Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube
  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
  • Mentions 341
  • Primary focus 97
For whatever topics you select (currently: Unemployment/Participation):
Choose search scope

Your importance filter 'Database' shows fewer articles.

Remove filters to see full article counts

U.S. Wages Still Rising Briskly, Employment Holding Up, and Inflation Still Sticky (Probably)

AI Summary. The U.S. job market looks no less healthy than a few months earlier: the rise in unemployment to 4.56% has coincided with more people actively looking for work, while the share of Americans aged 25-54 with a job held near 80.6%. Wages rising about 4% a year can explain inflation running about 1 percentage point above pre-pandemic rates.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
December 19, 2025

Klein argues that the US labor market has not really deteriorated. The rise in the unemployment rate since March is due to increased participation. Wages are growing at 4% per year; 1pp above the pre-pandemic rate.

Does brisk wage growth explain why inflation remains above pre-pandemic rates?

Core argument: The prime-age (25–54) employment-population ratio was 80.6% in November, up slightly from 80.4% in March 2025, and has been stable since reaching a multi-decade high of just under 81% in early 2023.

Lowering interest rates could make sense if the job market were clearly in danger of rolling over. As of this writing, however, the job market still looks relatively healthy, or at least no less healthy than it did a few months ago. The headline unemployment rate (U-3) rose from 4.44% of the labor force in September to 4.56% in November. [However], the rise in unemployment since March 2025 has coincided with a rise in the share of people saying that they are actively looking for a job, rather than a decline in the proportion of people who are gainfully employed. The share of Americans aged 25-54 with a job was 80.6% in November, up slightly from March 2025, when the “prime age” employment-population ratio was 80.4%. In fact, the share of Americans aged 25-54 with a job has been remarkably stable since hitting its multi-decade high of just under 81% in early 2023. The typical American worker’s wages have consistently been rising about 4% a year since early 2023, compared to about 3% a year in 2018-2019 - large enough to explain why inflation is still running about 1pp faster than before the pandemic. The data imply that the burden for loosening policy should be high, especially given the latent risk [of] inflationary policy shocks.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The prime-age (25–54) employment-population ratio was 80.6% in November, up slightly from 80.4% in March 2025, and has been stable since reaching a multi-decade high of just under 81% in early 2023.
  2. The U-3 unemployment rate rose from 4.44% of the labor force in September to 4.56% in November, a rise that since March 2025 has coincided with more people saying they are actively looking for work rather than fewer people employed.
  3. Typical American workers' wages have risen about 4% a year since early 2023, against about 3% a year in 2018-2019, large enough to explain inflation running about 1pp faster than before the pandemic, implying a high burden for loosening policy.

Related Articles:

  • A New Era of Higher Inflation Risks — The authors argue inflation's baseline is now higher than pre-pandemic, with 2% acting more as a floor than a ceiling, noting disinflation has largely stalled and core inflation has run above target on a six-month annualized basis for five years. They expect a structurally wider range of inflation outcomes, skewed to the upside and centered higher than in the 2010s.
  • Jobless Growth — Labor demand growth may be too weak to keep pace with even modest labor supply growth: the labor market is somewhat weaker than before the pandemic, job growth has turned negative outside healthcare, and firms are focused on using AI to cut labor costs. Economists estimate most employment losses in routine manual occupations since the 1970s occurred during recessions.
  • The Jobs Chart That Really Has Us Worried — The recent jobs trajectory sits in the upper tail of historical month-to-month variation and closer to the range typically seen around past recessions, based on a comparison with paths beginning at the onset of prior recessions.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • GDP
    • Inflation
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleDecember 19, 2025Welcome To The Age Of Zero-Sum PoliticsMore than half of young voters in the US, UK, France and Germany now back “zero sum” parties fueled by the beliefs such as “people only get rich by making others poor” on the left and “immigrants succeed at the expense of the native-born” on the right.Next articleDecember 19, 2025Japan Raises Interest Rates To Highest Level In 30 YearsThe yield on 10-year Japanese government debt climbed 5bp, breaching 2% and reaching its highest level since 1999, after the BOJ raised its policy rate 25bps to .75%.
Showing 97 database articles primarily about Unemployment/Participation
Currently filtering by:
  • Remove 'Database'

On Europe’s Economy, Let’s Ditch The Lazy Stereotypes

AI Summary. Prime-age adults aged 25–54 and older workers aged 55–64 have higher employment rates in Europe than in the US, while US youth employment is higher because Europeans spend longer in education. The share of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe.

Chris Giles Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 10, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Despite Europe’s high social spending relative to the US, Chris Giles notes that prime-age adult (25–54) labor force participation in the Eurozone has overtaken that of the US, and there has been a dramatic convergence in the LFP of older workers.

Do Europeans work less than Americans?

Core argument: Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.

It does not matter whether you use EU or Eurozone data, prime-age adults (between 25 and 54) in Europe are more likely to be in work than those in the US. Older people (between 55 and 64) also have higher employment rates in Europe. Younger people (between 15 and 24) are more likely to have a job in the US, but that results from Europeans educating themselves for longer. The proportion of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe. So welfare is not stopping work. More than that, the higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, although there is convergence within the Eurozone. Spain, in particular, has enjoyed rapid improvements.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
  2. Young people aged 15–24 are more likely to have a job in the US than in Europe, but that gap results from Europeans spending longer in education, and the share not in education, employment or training is higher in the US.
  3. The higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, with convergence within the Eurozone and rapid improvement in Spain.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — About half of the 1990s gap between American and European hours worked had reversed by the end of the 2010s. The authors estimate US hours per person declined after the 2000s because of rising benefits for the non-employed—especially health benefits like Medicaid—while non-US hours rose with higher wages and lower work costs.
  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Comparisons
    • Europe USA Relative Performance
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Workforce

The Jobs Apocalypse Is Postponed. An AI Jobs Boom Is Here

AI Summary. Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, including electrical contracting and equipment manufacturing, has risen roughly 320,000 above what broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists have added about 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The Economist estimates that so far the AI boom has created ~1mm new jobs in the US, exceeding their estimate of ~200,000 layoffs attributed to AI since mid-2023.

Is the AI build-out adding jobs above trend?

Core argument: Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing, has risen by roughly 320,000 more since 2023 than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest.

[We] tracked five industries at the heart of the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing. Since 2023 employment in them has risen by roughly 320,000 more than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Not all of those jobs owe their existence to AI—grid upgrades and other factory building matters too. [We also] tracked employment in professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—and compared their growth since 2022 with professional employment overall. These roles have added roughly 730,000 jobs above trend in recent years. AI will not have created every single one of them. But it has almost certainly created quite a few.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing, has risen by roughly 320,000 more since 2023 than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest.
  2. Professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—have added roughly 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall since 2022.
  3. Not all of these above-trend gains are attributable to AI, since grid upgrades and other factory building also matter, though AI has almost certainly created quite a few of them.

Related Articles:

  • The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era — The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
  • Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
  • Looking for the Ladder — The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment
  • Workforce

Americans Without College Degrees Are Having One of the Best Job Markets in Years

AI Summary. The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 without a college degree has rarely been lower in the past two decades, and relative to their own historical ranges the job market looks much better for blue-collar and manual-service workers. Degree-holders still face lower unemployment rates overall.

Theo Francis and Ray Smith Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
September 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

In 2026, the 12-month moving-average unemployment for college-educated 22–34-year-olds is above its post-2003 mean, while the rate for non-college peers is historically low. Prime-age college grads still have lower unemployment than those with no degree.

Is the job market unusually strong for workers without college degrees?

Core argument: The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades, based on data through July.

The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades. To gauge how the job market has shifted for each cohort, [Gad Levanon, Burning Glass’s chief economist] compared current unemployment rates for the different groups with their own range of unemployment rates since 2003. The analysis included data through July. By that measure, the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers, including those in construction and on manufacturing lines, and manual-service workers. It is [however] still easier to find a job with a college degree. The unemployment rate for degree-holders in their prime working years—ages 25 to 54—averaged 2.7% for the 12 months ending in July - well below the 3.6% rate for workers with just some college education, and 4.7% for people with a high-school diploma only.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades, based on data through July.
  2. Burning Glass chief economist Gad Levanon compared each cohort's current unemployment rate against its own range since 2003, and by that measure the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers in construction and manufacturing and for manual-service workers.
  3. College graduates ages 25 to 54 averaged a 2.7% unemployment rate for the 12 months ending in July, below the 3.6% rate for workers with some college education and 4.7% for those with only a high-school diploma.

Related Articles:

  • College Grads Struggle to Find Jobs. Non-Grads Are Giving Up — The narrowing gap in unemployment rates between young college graduates and non-graduates appears driven mainly by non-graduates dropping out of the labor force rather than by diplomas losing value, since people not seeking work aren't counted as unemployed. The share of young non-graduates employed is 1.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels.
  • To Fix Education, Fix The Economy First — 30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old, yet US workers scoring at that low level earn an average of nearly $30 an hour and two-thirds are employed, compared with about $20 and fewer than half employed in Britain. The author argues this reflects stronger economic growth rather than vocational education policy.
  • The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era — The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • College
      • K-12

What’s Behind the Declining Trend Unemployment Rate?

AI Summary. The trend unemployment rate is estimated to have fallen from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024, a decline of about 3.3 percentage points, with a little more than half attributed to changes in workforce composition. Rising educational attainment is the largest compositional factor, lowering the trend by about 1 percentage point.

Andreas Hornstein, Marianna Kudlyak, Greeshma Avaradi and Taerin Kim Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Date Posted:
August 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Hornstein et al find that about half of the ~3pp drop in the trend unemployment rate since 1976 is due to compositional change in the work force towards lower unemployment “types ” – in particular, older and more educated workers.

Why has the trend unemployment rate declined over recent decades?

Core argument: The estimated trend unemployment rate fell from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024, a decline of about 3.3 percentage points, with changes in workforce composition accounting for a little more than half of it.

We find that the trend unemployment rate declined from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024 [Figure 1]. Roughly half of that decline reflects compositional change. Figure 2 separates the estimated cumulative change in the annual unemployment trend since 1976 into its components. The total decline was about 3.3 percentage points by 2024. Changes in workforce composition account for a little more than half of that decline. Rising educational attainment is the single largest compositional force, lowering the trend about 1pp. Figure 4 plots estimated education shares for entering cohorts of women, and these patterns are similar for male cohorts (not shown). The figure shows a steady long-run fall in the share of new female cohorts with less than high school education and a steady rise in the share with some college or a college degree. [Returning to Figure 2], changes in group-specific LFP rate trends contribute only ~0.3 pp. The remaining decline, a bit under 1pp, comes from lower group-specific trend unemployment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The estimated trend unemployment rate fell from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024, a decline of about 3.3 percentage points, with changes in workforce composition accounting for a little more than half of it.
  2. Rising educational attainment is the single largest compositional force in the decomposition, lowering the trend unemployment rate by about 1 percentage point.
  3. Changes in group-specific labor force participation rate trends contribute about 0.3 percentage point of the decline, while lower group-specific trend unemployment accounts for a bit under 1 percentage point.

Related Articles:

  • Global Views: They’re Not Hiking — Estimated underlying trend job growth slowed to about 5k, below the estimated 50k breakeven pace, so similar readings would likely reverse part of the unemployment rate's decline from 4.5% to 4.1%. The authors argue that decline reflects lower labor force participation rather than higher employment, with wage growth still weak.
  • Labor Force Participation Is High If You Measure It Right — The headline labor force participation rate — the share of people 16 and older working or looking for work — is a limited gauge of labor market health because participation varies greatly by age. Aging baby boomers and the addition of nearly 1.7m Americans 65 and older to population estimates add distortion.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Workforce

College Grads Struggle to Find Jobs. Non-Grads Are Giving Up

AI Summary. The narrowing gap in unemployment rates between young college graduates and non-graduates appears driven mainly by non-graduates dropping out of the labor force rather than by diplomas losing value, since people not seeking work aren't counted as unemployed. The share of young non-graduates employed is 1.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Labor force participation is rising for American college graduates aged 25–29, and is now at 89.4% – above its pre-pandemic level. Participation among non-college members of that age cohort is falling; at 78.7%, it is now below its pre-pandemic level.

Is the narrowing unemployment gap driven by non-graduates leaving the workforce?

Core argument: The employment-population ratio for young adults without college degrees is 1.7 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level and trending downward, while the ratio for young college graduates sits near its pre-pandemic level.

The narrowing of [the unemployment gap btw college and non-college workers] in recent years has lent support to narratives that college diplomas are losing their value amid the rise of large language models, the purported return of blue-collar work, and other job market changes. But while it may well be that diplomas have lost value, the recent shrinking of the young-adult education-unemployment gap seems to be driven mainly by a different phenomenon. Growing numbers of young adults without college degrees simply aren’t trying to find work and thus aren’t counted in unemployment calculations. The employment-population ratio for young college grads is not far off from where it was just before the pandemic and seems as if it might be headed upward again after a sharp drop in 2023 and 2024, for non-grads it is 1.7 percentage points lower than before the pandemic and clearly trending downward.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The employment-population ratio for young adults without college degrees is 1.7 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level and trending downward, while the ratio for young college graduates sits near its pre-pandemic level.
  2. The narrowing unemployment gap between young college and non-college workers appears driven mainly by growing numbers of non-graduates who are not seeking work and therefore are not counted as unemployed.
  3. The employment-population ratio for young college graduates fell sharply in 2023 and 2024 and appears as if it might be headed upward again.

Related Articles:

  • Labor Force Participation Is High If You Measure It Right — The headline labor force participation rate — the share of people 16 and older working or looking for work — is a limited gauge of labor market health because participation varies greatly by age. Aging baby boomers and the addition of nearly 1.7m Americans 65 and older to population estimates add distortion.
  • How Labor Force Participation Has Diverged Across Genders — Between 1976 and 2024 the trend labor force participation rate fell 10.1 percentage points for men and rose 8.2 points for women. Population aging lowered participation by about 4 points for each gender and rising education raised it (+6 for women, +3 for men), but the divergence is dominated by participation trends within age-gender groups.
  • AI, Immigration, and Collapsing Labor Force Participation — As labor force participation falls, a shrinking group of workers generates the income, taxes, and innovation supporting a growing number of non-workers, leaving the economy more fragile because labor shocks are concentrated among fewer participants. Labor scarcity raises the return on automation, robotics, and software, making growth depend on productivity rather than participation.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • College
      • K-12
    • Family/Marriage

The Big Exceptions To The American Manufacturing Jobs Decline

AI Summary. Aerospace leads all US manufacturing industries in job growth and posted the largest manufacturing trade surplus at $116.7bn, supported by strong commercial airline demand and a record-high order backlog. Electrical equipment and components employment has also grown, with dedicated data centers more than doubling their real consumption of electrical equipment and components.

Jiaxin (Jason) He Agglomerations
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The US has lost 300,000 manufacturing jobs since their recent peak in Q2 2023. Two subsectors have seen strong job growth: aerospace manufacturing added 43,000 jobs, and electrical equipment, cable and battery manufacturing added 36,200.

Which US manufacturing industries are adding jobs despite the overall decline?

Core argument: Aerospace leads all U.S. manufacturing industries in job growth since 2023 and posted the largest nominal trade surplus of any manufacturing industry last year, at $116.7 billion.

Aerospace leads all manufacturing industries in job growth since 2023. Last year it also posted the largest nominal trade surplus of any manufacturing industry, at $116.7 billion. Driving the growth has been strong commercial and passenger airline demand, including a record-high order backlog. Boeing, the world’s leading airplane manufacturer, returned to profitability and high delivery volumes in 2025. The employment surge in the electrical components subsector tells a different story. It owes its strength to two industries: electrical equipment manufacturing and batteries, wires, cables, and miscellaneous electrical components. These are among the industries that bore the brunt of the China Shock and suffered acute decline in the 2000s. Green energy and electric vehicles likely contributed to their initial recovery, raising demand for batteries and electrical infrastructure. But their continued growth even after the cancellation of EV subsidies in 2025 points to a different, potent, and entirely unsurprising driver: Artificial Intelligence. AI’s manufacturing footprint runs the length of the supply chain. Dedicated data centers more than doubled their real consumption of electrical equipment and components from 2019 to 2024.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Aerospace leads all U.S. manufacturing industries in job growth since 2023 and posted the largest nominal trade surplus of any manufacturing industry last year, at $116.7 billion.
  2. Strong commercial and passenger airline demand, including a record-high order backlog, has driven aerospace growth, and Boeing returned to profitability and high delivery volumes in 2025.
  3. Employment growth in electrical equipment manufacturing and in batteries, wires, cables, and miscellaneous electrical components continued after the 2025 cancellation of EV subsidies, pointing to artificial intelligence as a driver, with dedicated data centers more than doubling real consumption of electrical equipment and components from 2019 to 2024.

Related Articles:

  • Does the Import Invasion Explain the Mysterious Disappearance of Productivity Growth in U.S. Manufacturing? — The authors trace a channel from rising imports to lower domestic sales, employment, plant closures, profits, capacity utilization, and reduced investment in fixed capital and research. They note the computer and electronic products industry, which contributed most to the US manufacturing productivity slowdown, offshored production to Asia, reaching 84% import penetration.
  • Midyear Outlook — Tech-related investment rose 30% from year-ago levels while all other capital spending fell, a divergence the author argues reflects the AI boom bidding away scarce physical inputs such as electricians, grid capacity, metals, and construction labor. With hyperscalers' free cash flow now exhausted, over 80% of projected capital spending in coming years will require external financing.
  • What Would It Take to Bring Back US Manufacturing? Part 1: America’s Structural Headwinds — The US imports roughly 40% of the goods it consumes, directly and through imported inputs, with labor-intensive goods like apparel almost entirely imported. The authors argue America's main comparative disadvantage is its cost of production, driven mainly by labor costs, with real estate costs and a strong dollar also contributing.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Productivity
    • Investment
  • Workforce
© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms