% on average, while the ideal number of children fell in 17 of 22 International Social Survey Programme countries, from 2.42 to 2.31.
Children became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status, and the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any other attitude measured.
Gender roles became less traditional and household work was divided more equally, yet work–family conflict rose sharply.

Terra Incognita: The Economics of a Shrinking World

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick Norrick University of Pennsylvania

Date Posted:: August 14, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
World population is set to keep growing for roughly another 30 years because of momentum effects, as large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago have their children while their own parents are still alive.
Unless trends change, world population will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Americans Are Done With Being Put in Racial Boxes

Justin Fox Bloomberg

Date Posted:: July 21, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of rising U.S. diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White share of the population.
Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than among Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, though rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups as well.
A growing share of Americans does not fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category the U.S. government defines, as recent immigrants follow earlier generations in becoming Americans.

The Pig In The Python: US Decennial Labor Flows And Economic Opportunity, 1910–2040

Steven Ruggles Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Date Posted:: July 14, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Wages for young U.S. workers declined sharply after peaking in 1973, as the economy struggled to absorb the influx of workers entering the labor force between 1960 and 1980 from the baby-boom cohort, rising female participation, and increased immigration.
Decennial labor-force entries alone misstate labor-market competition, because baby boomers, newly employed women, and immigrants kept occupying jobs and stifling demand for new workers until their retirements, a process still in progress.
An index of employment competition measuring cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a percentage of the current decade's working-age population is offered as a better gauge of relative cohort size, with young workers' wages already showing an uptick.

Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy

Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, Keelan Beirne and Andrew Scott National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: July 7, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Figure 3 traces out how GDP per worker evolves following a 1pp increase in birth rates at t−20. Since cohorts born at t−20 (e.g., 1970) do not enter the working-age population until t = 0 (e.g., 1990), we should observe no response before t = 0; [indeed] the estimated coefficients are ~0 and statistically insignificant before t = 0. Beginning at t = 0, however, higher birth rates are associated with lower GDP per worker, and the negative effects grow progressively larger over time. For example, a 1pp lower birth rate at t−20 is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points higher by t+40. The latter corresponds to roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval. We find that lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents and a growing share of high-tech industries across countries and US commuting zones [Figure 11]. They are also predictive of higher TFP growth across countries and US industries and increased patenting in ICT and broader automation technology classes. Using cross-country variation in WWII-era military and civilian deaths, we present suggestive evidence that the positive growth effects of falling birth rates are primarily driven by the scarcity of younger workers rather than by reductions in population per se [Figure 14]. [Editor’s note: the paper does not grapple with the fiscal consequences of an aging population.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points by t+40, roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval.
Estimated coefficients for GDP per worker are near zero and statistically insignificant before affected cohorts enter the working-age population at t = 0.
Lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents, a growing high-tech industry share across countries and US commuting zones, higher TFP growth, and more ICT and automation patenting, with WWII-era death variation offering suggestive evidence that scarcity of younger workers, rather than smaller population, drives the growth effects.

What Demographic Prediction Can and Cannot Achieve

Samuele Lo Piano, Marta Kuc-Czarnecka, Roger Pielke, and Andrea Saltelli Social Science Research Network

Date Posted:: May 29, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

We explore demographic predictions by propagating all plausible choices that can be made during the analysis through the modelling process. This approach involves navigating the so-called ’garden of forking paths’—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators were to examine the same problem. For this, we now abandon [the Chinese government mathematician] Song Jian’s ‘historic’ model and turn to models currently in use: the Cohort-Component and UN WPP models, the Lee-Carter model and the Lotka-Volterra model. Note that in standard use, these tools are used in isolation, see e.g. the FAO’s How to Feed the World in 2050, resting on a single UN WPP population trajectory shielding the reader from the compounding effect of their uncertainty. Unsurprisingly, the exercise capturing the modelling of the modelling process for global population projections to 2050 and 2075 reveals distinct characteristics regarding the sensitivity and projection outcomes of the different models. Once abandoned the straitjacket of Song’s approach, uncertainty is free to manifest itself. The overall uncertainty distributions of the projected populations show a wide range of possible outcomes, reflecting the inherent uncertainties in demographic projections.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Propagating all plausible analytical choices through global population projections to 2050 and 2075 yields wide overall uncertainty distributions, with the Cohort-Component, UN World Population Prospects, Lee-Carter and Lotka-Volterra models showing distinct sensitivities and outcomes.
Standard demographic practice uses these projection models in isolation, as in the FAO's How to Feed the World in 2050, which rests on a single UN World Population Prospects trajectory and shields readers from the compounding effect of their uncertainty.
Abandoning Song Jian's historic model and navigating the "garden of forking paths"—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators examined the same problem—allows uncertainty in demographic projections to manifest itself.

How is domestic migration reshaping politics in Republican counties?

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Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Are shifting attitudes about children behind falling fertility intentions?

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The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

Will world population keep growing even as fertility falls below replacement?

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Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

Are immigration and intermarriage making single racial categories obsolete?

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Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

How does a large influx of workers affect young workers' wages?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Do lower birth rates raise output per worker decades later?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

How much uncertainty do single-trajectory population projections hide?

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