“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
A hub for comparative evidence across countries, eras, regions, demographic groups, political systems, industries, and skill levels. These articles use contrasts and natural benchmarks to clarify economic performance and social outcomes.
AI Summary.Prime-age adults aged 25–54 and older workers aged 55–64 have higher employment rates in Europe than in the US, while US youth employment is higher because Europeans spend longer in education. The share of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe.
Chris GilesFinancial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important
Despite Europe’s high social spending relative to the US, Chris Giles notes that prime-age adult (25–54) labor force participation in the Eurozone has overtaken that of the US, and there has been a dramatic convergence in the LFP of older workers.
Do Europeans work less than Americans?
Core argument: Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
It does not matter whether you use EU or Eurozone data, prime-age adults (between 25 and 54) in Europe are more likely to be in work than those in the US. Older people (between 55 and 64) also have higher employment rates in Europe. Younger people (between 15 and 24) are more likely to have a job in the US, but that results from Europeans educating themselves for longer. The proportion of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe. So welfare is not stopping work. More than that, the higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, although there is convergence within the Eurozone. Spain, in particular, has enjoyed rapid improvements.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
Young people aged 15–24 are more likely to have a job in the US than in Europe, but that gap results from Europeans spending longer in education, and the share not in education, employment or training is higher in the US.
The higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, with convergence within the Eurozone and rapid improvement in Spain.
Related Articles:
Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans?— About half of the 1990s gap between American and European hours worked had reversed by the end of the 2010s. The authors estimate US hours per person declined after the 2000s because of rising benefits for the non-employed—especially health benefits like Medicaid—while non-US hours rose with higher wages and lower work costs.
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
AI Summary.Oxford Economics projects US corporate spending on new equipment and facilities will rise 40% in real terms over a roughly five-year span, versus 12% in the euro area, with German business investment nearly stagnant. US output per hour worked rose $14 between 2018 and 2025, compared with $2 in Europe.
Sam Fleming, Amy Borrett and Olaf StorbeckFinancial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Oxford Economics projects US real business investment will rise 40% over 2021–2027, ~3x the euro area’s 12%. US investment growth since 2024 has been largely information processing and software, but high US growth in GDP/hour is not “merely digital.”
Is US business investment growing far faster than Europe's?
Core argument: Oxford Economics projects US corporate spending on new equipment and facilities will rise 40% in real terms between 2021 and the end of next year, versus 12% in the euro area.
Corporate spending on new equipment and facilities in the US is projected to increase 40% in real terms between 2021 and the end of next year, according to forecasts from Oxford Economics. The US surge compared with a real-terms increase of just 12% in the euro area, while German business investment is expected to have all but stagnated over the same period. Europe also faces a large and growing productivity gap with the US. “The United States has recently pulled further ahead of Europe,” Bart van Ark, a professor at the University of Manchester, told policymakers at the ECB Forum in Sintra. GDP per hour worked increased $14 in the US between 2018 and 2025, compared with just $2 in Europe. “The gap is not only a digital sector story,” added van Ark, stressing that the US outperformance extended to other sectors, including wholesale and retail as well as professional services.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Oxford Economics projects US corporate spending on new equipment and facilities will rise 40% in real terms between 2021 and the end of next year, versus 12% in the euro area.
German business investment is expected to have all but stagnated between 2021 and the end of next year, according to Oxford Economics forecasts.
GDP per hour worked rose $14 in the US between 2018 and 2025 compared with $2 in Europe, with Bart van Ark telling the ECB Forum in Sintra that US outperformance extended beyond the digital sector to wholesale and retail and professional services.
Related Articles:
The Two Europes— The International Monetary Fund projects Eastern European economies will close much of the gap with US per capita GDP — Poland from 34% to 67%, Romania 27% to 60%, Lithuania 29% to 69% — while Western Europe slips, with France falling from 86% to 71% and Italy from 93% to 68%.
Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking”— A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
AI Summary.Europe consumes AI products like ChatGPT without capturing the capital gains, payroll taxes on high-paid engineers, or agglomeration effects, because the tax base accrues where high-value production occurs rather than where products are consumed. The author argues Europe's welfare commitments were implicitly backed by expected future growth that is no longer anticipated.
Hanno LustigThe Two Cents
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Lustig argues that Krugman is wrong to dismiss concerns about slower European growth relative to the US based on welfare measures: “Europe’s social model is not financed out of consumer surplus; it is financed out of taxable income and taxable profits.”
Does consuming AI without producing it erode Europe's tax base?
Core argument: Europe consumes ChatGPT but collects none of the capital gains, payroll taxes on million-dollar AI engineers, or agglomeration effects, because the tax base migrates to where high-value production occurs rather than where products are consumed.
Europe consumes ChatGPT; it does not collect the capital gains, the payroll taxes on million-dollar AI engineers, or the agglomeration effects. The worst possible combination for a welfare state: contented consumers committed to the status quo, eroding public finances. The tax base migrates to where the high-value production takes place, not where the products are ultimately consumed. All this insurance that European states are committed to providing was implicitly backed by the promise of future growth. And that growth is no longer expected to materialize, but the promises remain. The problem is not simply that Europeans chose a different point on the efficiency-equity frontier. Their choices have shifted the frontier itself inward over time, leaving future generations of Europeans with a trade-off that is much worse.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Europe consumes ChatGPT but collects none of the capital gains, payroll taxes on million-dollar AI engineers, or agglomeration effects, because the tax base migrates to where high-value production occurs rather than where products are consumed.
Europe's welfare-state insurance was implicitly backed by a promise of future growth that is no longer expected to materialize, while the promises themselves remain in place.
European choices have shifted the efficiency-equity frontier itself inward over time, leaving future generations with a worse trade-off rather than merely a different point on the same frontier.
Related Articles:
European vs. U.S. Economic Performance: An Update— Productivity growth from 2000-2019 was higher in the US than in western Europe, but almost half the gap disappears when information and communications technology is excluded, even though tech was 9.2% of US output versus 5.4% in the EU. The author estimates this difference in industrial mix accounts for roughly 40% of the overall productivity growth gap.
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
European Stagnation Is Real— Comparing the United States, France, and Germany at current purchasing power parity prices shows the European economies roughly constant relative to America since 2000, but current-price measures miss output gains in sectors where prices fall, such as software. The author argues constant-price comparisons, the standard approach for growth over time, reveal greater European stagnation.
AI Summary.Comparisons of living standards across countries can use "constant price" purchasing power parities, which extrapolate from a base year using national inflation measures, or "current price" parities recalculated annually; the debate over whether Europe has fallen behind the U.S. turns on which method is preferable. The two methods agree when inflation is measured consistently across countries.
Matt KleinThe Overshoot
Date Posted:
Addressing whether intra-country growth comparisons should use constant or current price PPPs, Klein notes that for Japan, both give the same conclusion. ICT‑related price and quality‑adjustment asymmetries—while present—have not yielded large PPP drift.
Does the method of comparing prices across countries change living standards conclusions?
Core argument: The dispute over whether Europe's living standards have fallen relative to the U.S. turns on which purchasing power parity method is preferred: constant price PPPs anchored to a base year or current price PPPs recalculated each year.
One obvious approach would be to start from a given base year and then run the data forwards and backwards using national measures of inflation. This generates “constant price purchasing power parities”. In any given year, the relative purchasing power between two societies is sensitive to the starting benchmark, but the direction of travel always looks the same. The other obvious approach would be to recalculate the price parities each year, if possible, and then use those to compare incomes each year. This creates “current price purchasing power parities.” The argument about whether Europe’s living standards have fallen relative to the U.S. is an argument about whether one method is better than the other. In theory these should produce more or less the same answers as long as inflation is measured consistently across countries and as long as the mix of items tracked does not change. Sometimes, that is exactly what happens. Both methods produce essentially the same results when comparing Japanese and U.S. incomes over time, for example.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
The dispute over whether Europe's living standards have fallen relative to the U.S. turns on which purchasing power parity method is preferred: constant price PPPs anchored to a base year or current price PPPs recalculated each year.
Constant price purchasing power parities, built by running data forward and backward from a base year using national inflation measures, yield relative purchasing power that is sensitive to the starting benchmark, though the direction of travel looks the same.
In theory the two purchasing power parity methods should produce roughly the same answers as long as inflation is measured consistently across countries and the mix of tracked items does not change, as happens when comparing Japanese and U.S. incomes.
Related Articles:
Europe Versus America: A Response to the Critics— The author argues that standard productivity measures do not carry the implications for cross-country comparisons of living standards and economic welfare that many economists assume, rather than that European productivity is mismeasured. Faster measured US productivity growth coexists with European relative productivity and purchasing power at current prices not declining.
The Mismeasurement of European Productivity— European productivity growth has trailed the United States for three decades, and measures using current purchasing-power-parity conversions versus national price deflators answer different questions. The authors argue the flat current-purchasing-power-parity series reflects changing the price yardstick each year rather than showing Europe is keeping pace.
The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe— A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
AI Summary.In a survey of generative AI users, a plurality across most occupations reported that the tools assist with tasks requiring intermediate expertise, with high-expertise assistance reported by over 30% in computer and math, architecture and engineering, and management roles but under 10% in some manual occupations.
Alexander Bick, Adam Blandin, David Deming and Tyler SchumacherNational Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
In a real-time survey, >30% of workers in tech and professional occupations reported that genAI assists with high-expertise tasks, compared to <10% in manual jobs. The modal response saw AI assisting in medium-expertise tasks.
What level of expertise does generative AI assist workers with?
Core argument: In the Real Time Population Survey, more than 30% of workers in Computer and Math, Architecture and Engineering, and Management occupations report that generative AI assists with high-expertise parts of their job.
The RPS [Real Time Population Survey] asked genAI users whether genAI primarily assisted them with low-, moderate-, or high-expertise parts of their job (workers could select multiple options). Figure 7 displays the average responses by broad occupation. In most occupations, a plurality of workers indicate that genAI assists with work that require intermediate expertise. In most technical and professional occupations, a relatively large share of workers report that genAI assists with high-expertise work. Computer and Math, Architecture and Engineering, and Management Occupations all exhibit high-expertise shares above 30%. By contrast, many occupations involving manual work exhibit small shares of workers who report high-expertise assistance - e.g. Protective Service and Buildings and Grounds Maintenance occupations exhibit high-expertise shares below 10%. However, we also observe a few interesting counterexamples to these patterns. Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations, which involve substantial manual work and average education rates, exhibit large high-expertise shares. In the other direction, Legal Occupations, which exhibit high adoption rates, high education levels, and minimal manual work, exhibit small high-expertise shares. Overall, these patterns suggest that genAI does not map cleanly into a uniform “low-expertise” or “high-expertise” case.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
In the Real Time Population Survey, more than 30% of workers in Computer and Math, Architecture and Engineering, and Management occupations report that generative AI assists with high-expertise parts of their job.
Protective Service and Buildings and Grounds Maintenance occupations show high-expertise generative AI assistance shares below 10%, while in most occupations a plurality of users report that generative AI assists with work requiring intermediate expertise.
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair occupations show large high-expertise shares despite substantial manual work and average education rates, while Legal occupations show small high-expertise shares despite high adoption rates, high education levels, and minimal manual work.
Related Articles:
Expertise— The authors' model of automation predicts that occupations with rising expertise requirements see higher wages but falling employment, while those with declining requirements see lower wages alongside rising employment. Analyzing employment and earnings data by occupation across four decades, they find changes in occupational expertise strongly predict changes in occupational wages.
Generative AI and Entrepreneurship— The authors find that startups with a larger share of tasks doable by generative AI cut employment beginning immediately after ChatGPT's release, with technically proficient founders restructuring teams toward higher-skill roles. Venture investors made smaller but more numerous deals, and new firm entry offset the decline in total startup employment.
The Labor Market Effects of Generative AI: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of AI Exposure— U.S. sectors with greater exposure to large language models are estimated to have seen statistically significant gains in total wages paid, employment, and hourly wages, with larger hourly wage gains for younger and more educated workers in exposed occupations. Sectors intensive in human–AI collaboration tasks gained employment and wages, while those with more directly automatable tasks saw declines.
AI Summary.Global average sea surface temperature reached 20.79C in May, the second-highest May level on record, while atmospheric carbon dioxide peaked at a global mean of 426 parts per million, up from 423 a year earlier. Scientists estimate the ocean absorbs a quarter to 30% of emitted carbon dioxide and about 90% of excess heat.
Attracta Mooney and Steven BernardFinancial Times
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
The world’s ocean temperatures reached the second-highest level on record for May, capping an “alarming” two-year streak of rapid warming. Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 hit their highest seasonal peak since records began, a global mean of 426 ppm.
Are ocean temperatures staying near record highs as carbon dioxide rises?
Core argument: Atmospheric CO₂ peaked globally at a mean of 426 parts per million in March, up from 423 ppm a year earlier, and surpassed 430 ppm at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii.
The world’s ocean temperatures reached the second-highest level on record for May, capping an “alarming” two-year streak of rapid warming and fueling concerns about the seas’ ability to absorb rising levels of carbon dioxide. The EU’s Earth observation service Copernicus said the global average sea surface temperature in May was 20.79C, 0.14C below the record in the same month in 2024. The level of CO₂ in the atmosphere peaked globally at the mean of 426 parts per million in March, up from 423 ppm a year ago, and surpassed 430 ppm at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii. Scientists estimate the ocean has absorbed between a quarter and about 30% of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere and about 90% of excess heat, helping to keep temperatures on land cooler. But Michael Meredith, a scientist at the British Antarctic Survey in Cambridge, warned the ocean “may lose some of its capacity to buffer us against the worst extremes of climate change” by absorbing less warmth or carbon than previously. “We’re seeing stronger and stronger bursts of ocean warming — marine heatwaves — that are pushing us past records at an alarming rate.”
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Atmospheric CO₂ peaked globally at a mean of 426 parts per million in March, up from 423 ppm a year earlier, and surpassed 430 ppm at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii.
Scientists estimate the ocean has absorbed between a quarter and about 30% of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere and about 90% of excess heat, and Michael Meredith of the British Antarctic Survey warned it may lose some of that buffering capacity.
Related Articles:
Long-term Surface Impact of Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai-like Stratospheric Water Vapor Injection— A volcanic eruption that injected large amounts of water vapor — a strong greenhouse gas — into the stratosphere is estimated to have raised surface temperatures by more than 1.5°C across large regions for several years, while cooling some areas by close to 1°C. The authors suggest a possible link to tropical Pacific sea surface temperatures that warrants further investigation.
Take the Under— Downward revisions to global population and GDP projections make climate change appear more tractable, the author argues, since the scenarios used to model emissions rely on socio-economic assumptions that are more extreme than real-world observations. With slower population and economic growth, even partial policy successes could bring emissions consistent with a 2C target within reach.
AI Summary.Seasonally adjusted monthly tourist arrivals to the US from Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK show no collapse in foreign travel, with arrivals from Italy reaching an all-time high. The UK accounts for by far the largest share of arrivals among these four countries, followed by Germany and Italy.
Robin BrooksRobin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
Foreign tourist arrivals in the US–especially from Europe–remain buoyant. Italy posted a new all-time high in April 2025; data provide evidence contrary to the narrative warning of a collapse in travel to the US.
Have European tourist arrivals to the US declined?
Core argument: Seasonally adjusted monthly tourist arrivals to the US from Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK show no collapse in foreign travel through April 2025, based on National Travel and Tourism Office data from January 2015 onward.
[The charts show] monthly tourist arrivals into the US from January 2015 to April 2025, the latest month for which data are available. Source for these data is the National Travel and Tourism Office (NTTO). Travel is highly seasonal, so I seasonally adjust these data. This means you can compare arrivals during the peak summer vacation season with arrivals at other times of the year. Data are for Germany (top left), Italy (top right), Spain (bottom left) and the UK (bottom right). The scale of these charts is different, with tourism from the UK by far the most important across these four countries, followed by Germany and Italy. What’s notable is that there’s no collapse in foreign travel to the US. In fact, in one case - Italy - arrivals posted a new all-time high in April 2025.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Seasonally adjusted monthly tourist arrivals to the US from Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK show no collapse in foreign travel through April 2025, based on National Travel and Tourism Office data from January 2015 onward.
Italian arrivals to the US posted an all-time high in April 2025, the latest month for which National Travel and Tourism Office data are available.
The UK is by far the largest source of US-bound tourists among Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, followed by Germany and then Italy.
Related Articles:
European Travellers Cancel US Visits As Trump’s Policies Threaten Tourism— Overnight visitors from western Europe to the US fell 17% year-on-year, with declines of more than 20% from countries including Ireland, Norway and Germany, according to the International Trade Administration. Total overseas visitors dropped 12% year-on-year, the steepest decline since pandemic travel restrictions.
U.S. Is Top Investment Destination Despite Falling Inflows— United Nations data show the U.S. remained the top destination for foreign direct investment even as inflows fell to $285bn from $388bn, driven mainly by a drop in foreign purchases of American companies. China recorded its highest-ever inflow at $189bn, a 5% increase, much of it from European businesses.
European Travellers Cancel US Visits As Trump’s Policies Threaten Tourism— Overnight visitors from western Europe to the US fell 17% year-on-year, with declines of more than 20% from countries including Ireland, Norway and Germany, according to the International Trade Administration. Total overseas visitors dropped 12% year-on-year, the steepest decline since pandemic travel restrictions.
AI Summary.Quality-adjusted real house prices are historically high in many major US markets, especially in the Sunbelt, while homebuilding has fallen sharply, particularly in higher-price, lower-density areas. The authors find high suburban prices in Sunbelt metros no longer stimulate much new construction, possibly because residents have made new projects difficult to permit.
Edward Glaeser and Joseph GyourkoNational Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
Is Database:
Database
Supply curves in four key sunbelt areas have become less elastic. “High prices in the suburban parts of these areas no longer stimulate much new building, possibly because the residents of these areas have made it difficult to permit new projects”.
Why have high suburban house prices stopped spurring new homebuilding?
Core argument: Real, constant-quality house prices sit at historically high levels in many major U.S. markets, most notably sunbelt areas, while homebuilding has declined sharply, especially in higher-price, lower-density places.
Real, constant-quality prices are at historically high levels in many major markets, most notably in sunbelt areas. Building levels have declined dramatically, especially in higher price, lower density areas. Figure 10 plots the shifting empirical supply curves [with price on the x axis and change in density on the y axis] over time for the four sunbelt metros. The empirical supply curve among suburban tracts in the 1970s (thick solid line) is always steeper than the supply curve for more central tracts (thick dotted line). Except for Dallas, the suburban line always is above the city line throughout our domain. In addition, the 1970s lines always are above those for the 1990s and 2010s. By the end of our data in the 2010s, the schedules have shifted down and flattened considerably, which is compatible with the decline in homebuilding discussed above. The lines for the 1990s show that this change began before the 2010s. High prices in the suburban parts of these metro areas no longer stimulate much new building, possibly because the residents of these areas have made it difficult to permit new projects.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Real, constant-quality house prices sit at historically high levels in many major U.S. markets, most notably sunbelt areas, while homebuilding has declined sharply, especially in higher-price, lower-density places.
Empirical supply curves for four sunbelt metros shifted down and flattened considerably by the 2010s relative to the 1970s, with the change already visible in the 1990s.
In the 1970s, suburban tracts in these sunbelt metros had steeper supply curves than more central tracts, and high suburban prices no longer stimulate much new building, possibly because residents have made new projects difficult to permit.
Related Articles:
Why Has Construction Productivity Stagnated? The Role of Land-Use Regulation— Homes built per construction worker boomed after World War II and fell after 1970, a decline the authors link to local land-use regulation that limits project size and keeps construction firms small and less productive. They estimate US residential builders would be roughly 60% more productive if their size distribution matched manufacturing.
America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply— Housing production intensity has fallen substantially, especially in fast-growing Sunbelt markets once known for building, converging toward the low rates long seen on the coasts and in declining industrial centers. The authors argue incumbent-controlled regulation explains the weakening link between high prices, high demand areas, and new construction.
This Is How to Fix the Housing Crisis— US homebuilding falls short of demand, particularly in high-demand coastal markets, with per-person permitting running at less than half the level of two and five decades ago. The author argues Washington could unlock construction by conditioning federal highway funds on state housing reform, the same lever used to push states to set the drinking age at 21.
