“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute

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GLP-1–Induced Weight Loss and the Female Obesity Penalty

Rebecca Diamond Harvard University

Date Posted:: June 23, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Women who began treatment with GLP-1 drugs when not currently married or partnered saw an increased probability of marriage or cohabitation of ~29pp after 6 quarters. Those not initially employed were 27pp more likely to be working after 6 quarters.

BMI is flat before women start [GLP-1 treatment] and then falls (Figure 2, Panel A). All groups lose between 1.4 and 2.5 BMI points in the post period. These effects grow to between 2.7 and 4.2 BMI points at 1.5+ years after initiation. The largest magnitude change is in the marriage market. Women who are single when they start (Figure 2, Panel B) increase their probability of being married or living with a partner by 18.3 pp overall and 28.6pp (s.e. 7.1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lose weight. Partnered women’s relationships, by contrast, are stable. Their partnership probability barely moves (0.1 points, s.e. 1.8), and there is no excess relationship dissolution (0.0, s.e. 1.7). The marriage-market response is the making of new matches, not the breaking or remaking of old ones. In contrast, single women’s weight loss seems to dramatically affect first impressions of potential partners, leading to a large increase in marriage and cohabitation. This is consistent with prior work on the obesity penalty negatively affecting women in the marriage market. Figure 2, panels C and D show that women not employed at baseline move into work: their employment rate rises 13pp overall and 27pp after six or more quarters, and their weekly hours rise by nearly ten hours at the longer horizon.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The largest magnitude change is in the marriage market.
Women who are single when they start (Figure 2, Panel B) increase their probability of being married or living with.
1) at six or more quarters, building gradually as they lose weight.

America's Demoralized Men, Part II: Lost Pathways, Greater Struggles

Joseph Davis, Michael Toscano and Ken Burchfiel Institute For Family Studies

Date Posted:: August 27, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

An ISF survey of 2,000 American men aged 18–29 found 23% reported gambling daily and 27% watch pornography daily. 66% of the men who gambled daily reported feeling like a failure, as well as 63% of the men who watch pornography daily.

More than half of young men in our survey are now gamblers. Nearly 1 in 4 (23%) report that they gamble daily, plus 12% doing so more than several times a week, and a further 21% at least some of the time. 43% of young men say they watch pornography daily (27%) or several times a week (16%), with another 26% about weekly or less. More than 4 in 10 young men (42%) believe that the statement “all in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure” describes them “very well” (15%) or “somewhat well” (27%). Those who view pornography (63%) and gamble (66%) every day—along with day trading and playing fantasy sports—are significantly more inclined to see themselves as a failure.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

42% of young men identify as failures, with daily pornography viewers (63%) and daily gamblers (66%) reporting self-perceived failure at rates roughly 1.5× the overall average.
More than half of young men gamble at some frequency, with 23% doing so daily—a pattern concentrated among those also exhibiting compulsive pornography use and self-perceived failure.
43% of young men consume pornography daily or several times a week, with daily users (27%) disproportionately represented among those who describe themselves as failures (63%).

The Child Cost Index

Christina Patterson and Heather Sarsons National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: July 28, 2026
Is Database:: Database

A Child Cost Index newly created by Patters and Sarsons finds little rise in costs per child relative to adult consumption (not counting parental leisure time). Higher child costs are thus unlikely to be the main explanation for falling fertility.

Figure 6 shows that real spending on children has increased substantially. Panel (a) plots real spending per child, deflated [by the authors’ new] child cost index, together with real spending per parent, deflated by [their adult cost index.] Both series rise by roughly one-half between 1990 and 2023 and move closely together over the medium run. Thus, households devote more real resources to children today than in 1990, but this increase appears to be part of a broader rise in household consumption rather than a child-specific expansion in required market inputs. Panel (b) reinforces this interpretation by plotting the share of total household spending allocated to children, separately by family size. Children absorb a large share of household resources in every year of the sample, but that share is strikingly stable over time within family size. Households with one child allocate just under 30% of total spending to that child in both 1990 and 2023. The sacrifice of adult consumption associated with children is therefore large, but it is not a recent development. Panel (b) also reveals clear economies of scale in child-rearing. Moving from one to two children raises the child share of household spending from roughly 30% to roughly 40%, far less than a doubling, and the incremental spending share falls further for larger families.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The Child Cost Index tracked closely with adult consumption benchmarks, as rapid childcare and tuition price increases were offset by other components of the child-rearing basket, leaving the relative price of children largely stable.
Parental time costs shift the level of the Child Cost Index but contribute little to its growth rate, because mothers today forgo fewer market-work hours than prior generations, reducing the forgone-earnings penalty of child-rearing.
The full child-rearing cost bundle rose roughly in step with adult spending rather than outpacing it, making a large increase in the relative price of children an insufficient explanation for the recent fertility decline.

The Collapse of Teen Fertility in the Digital Era

Nathan Hudson and Hernan Moscoso Boedo University of Cincinnati

Date Posted:: May 18, 2026
Is Database:: Database

US birth rates over 2007–2024 were down 71% for women 15–19, 43% for those 20–24, and 23% for those 25–29, but up 9% for women 35–39. Hudson and Moscoso-Boedo argue that this monotone age gradient is the signature of a smartphone shock.

Teen fertility collapsed almost everywhere in the world starting around 2007. This is a striking fact. Countries with very different healthcare systems, welfare regimes, abortion laws, religious traditions, recessions, and demographic trends all saw similar breaks in the same window. Whatever caused it was something global—something that arrived in roughly the same form in all of these places at roughly the same time… between 2007 and 2024, the birth rate among women 15–19 fell by 71 percent, 20–24 by 43 percent, 25–29 by 23 percent, 30–34 by 1 percent, and 35–39 rose by 9 percent… U.S. teens reduced in-person socializing from 68 minutes per day in 2003 to 38 in 2019 while computer-leisure rose from 22 to 96 minutes… Under-18 conception rates accelerated from −1.3 percent per year pre-2007 to −8.9 percent post-2007, a 6.8x acceleration that nearly matches the U.S. 5.6x acceleration.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

U.S. teen birth rates fell 71% for ages 15–19 between 2007–2024 vs. 9% increase for ages 35–39, driven by smartphone-mediated.
Counties with 10 percentage points higher broadband penetration experienced teen birth rate declines 18.9 pts larger during 2003–2018, establishing digital.
Teen in-person socializing collapsed 44% from 68 to 38 minutes daily (2003–2019) while computer leisure quadrupled, with 0.97 correlation to.

Why Birth Rates Are Falling Everywhere All At Once

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times

Date Posted:: May 18, 2026
Is Database:: Database

The most striking finding in the global birth-rate collapse is that if one re-centers each country’s data by the year smartphones took off, every decline looks identical (US/UK 2007, France 2009, Mexico/Indonesia 2012, Nigeria/Senegal 2013–2015).

US, British and Australian birth rates for teens and young adults were broadly flat during the early 2000s but began to fall markedly from 2007. The same slide began in France and Poland around 2009, and in Mexico, Morocco and Indonesia around 2012. What had been steady declines in fertility in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal became precipitous drops between 2013 and 2015. All of these inflection points coincided with the mass adoption of smartphones in local markets — as measured by Google searches for mobile apps. In country after country the birth rate plunged after the introduction of smartphones, no matter what the previous trend was. The younger the age group, the more pronounced the downturn — a mirror image of smartphone usage patterns.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Why Birth Rates Are Falling Everywhere All At Once.
Japan’s working-age population shrinkage explains its economic stagnation since the 1990s, with GDP per working-age adult remaining productive while total.
The primary driver is fewer couple formation rather than couples having fewer children.

Record High Number of 18-Year-Olds in the US Today

Torsten Sløk Apollo

Date Posted:: May 11, 2026
Is Database:: Database

The number of American 18-year-olds will peak this year and fall 14% over the next decade.

America is at peak 18, and the number of 18-year-olds will fall 14% over the coming decade.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The 18-year-old population peaks today before declining 14% through 2034, reducing workforce entry cohorts and straining labor-dependent sectors.
Declining youth cohorts lead to tighter labor markets and higher wage pressure for entry-level positions relative to the prior 20-year.

Why is the Mental Health of the Youngest American Workers in Decline?

David Blanchflower and Alex Bryson National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: February 4, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Survey evidence suggests that the worsened mental health of the young in recent years is particularly concentrated among those who are less-educated and working. For the 2021–2025 cohort of 18–22 year olds, “despair” is higher for workers than non-workers.

Declines in mental health are most pronounced among the youngest workers ages 18-22, who are likely drawn from lower socioeconomic classes and report the greatest difficulties making ends meet. Chart 7a and 7b show changes in despair over time for non-workers and workers. The rise is especially marked in the later period among young workers. Chart 8 shows that the change observed in the age/despair relation is driven by those aged 18-22. The chart plots the difference between despair rates for workers and non-workers. For all age groups other than the youngest in all years the relation was negative [i.e.] that despair rates of workers were lower than of non-workers. Chart 9 shows the importance of education. The rise in despair for those workers ages 18-22 is most apparent among those without a college education. In the years 2021-2025 52% (weighted) of ages 18-22 had a high school diploma with a further 11% who were dropouts. In the same years those ages 23-29 29% were high school graduates, 8% were dropouts, 28% had some college and 35% had 4 years + of college. Chart 9 shows the rise in despair is particularly pronounced for the least educated workers, covering high school dropouts and graduates, and more than it is for less educated non-workers.

Women who began treatment with GLP-1 drugs when not currently married or partnered saw an increased probability of marriage or cohabitation of ~29pp after 6 quarters. Those not initially employed were 27pp more likely to be working after 6 quarters.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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An ISF survey of 2,000 American men aged 18–29 found 23% reported gambling daily and 27% watch pornography daily. 66% of the men who gambled daily reported feeling like a failure, as well as 63% of the men who watch pornography daily.

Are young men's struggles with addiction driving their sense of failure?

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A Child Cost Index newly created by Patters and Sarsons finds little rise in costs per child relative to adult consumption (not counting parental leisure time). Higher child costs are thus unlikely to be the main explanation for falling fertility.

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US birth rates over 2007–2024 were down 71% for women 15–19, 43% for those 20–24, and 23% for those 25–29, but up 9% for women 35–39. Hudson and Moscoso-Boedo argue that this monotone age gradient is the signature of a smartphone shock.

Does digital connectivity reduce teen pregnancy by limiting in-person contact?

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The most striking finding in the global birth-rate collapse is that if one re-centers each country’s data by the year smartphones took off, every decline looks identical (US/UK 2007, France 2009, Mexico/Indonesia 2012, Nigeria/Senegal 2013–2015).

Is smartphone adoption reshaping how people form relationships globally?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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The number of American 18-year-olds will peak this year and fall 14% over the next decade.

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Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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Survey evidence suggests that the worsened mental health of the young in recent years is particularly concentrated among those who are less-educated and working. For the 2021–2025 cohort of 18–22 year olds, “despair” is higher for workers than non-workers.

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Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI