“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

For whatever topics you select (currently: Financial Markets):

Include articles that mention this topic 520

Only articles primarily about this topic 253

The Impact of Rates Higher for Longer on the Capital Structure

Torsten Sløk Apollo

Date Posted:: February 12, 2025

Torsten Sløk argues that “higher for longer” rates shift value towards firms that have cash flow to service their debt while making risk-taking more challenging for new ventures with “no earnings, no revenue, and no cash flow.”

The transmission mechanism of monetary policy works through higher costs of capital that lowers demand for capex and hiring but also raises return requirements for equity to pay the debt holders in the company. Higher interest rates are a redistribution of value from the junior parts of the capital structure to the senior parts. Someone has to pay the higher level of interest rates in corporate capital structures, and it is not the Fed, it is the equity holder. In short, companies with no earnings, no cash flow, and no revenue will continue to struggle simply because they cannot pay the higher debt servicing costs. In other words, when interest rates are higher for longer, companies with earnings tend to outperform because companies with earnings are able to pay higher debt servicing costs. The purpose with higher interest rates is to slow growth, which makes value more attractive than growth. In fact, this is the entire idea from the Fed with raising interest rates—to discourage too much risk taking, such as investments in companies and capital structures with no earnings, no revenue, and no cash flow. Examples of [such] unattractive sectors are growth, software, and venture capital.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Higher interest rates redistribute value from junior to senior parts of the corporate capital structure, with equity holders, not the Fed, bearing the cost of higher debt servicing.
Companies with no earnings, no revenue, and no cash flow struggle under rates higher for longer because they cannot cover higher debt servicing costs, while companies with earnings tend to outperform.
The Fed's aim in raising rates is to slow growth and discourage risk taking in companies and capital structures without earnings, revenue, or cash flow, which makes value more attractive than growth and leaves growth, software, and venture capital unattractive.

The Stock Market’s Read On The Midterms, In Its Winners And Losers

Jason Furman Econvitals

Date Posted:: November 5, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Furman notes that between election day and Wednesday’s close there were broad-based gains for the solar sector and health companies, particularly those with close ties to the ACA, even though substantial, while less dramatic, Democratic victories in the House and Senate were already priced in. [Note: Today saw technology stocks plunge, pushing the S&P 500 down ~4% and the Nasdaq down ~5%].

The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections. Perhaps more interesting, and more telling, was the composition, which shows what the market thinks the policy impact of the election will be: health companies (especially ones like Centene, with close ties to the Affordable Care Act) and solar companies were up, while data-center companies and Trump- and Musk-related companies were down. And remember, Democratic victories were already priced in, so this is just the additional increment from greater certainty as well as the larger-than-expected magnitude.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections, and the composition of winners and losers indicates what the market expects the policy impact to be.
Health companies with close ties to the Affordable Care Act, such as Centene, and solar companies rose after the midterms, while data-center companies and Trump- and Musk-related companies fell.
Democratic victories were already priced into the stock market, so the post-election move reflects only the added increment from greater certainty and the larger-than-expected magnitude.

This Time Would Have To Be Very Different. Part II

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents

Date Posted:: November 3, 2026
Is Database:: Database

If the free cash flow of the entire US corporate sector were to hold at its record ~15% share of corporate value added, corporations would return only ~5.3% over the next decade. To earn the historical mean return, FCF would have to keep rising, implying a structural transformation favoring capital at labor’s expense.

At a CAPE of 40.7 US stocks look extremely expensive, and expected returns are low, especially compared to TIPS yields. Plugging in today’s numbers, you back out an expected real return of around 3% over the next decade, compared to a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.6%. Now, instead of an investor holding a single share, we could look at an investor who owns the entire corporate sector, all equity, bonds, and other liabilities. This investor acquired a claim to FCF, the total amount of cash that can be paid out to its owners, including bondholders: gross corporate value added left after paying workers, the government, and investment expenditure. This FCF is now about 15% of corporate value added. Earnings minus FCF is net investment; corporations have invested less. Its FCF yield is 3.26%, vs. 3.21% since 1952. That delivers an approximate real expected return of 5.3%, below what US corporate capital has historically delivered.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Holding the multiple fixed, a 3.26% free cash flow yield plus the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ 4.58% projected nominal GDP growth and 2.5% inflation implies a real expected return of roughly 5.3% on US corporate debt plus equity.
The 5.3% real return assumes free cash flow stays at its record 15% of gross value added indefinitely, and still falls below what US corporate capital has historically delivered.
Earning the historical average return requires the free cash flow share of value added to keep climbing, a bet on a structural transformation of US capitalism favoring capital at the expense of labor.

This Time Would Have To Be Very Different

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents

Date Posted:: October 26, 2026
Is Database:: Database

At 40.7, CAPE is nearing its December 1999 peak of 44.2. For the S&P 500 to beat TIPS over the next decade, today’s near-record P/E multiple must persist for ten years, or real earnings must grow more than 5.8% a year—a pace exceeded in only two decades since 1880: the 1920s and 2010s.

The CAPE is currently trading at 40.7, which is close to an all-time high. You’re paying close to 41 times annual earnings when you buy the S&P 500. The implied earnings yield is only 2.46%. According to AQR, a reasonable estimate for real earnings growth (on a per share basis) is 1.8% per annum. If you plug in today’s numbers, you end up with a real expected return of around 3% per year for U.S. equity. That’s a surprisingly low number. When you compare it to the 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, you’re left with a razor-thin equity premium. The stock market will only yield an extra 25 basis points per annum over the next, say, 10 years to compensate you for taking on equity risk. You might think this is a very conservative estimate, but it’s actually not, because we’re implicitly assuming that the CAPE stays at 40.7 over the next 10 years. That’s quite a lofty multiple. Even casual eyeball econometrics suggests that that’s not a great assumption, because the price-earnings ratio tends to revert back to its mean.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.
Combining the 2.46% earnings yield with AQR’s estimate of 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth yields a real expected return of roughly 3% per year for U.S. equity.
Against a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, U.S. equities offer an equity premium of about 25 basis points per year, an estimate that assumes the CAPE stays at 40.7 for a decade despite the price-earnings ratio’s tendency to revert to its mean.

Circularity in AI Shows Up in Token Spending Too

Torsten Slok Apollo

Date Posted:: October 22, 2026
Is Database:: Database

According to Ramp data, 80% of firms in the top 1% of AI spending are VC-backed, compared with just 13% of firms at the median. This suggests that the largest purchasers of AI computing capacity rely heavily on venture capital rather than internally generated earnings.

Ramp data show that 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are VC-backed, compared with only 13% of the median spender, suggesting that the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending, as the startups buying the most compute are paying for it with venture capital rather than organic earnings. If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, VC returns would come under pressure, since the capital funding today’s token spending would have little to show for it, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Ramp data show 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, suggesting the largest buyers of compute are funding token spending with venture capital rather than organic earnings.
Ramp’s data on the venture backing of the heaviest AI spenders suggest the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending.
If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, venture capital returns would come under pressure, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.

Revenue Per Worker Is Up. Are Firms Getting a Larger Share?

Jeremy Pearce Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Date Posted:: October 16, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Nonfarm business output per hour grew 2.2% annually between 2019 and 2025, up from 1% in 2010–19. Among public firms, growth in real revenue per worker accelerated from 0.7% to 2.2%. Operating margins rose from 16% to 18% of sales (2.4% annual growth).

A profit margin is profit divided by sales: the share of each sales dollar the firm keeps after paying its costs. The gross margin subtracts the direct cost of production (cost of goods sold), while the operating margin also subtracts overhead (selling, general, and administrative expense, which in Compustat typically includes R&D). If productivity gains were flowing to firms’ profits, margins should show it. Through the 2010s margins were flat: gross margins grew about 0.4% a year from 2010 to 2019, and operating margins were roughly flat. Both then turned up: on average, gross margins went from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025 (1.3% growth per year), and operating margins from 16% to 18% (2.4% growth per year). Part of the gains surfaced with wider profit margins: on a reasonable baseline, the operating margin rose over 2% a year from 2019 to 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Average operating margins rose from about 16% of sales in 2019 to 18% in 2025, growth of 2.4% a year, after being roughly flat through the 2010s.
Average gross margins increased from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025, growth of 1.3% a year, up from about 0.4% a year over 2010–2019.
On a reasonable baseline, the operating margin rose over 2% a year from 2019 to 2025, indicating part of the productivity gains surfaced as wider profit margins.

Earnings Will Be Spectacular. It May Not Be Enough

John Authers Bloomberg

Date Posted:: October 8, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Since 2000, post-tax corporate profits as a share of GDP have trended upward across cyclical setbacks and are now near an all time high, above their 1929 level.

Throughout the 20th century, profit margins were regarded as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy. So far this century, however, margins have done nothing but rise. Measured with the National Income and Product Accounts, part of the GDP calculation, profits are currently taking a bigger share of the economy even than on the eve of the Great Crash in 1929. The series comes with a lag, so we can assume the profit share on this basis is comfortably at a record by now.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Corporate profits measured in the National Income and Product Accounts take a larger share of the U.S. economy than on the eve of the 1929 Great Crash.
Profit margins were regarded throughout the 20th century as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy, yet so far this century they have done nothing but rise.
The National Income and Product Accounts profits series comes with a lag, so the profit share on this basis can be assumed to be comfortably at a record.

Torsten Sløk argues that “higher for longer” rates shift value towards firms that have cash flow to service their debt while making risk-taking more challenging for new ventures with “no earnings, no revenue, and no cash flow.”

How do higher interest rates shift value from equity to debt holders?

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At 40.7, CAPE is nearing its December 1999 peak of 44.2. For the S&P 500 to beat TIPS over the next decade, today’s near-record P/E multiple must persist for ten years, or real earnings must grow more than 5.8% a year—a pace exceeded in only two decades since 1880: the 1920s and 2010s.

How much do stock valuations offer over inflation-protected Treasuries?

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According to Ramp data, 80% of firms in the top 1% of AI spending are VC-backed, compared with just 13% of firms at the median. This suggests that the largest purchasers of AI computing capacity rely heavily on venture capital rather than internally generated earnings.

Is venture capital funding most corporate AI token spending?

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Nonfarm business output per hour grew 2.2% annually between 2019 and 2025, up from 1% in 2010–19. Among public firms, growth in real revenue per worker accelerated from 0.7% to 2.2%. Operating margins rose from 16% to 18% of sales (2.4% annual growth).

Have corporate profit margins risen after a flat decade?

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Since 2000, post-tax corporate profits as a share of GDP have trended upward across cyclical setbacks and are now near an all time high, above their 1929 level.

Have corporate profit margins stopped reverting to the mean?

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