Do discount rates or growth forecasts drive valuation errors?
Core argument: Damodaran argues that valuers of mature US companies pressed for time should use a cost of capital of 8.35%, the median for US companies at the start of 2025, and concentrate on growth and profit prospects instead.
Hurdle rates are not where business/valuation battles are won or lost: It is true that costs of capital are the D in a DCF, but they are not and should never be what makes or breaks a valuation. I have been badly mistaken many times, and the culprit almost always has been an error on forecasting growth, profitability or reinvestment (all of which lead into the cash flows), not the discount rate. In the same vein, I cannot think of a single great company that got to greatness because of its skill in finessing its cost of capital, and I know of plenty that are worth trillions of dollars, in spite of never having actively thought about how to optimize their costs of capital. If you are valuing a mature US company at the start of 2025, and you are in a hurry (and who isn't?), you would be well served using a cost of capital of 8.35% (the median for US companies at the start of 2025) and spending your time assessing its growth and profit prospects, and coming back to tweak the cost of capital at the end, if you have the time.

