“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers

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What Demographic Prediction Can and Cannot Achieve

Samuele Lo Piano, Marta Kuc-Czarnecka, Roger Pielke, and Andrea Saltelli Social Science Research Network

Date Posted:: May 29, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

We explore demographic predictions by propagating all plausible choices that can be made during the analysis through the modelling process. This approach involves navigating the so-called ’garden of forking paths’—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators were to examine the same problem. For this, we now abandon [the Chinese government mathematician] Song Jian’s ‘historic’ model and turn to models currently in use: the Cohort-Component and UN WPP models, the Lee-Carter model and the Lotka-Volterra model. Note that in standard use, these tools are used in isolation, see e.g. the FAO’s How to Feed the World in 2050, resting on a single UN WPP population trajectory shielding the reader from the compounding effect of their uncertainty. Unsurprisingly, the exercise capturing the modelling of the modelling process for global population projections to 2050 and 2075 reveals distinct characteristics regarding the sensitivity and projection outcomes of the different models. Once abandoned the straitjacket of Song’s approach, uncertainty is free to manifest itself. The overall uncertainty distributions of the projected populations show a wide range of possible outcomes, reflecting the inherent uncertainties in demographic projections.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Model choice accounts for 98% of output variance in 2050 global population projections, driving divergent forecasts ranging from 4–25 billion.
Song Jian’s optimization model converges to 700 million people by 2080 across all parameter variations (670–700 million range), demonstrating structural.
Global fertility declined from 5 children per woman in 1950 to 2.1 currently, with no rebound in countries where rates.

Terra Incognita: The Economics of a Shrinking World

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick Norrick University of Pennsylvania

Date Posted:: August 14, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Global fertility has fallen below replacement level as of 2026, ending humanity’s ability to sustain long-run population stability without a reversal in trends.
Population momentum—driven by large cohorts of women now in peak childbearing years—will sustain growth for roughly 30 more years before world population peaks at approximately 9 billion around 2056 and begins declining.

Americans Are Done With Being Put in Racial Boxes

Justin Fox Bloomberg

Date Posted:: July 21, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Post-1960s immigration from Asia and Latin America is the primary driver of rising U.S. demographic diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White population share.
Intermarriage rates among Hispanic and Asian Americans exceed those of Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, expanding a multiracial population that no single government racial category can accurately capture.

The Pig In The Python: US Decennial Labor Flows And Economic Opportunity, 1910–2040

Steven Ruggles Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Date Posted:: July 14, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Baby-boom labor-force entry during 1960–1980 suppressed young-worker wages, which declined sharply after peaking in 1973, reducing economic opportunity for new.
Cumulative labor-market entries over five decades as a % of working-age population drives employment competition that persists decades after initial.
Female labor-force participation expansion and immigration during 1960–1980 created a sustained worker glut that stifled demand for new employment until.

Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy

Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, Keelan Beirne and Andrew Scott National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: July 7, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Figure 3 traces out how GDP per worker evolves following a 1pp increase in birth rates at t−20. Since cohorts born at t−20 (e.g., 1970) do not enter the working-age population until t = 0 (e.g., 1990), we should observe no response before t = 0; [indeed] the estimated coefficients are ~0 and statistically insignificant before t = 0. Beginning at t = 0, however, higher birth rates are associated with lower GDP per worker, and the negative effects grow progressively larger over time. For example, a 1pp lower birth rate at t−20 is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points higher by t+40. The latter corresponds to roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval. We find that lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents and a growing share of high-tech industries across countries and US commuting zones [Figure 11]. They are also predictive of higher TFP growth across countries and US industries and increased patenting in ICT and broader automation technology classes. Using cross-country variation in WWII-era military and civilian deaths, we present suggestive evidence that the positive growth effects of falling birth rates are primarily driven by the scarcity of younger workers rather than by reductions in population per se [Figure 14]. [Editor’s note: the paper does not grapple with the fiscal consequences of an aging population.]

The Midwest's Brain Drain Is Accelerating

Aziz Sunderji Home Economics

Date Posted:: May 13, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

The “Brain Drain” is ongoing in the Midwest. The fraction of adult out-migrants with at least a bachelor’s degree is now 57%, up from ~40% in 2005. “It’s the most educated and highest-earning that are still leaving in droves.”

Take Illinois, the most populous Midwestern state: my analysis of Census Bureau microdata shows that between 2014–15 and 2023–24, annual out-migration by households earning under $50K fell by 104K. Out-migration by Illinois households earning over $200K rose by 54K over the same period. Across the region, the trend along educational lines is the same: the bachelor’s-or-higher share of adult out-migrants is now 57%, up from around 40% in 2005. It’s the most educated and highest-earning that are still leaving in droves.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Illinois high-earner out-migration surged +54K annually (2014–15 to 2023–24) while low-earner departures fell -104K, driving regional brain drain toward higher-income.
The Midwest’s leaver premium nearly tripled from $5.6K to $15.6K (2005–07 to 2022–24), indicating departing households earn substantially more than.
Bachelor’s-or-higher share of out-migrants reached 57% vs. 40% in 2005, showing education-driven exodus leads to reduced regional human capital and.

Why the U.S. Fertility Rate Has Hit a Record Low

Anthony DeBarros, Paul Overberg and Andrea Petersen Wall Street Journal

Date Posted:: April 9, 2026
Is Database:: Database

The US’s total fertility rate likely hit a record low of 1.57 in 2025, according to provisional CDC data. Childbearing continued to shift toward older women with the birthrate for American women 35–39 exceeding that of women 20–24 for the first time.

The nation’s fertility rates hit record lows in 2025 as childbearing continued to shift toward older women, according to new federal data released Thursday. For the sixth straight year, the number of children born in the U.S. remained at roughly 3.6 million. The number of births per 1,000 women ages 15 to 44—the general fertility rate—reached a record low of 53.1 in 2025, according to provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The rate has mostly headed down since 2007, a prerecession peak when millennial women started to enter their prime childbearing years. While non-Hispanic white women saw a small increase in births last year, births by women of other racial and ethnic groups declined slightly.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Declining birth rates will shrink the future workforce, increasing pressure on social security and pension systems.
Delayed childbearing among older women signals shifting priorities toward education and career advancement over early parenthood.

Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

How much do demographic models actually predict versus explore?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

Will declining birth rates eventually shrink the global economy?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

Is the traditional racial classification system becoming obsolete?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

Does a one-time labor surge create permanent wage pressure?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Related Articles:

The “Brain Drain” is ongoing in the Midwest. The fraction of adult out-migrants with at least a bachelor’s degree is now 57%, up from ~40% in 2005. “It’s the most educated and highest-earning that are still leaving in droves.”

What factors are driving the Midwest's accelerating brain drain?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

The US’s total fertility rate likely hit a record low of 1.57 in 2025, according to provisional CDC data. Childbearing continued to shift toward older women with the birthrate for American women 35–39 exceeding that of women 20–24 for the first time.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

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