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“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
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For whatever topics you select (currently: China):

Include articles that mention this topic 134

Only articles primarily about this topic 94

How China Curbed Its Oil Addiction—and Blunted a U.S. Pressure Point

Brian Spegele Wall Street Journal

Date Posted:: July 22, 2025
Is Database:: Database

Enormous government subsidies for EVs are reducing Chinese oil demand, which is expected to peak in 2027.

Across China, fleets of gas-guzzling Volkswagen and Hyundai taxicabs are being replaced by electric models designed and produced locally. Last year, nearly half of passenger vehicles sold in the country were either all-electrics or plug-in hybrids, compared with 6% in 2020. In a remote corner of China called the “sea of death” for its harsh conditions, oil workers are trying to coax more crude out of the ground by drilling holes as deep as Mt. Everest is high. State-owned PetroChina reported $38 billion of capital expenditures last year, nearly as much as Exxon Mobil’s and Chevron’s combined. China boosted oil output by 13% from 2018 to 2024, to around 4.3 million barrels a day. Crude imports fell nearly 2% last year, though they have rebounded slightly this year as some Chinese companies built stockpiles. China won’t stop importing oil. It still brings in roughly 11 million barrels a day, about 70% of what it consumes, up from less than three million a day 20 years ago. And overall oil consumption is likely to decline only gradually as China’s demand for oil to make petrochemicals continues to grow.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Nearly half of passenger vehicles sold in China last year were all-electrics or plug-in hybrids, up from 6% in 2020, as locally designed and produced electric models replace Volkswagen and Hyundai taxicabs.
China raised domestic oil output 13% from 2018 to 2024 to around 4.3 million barrels a day, and state-owned PetroChina reported $38 billion of capital expenditures last year, nearly as much as Exxon Mobil's and Chevron's combined.
China still imports roughly 11 million barrels of oil a day, about 70% of what it consumes and up from less than three million a day 20 years ago, with crude imports down nearly 2% last year.

China Sees Nearly 10% Decline In Marriages in 2026 So Far, Foreshadowing Lower Birth Rate

Mandy Zuo South China Morning Post

Date Posted:: November 6, 2026
Is Database:: Database

The number of marriages in China fell ~10% y/y to ~4.6mm in the first three quarters of this year, after rising 10.8% to ~6.8mm in 2025. The number of marriages peaked in 2013 at 13.5mm, and the most recent trough was 6.1mm in 2024.

China has witnessed a nearly 10% drop in the number of marriages in the first three quarters of the year, signalling a possible full-year fall in 2026 after a rebound in 2025. The country recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months, down 504,000 from a year earlier, data released by the Ministry of Civil Affairs showed. The latest figures mean that 2026 marriage registrations would most likely see a year-on-year drop as well, said He Yafu, an independent demographer based in Guangdong province. Based on the historical share of annual marriage registrations recorded in each quarter, he estimated that nationwide marriages for the entire year would range from 5.88 million to 6.46 million couples. Even if registrations reached the upper end of that forecast, they would still be lower than the 2025 level.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

China recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months of 2026, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a decline of nearly 10%, according to Ministry of Civil Affairs data.
Independent demographer He Yafu estimates full-year 2026 marriages at 5.88 million to 6.46 million couples, below the 6.765 million recorded in 2025, when registrations rose 10.8%, boosted by auspicious dates, a new nationwide registration service and local incentives.
China’s marriage registrations peaked at 13.469 million in 2013, fell below 10 million in 2019 and dropped to 6.1 million in 2024, a record low since the data was first published, while divorce registrations in the first nine months of 2026 reached 2.082 million, up 5,000 year-on-year.

Surging Export Similarity is Fueling Advanced Economy Trade Tensions With China

Benn Steil and Yuma Schuster Council On Foreign Relations

Date Posted:: October 22, 2026
Is Database:: Database

China’s export basket increasingly overlaps with that of advanced economies. By CFR’s measure, the export similarity index has risen ~6pp since 2007, driven by growing overlap in chemicals since 2016 and in machinery and transport equipment, notably EVs, since 2023.

The index measures how closely China’s export basket resembles that of the advanced economies. Broadly, the more similar the baskets become relative to 2007, the greater the potential for immediate trade conflict. The index fell from 2007 to 2013, as the advanced economies reduced wood, textiles, and other basic manufactures as a share of their exports. The orange bars show the advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures, which lowered the index by about two points by 2009—and, combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013. That downward tug, however, is no longer enough to offset upward pressures elsewhere. Those pressures have been in two categories—in chemicals since 2016, and machinery since 2023. As shown by the black line, they have driven the steep rise in the index value.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures lowered the export similarity index with China by about two points by 2009, and combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013.
Upward pressures in chemicals since 2016 and machinery since 2023 have driven a steep rise in the index measuring how closely China’s export basket resembles that of the advanced economies.
The more China’s and the advanced economies’ export baskets resemble each other relative to 2007, the greater the potential for immediate trade conflict, and the downward tug from advanced-economy exits from basic manufactures no longer offsets upward pressures elsewhere.

China’s Growth Machines

Robin Rivaton and Ben Southwood Works In Progress

Date Posted:: October 14, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

The US generates ~2x as much output per dollar of capital as China. Rivaton and Southwood argue that relentless competition among Chinese subnational governments, who account for ~85% of public expenditure, drives industrial growth at the cost of reduced capital efficiency.

Overexuberance is visible in economic data. Interest rates that banks pay to depositors are capped, giving banks artificially cheap capital. Entrepreneurs may be backed to attempt extremely unlikely, borderline schemes. The capital efficiency ratio measures how much output a country gets out of the capital stock it has invested – how many dollars of GDP a country can buy with a dollar of investment. The United States gets almost twice as much economic output out of every dollar it invests as China does, precisely the opposite of what we would expect from a developed country with a mature economy versus a rapidly growing country playing catch up.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.
China’s capital efficiency inverts the expected pattern, in which a rapidly growing catch-up economy would extract more output per dollar of investment than a mature developed economy.
Overexuberance is visible in Chinese macroeconomic data, with China’s investment generating less economic output per dollar than that of the United States.

Who Loses from China’s Export Gains?

Charles Austin Jordan and Logan Wright Rhodium Group

Date Posted:: September 24, 2026
Is Database:: Database

China’s share of global exports by volume is on track to rise from 20% in 2025 to 28% by 2030. Yet China’s rising export share may depress the total value of global exports as lower-priced Chinese goods displace more expensive exports from other countries.

The net result of our projection would suggest that China gains around $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses around $5.1 trillion, with the G7 accounting for $2.25 trillion of those potential losses alone. This implies that China’s export share gains effectively destroy overall global trade values relative to the status quo due to continued declines in export prices. Regardless of which assumptions are used, China’s export share gains appear to reduce global total potential export values, because trade patterns are shifting toward Chinese goods that are declining in price.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The projection has China gaining roughly $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses about $5.1 trillion.
The G7 accounts for $2.25 trillion of the projected $5.1 trillion in export value losses borne by countries outside China.
China’s export share gains appear to reduce global total potential export values regardless of the assumptions used, because trade patterns shift toward Chinese goods whose prices continue to decline.

The Export Wave Is Cresting

Andrew Batson Gavekal

Date Posted:: September 23, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Andrew Batson argues that as the memory-chip price cycle’s impact on Chinese export growth fades, export growth in renminbi terms in 2027 “will most likely converge toward the recent trend for products outside the AI complex, which is around 5–7%.”

China’s latest extraordinary export wave is showing signs of cresting. The headline YoY growth of exports has leveled off over the past three months, staying around 24-27% in US dollar terms and 18-20% in renminbi terms. The boom in exports of products associated with investment in artificial intelligence is certainly not over, but current super-high growth rates will probably slow in coming months. Memory chips are now the biggest single swing factor for exports, and prices for some products have recently leveled off after their massive surge. While the ebb and flow of memory prices is difficult to forecast, growth of total exports in 2027 will most likely converge toward the recent trend for products outside the AI complex, which is around 5-7%. Semiconductor cycles have limited implications for China’s vast range of other exports, which are still very competitive in global markets.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

China’s export growth has leveled off over the past three months at roughly 24–27% year-on-year in US dollar terms and 18–20% in renminbi terms, a sign the export wave is cresting.
Memory chips are the biggest single swing factor for China’s exports, with prices for some products leveling off after a massive surge and super-high AI-related growth rates likely to slow in coming months.
Total Chinese export growth in 2027 will most likely converge toward the recent 5–7% trend for products outside the AI complex, which remain very competitive in global markets.

Who Will Win The War Of Neo-Mercantilists?

Martin Wolf Financial Times

Date Posted:: July 22, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Martin Wolf estimates that under reasonable assumptions, China should be earning ~$100B annually on her $4T of foreign assets. Yet, China shows an unexplained negative net income of around $125bn on its net foreign asset position.

China’s macroeconomics are very different from those obtained before the global financial crisis and, even more so, before the end of its property boom. Exports are surging, but domestic demand has stalled. China's export surplus in manufacturing is now around 2% of world GDP, which is “roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran.” Most importantly, China shows an unexplained negative net income of around $125bn on its net foreign investments. But it should, on reasonable assumptions about the income it earns on its $4tn in net foreign assets, have a surplus of some $100bn. As a result, Brad Setser argues, the renminbi is by now some 30% undervalued. China’s policies look unavoidably threatening to much of the world. If a major trading partner runs huge and persistent trade and current account surpluses, everyone else has to run offsetting deficits. This leads to the shrinkage of sectors specialising in producing tradable goods and services, as well as huge domestic financial deficits.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

China's manufacturing export surplus stands at roughly 2% of world GDP, described as roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran, while exports surge and domestic demand stalls.
China reports an unexplained negative net income of about $125bn on its net foreign investments, though reasonable assumptions about returns on its $4tn in net foreign assets imply a surplus near $100bn.
Brad Setser argues the renminbi is some 30% undervalued; persistent Chinese trade and current account surpluses require offsetting deficits elsewhere, shrinking sectors producing tradable goods and services and producing large domestic financial deficits.

Enormous government subsidies for EVs are reducing Chinese oil demand, which is expected to peak in 2027.

Is China reducing its reliance on imported oil?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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The number of marriages in China fell ~10% y/y to ~4.6mm in the first three quarters of this year, after rising 10.8% to ~6.8mm in 2025. The number of marriages peaked in 2013 at 13.5mm, and the most recent trough was 6.1mm in 2024.

Are marriages in China declining again after last year's rebound?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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China’s export basket increasingly overlaps with that of advanced economies. By CFR’s measure, the export similarity index has risen ~6pp since 2007, driven by growing overlap in chemicals since 2016 and in machinery and transport equipment, notably EVs, since 2023.

Are Chinese and advanced economy exports becoming more alike?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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The US generates ~2x as much output per dollar of capital as China. Rivaton and Southwood argue that relentless competition among Chinese subnational governments, who account for ~85% of public expenditure, drives industrial growth at the cost of reduced capital efficiency.

Does China get less economic output per dollar invested than America?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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China’s share of global exports by volume is on track to rise from 20% in 2025 to 28% by 2030. Yet China’s rising export share may depress the total value of global exports as lower-priced Chinese goods displace more expensive exports from other countries.

Do China's export share gains reduce global export values?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Andrew Batson argues that as the memory-chip price cycle’s impact on Chinese export growth fades, export growth in renminbi terms in 2027 “will most likely converge toward the recent trend for products outside the AI complex, which is around 5–7%.”

Is China's export boom leveling off toward slower growth?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Martin Wolf estimates that under reasonable assumptions, China should be earning ~$100B annually on her $4T of foreign assets. Yet, China shows an unexplained negative net income of around $125bn on its net foreign asset position.

Is China's currency undervalued as its export surplus hits record levels?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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