“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Evidence and debate on climate change, temperatures, emissions, energy systems, damages, adaptation, mitigation, and climate policy. The archive brings together scientific and economic research while preserving uncertainty and competing estimates.
AI Summary.Direct carbon pricing—carbon taxes and emissions trading systems—now covers about 30% of global emissions, with most coverage coming from emissions trading systems in China and the European Union. The EU complements its system with a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism that prices carbon on certain high-emitting imports regardless of where they are produced.
Karen Karniol-Tambour, Jeremy Ng and Daniel HochmanBridgewater Associates
Date Posted:
Bridgewater argues that carbon pricing is increasingly becoming an industrial-policy tool, with measures such as the EU’s CBAM supporting domestic producers by limiting carbon leakage, while carbon prices encourage investment in energy efficiency and industrial upgrading.
How much of global emissions does carbon pricing now cover?
Core argument: Direct carbon pricing, spanning carbon taxes and emissions trading systems, now covers roughly 30% of global emissions, with most of that coverage coming from emissions trading systems in China and the EU.
Carbon pricing schemes have continued to grow over the last few years. Some form of direct carbon pricing now covers ~30% of global emissions—spanning both carbon taxes and emissions trading systems. Most coverage comes from emissions trading systems in China and the EU, and these schemes are increasingly being adapted to fit their specific industrial policy goals. For example, as a complement to its domestic emissions trading system, the EU has started to implement a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which imposes carbon pricing on certain high-emitting imports regardless of where they are produced. In a world of modern mercantilism, policy makers have increasingly emphasized the need for carbon pricing schemes to support—rather than constrain—industrial competitiveness.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Direct carbon pricing, spanning carbon taxes and emissions trading systems, now covers roughly 30% of global emissions, with most of that coverage coming from emissions trading systems in China and the EU.
The EU has begun implementing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, which imposes carbon pricing on certain high-emitting imports regardless of where they are produced, as a complement to its domestic emissions trading system.
Carbon pricing schemes are increasingly being adapted to fit specific industrial policy goals, with policy makers emphasizing that such schemes should support rather than constrain industrial competitiveness.
Related Articles:
We Are All Mercantilists Now— The postwar free-trade system depended on American soft power and broad respect for its rules, and as countries defected to mercantilist policies each defection pushed others to respond in kind. China's economic size and its use of currency management, public procurement, state subsidies and protectionism to build leading industries in electric vehicles, solar power and batteries broke the existing order.
Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World— China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.
Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026— Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
AI Summary.The European earth observation service reported an August global average surface air temperature of just under 62.6°F, 2.97°F above the pre-industrial baseline and on a par with the prior record, with global sea temperature at 69.93°F. Provisional US data recorded 100 consecutive days of record ocean warming.
Attracta Mooney and Aditi BhandariFinancial Times
Date Posted:
Global mean sea-surface temperature reached 69.9°F in August, amid 100 consecutive days of record ocean warming since early June, according to provisional NOAA data. The increase in temperature has been amplified by the El Niño cycle.
Are global air and ocean temperatures setting new records?
Core argument: The European earth observation service put August’s global average surface air temperature at 2.97°F above the pre-industrial baseline, just under 62.6°F, on a par with the previous record set in July 2023.
The European earth observation service said the global average surface air temperature in August was 2.97°F higher than the pre-industrial baseline, reaching just under 62.6°F. This put it on a par with the previous record set in July 2023. The global sea temperature in August was put at 69.93°F. This week marked 100 consecutive days of record warming since early June, according to provisional data from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. This stretch was exceeded during the previous El Niño cycle. It is estimated that El Niño typically affects the global mean temperature by about 0.36°F, although the magnitude was likely to be larger this year because of the extent of the naturally occurring event.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The European earth observation service put August’s global average surface air temperature at 2.97°F above the pre-industrial baseline, just under 62.6°F, on a par with the previous record set in July 2023.
Global sea temperature in August was put at 69.93°F, and provisional NOAA data show 100 consecutive days of record warming since early June, a stretch exceeded during the previous El Niño cycle.
El Niño is estimated to affect the global mean temperature by about 0.36°F, though the magnitude was likely to be larger this year given the extent of the naturally occurring event.
Related Articles:
Warming Seas Are Brewing Extreme Weather In Months Ahead, Scientists Forecast— Global sea temperatures reached their second highest level on record for the month of April, with the European Union's Copernicus Climate Change Service reporting record sea-surface temperatures across much of the tropical Pacific. Scientists say this raises concerns that an El Niño warming cycle is forming, which would temporarily accelerate global air temperature rise and intensify fires, floods and droughts.
The Dangerous Effects Of Rising Sea Temperatures— The world's oceans have absorbed 90% of excess heat and about a quarter of human-caused carbon dioxide emissions during the industrial era, and scientists are investigating what drove an anomalous rise in sea temperatures and whether seas will cool again. Researchers caution there is no guarantee oceans will keep absorbing heat at the same rate.
Three Tough Truths About Climate— The International Energy Agency's projection for annual carbon dioxide emissions in 2040 has fallen from 50bn tons to 30bn tons, though the world is expected to fall far short of the 1.5°C Paris goal, with warming likely between 2°C and 3°C by 2100. Global energy demand is projected to more than double by 2050.
AI Summary.Global fertility is likely below the replacement level needed to keep population constant in the long run, though population momentum from large cohorts of women now having children means world population will keep growing for roughly another 30 years. Unless trends change, it is projected to peak near 9bn around 2056 and then decline.
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick NorrickUniversity of Pennsylvania
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important
The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.
Will world population keep growing even as fertility falls below replacement?
Core argument: As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below replacement fertility, with fewer births than needed to keep population constant in the long run.
World population is set to keep growing for roughly another 30 years because of momentum effects, as large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago have their children while their own parents are still alive.
Unless trends change, world population will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.
Related Articles:
The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences— The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
The Wealth of Working Nations— Because of population aging, growth in GDP per capita and GDP per working-age adult have diverged across advanced economies; from 1998 to 2019 Japan's accumulated growth per working-age adult was 31.9% versus 29.5% in the US. The authors find a standard neoclassical growth model calibrated to each country's working-age population tracks output per working-age adult in most economies.
AI Summary.The US is projected to cut greenhouse gas emissions 27–41% below 2005 levels by 2040 under federal and state policies currently on the books. In the high-emissions scenario, reductions slow through the early 2030s and then reverse, while in the low-emissions scenario, clean technologies' cost competitiveness accelerates declines through 2040.
Hannah Kolus, Ben King, Parker Case, Michael Gaffney, et al.Rhodium Group
Date Posted:
Rhodium projects that under current policy, US GHG emissions will be 26–29% under the 2005 level in four years, driven by an influx of natural gas and renewable production. Their forecast for 2040 is 27-41% below the 2005 level.
How much will US greenhouse gas emissions fall under current policies?
Core argument: The US is on track to cut greenhouse gas emissions 27–41% below 2005 levels in 2040, considering all federal and state policies on the books as of June 2026.
The US is on track to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 27-41% below 2005 levels in 2040, considering all relevant federal and state policies on the books as of June 2026. These emissions outcomes represent divergent futures after the late 2020s. In the high-emissions scenario, the emissions reductions that have characterized the last 20 years slow through the early 2030s before reversing direction altogether, with growing emissions through most of that decade. In the low-emissions case, the economic competitiveness of clean technologies relative to fossil incumbents, alongside an imperative for “speed-to-power” for large loads, continues—and accelerates—GHG emission declines through 2040.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The US is on track to cut greenhouse gas emissions 27–41% below 2005 levels in 2040, considering all federal and state policies on the books as of June 2026.
In the high-emissions scenario, the emissions declines of the past 20 years slow through the early 2030s and then reverse, with US emissions growing through most of that decade.
In the low-emissions scenario, the economic competitiveness of clean technologies relative to fossil incumbents and a "speed-to-power" imperative for large loads accelerate US emissions declines through 2040.
Related Articles:
Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026— Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
The Most Amazing Climate Policy Figure— U.S. carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels moved closely with GDP from 1992 to about 2005, after which the two decoupled, with GDP continuing to rise while emissions fell.
The U.S. Is Forfeiting the Clean-Energy Race to China— China installed 277 gigawatts of wind and solar capacity in seven months, roughly four times the utility-scale additions U.S. federal analysts project for all power sources over a full year. Chinese firms' global market share in batteries and solar modules has reached 75% or higher, according to BloombergNEF.
AI Summary.Running standard demographic models—including the Cohort-Component, United Nations World Population Prospects, Lee-Carter, and Lotka-Volterra approaches—across all plausible analytical choices yields a wide range of possible global population outcomes for 2050 and 2075. The authors argue that presenting a single population trajectory hides the compounding uncertainty inherent in such projections.
Samuele Lo Piano, Marta Kuc-Czarnecka, Roger Pielke, and Andrea SaltelliSocial Science Research Network
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.
How much uncertainty do single-trajectory population projections hide?
Core argument: Propagating all plausible analytical choices through global population projections to 2050 and 2075 yields wide overall uncertainty distributions, with the Cohort-Component, UN World Population Prospects, Lee-Carter and Lotka-Volterra models showing distinct sensitivities and outcomes.
We explore demographic predictions by propagating all plausible choices that can be made during the analysis through the modelling process. This approach involves navigating the so-called ’garden of forking paths’—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators were to examine the same problem. For this, we now abandon [the Chinese government mathematician] Song Jian’s ‘historic’ model and turn to models currently in use: the Cohort-Component and UN WPP models, the Lee-Carter model and the Lotka-Volterra model. Note that in standard use, these tools are used in isolation, see e.g. the FAO’s How to Feed the World in 2050, resting on a single UN WPP population trajectory shielding the reader from the compounding effect of their uncertainty. Unsurprisingly, the exercise capturing the modelling of the modelling process for global population projections to 2050 and 2075 reveals distinct characteristics regarding the sensitivity and projection outcomes of the different models. Once abandoned the straitjacket of Song’s approach, uncertainty is free to manifest itself. The overall uncertainty distributions of the projected populations show a wide range of possible outcomes, reflecting the inherent uncertainties in demographic projections.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Propagating all plausible analytical choices through global population projections to 2050 and 2075 yields wide overall uncertainty distributions, with the Cohort-Component, UN World Population Prospects, Lee-Carter and Lotka-Volterra models showing distinct sensitivities and outcomes.
Standard demographic practice uses these projection models in isolation, as in the FAO's How to Feed the World in 2050, which rests on a single UN World Population Prospects trajectory and shields readers from the compounding effect of their uncertainty.
Abandoning Song Jian's historic model and navigating the "garden of forking paths"—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators examined the same problem—allows uncertainty in demographic projections to manifest itself.
Related Articles:
The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences— The authors estimate the world total fertility rate is around 2.17, below the global replacement rate of roughly 2.21, meaning humanity is already below replacement, with fertility and births falling faster than anticipated. They project middle-income countries' fertility may fall below that of rich countries outside East Asia, with emigration compounding population decline.
World Depopulation: Prospects and Implications— The US is projected to account for a growing share of the rich world's labor force, youth, and highly educated talent, with continuing population and labor force growth and only moderate aging through 2050. Its fertility, though below replacement, exceeds that of East Asian and nearly all European countries, and sustained legal immigration is essential to this demographic advantage.
Take the Under— Downward revisions to global population and GDP projections make climate change appear more tractable, the author argues, since the scenarios used to model emissions rely on socio-economic assumptions that are more extreme than real-world observations. With slower population and economic growth, even partial policy successes could bring emissions consistent with a 2C target within reach.
AI Summary.Global sea temperatures reached their second highest level on record for the month of April, with the European Union's Copernicus Climate Change Service reporting record sea-surface temperatures across much of the tropical Pacific. Scientists say this raises concerns that an El Niño warming cycle is forming, which would temporarily accelerate global air temperature rise and intensify fires, floods and droughts.
Attracta MooneyFinancial Times
Date Posted:
April’s global ocean temperatures rose to their second-highest level on record, suggesting a brewing El Niño warming cycle. April temperatures were just shy of their level in 2024, which was also an El Niño year.
Are record ocean temperatures signaling more extreme weather ahead?
Core argument: Global average sea-surface temperatures for non-polar oceans reached 21°C (69.8°F) in April, just below the record 21.04°C (69.9°F) set in April 2024 during the last El Niño event.
Sea temperatures around the world were the second highest on record for the month of April, stoking concerns among scientists that an El Niño warming cycle is brewing that would intensify extreme weather. The naturally occurring El Niño weather phenomenon, where water temperatures in the central and eastern tropical Pacific Ocean become significantly warmer, temporarily accelerates the rise in global air temperature, resulting in the spread of fires, floods and droughts. The EU’s Copernicus Climate Change Service reported record sea-surface temperatures across much of the tropical Pacific in April, while the global average for non-polar oceans reached 21°C [69.8°F]— just shy of the 21.04°C [69.9°F] record set in April 2024 during the last El Niño event.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Global average sea-surface temperatures for non-polar oceans reached 21°C (69.8°F) in April, just below the record 21.04°C (69.9°F) set in April 2024 during the last El Niño event.
The EU's Copernicus Climate Change Service reported record sea-surface temperatures across much of the tropical Pacific in April, stoking scientists' concerns that an El Niño warming cycle is brewing.
El Niño, in which central and eastern tropical Pacific waters become significantly warmer, temporarily accelerates the rise in global air temperature and results in the spread of fires, floods and droughts.
Related Articles:
Three Tough Truths About Climate— The International Energy Agency's projection for annual carbon dioxide emissions in 2040 has fallen from 50bn tons to 30bn tons, though the world is expected to fall far short of the 1.5°C Paris goal, with warming likely between 2°C and 3°C by 2100. Global energy demand is projected to more than double by 2050.
The Most Amazing Climate Policy Figure— U.S. carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels moved closely with GDP from 1992 to about 2005, after which the two decoupled, with GDP continuing to rise while emissions fell.
Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026— Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
AI Summary.Lower fertility cannot meaningfully reduce mid-century emissions because of timing: most people alive in 2050 have already been born, with United Nations projections implying about 75% of the 2050 US population will be over age 24. A 10% decline in births would cut the 2050 population by only about 2.5%, mostly children whose consumption and emissions are low.
Kevin KurucAspen Economic Strategy Group
Date Posted:
Kuruc argues fertility changes reduce population far too slowly to affect near-term climate goals – particularly reducing carbon emissions. Further, smaller and older populations will mean greater fiscal constraints on environmental initiatives.
Can lower birth rates meaningfully reduce mid-century emissions?
Core argument: United Nations 2024 projections expect about 75% of the U.S. population in 2050 to be over age 24 and thus born before 2026, so fertility changes can affect only the remaining 25% of the population pyramid.
The reason that low fertility will not reduce long-run climate change is simple: timing. The timelines over which the world is aiming to substantially curtail emissions do not line up with the timelines over which fertility impacts the size of the population. It is too late for changes in fertility to make a large difference in population sizes this century, and by the end of this century, it will be too late for population changes to make a large difference to eventual warming. A large majority of the people who will be alive in 2050—a focal year in climate discussions—have already been born. Demographic projections expect that about 75% of the United States population in 2050 will be over the age of 24, and hence, born prior to 2026 (United Nations 2024). Even an immediate change in fertility can only affect the 25 percent of the population pyramid that has not yet been born, implying that, for example, a 10% decline in births would produce only a 2.5% decline in the size of the overall 2050 population. Moreover, these missing individuals would be mostly children—too young to have entered the workforce, when their income, consumption, and emissions peak. So, any realistic decline in near-term births would have a trivial impact on mid-century emissions.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
United Nations 2024 projections expect about 75% of the U.S. population in 2050 to be over age 24 and thus born before 2026, so fertility changes can affect only the remaining 25% of the population pyramid.
A 10% decline in births would produce only a 2.5% decline in the overall 2050 population, and those missing individuals would mostly be children, too young to have entered the workforce, when income, consumption, and emissions peak.
The environmental case for low fertility turns on timing: it is too late for fertility changes to make a large difference in population size this century, and by the end of the century population changes will matter little for eventual warming.
Related Articles:
Three Tough Truths About Climate— The International Energy Agency's projection for annual carbon dioxide emissions in 2040 has fallen from 50bn tons to 30bn tons, though the world is expected to fall far short of the 1.5°C Paris goal, with warming likely between 2°C and 3°C by 2100. Global energy demand is projected to more than double by 2050.
The Most Amazing Climate Policy Figure— U.S. carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels moved closely with GDP from 1992 to about 2005, after which the two decoupled, with GDP continuing to rise while emissions fell.
Is the Green Energy Transition Dead?— The world is undergoing an energy addition rather than an energy transition: renewables have grown as a share of supply while fossil fuel production has also risen in absolute terms, leaving total energy supply and greenhouse gas emissions at all-time highs.
AI Summary.Insurance broker Aon reports global insured losses from natural disasters exceeded $127bn, with more than $100bn in the US, led by the Los Angeles wildfires, while total global economic losses from disasters reached about $260bn. More than half of those economic losses were uninsured, reflecting persistent coverage gaps in emerging markets.
Eva Xiao and Lee HarrisFinancial Times
Date Posted:
$100B of the $127B total global insured losses due to natural disasters in 2025 were in the US, according to an Aon report, ~$58B of which were caused by the Los Angeles fires. Overall global economic losses from disasters in 2025 totaled $260B.
How large were global insured and uninsured natural disaster losses?
Core argument: Global insured losses from natural disasters exceeded $127bn in 2025, with more than $100bn occurring in the US after the Los Angeles fires, according to insurance broker Aon.
Global insured losses of more than $127bn from natural disasters were dominated by more than $100bn occurring in the US in 2025 after the Los Angeles fires, according to a new industry report on climate and other extreme events. Overall global economic losses stemming from disasters, including thunderstorms and earthquakes, totalled about $260bn, according to the review by insurance broker Aon. But more than half of those losses remain not covered by insurance, highlighting the persistence of inadequate coverage in emerging markets, it said. “Extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and unpredictable, affecting new geographies and sectors, and challenging long-held assumptions about resilience,” wrote Greg Case, Aon chief executive. “Weather exposures are rising,” he noted. Insured losses from climate disasters were 27% higher than the long-term average since 2000.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Global insured losses from natural disasters exceeded $127bn in 2025, with more than $100bn occurring in the US after the Los Angeles fires, according to insurance broker Aon.
Aon puts total global economic losses from disasters, including thunderstorms and earthquakes, at about $260bn, with more than half uninsured, highlighting the persistence of inadequate coverage in emerging markets.
Insured losses from climate disasters ran 27% above the long-term average since 2000, and Aon chief executive Greg Case wrote that extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and unpredictable, affecting new geographies and sectors.
Related Articles:
The World Is Getting Riskier. Americans Don’t Want to Pay for It— Americans' resistance to paying to insure against risks from illness, old age, and natural and financial disasters is growing alongside those risks; JPMorgan estimated wildfires around Los Angeles caused $50bn in losses, of which only $20bn were insured. Socializing risk removes the price signal that encourages the insured to mitigate their own exposure.
Runaway Insurance Costs Bring Back Talk of Price Caps— State regulators have approved home insurance rate increases averaging 50% and auto increases averaging 42%, outpacing a 26% rise in consumer prices over the same period, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence and Labor Department data.
Insurance: Climbing Costs Cut Into Consumer Budgets— Bank of America internal data show median household property insurance payments (auto and home) rose 6% year-over-year and more than 40% over five years, lifting such payments to 5% of income. Younger generations saw the largest increases, though Gen X payments also rose 45%.
