Edward Conard

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Chinese Sanctions Hit US Drone Maker Supplying Ukraine

AI Summary. China imposed sanctions on Skydio, the largest US drone maker and a supplier to Ukraine's military, barring Chinese firms from supplying it with critical components including batteries from its sole provider. The company is seeking alternative suppliers and has asked the US government for help.

Demetri Sevastopulo, Kathrin Hille, and Ryan McMorrow Financial Times
Date Posted:
November 6, 2024

Skydiom, the largest US drone maker, is facing a supply chain crisis after Beijing banned Chinese groups from providing it with critical components. CEO Adam Bry noted, “This is an attempt to eliminate the leading American drone company.”

Skydiom, the largest US drone maker, is facing a supply chain crisis after Beijing banned Chinese groups from providing it...

Can a US drone maker keep producing without Chinese components?

Core argument: Beijing sanctioned Skydio, the largest US drone maker and a supplier to Ukraine's military, barring Chinese groups from supplying it critical components and blocking batteries from its sole provider.

Skydio, the US’s largest drone maker and a supplier to Ukraine’s military, faces a supply chain crisis after Beijing imposed sanctions on the company, including banning Chinese groups from providing it with critical components. Skydio is rushing to find alternative suppliers after Beijing’s move, which also blocks battery supplies from its sole provider, said people familiar with the situation. The drone maker has sought help from the Biden administration. The Chinese action comes as the US Congress considers legislation that would ban Americans from flying drones made by DJI, the Shenzhen-based company that dominates the global commercial drone industry. “We suspect Skydio was targeted by Beijing because it is likely seen as a competitor to DJI,” said one US official. “If there is a silver lining, we can use this episode to accelerate our work to diversify drone supply chains away from . . . China.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Beijing sanctioned Skydio, the largest US drone maker and a supplier to Ukraine's military, barring Chinese groups from supplying it critical components and blocking batteries from its sole provider.
  2. Skydio is rushing to find alternative suppliers and has sought help from the Biden administration after the Chinese sanctions triggered a supply chain crisis.
  3. One US official said Skydio was suspected of being targeted because Beijing likely sees it as a competitor to DJI, as the US Congress considers legislation banning Americans from flying DJI drones.

Related Articles:

  • US Efforts to Contain Xi’s Push for Tech Supremacy Are Faltering — Research by Bloomberg Economics and Bloomberg Intelligence finds that of 13 key technologies tracked, China has reached global leadership in five and is catching up in seven others, with clear leads in electric vehicles, automotive software and lithium battery technology. China still struggles to develop manufacturing processes for advanced semiconductors, the main focus of US export controls.
  • Mystery Drones Swarmed a U.S. Military Base for 17 Days. The Pentagon Is Stumped — Unidentified drones flew over a U.S. military base for 17 days in a coordinated pattern of higher-altitude fixed-wing aircraft and smaller quadcopters below, leading U.S. officials to doubt hobbyists were responsible. Federal law bars the military from shooting down drones near domestic bases absent an imminent threat.
  • Pentagon Plan to Buy Thousands of Drones Faces Looming Snags — The US Department of Defense aims to buy thousands of low-cost drones within as little as 18 months and up to 2,000 larger uncrewed jets, while one of its primary drone suppliers produced 38 aircraft last year. Booming commercial aerospace demand has left shortages of skilled labor, raw materials, and parts such as advanced electronics and fasteners.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)
  • Security
Previous articleNovember 6, 2024What Trump’s Win Means for the Economy.@greg_ip argues that Trump’s proposed tariff and tax cut policies would put upward pressure on inflation and interest rates. As evidence, he cites the rise of 10-year Treasury yields alongside Trump’s polling.Next articleNovember 6, 2024Xi Is Better Prepared for Trump Even as 60% Tariffs Risk ChaosTrump’s 60% tariff on Chinese goods would impact $500B in exports to the US, 15% of the value of all Chinese exports. China may respond with “export controls on critical raw materials,” and “an entity list that can target key American companies.”
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China Sees Nearly 10% Decline In Marriages in 2026 So Far, Foreshadowing Lower Birth Rate

AI Summary. China recorded 4.648m marriage registrations in the first nine months of the year, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a nearly 10% decline that points to a full-year drop. Marriages peaked at 13.469m in 2013 and have generally trended downward since, with divorce registrations at 2.082m.

Mandy Zuo South China Morning Post
Date Posted:
November 6, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The number of marriages in China fell ~10% y/y to ~4.6mm in the first three quarters of this year, after rising 10.8% to ~6.8mm in 2025. The number of marriages peaked in 2013 at 13.5mm, and the most recent trough was 6.1mm in 2024.

The number of marriages in China fell ~10% y/y to ~4.6mm in the first three quarters of this year, after rising 10.8% to...

Are marriages in China declining again after last year's rebound?

Core argument: China recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months of 2026, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a decline of nearly 10%, according to Ministry of Civil Affairs data.

China has witnessed a nearly 10% drop in the number of marriages in the first three quarters of the year, signalling a possible full-year fall in 2026 after a rebound in 2025. The country recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months, down 504,000 from a year earlier, data released by the Ministry of Civil Affairs showed. The latest figures mean that 2026 marriage registrations would most likely see a year-on-year drop as well, said He Yafu, an independent demographer based in Guangdong province. Based on the historical share of annual marriage registrations recorded in each quarter, he estimated that nationwide marriages for the entire year would range from 5.88 million to 6.46 million couples. Even if registrations reached the upper end of that forecast, they would still be lower than the 2025 level.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China recorded 4.648 million marriage registrations in the first nine months of 2026, down 504,000 from a year earlier, a decline of nearly 10%, according to Ministry of Civil Affairs data.
  2. Independent demographer He Yafu estimates full-year 2026 marriages at 5.88 million to 6.46 million couples, below the 6.765 million recorded in 2025, when registrations rose 10.8%, boosted by auspicious dates, a new nationwide registration service and local incentives.
  3. China’s marriage registrations peaked at 13.469 million in 2013, fell below 10 million in 2019 and dropped to 6.1 million in 2024, a record low since the data was first published, while divorce registrations in the first nine months of 2026 reached 2.082 million, up 5,000 year-on-year.

Related Articles:

  • Why China’s Women Are Having Fewer Babies — In China, about 30% of 30-year-olds were unmarried in 2023, up from 14.5% a decade earlier, while the share of 40-year-olds who were divorced roughly doubled from 2.6% to 5%. Women have outnumbered men in Chinese undergraduate and postgraduate programs since 2009, even as men outnumber women nationally.
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Population aging and fertility below replacement levels are connected to a revolution in family structure in which families grow smaller, fewer people marry, and voluntary childlessness becomes common across countries. As a result, families become less able to bear the demands that may be placed on them.
  • The Power of Demography and the Fate of East Asia — East Asia's total population has peaked and is projected to decline for at least a generation, with the pace of decline likely accelerating each decade, while US population is projected to keep growing for decades. The author argues such sustained divergence can shift the global balance of power.
  • China
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Family/Marriage

Surging Export Similarity is Fueling Advanced Economy Trade Tensions With China

AI Summary. An index of how closely China's export basket resembles that of advanced economies fell from 2007 to 2013 as advanced economies cut basic manufactures such as wood and textiles, then rose steeply, driven by greater similarity in chemicals and machinery. Greater overlap signals greater potential for trade conflict.

Benn Steil and Yuma Schuster Council On Foreign Relations
Date Posted:
October 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database

China’s export basket increasingly overlaps with that of advanced economies. By CFR’s measure, the export similarity index has risen ~6pp since 2007, driven by growing overlap in chemicals since 2016 and in machinery and transport equipment, notably EVs, since 2023.

Are Chinese and advanced economy exports becoming more alike?

Core argument: The advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures lowered the export similarity index with China by about two points by 2009, and combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013.

The index measures how closely China’s export basket resembles that of the advanced economies. Broadly, the more similar the baskets become relative to 2007, the greater the potential for immediate trade conflict. The index fell from 2007 to 2013, as the advanced economies reduced wood, textiles, and other basic manufactures as a share of their exports. The orange bars show the advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures, which lowered the index by about two points by 2009—and, combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013. That downward tug, however, is no longer enough to offset upward pressures elsewhere. Those pressures have been in two categories—in chemicals since 2016, and machinery since 2023. As shown by the black line, they have driven the steep rise in the index value.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures lowered the export similarity index with China by about two points by 2009, and combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013.
  2. Upward pressures in chemicals since 2016 and machinery since 2023 have driven a steep rise in the index measuring how closely China’s export basket resembles that of the advanced economies.
  3. The more China’s and the advanced economies’ export baskets resemble each other relative to 2007, the greater the potential for immediate trade conflict, and the downward tug from advanced-economy exits from basic manufactures no longer offsets upward pressures elsewhere.

Related Articles:

  • How to Fight an Economic War — China earned about $3.4bn from exporting rare-earth elements and magnets in a year, while the U.S. Geological Survey estimates a 30% disruption to U.S. supply of the rare-earth element neodymium alone would cut U.S. GDP by 2.2%, over $600bn. This asymmetry gives Chinese export controls their leverage.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026 — The authors argue China's official growth figures are inconsistent with ten consecutive quarters of deflation, estimating that real GDP is around 11% below official levels, with most of the adjustment in investment. That would imply a drop of roughly 9 percentage points in China's share of global investment, helping explain its export surge.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)

China’s Growth Machines

AI Summary. The United States generates almost twice as much economic output per dollar invested as China, the opposite of what would be expected from a mature developed economy versus a fast-growing economy catching up. The gap points to overexuberance in Chinese investment.

Robin Rivaton and Ben Southwood Works In Progress
Date Posted:
October 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The US generates ~2x as much output per dollar of capital as China. Rivaton and Southwood argue that relentless competition among Chinese subnational governments, who account for ~85% of public expenditure, drives industrial growth at the cost of reduced capital efficiency.

Does China get less economic output per dollar invested than America?

Core argument: The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.

Overexuberance is visible in economic data. Interest rates that banks pay to depositors are capped, giving banks artificially cheap capital. Entrepreneurs may be backed to attempt extremely unlikely, borderline schemes. The capital efficiency ratio measures how much output a country gets out of the capital stock it has invested – how many dollars of GDP a country can buy with a dollar of investment. The United States gets almost twice as much economic output out of every dollar it invests as China does, precisely the opposite of what we would expect from a developed country with a mature economy versus a rapidly growing country playing catch up.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.
  2. China’s capital efficiency inverts the expected pattern, in which a rapidly growing catch-up economy would extract more output per dollar of investment than a mature developed economy.
  3. Overexuberance is visible in Chinese macroeconomic data, with China’s investment generating less economic output per dollar than that of the United States.

Related Articles:

  • The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism — About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
  • Xi’s Superpower Ambitions Fuel a Dangerous Debt Spiral in China — China's credit to the nonfinancial sector—corporate, government and household borrowing—topped 300% of gross domestic product, 60 percentage points above its end-2019 level and larger than in the US, according to the Bank for International Settlements. The International Monetary Fund estimates broad Chinese government debt, including local financing vehicles, reached 127% of GDP, up from 98% in 2020.
  • Is China’s High-Quality Investment Output Economically Viable? — China's technological progress and infrastructure do not refute claims of overinvestment, since overinvestment often produces real physical assets and technological gains yet still counts as overinvestment when it generates less real value than the resources, subsidies, and transfers it consumes. When such losses are capitalized, assets are carried above their real economic value.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Growth
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Who Loses from China’s Export Gains?

AI Summary. A projection estimates China gains about $1.13tn in annual export value by 2030 relative to baseline while the rest of the world loses about $5.1tn, including $2.25tn for the G7. The authors attribute the net global decline to trade shifting toward Chinese goods whose export prices keep falling.

Charles Austin Jordan and Logan Wright Rhodium Group
Date Posted:
September 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

China’s share of global exports by volume is on track to rise from 20% in 2025 to 28% by 2030. Yet China’s rising export share may depress the total value of global exports as lower-priced Chinese goods displace more expensive exports from other countries.

Do China's export share gains reduce global export values?

Core argument: The projection has China gaining roughly $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses about $5.1 trillion.

The net result of our projection would suggest that China gains around $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses around $5.1 trillion, with the G7 accounting for $2.25 trillion of those potential losses alone. This implies that China’s export share gains effectively destroy overall global trade values relative to the status quo due to continued declines in export prices. Regardless of which assumptions are used, China’s export share gains appear to reduce global total potential export values, because trade patterns are shifting toward Chinese goods that are declining in price.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The projection has China gaining roughly $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses about $5.1 trillion.
  2. The G7 accounts for $2.25 trillion of the projected $5.1 trillion in export value losses borne by countries outside China.
  3. China’s export share gains appear to reduce global total potential export values regardless of the assumptions used, because trade patterns shift toward Chinese goods whose prices continue to decline.

Related Articles:

  • The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism — About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
  • China Is Making Trade Impossible — Interviews with Chinese economists, technologists and business leaders yielded no clear answer to what products China would want to buy from the rest of the world in future, beyond commodities, luxury goods and higher education. The author argues China sees nothing it cannot eventually make better and cheaper itself, undermining trade as a two-way exchange.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)

The Export Wave Is Cresting

AI Summary. China's export boom shows signs of cresting, with year-over-year growth leveling off at roughly 24-27% in US dollar terms, and memory chips now the biggest single swing factor for exports. Total export growth is expected to converge toward the recent trend for non-artificial-intelligence products of about 5-7%.

Andrew Batson Gavekal
Date Posted:
September 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Andrew Batson argues that as the memory-chip price cycle’s impact on Chinese export growth fades, export growth in renminbi terms in 2027 “will most likely converge toward the recent trend for products outside the AI complex, which is around 5–7%.”

Is China's export boom leveling off toward slower growth?

Core argument: China’s export growth has leveled off over the past three months at roughly 24–27% year-on-year in US dollar terms and 18–20% in renminbi terms, a sign the export wave is cresting.

China’s latest extraordinary export wave is showing signs of cresting. The headline YoY growth of exports has leveled off over the past three months, staying around 24-27% in US dollar terms and 18-20% in renminbi terms. The boom in exports of products associated with investment in artificial intelligence is certainly not over, but current super-high growth rates will probably slow in coming months. Memory chips are now the biggest single swing factor for exports, and prices for some products have recently leveled off after their massive surge. While the ebb and flow of memory prices is difficult to forecast, growth of total exports in 2027 will most likely converge toward the recent trend for products outside the AI complex, which is around 5-7%. Semiconductor cycles have limited implications for China’s vast range of other exports, which are still very competitive in global markets.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China’s export growth has leveled off over the past three months at roughly 24–27% year-on-year in US dollar terms and 18–20% in renminbi terms, a sign the export wave is cresting.
  2. Memory chips are the biggest single swing factor for China’s exports, with prices for some products leveling off after a massive surge and super-high AI-related growth rates likely to slow in coming months.
  3. Total Chinese export growth in 2027 will most likely converge toward the recent 5–7% trend for products outside the AI complex, which remain very competitive in global markets.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Share Of Global Container Exports Soars To 40% — China accounted for 40% of global container exports on a three-month rolling average, up 2.5 percentage points in nine months, according to the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. The chamber's president argues this shows global trade imbalances are growing faster than expected.
  • Understanding Global Imbalances — The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.
  • The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism — About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)

Who Will Win The War Of Neo-Mercantilists?

AI Summary. China's manufacturing export surplus is around 2% of world GDP, roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran, while domestic demand has stalled. Unexplained negative net income of about $125bn on its $4tn in net foreign assets, versus an expected $100bn surplus, supports the argument that the renminbi is about 30% undervalued.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Martin Wolf estimates that under reasonable assumptions, China should be earning ~$100B annually on her $4T of foreign assets. Yet, China shows an unexplained negative net income of around $125bn on its net foreign asset position.

Is China's currency undervalued as its export surplus hits record levels?

Core argument: China's manufacturing export surplus stands at roughly 2% of world GDP, described as roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran, while exports surge and domestic demand stalls.

China’s macroeconomics are very different from those obtained before the global financial crisis and, even more so, before the end of its property boom. Exports are surging, but domestic demand has stalled. China's export surplus in manufacturing is now around 2% of world GDP, which is “roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran.” Most importantly, China shows an unexplained negative net income of around $125bn on its net foreign investments. But it should, on reasonable assumptions about the income it earns on its $4tn in net foreign assets, have a surplus of some $100bn. As a result, Brad Setser argues, the renminbi is by now some 30% undervalued. China’s policies look unavoidably threatening to much of the world. If a major trading partner runs huge and persistent trade and current account surpluses, everyone else has to run offsetting deficits. This leads to the shrinkage of sectors specialising in producing tradable goods and services, as well as huge domestic financial deficits.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's manufacturing export surplus stands at roughly 2% of world GDP, described as roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran, while exports surge and domestic demand stalls.
  2. China reports an unexplained negative net income of about $125bn on its net foreign investments, though reasonable assumptions about returns on its $4tn in net foreign assets imply a surplus near $100bn.
  3. Brad Setser argues the renminbi is some 30% undervalued; persistent Chinese trade and current account surpluses require offsetting deficits elsewhere, shrinking sectors producing tradable goods and services and producing large domestic financial deficits.

Related Articles:

  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — Neo-mercantilism is thriving in both China, which pairs infant-industry promotion with large trade surpluses, and in a United States focused on external deficits and protecting domestic markets. The author argues this will likely fracture the world economy, and that a new multilateral treaty could include a mechanism to combat large structural trade surpluses.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026 — The authors argue China's official growth figures are inconsistent with ten consecutive quarters of deflation, estimating that real GDP is around 11% below official levels, with most of the adjustment in investment. That would imply a drop of roughly 9 percentage points in China's share of global investment, helping explain its export surge.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Growth
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)
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