“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Analysis of housing supply, prices, rents, construction, affordability, migration, land use, and residential investment. The archive connects housing-market outcomes to household finances, productivity, inflation, and broader economic growth.
AI Summary.The Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates total housing costs in the Miami–Fort Lauderdale–Palm Beach area are about 5% higher than in the New York metropolitan area, with southern Connecticut also cheaper than Miami. Miami's typical household income is about $1,000 below the national median, and average lawyer pay trails New York's by roughly $51,000.
Ben Steverman and Paulina CacheroBloomberg
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South Florida’s consumer price index is up 36% relative to 2019, leaving Miami’s cost of living above that of New York. Wages have not kept pace; Miami metro area’s typical household income is ~ $1,000 less than the national median.
Is Miami still cheaper to live in than New York?
Core argument: Total housing costs in the Miami–Fort Lauderdale–Palm Beach metro area run about 5% higher than in New York and its suburbs, including New Jersey, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The total cost of housing in the Miami, Fort Lauderdale and Palm Beach metropolitan area is about 5% higher than in New York and its suburbs, which includes New Jersey, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Southern Connecticut, where many hedge funds are located, is also now cheaper than Miami. Salaries largely aren’t keeping pace with costs. The Miami metro area’s typical household income is about $1,000 less than the national median, according to the latest US Census Bureau estimates. Even professionals make less in Miami than they do in New York City. The average lawyer in the New York City area earned about $51,000 more last year than one in Miami, BLS data show.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Total housing costs in the Miami–Fort Lauderdale–Palm Beach metro area run about 5% higher than in New York and its suburbs, including New Jersey, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The Miami metro area's typical household income is about $1,000 below the national median, according to US Census Bureau estimates, as salaries largely fail to keep pace with costs.
The average lawyer in the New York City area earned about $51,000 more last year than one in Miami, according to BLS data, and southern Connecticut, where many hedge funds are located, is now cheaper than Miami.
Related Articles:
Miami Got NYC’s Billionaires. Will It Get Their Businesses?— Miami has added investment banking and portfolio management jobs but has grown less than New York City, trailing Salt Lake City in banking growth and Atlanta in portfolio management growth. Measured by employment levels in both segments combined, South Florida ranks fifth among counties, behind Manhattan, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles.
Florida’s Population Boom Fizzles as High Costs Drive Away Middle Class— Florida's net domestic migration has slowed to a trickle as prime-working-age residents leave citing affordability and arrivals from other states decline. An influx of wealthy newcomers has helped drive up home prices, inflation in parts of the state outpaced the national average, home-insurance rates soared, and deaths began outnumbering births.
Miami Is Getting Much Richer. It’s Also Getting Smaller— People moving to Miami-Dade County from other states had average adjusted gross income of $178,000, more than double that of those leaving for other states, according to an analysis of Internal Revenue Service data. A residence-planning firm counts 38,800 millionaires in Miami, up 94% over a decade.
AI Summary.People moving to Miami-Dade County from other states had average adjusted gross income of $178,000, more than double that of those leaving for other states, according to an analysis of Internal Revenue Service data. A residence-planning firm counts 38,800 millionaires in Miami, up 94% over a decade.
Arian Campo-FloresThe Wall Street Journal
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Miami illustrates wealth-driven bifurcation: new arrivals report ~$178K average AGI, among the highest in the US, even as the metro leads major cities in net out-migration. Luxury spending and tax revenue are rising; the middle class is being priced out.
Are wealthier newcomers replacing lower-income residents leaving Miami?
Core argument: People moving to Miami-Dade County from other states had average adjusted gross income of $178,000, more than double that of people leaving the county for other states, according to Maria Ilcheva's analysis of 2022–23 IRS data.
People moving to Miami-Dade County from other states had on average $178,000 in adjusted gross income, more than double that of people who left the county for other states, according to an analysis of 2022-23 Internal Revenue Service data by Maria Ilcheva, associate director of the Jorge M. Pérez Metropolitan Center at Florida International University. Those coming from Manhattan earned on average $358,000, and those from Chicago earned on average $711,000. The number of millionaires in Miami soared 94% to 38,800 between 2014 and 2024, according to Henley & Partners, a residence and citizenship planning firm. That was the second-largest percentage increase among the U.S. cities it studied, behind the San Francisco Bay Area.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
People moving to Miami-Dade County from other states had average adjusted gross income of $178,000, more than double that of people leaving the county for other states, according to Maria Ilcheva's analysis of 2022–23 IRS data.
Arrivals to Miami-Dade from Manhattan earned an average of $358,000 and those from Chicago an average of $711,000, according to the Florida International University analysis of IRS data.
Miami's millionaire count rose 94% to 38,800 between 2014 and 2024, the second-largest percentage increase among U.S. cities studied by Henley & Partners, behind the San Francisco Bay Area.
Related Articles:
Florida’s Population Boom Fizzles as High Costs Drive Away Middle Class— Florida's net domestic migration has slowed to a trickle as prime-working-age residents leave citing affordability and arrivals from other states decline. An influx of wealthy newcomers has helped drive up home prices, inflation in parts of the state outpaced the national average, home-insurance rates soared, and deaths began outnumbering births.
With Less Immigration, Urban Growth Slowed in 2025— Census population estimates show urban counties growing more slowly than suburbs, smaller metropolitan areas, and rural areas, with all county types slowing as immigration fell and the slowdown especially sharp in urban counties. Domestic migration is driven more by affordability, with people leaving expensive urban counties for cheaper suburbs and smaller communities.
Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave— County-level mapping of net domestic migration within the United States shows some counties gained net movers equal to 10% or more of their 2020 population while others lost an equivalent share, excluding international moves.
AI Summary.Census Bureau microdata analysis finds that in Illinois annual out-migration by households earning under $50K fell by 104K while out-migration by households earning over $200K rose by 54K. Across the Midwest, adults with a bachelor's degree or higher now make up 57% of out-migrants, up from around 40%.
Aziz SunderjiHome Economics
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The “Brain Drain” is ongoing in the Midwest. The fraction of adult out-migrants with at least a bachelor’s degree is now 57%, up from ~40% in 2005. “It’s the most educated and highest-earning that are still leaving in droves.”
Are the most educated and highest-earning residents leaving the Midwest?
Core argument: Annual out-migration by Illinois households earning over $200K rose by 54K between 2014–15 and 2023–24, according to the author's analysis of Census Bureau microdata.
Take Illinois, the most populous Midwestern state: my analysis of Census Bureau microdata shows that between 2014–15 and 2023–24, annual out-migration by households earning under $50K fell by 104K. Out-migration by Illinois households earning over $200K rose by 54K over the same period. Across the region, the trend along educational lines is the same: the bachelor’s-or-higher share of adult out-migrants is now 57%, up from around 40% in 2005. It’s the most educated and highest-earning that are still leaving in droves.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Annual out-migration by Illinois households earning over $200K rose by 54K between 2014–15 and 2023–24, according to the author's analysis of Census Bureau microdata.
Annual out-migration by Illinois households earning under $50K fell by 104K between 2014–15 and 2023–24, according to the author's analysis of Census Bureau microdata.
Adults with a bachelor's degree or higher make up 57% of out-migrants from the Midwest, up from around 40% in 2005.
Related Articles:
Housing and the American Worker— Wages net of housing costs were once substantially higher in high-density areas than low-density areas for workers both with and without college education, but over the past half-century that urban wage premium has persisted only for college-educated workers, not for those with a high school degree or less.
Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption— The authors estimate that geographical differences in cost of living are especially large for low-income US households, and that expensive cities offer college graduates a standard of living similar to affordable cities while offering less-educated households a lower one. A high school dropout household moving from the most affordable to the most expensive commuting zone would see consumption fall 18.5%.
The Determinants Of Declining Internal Migration— A 10% increase in wages where people live is associated with 3.5% less migration, while a 10% increase in destination wages is associated with 7.8% more migration; a 10% rise in destination home prices is associated with 2.6% less migration. The authors find wage responses alone would have raised migration rates, but housing-related factors more than offset them.
AI Summary.Statistics Canada reports 16.3% of millennials aged 25 to 39 lived with their parents in 2021, compared with 8.2% of baby boomers at the same age in 1991, with the pattern most pronounced in expensive cities. Homeownership among 25-to-39-year-olds was 49.9%, down from about 56% for baby boomers and Gen Xers at that age.
Nojoud Al MalleesBloomberg
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16.3% of Canadians aged 25–39 were living with their parents in 2021, up from 8.2% of baby boomers at the same age in 1991.
Are more young adults living with parents and owning fewer homes?
Core argument: A Statistics Canada study based on the most recent census data found 16.3% of millennials aged 25 to 39 lived with their parents in 2021, up from 8.2% of baby boomers at the same age in 1991.
Millennials were twice as likely to live with their parents in 2021 than baby boomers were at the same age, a trend that was particularly acute in expensive cities but not fully attributed to affordability challenges. A new Statistics Canada study based on the most recent census data found 16.3% of millennials aged 25 to 39 were living with parents, up from 8.2% of baby boomers of the same age in 1991. After taking into account the share of millennials living with parents, the study found a lower rate of homeownership among young adults in 2021. While 55.9% of baby boomers in 1991 and 56.2% of Gen Xers in 2006 owned a home when they were aged 25 and 39, that proportion was only 49.9% for millennials.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
A Statistics Canada study based on the most recent census data found 16.3% of millennials aged 25 to 39 lived with their parents in 2021, up from 8.2% of baby boomers at the same age in 1991.
After accounting for the share of millennials living with parents, Statistics Canada found homeownership among those aged 25 to 39 was 49.9% for millennials in 2021, compared with 55.9% for baby boomers in 1991 and 56.2% for Gen Xers in 2006.
The trend of young Canadians living with parents was particularly acute in expensive cities, though Statistics Canada did not fully attribute it to affordability challenges.
Related Articles:
A “Heat Dome” of Immigration— Canada has adopted some of the most aggressive immigration policies in the OECD, adding 1.273m residents in a year to reach a population of 41m — proportionally equivalent to the US admitting more than 10m immigrants annually. Canadians are increasingly angry as housing prices soar, sprawl expands, and traffic worsens.
Canada’s Population Dips for Second Straight Quarter, Leading to First Annual Fall On Record— Statistics Canada estimates the country's population fell by about 102,436 people, or 0.2%, over the course of a year to 41.47 million, its first annual decline on record, driven by a steep reduction in temporary residents. Deaths exceeded births in the latest quarter, the second consecutive quarterly population drop.
How Canada Is Responding to American Mercantilism— US tariffs as high as 35% on certain goods not compliant with the US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement have coincided with falling Canadian exports, weaker business confidence and investment, a softening labor market, and a contraction in Canadian output. Canada has responded by aiming to double non-US exports within 10 years, expanding fiscal spending and deregulation, and keeping monetary policy loose.
AI Summary.Across nearly every 10-year period measured, US construction cost indexes rose faster than overall consumer price inflation, with the main exception being a two-decade stretch in which most indexes rose more slowly than inflation or declined against it. Earlier periods of the 20th century show cost increases as large as or larger than recent ones.
Brian PotterConstruction Physics
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Multiple measures show real construction costs have “virtually never fallen” since 1875, with the striking exception of 1975–95—consistent with input cost and productivity series. The upward drift is not new; if anything, it has moderated over time.
Do construction costs usually rise faster than overall inflation?
Core argument: Across nearly every 10-year period measured, virtually every construction cost index rose faster than CPI.
Let’s look at the average annual growth rate for each index over 10-year periods, minus the average growth rate of CPI for the same period. This will let us see how construction costs are changing with respect to inflation over specific periods: positive values mean construction costs are rising faster than inflation, negative means construction costs are rising slower than inflation. We see that in almost every period of time, construction costs are rising faster than overall inflation for virtually every cost index. The major exception is the period from 1975 to 1995, where most indexes show lower rates of increase or even declines against overall inflation. We also see that historic rates of cost increase seem to be as bad or worse than modern ones. For four of the five 10-year periods between 1915 and 1965, the Turner Cost index rose more than a percentage point faster than overall inflation, whereas for the periods from 1995 to 2025 it rose less than a percentage point.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
Across nearly every 10-year period measured, virtually every construction cost index rose faster than CPI.
The Turner Cost index rose more than a percentage point faster than overall inflation in four of the five 10-year periods between 1915 and 1965, versus less than a percentage point for the periods from 1995 to 2025.
The period from 1975 to 1995 is the major exception, with most construction cost indexes showing lower rates of increase or even declines against overall inflation.
Related Articles:
Stagnant Construction Productivity Is a Worldwide Problem— Construction labor productivity has been roughly flat or declining since the 1990s across most of Western Europe, Japan, and Korea, a pattern consistent with the flat US trend. Countries often held up as models — Sweden and Japan for prefabrication, China for infrastructure — show little or unremarkable construction productivity improvement.
Five Decades of Decline: U.S. Construction Sector Productivity— U.S. construction labor productivity in 2023 was essentially unchanged from 1948, with real output per worker in 2020 more than 30% below its 1970 level, even as aggregate U.S. labor productivity tripled between 1950 and 2020. Construction accounted for about 4.5% of U.S. GDP in 2024.
Why Has Construction Productivity Stagnated? The Role of Land-Use Regulation— Homes built per construction worker boomed after World War II and fell after 1970, a decline the authors link to local land-use regulation that limits project size and keeps construction firms small and less productive. They estimate US residential builders would be roughly 60% more productive if their size distribution matched manufacturing.
AI Summary.Harvard's Remodeling Futures Program reports that 49% of U.S. home-improvement spending now goes to necessary replacements such as heating and cooling systems, with homeowners spending an average of $9,030 on replacement projects like windows, up 59% from 2009 after adjusting for inflation.
Veronica DagherWall Street Journal
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America’s housing stock is aging, with the median age of a home climbing to 44 years old. The cost of maintaining a home has increased, with real structural repair costs rising ~14.1%, and plumbing costs 23.6%, between 2022 and 2024.
Are aging homes pushing homeowner repair and replacement costs higher?
Core argument: U.S. homeowners spent an average of $9,030 on replacement projects such as windows in 2023, up 59% from 2009 after adjusting for inflation, according to Rachel Drew of Harvard's Remodeling Futures Program.
49% percent of all improvement spending is now for necessary replacements like HVAC that owners can’t delay, said Rachel Drew, director of Harvard’s Remodeling Futures Program. In 2023, homeowners in the U.S. spent an average of $9,030 on replacement projects such as windows, up 59% from 2009 after adjusting for inflation, said Harvard’s Drew. Financial advisers traditionally suggested setting aside 1% of a home’s value annually for upkeep, but many now argue that isn’t enough. While 1% may cover routine upkeep, 2% to 3% provides a more realistic cushion for expected maintenance, home-improvement projects and unexpected repairs, particularly for older homes, said Angie Hicks, co-founder of home-services company Angi.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
U.S. homeowners spent an average of $9,030 on replacement projects such as windows in 2023, up 59% from 2009 after adjusting for inflation, according to Rachel Drew of Harvard's Remodeling Futures Program.
Rachel Drew of Harvard's Remodeling Futures Program said 49% of all home-improvement spending now goes to necessary replacements such as HVAC that owners cannot delay.
Angie Hicks, co-founder of home-services company Angi, said the traditional advice to set aside 1% of a home's value annually may cover routine upkeep, while 2% to 3% offers a more realistic cushion, particularly for older homes.
Related Articles:
Inflation Is Down, But Americans Still Feel an Affordability Squeeze— Average US weekly pay has risen 31% over six years, outpacing prices, but inflation erased most of those gains. Grocery prices are up about 30% since early 2020, a young married couple now needs 70% of annual household income for an average down payment versus 58% in 2019.
Productivity Stagnation in the Construction Industry: An International Perspective— The authors estimate that tighter land use regulation accounts for 40% of the gap in productivity growth between US construction and the rest of the economy, with weak innovation and quality mismeasurement each accounting for 20%. Across major economies, regulation and mismeasurement explain most of US construction's underperformance.
Five Decades of Decline: U.S. Construction Sector Productivity— U.S. construction labor productivity in 2023 was essentially unchanged from 1948, with real output per worker in 2020 more than 30% below its 1970 level, even as aggregate U.S. labor productivity tripled between 1950 and 2020. Construction accounted for about 4.5% of U.S. GDP in 2024.
AI Summary.China has moved to ban the burial of cremated remains in empty apartments as rapid urbanisation and population ageing strain limited city cemetery plots. Annual deaths have risen to 11.3mn from 9.8mn a decade earlier, outpacing 7.9mn births, while average funeral costs of about $5,400 rank second globally after Japan.
Joe Leahy and Wenjie DingFinancial Times
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Chinese funeral expenses were 45% of the mean annual wage in 2020. As real estate prices declined, many families started using empty apartments as “bone ash apartments.” The practice is being outlawed this week.
Are aging and urbanization straining China's burial capacity and costs?
Core argument: China recorded 11.3mn deaths in 2025, up from 9.8mn in 2015 and outpacing the 7.9mn births last year, as the country's population ages at one of the fastest paces in history.
The new law comes as China prepares to celebrate the Qingming grave-sweeping festival on Sunday. Rapid urbanisation has raised demand for limited cemetery plots in cities. Coupled with this, China’s population is ageing at one of the fastest paces in history. The number of deaths in 2025 was 11.3mn, up from 9.8mn in 2015 and outpacing 7.9mn births last year. In contrast to apartments, whose prices have fallen sharply since President Xi Jinping’s campaign that “properties are for living in, not for speculation,” cemetery plots have become prohibitively expensive. A global funeral expense survey in 2020 by the insurer SunLife showed that China’s average funeral expenses were the second-highest in the world at about Rmb 37,375 ($5,400), after Japan, accounting for about 45% of average annual wages. While residential properties in China carry 70-year usage rights from the government, cemetery plots come with only a 20-year lease.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China recorded 11.3mn deaths in 2025, up from 9.8mn in 2015 and outpacing the 7.9mn births last year, as the country's population ages at one of the fastest paces in history.
SunLife's 2020 global funeral expense survey put China's average funeral cost at about Rmb 37,375 ($5,400), the second-highest in the world after Japan and roughly 45% of average annual wages.
Chinese cemetery plots have become prohibitively expensive and carry only 20-year leases, versus 70-year usage rights for residential property, whose prices have fallen sharply since Xi Jinping's campaign that "properties are for living in, not for speculation.".
Related Articles:
A Tale of Two Countries: The Real Estate Crises in 1990s Japan and Contemporary China— The authors argue Japan's prolonged recession reflected the interplay of slowing returns to investment, weak consumption, and negative sentiment, and that China is in the middle stages of a multi-year real estate correction under more difficult macroeconomic and demographic conditions. They note China retains advantages, including a state-dominated financial system with implicit government guarantees capable of large-scale intervention.
China Registers Lowest Number Of Births Since Records Began— China recorded 7.92mn births, down from 9.54mn a year earlier and the lowest since 1949, while 11.31mn people died and the population fell 3.39mn to 1.405bn. The figures indicate China is still not seeing benefits from measures to bolster its fertility rate after loosening the "one-child" policy.
Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come— Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
AI Summary.The authors argue Japan's prolonged recession reflected the interplay of slowing returns to investment, weak consumption, and negative sentiment, and that China is in the middle stages of a multi-year real estate correction under more difficult macroeconomic and demographic conditions. They note China retains advantages, including a state-dominated financial system with implicit government guarantees capable of large-scale intervention.
Kenneth Rogoff and Yuanchen YangBrookings Papers On Economic Activity
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The deep recession after Japan’s 1990–1991 real estate crash saw low returns on investment, soft consumption and weak sentiment. After its property bust, China shows many parallels, but strong productivity and state-backed finance are potential cushions.
Is China's property correction following Japan's post-bubble path?
Core argument: China appears to be in the middle stages of a multi-year real estate correction, with structural and cyclical features resembling Japan's pre- and post-bubble conditions, though China's adjustment is unfolding in a more difficult macroeconomic and demographic context.
Japan’s prolonged recession was likely driven by the interplay of slowing returns to investment, soft consumption, and negative sentiment that reinforced these weaknesses. With some structural and cyclical characteristics closely resembling Japan’s pre- and post-bubble conditions, China appears to be in the middle stages of a multi-year correction. China’s post-boom adjustment is unfolding in a more difficult macroeconomic and demographic context than Japan’s. That said, China still possesses several economic and institutional advantages that could help cushion the blow of a prolonged real estate downturn. In Japan’s post-bubble era, the country’s productivity growth was considered a binding constraint, a factor that does not appear to limit China in the same way. Most crucially, China possesses a state-dominated financial system backed by implicit government guarantees and a highly proactive policymaking apparatus capable of large-scale interventions, which have thus far prevented the crisis from precipitating a financial sector breakdown.
Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI
China appears to be in the middle stages of a multi-year real estate correction, with structural and cyclical features resembling Japan's pre- and post-bubble conditions, though China's adjustment is unfolding in a more difficult macroeconomic and demographic context.
China's state-dominated financial system, backed by implicit government guarantees and a proactive policymaking apparatus capable of large-scale interventions, has thus far prevented its real estate crisis from precipitating a financial sector breakdown.
Japan's prolonged recession was likely driven by the interplay of slowing returns to investment, soft consumption, and negative sentiment, with productivity growth considered a binding constraint that does not appear to limit China in the same way.
Related Articles:
Peak China Housing— Real estate and related industries account for roughly 29% of China's GDP, a level of dependence the authors estimate exceeds that of Ireland and Spain before their financial crises. A 20% decline in housing activity could reduce economic output by 5-10%.
China Debt Overhang Leads To Rising Share Of ‘Zombie’ Firms— Firm-level data indicate the share of Chinese non-financial firms' assets held by "zombie" companies — those whose operating earnings fall short of their interest expenses — rose from 5% to 16% between 2018 and 2024, with real estate highest at 40%, services at 17% and manufacturing at 11%.
China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026— The authors argue China's official growth figures are inconsistent with ten consecutive quarters of deflation, estimating that real GDP is around 11% below official levels, with most of the adjustment in investment. That would imply a drop of roughly 9 percentage points in China's share of global investment, helping explain its export surge.
