“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers

Showing 42 database articles primarily about Family/Marriage

Currently filtering by:

Remove Family/Marriage

Remove "primary topics only" restriction

Remove 'Database'

Show all 7,320 articles

For whatever topics you select (currently: Family/Marriage):

Include articles that mention this topic 160

Only articles primarily about this topic 42

Why Birth Rates Are Falling Everywhere All At Once

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times

Date Posted:: May 18, 2026
Is Database:: Database

The most striking finding in the global birth-rate collapse is that if one re-centers each country’s data by the year smartphones took off, every decline looks identical (US/UK 2007, France 2009, Mexico/Indonesia 2012, Nigeria/Senegal 2013–2015).

US, British and Australian birth rates for teens and young adults were broadly flat during the early 2000s but began to fall markedly from 2007. The same slide began in France and Poland around 2009, and in Mexico, Morocco and Indonesia around 2012. What had been steady declines in fertility in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal became precipitous drops between 2013 and 2015. All of these inflection points coincided with the mass adoption of smartphones in local markets — as measured by Google searches for mobile apps. In country after country the birth rate plunged after the introduction of smartphones, no matter what the previous trend was. The younger the age group, the more pronounced the downturn — a mirror image of smartphone usage patterns.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Birth rates for teens and young adults in the US, Britain and Australia were broadly flat in the early 2000s but fell markedly from 2007, with the same slide starting in France and Poland around 2009 and in Mexico, Morocco and Indonesia around 2012.
Steady fertility declines in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal turned into precipitous drops between 2013 and 2015, and these inflection points coincided with mass smartphone adoption as measured by Google searches for mobile apps.
Birth rates fell after smartphones were introduced regardless of the prior trend, with the downturn more pronounced in younger age groups, mirroring smartphone usage patterns.

Younger Teens Are Now Much Less Likely To Say They Are Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual

Jean Twenge Generation Tech

Date Posted:: September 29, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Among US high-school students, the LGB share fell btw 2023 to 2025 by 5pp for girls (27% to 22%), and 2pp for boys (9% to 7%). The preceding rise was likewise larger for girls: +128% from 2015 to 2021, versus +99% for boys to 2023.

[New data from the Youth Risk Survey of U.S. 9th to 12th graders from the CDC shows] for 12th graders, 17 and 18 years old, identifying as LGB declines only a few percentage points between 2023 and 2025 (from 18% to 16%). But the headline result is for 9th graders (14 and 15 years old): Identifying as LGB absolutely plummets between 2023 and 2025, from 17% to 11%. That really does look like a free fall. The decline appears to be driven almost entirely by girls. Identifying as LGB dropped from 27% in 2023 to 22% in 2025 among girls, and from 9% to 7% among boys. [In terms of the share of high school students reporting engaging in same-sex activity] most high school students are not sexually active, so this is only a subsample of the larger group. For boys, there’s been a fairly steady rise in same-sex partners, not too different from the pattern of identifying as LGB among boys. The story is different for girls, where having non-heterosexual sex peaked in 2021 and then fell steeply.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The share of U.S. 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% in 2023 to 11% in 2025 in the CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey, while 12th graders declined from 18% to 16%.
The decline appears driven almost entirely by girls, whose LGB identification fell from 27% in 2023 to 22% in 2025, compared with a drop from 9% to 7% among boys.
Among sexually active teens, the share of boys reporting at least one same-sex partner has risen fairly steadily, while for girls it peaked in 2021 and then fell steeply.

America's Demoralized Men, Part II: Lost Pathways, Greater Struggles

Joseph Davis, Michael Toscano and Ken Burchfiel Institute For Family Studies

Date Posted:: August 27, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

An ISF survey of 2,000 American men aged 18–29 found 23% reported gambling daily and 27% watch pornography daily. 66% of the men who gambled daily reported feeling like a failure, as well as 63% of the men who watch pornography daily.

More than half of young men in our survey are now gamblers. Nearly 1 in 4 (23%) report that they gamble daily, plus 12% doing so more than several times a week, and a further 21% at least some of the time. 43% of young men say they watch pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), with another 26% about weekly or less. More than 4 in 10 young men (42%) believe that the statement “all in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure” describes them “very well” (15%) or “somewhat well” (27%). Those who view pornography (63%) and gamble (66%) every day—along with day trading and playing fantasy sports—are significantly more inclined to see themselves as a failure.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

More than half of young men surveyed gamble, with 23% gambling daily, 12% more than several times a week, and 21% at least some of the time.
43% of young men report watching pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), and daily pornography viewers (63%) and daily gamblers (66%) are significantly more inclined to see themselves as failures.

The Child Cost Index

Christina Patterson and Heather Sarsons National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: July 28, 2026
Is Database:: Database

A Child Cost Index newly created by Patters and Sarsons finds little rise in costs per child relative to adult consumption (not counting parental leisure time). Higher child costs are thus unlikely to be the main explanation for falling fertility.

Figure 6 shows that real spending on children has increased substantially. Panel (a) plots real spending per child, deflated [by the authors’ new] child cost index, together with real spending per parent, deflated by [their adult cost index.] Both series rise by roughly one-half between 1990 and 2023 and move closely together over the medium run. Thus, households devote more real resources to children today than in 1990, but this increase appears to be part of a broader rise in household consumption rather than a child-specific expansion in required market inputs. Panel (b) reinforces this interpretation by plotting the share of total household spending allocated to children, separately by family size. Children absorb a large share of household resources in every year of the sample, but that share is strikingly stable over time within family size. Households with one child allocate just under 30% of total spending to that child in both 1990 and 2023. The sacrifice of adult consumption associated with children is therefore large, but it is not a recent development. Panel (b) also reveals clear economies of scale in child-rearing. Moving from one to two children raises the child share of household spending from roughly 30% to roughly 40%, far less than a doubling, and the incremental spending share falls further for larger families.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Real spending per child and real spending per parent each rose by roughly one-half between 1990 and 2023, deflated by the authors' new child and adult cost indices, and moved closely together over the medium run.
Households with one child allocated just under 30% of total spending to that child in both 1990 and 2023, a share that is stable over time within family size.
Moving from one child to two raises the child share of household spending from roughly 30% to roughly 40%, far less than a doubling, with the incremental share falling further for larger families.

GLP-1–Induced Weight Loss and the Female Obesity Penalty

Rebecca Diamond Harvard University

Date Posted:: June 23, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Women who began treatment with GLP-1 drugs when not currently married or partnered saw an increased probability of marriage or cohabitation of ~29pp after 6 quarters. Those not initially employed were 27pp more likely to be working after 6 quarters.

BMI is flat before women start [GLP-1 treatment] and then falls (Figure 2, Panel A). All groups lose between 1.4 and 2.5 BMI points in the post period. These effects grow to between 2.7 and 4.2 BMI points at 1.5+ years after initiation. The largest magnitude change is in the marriage market. Women who are single when they start (Figure 2, Panel B) increase their probability of being married or living with a partner by 18.3 pp overall and 28.6pp (s.e. 7.1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lose weight. Partnered women’s relationships, by contrast, are stable. Their partnership probability barely moves (0.1 points, s.e. 1.8), and there is no excess relationship dissolution (0.0, s.e. 1.7). The marriage-market response is the making of new matches, not the breaking or remaking of old ones. In contrast, single women’s weight loss seems to dramatically affect first impressions of potential partners, leading to a large increase in marriage and cohabitation. This is consistent with prior work on the obesity penalty negatively affecting women in the marriage market. Figure 2, panels C and D show that women not employed at baseline move into work: their employment rate rises 13pp overall and 27pp after six or more quarters, and their weekly hours rise by nearly ten hours at the longer horizon.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Women who were single when starting GLP-1 treatment raised their probability of being married or cohabiting by 18.3 pp overall and 28.6 pp (s.e. 7.1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lost weight.
Partnered women's relationships remained stable after GLP-1 initiation, with partnership probability moving 0.1 points (s.e. 1.8) and no excess dissolution (0.0, s.e. 1.7).
Women not employed at baseline moved into work after GLP-1 initiation, with employment rates rising 13 pp overall and 27 pp after six or more quarters and weekly hours up nearly ten at the longer horizon.

The Collapse of Teen Fertility in the Digital Era

Nathan Hudson and Hernan Moscoso Boedo University of Cincinnati

Date Posted:: May 18, 2026
Is Database:: Database

US birth rates over 2007–2024 were down 71% for women 15–19, 43% for those 20–24, and 23% for those 25–29, but up 9% for women 35–39. Hudson and Moscoso-Boedo argue that this monotone age gradient is the signature of a smartphone shock.

Teen fertility collapsed almost everywhere in the world starting around 2007. This is a striking fact. Countries with very different healthcare systems, welfare regimes, abortion laws, religious traditions, recessions, and demographic trends all saw similar breaks in the same window. Whatever caused it was something global—something that arrived in roughly the same form in all of these places at roughly the same time… between 2007 and 2024, the birth rate among women 15–19 fell by 71 percent, 20–24 by 43 percent, 25–29 by 23 percent, 30–34 by 1 percent, and 35–39 rose by 9 percent… U.S. teens reduced in-person socializing from 68 minutes per day in 2003 to 38 in 2019 while computer-leisure rose from 22 to 96 minutes… Under-18 conception rates accelerated from −1.3 percent per year pre-2007 to −8.9 percent post-2007, a 6.8x acceleration that nearly matches the U.S. 5.6x acceleration.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Between 2007 and 2024, the birth rate among women 15–19 fell 71 percent, 20–24 fell 43 percent, and 25–29 fell 23 percent, while the rate among women 35–39 rose 9 percent.
Teen fertility broke downward around 2007 in countries with very different healthcare systems, welfare regimes, abortion laws, religious traditions, recessions, and demographic trends, indicating a cause that arrived globally in roughly the same form at roughly the same time.
U.S. teens cut in-person socializing from 68 minutes per day in 2003 to 38 in 2019 while computer leisure rose from 22 to 96 minutes, and under-18 conception rates moved from −1.3 percent per year before 2007 to −8.9 percent after.

Record High Number of 18-Year-Olds in the US Today

Torsten Sløk Apollo

Date Posted:: May 11, 2026
Is Database:: Database

The number of American 18-year-olds will peak this year and fall 14% over the next decade.

America is at peak 18, and the number of 18-year-olds will fall 14% over the coming decade.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The number of 18-year-olds in the United States is projected to peak this year at a record high and then fall 14% over the coming decade.

The most striking finding in the global birth-rate collapse is that if one re-centers each country’s data by the year smartphones took off, every decline looks identical (US/UK 2007, France 2009, Mexico/Indonesia 2012, Nigeria/Senegal 2013–2015).

Do falling birth rates worldwide coincide with mass smartphone adoption?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Among US high-school students, the LGB share fell btw 2023 to 2025 by 5pp for girls (27% to 22%), and 2pp for boys (9% to 7%). The preceding rise was likewise larger for girls: +128% from 2015 to 2021, versus +99% for boys to 2023.

Are younger teens less likely to identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

An ISF survey of 2,000 American men aged 18–29 found 23% reported gambling daily and 27% watch pornography daily. 66% of the men who gambled daily reported feeling like a failure, as well as 63% of the men who watch pornography daily.

Do daily gambling and pornography use correlate with young men's self-perceived failure?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

A Child Cost Index newly created by Patters and Sarsons finds little rise in costs per child relative to adult consumption (not counting parental leisure time). Higher child costs are thus unlikely to be the main explanation for falling fertility.

Has spending on children risen faster than spending on parents?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Women who began treatment with GLP-1 drugs when not currently married or partnered saw an increased probability of marriage or cohabitation of ~29pp after 6 quarters. Those not initially employed were 27pp more likely to be working after 6 quarters.

Does weight-loss medication improve women's marriage and employment outcomes?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

US birth rates over 2007–2024 were down 71% for women 15–19, 43% for those 20–24, and 23% for those 25–29, but up 9% for women 35–39. Hudson and Moscoso-Boedo argue that this monotone age gradient is the signature of a smartphone shock.

Does the worldwide drop in teen fertility share one cause?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

The number of American 18-year-olds will peak this year and fall 14% over the next decade.

Is the number of 18-year-olds in the US peaking?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI