“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal

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Include articles that mention this topic 520

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How the AI Sell-Off Reveals Fiscal Strain

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack

Date Posted:: November 9, 2026

Brooks notes that while the 2-year and 10-year Treasury yields fell during last week’s AI sell-off, the 10y10y forward yield did not. He argues its failure to do so “further cements the case for the fiscal risk premium,” concluding that long yields are up “because of mounting fiscal stress, not because of AI capex.”

The black line shows daily data from the start of 2026 for the two-year Treasury yield.The blue line is the 10-year yield and the purple line is the 10y10y forward yield. If the AI bubble were a material driver of the rise in long-term yields, the purple line should have fallen this week alongside the blue and black ones. It didn’t and that in my mind further cements the case for the fiscal risk premium. The midterm elections and the AI sell-off that’s ensued have given us the perfect natural experiment to disentangle what’s going on with long-term yields. They’re up because of mounting fiscal stress, not because of AI. Once the war ends - and it will - we’ll be left with all the structural challenges the US and others in the G10 face. The fact that we’re rapidly running out of fiscal space is top of that list.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Robin Brooks argues that long-term Treasury yields failed to fall during the late-2026 AI equity sell-off, contradicting the view that AI capital expenditure and hyperscaler debt issuance have been the primary force pushing yields higher.
The November payrolls print of 165,000 jobs beat the Bloomberg consensus of 70,000 by 95,000, or 1.2 standard deviations against a historical standard deviation of 76,000, and the two-year yield rose five basis points, in line with or above the historical regression of yield responses to payrolls surprises.
Brooks concludes that elevated long-term yields reflect mounting fiscal stress rather than AI, noting the 10-year/10-year forward yield did not decline alongside shorter maturities during the sell-off week and that corporate dissaving is “not remotely near where it was in the IT bubble of the early 2000s.”.

The Stock Market’s Read On The Midterms, In Its Winners And Losers

Jason Furman Econvitals

Date Posted:: November 5, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Furman notes that between election day and Wednesday’s close there were broad-based gains for the solar sector and health companies, particularly those with close ties to the ACA, even though substantial, while less dramatic, Democratic victories in the House and Senate were already priced in. [Note: Today saw technology stocks plunge, pushing the S&P 500 down ~4% and the Nasdaq down ~5%].

The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections. Perhaps more interesting, and more telling, was the composition, which shows what the market thinks the policy impact of the election will be: health companies (especially ones like Centene, with close ties to the Affordable Care Act) and solar companies were up, while data-center companies and Trump- and Musk-related companies were down. And remember, Democratic victories were already priced in, so this is just the additional increment from greater certainty as well as the larger-than-expected magnitude.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections, and the composition of winners and losers indicates what the market expects the policy impact to be.
Health companies with close ties to the Affordable Care Act, such as Centene, and solar companies rose after the midterms, while data-center companies and Trump- and Musk-related companies fell.
Democratic victories were already priced into the stock market, so the post-election move reflects only the added increment from greater certainty and the larger-than-expected magnitude.

This Time Would Have To Be Very Different. Part II

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents

Date Posted:: November 3, 2026
Is Database:: Database

If the free cash flow of the entire US corporate sector were to hold at its record ~15% share of corporate value added, corporations would return only ~5.3% over the next decade. To earn the historical mean return, FCF would have to keep rising, implying a structural transformation favoring capital at labor’s expense.

At a CAPE of 40.7 US stocks look extremely expensive, and expected returns are low, especially compared to TIPS yields. Plugging in today’s numbers, you back out an expected real return of around 3% over the next decade, compared to a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.6%. Now, instead of an investor holding a single share, we could look at an investor who owns the entire corporate sector, all equity, bonds, and other liabilities. This investor acquired a claim to FCF, the total amount of cash that can be paid out to its owners, including bondholders: gross corporate value added left after paying workers, the government, and investment expenditure. This FCF is now about 15% of corporate value added. Earnings minus FCF is net investment; corporations have invested less. Its FCF yield is 3.26%, vs. 3.21% since 1952. That delivers an approximate real expected return of 5.3%, below what US corporate capital has historically delivered.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Holding the multiple fixed, a 3.26% free cash flow yield plus the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ 4.58% projected nominal GDP growth and 2.5% inflation implies a real expected return of roughly 5.3% on US corporate debt plus equity.
The 5.3% real return assumes free cash flow stays at its record 15% of gross value added indefinitely, and still falls below what US corporate capital has historically delivered.
Earning the historical average return requires the free cash flow share of value added to keep climbing, a bet on a structural transformation of US capitalism favoring capital at the expense of labor.

This Time Would Have To Be Very Different

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents

Date Posted:: October 26, 2026
Is Database:: Database

At 40.7, CAPE is nearing its December 1999 peak of 44.2. For the S&P 500 to beat TIPS over the next decade, today’s near-record P/E multiple must persist for ten years, or real earnings must grow more than 5.8% a year—a pace exceeded in only two decades since 1880: the 1920s and 2010s.

The CAPE is currently trading at 40.7, which is close to an all-time high. You’re paying close to 41 times annual earnings when you buy the S&P 500. The implied earnings yield is only 2.46%. According to AQR, a reasonable estimate for real earnings growth (on a per share basis) is 1.8% per annum. If you plug in today’s numbers, you end up with a real expected return of around 3% per year for U.S. equity. That’s a surprisingly low number. When you compare it to the 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, you’re left with a razor-thin equity premium. The stock market will only yield an extra 25 basis points per annum over the next, say, 10 years to compensate you for taking on equity risk. You might think this is a very conservative estimate, but it’s actually not, because we’re implicitly assuming that the CAPE stays at 40.7 over the next 10 years. That’s quite a lofty multiple. Even casual eyeball econometrics suggests that that’s not a great assumption, because the price-earnings ratio tends to revert back to its mean.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.
Combining the 2.46% earnings yield with AQR’s estimate of 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth yields a real expected return of roughly 3% per year for U.S. equity.
Against a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, U.S. equities offer an equity premium of about 25 basis points per year, an estimate that assumes the CAPE stays at 40.7 for a decade despite the price-earnings ratio’s tendency to revert to its mean.

Circularity in AI Shows Up in Token Spending Too

Torsten Slok Apollo

Date Posted:: October 22, 2026
Is Database:: Database

According to Ramp data, 80% of firms in the top 1% of AI spending are VC-backed, compared with just 13% of firms at the median. This suggests that the largest purchasers of AI computing capacity rely heavily on venture capital rather than internally generated earnings.

Ramp data show that 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are VC-backed, compared with only 13% of the median spender, suggesting that the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending, as the startups buying the most compute are paying for it with venture capital rather than organic earnings. If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, VC returns would come under pressure, since the capital funding today’s token spending would have little to show for it, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Ramp data show 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, suggesting the largest buyers of compute are funding token spending with venture capital rather than organic earnings.
Ramp’s data on the venture backing of the heaviest AI spenders suggest the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending.
If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, venture capital returns would come under pressure, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.

Revenue Per Worker Is Up. Are Firms Getting a Larger Share?

Jeremy Pearce Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Date Posted:: October 16, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Nonfarm business output per hour grew 2.2% annually between 2019 and 2025, up from 1% in 2010–19. Among public firms, growth in real revenue per worker accelerated from 0.7% to 2.2%. Operating margins rose from 16% to 18% of sales (2.4% annual growth).

A profit margin is profit divided by sales: the share of each sales dollar the firm keeps after paying its costs. The gross margin subtracts the direct cost of production (cost of goods sold), while the operating margin also subtracts overhead (selling, general, and administrative expense, which in Compustat typically includes R&D). If productivity gains were flowing to firms’ profits, margins should show it. Through the 2010s margins were flat: gross margins grew about 0.4% a year from 2010 to 2019, and operating margins were roughly flat. Both then turned up: on average, gross margins went from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025 (1.3% growth per year), and operating margins from 16% to 18% (2.4% growth per year). Part of the gains surfaced with wider profit margins: on a reasonable baseline, the operating margin rose over 2% a year from 2019 to 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Average operating margins rose from about 16% of sales in 2019 to 18% in 2025, growth of 2.4% a year, after being roughly flat through the 2010s.
Average gross margins increased from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025, growth of 1.3% a year, up from about 0.4% a year over 2010–2019.
On a reasonable baseline, the operating margin rose over 2% a year from 2019 to 2025, indicating part of the productivity gains surfaced as wider profit margins.

Earnings Will Be Spectacular. It May Not Be Enough

John Authers Bloomberg

Date Posted:: October 8, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Since 2000, post-tax corporate profits as a share of GDP have trended upward across cyclical setbacks and are now near an all time high, above their 1929 level.

Throughout the 20th century, profit margins were regarded as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy. So far this century, however, margins have done nothing but rise. Measured with the National Income and Product Accounts, part of the GDP calculation, profits are currently taking a bigger share of the economy even than on the eve of the Great Crash in 1929. The series comes with a lag, so we can assume the profit share on this basis is comfortably at a record by now.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Corporate profits measured in the National Income and Product Accounts take a larger share of the U.S. economy than on the eve of the 1929 Great Crash.
Profit margins were regarded throughout the 20th century as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy, yet so far this century they have done nothing but rise.
The National Income and Product Accounts profits series comes with a lag, so the profit share on this basis can be assumed to be comfortably at a record.

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At 40.7, CAPE is nearing its December 1999 peak of 44.2. For the S&P 500 to beat TIPS over the next decade, today’s near-record P/E multiple must persist for ten years, or real earnings must grow more than 5.8% a year—a pace exceeded in only two decades since 1880: the 1920s and 2010s.

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Nonfarm business output per hour grew 2.2% annually between 2019 and 2025, up from 1% in 2010–19. Among public firms, growth in real revenue per worker accelerated from 0.7% to 2.2%. Operating margins rose from 16% to 18% of sales (2.4% annual growth).

Have corporate profit margins risen after a flat decade?

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Since 2000, post-tax corporate profits as a share of GDP have trended upward across cyclical setbacks and are now near an all time high, above their 1929 level.

Have corporate profit margins stopped reverting to the mean?

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