Can gradual trade decoupling deter China from attacking Taiwan?
Core argument: An economic deterrence strategy would show China that the United States and its allies could use a Taiwan crisis to trigger a gradual restructuring of the global economy on their own terms, pushing the burden of economic escalation back onto Xi Jinping.
An economic deterrence strategy would show China that the United States and its allies could use a Taiwan crisis to trigger a gradual restructuring of the global economy on their own terms and to their own benefit. A web of bilateral and multilateral economic security agreements would create the basis for this new international economic architecture, pushing the burden of economic escalation back onto Xi. The driving mechanism for such a restructuring would be “avalanche decoupling,” a process by which the United States and like-minded allies use ratcheting tariffs or quotas to phase out specific imports from China over time. In peacetime, the United States and its allies can use avalanche decoupling to break dependencies on China for a small number of highly sensitive products such as drones and medicines, leaving the vast majority of trade with China unchanged. Doing so now—before a crisis takes place—would establish the proof of concept. Then, if China crosses U.S. red lines in the future, the allies could take the same approach to a broader share of trade, possibly on an accelerated basis and working with a larger coalition.



