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AI Summary. The number of 18-year-olds in the US is peaking at a record high and is projected to fall 14% over the next decade.
Torsten Sløk ApolloCore argument: The number of 18-year-olds in the United States is projected to peak this year at a record high and then fall 14% over the coming decade.
America is at peak 18, and the number of 18-year-olds will fall 14% over the coming decade.AI Summary. U.S. survey data on high school students show the share of 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% to 11% over two years, compared with a decline from 18% to 16% among 12th graders. The drop was concentrated among girls, from 27% to 22%, versus 9% to 7% among boys.
Jean Twenge Generation TechCore argument: The share of U.S. 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% in 2023 to 11% in 2025 in the CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey, while 12th graders declined from 18% to 16%.
[New data from the Youth Risk Survey of U.S. 9th to 12th graders from the CDC shows] for 12th graders, 17 and 18 years old, identifying as LGB declines only a few percentage points between 2023 and 2025 (from 18% to 16%). But the headline result is for 9th graders (14 and 15 years old): Identifying as LGB absolutely plummets between 2023 and 2025, from 17% to 11%. That really does look like a free fall. The decline appears to be driven almost entirely by girls. Identifying as LGB dropped from 27% in 2023 to 22% in 2025 among girls, and from 9% to 7% among boys. [In terms of the share of high school students reporting engaging in same-sex activity] most high school students are not sexually active, so this is only a subsample of the larger group. For boys, there’s been a fairly steady rise in same-sex partners, not too different from the pattern of identifying as LGB among boys. The story is different for girls, where having non-heterosexual sex peaked in 2021 and then fell steeply.AI Summary. A survey finds more than half of young men gamble, with 23% doing so daily, and 43% watch pornography daily or several times a week. 42% say the statement "I am inclined to think that I am a failure" describes them very or somewhat well, a view more common among daily gamblers (66%) and daily pornography viewers (63%).
Joseph Davis, Michael Toscano and Ken Burchfiel Institute For Family StudiesCore argument: More than half of young men surveyed gamble, with 23% gambling daily, 12% more than several times a week, and 21% at least some of the time.
More than half of young men in our survey are now gamblers. Nearly 1 in 4 (23%) report that they gamble daily, plus 12% doing so more than several times a week, and a further 21% at least some of the time. 43% of young men say they watch pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), with another 26% about weekly or less. More than 4 in 10 young men (42%) believe that the statement “all in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure” describes them “very well” (15%) or “somewhat well” (27%). Those who view pornography (63%) and gamble (66%) every day—along with day trading and playing fantasy sports—are significantly more inclined to see themselves as a failure.AI Summary. Using new price indexes for child- and adult-specific goods, the authors estimate that real spending per child and per parent each rose by about half from 1990 to 2023, indicating a broad rise in household consumption rather than a child-specific one. The share of household spending going to children was stable, near 30% for one child and 40% for two.
Christina Patterson and Heather Sarsons National Bureau of Economic ResearchCore argument: Real spending per child and real spending per parent each rose by roughly one-half between 1990 and 2023, deflated by the authors' new child and adult cost indices, and moved closely together over the medium run.
Figure 6 shows that real spending on children has increased substantially. Panel (a) plots real spending per child, deflated [by the authors’ new] child cost index, together with real spending per parent, deflated by [their adult cost index.] Both series rise by roughly one-half between 1990 and 2023 and move closely together over the medium run. Thus, households devote more real resources to children today than in 1990, but this increase appears to be part of a broader rise in household consumption rather than a child-specific expansion in required market inputs. Panel (b) reinforces this interpretation by plotting the share of total household spending allocated to children, separately by family size. Children absorb a large share of household resources in every year of the sample, but that share is strikingly stable over time within family size. Households with one child allocate just under 30% of total spending to that child in both 1990 and 2023. The sacrifice of adult consumption associated with children is therefore large, but it is not a recent development. Panel (b) also reveals clear economies of scale in child-rearing. Moving from one to two children raises the child share of household spending from roughly 30% to roughly 40%, far less than a doubling, and the incremental spending share falls further for larger families.AI Summary. Women starting GLP-1 weight-loss treatment lose 1.4–2.5 BMI points, rising to 2.7–4.2 points after 1.5 years or more, and those who are single increase their probability of being married or cohabiting by 18.3 percentage points, with no change for women already partnered. Women not employed at the outset raise their employment rate by 13 percentage points.
Rebecca Diamond Harvard UniversityCore argument: Women who were single when starting GLP-1 treatment raised their probability of being married or cohabiting by 18.3 pp overall and 28.6 pp (s.e. 7.1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lost weight.
BMI is flat before women start [GLP-1 treatment] and then falls (Figure 2, Panel A). All groups lose between 1.4 and 2.5 BMI points in the post period. These effects grow to between 2.7 and 4.2 BMI points at 1.5+ years after initiation. The largest magnitude change is in the marriage market. Women who are single when they start (Figure 2, Panel B) increase their probability of being married or living with a partner by 18.3 pp overall and 28.6pp (s.e. 7.1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lose weight. Partnered women’s relationships, by contrast, are stable. Their partnership probability barely moves (0.1 points, s.e. 1.8), and there is no excess relationship dissolution (0.0, s.e. 1.7). The marriage-market response is the making of new matches, not the breaking or remaking of old ones. In contrast, single women’s weight loss seems to dramatically affect first impressions of potential partners, leading to a large increase in marriage and cohabitation. This is consistent with prior work on the obesity penalty negatively affecting women in the marriage market. Figure 2, panels C and D show that women not employed at baseline move into work: their employment rate rises 13pp overall and 27pp after six or more quarters, and their weekly hours rise by nearly ten hours at the longer horizon.AI Summary. Teen fertility fell in countries with very different healthcare systems, welfare regimes, abortion laws, and religious traditions within roughly the same window, pointing to a global cause. Between 2007 and 2024 the US birth rate fell 71% among women 15–19 and 43% among those 20–24, while rising 9% among those 35–39.
Nathan Hudson and Hernan Moscoso Boedo University of CincinnatiCore argument: Between 2007 and 2024, the birth rate among women 15–19 fell 71 percent, 20–24 fell 43 percent, and 25–29 fell 23 percent, while the rate among women 35–39 rose 9 percent.
Teen fertility collapsed almost everywhere in the world starting around 2007. This is a striking fact. Countries with very different healthcare systems, welfare regimes, abortion laws, religious traditions, recessions, and demographic trends all saw similar breaks in the same window. Whatever caused it was something global—something that arrived in roughly the same form in all of these places at roughly the same time… between 2007 and 2024, the birth rate among women 15–19 fell by 71 percent, 20–24 by 43 percent, 25–29 by 23 percent, 30–34 by 1 percent, and 35–39 rose by 9 percent… U.S. teens reduced in-person socializing from 68 minutes per day in 2003 to 38 in 2019 while computer-leisure rose from 22 to 96 minutes… Under-18 conception rates accelerated from −1.3 percent per year pre-2007 to −8.9 percent post-2007, a 6.8x acceleration that nearly matches the U.S. 5.6x acceleration.AI Summary. Birth rates among teens and young adults in countries across the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia began falling at different times, and each inflection point coincided with mass smartphone adoption in that market as measured by Google searches for mobile apps. The declines were most pronounced in the youngest age groups, mirroring smartphone usage patterns.
John Burn-Murdoch Financial TimesCore argument: Birth rates for teens and young adults in the US, Britain and Australia were broadly flat in the early 2000s but fell markedly from 2007, with the same slide starting in France and Poland around 2009 and in Mexico, Morocco and Indonesia around 2012.
US, British and Australian birth rates for teens and young adults were broadly flat during the early 2000s but began to fall markedly from 2007. The same slide began in France and Poland around 2009, and in Mexico, Morocco and Indonesia around 2012. What had been steady declines in fertility in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal became precipitous drops between 2013 and 2015. All of these inflection points coincided with the mass adoption of smartphones in local markets — as measured by Google searches for mobile apps. In country after country the birth rate plunged after the introduction of smartphones, no matter what the previous trend was. The younger the age group, the more pronounced the downturn — a mirror image of smartphone usage patterns.