Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

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  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Dilution vs. Risk Taking: Capital Gains Taxes and Entrepreneurship

AI Summary. Modeling U.S. venture-backed startups, the authors estimate that taxing capital gains as they accrue rather than at sale would cut founders' average ownership at exit by about 25% while raising the share of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from roughly 16% to nearly 47%. Less risk-averse founders prefer taxation at sale.

Eduardo Azevedo, Florian Scheuer, Kent Smetters and Min Yang National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 10, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

~84% of venture backed founders end with zero exit value, while the top 2% capture ~80% of total exit value. Accrual-based taxation would reduce mean founder ownership stakes at exit by ~25%, but with fully refundable tax credits, raise the share of founders with >0 payoffs to ~47%.

How does taxing unrealized capital gains affect startup founders?

Core argument: The authors estimate that average founder shares at exit fall about 25% under accrual-based capital gains taxation relative to realization-based taxation, as advance taxation forces additional share sales before exit.

This paper examines how taxing unrealized capital gains affects entrepreneurship, combining a dynamic career-choice model with new evidence on all U.S. venture capital backed startups. Figure 1a plots a histogram of the positive company exit values. The distribution spans several orders of magnitude and is relatively similar to a lognormal, but with a right skew and fatter right tail. A stylized model highlights a key trade-off: accrual-based capital gains taxes dilute successful founders by forcing additional share sales before exit, a well known concern, yet they also provide insurance through tax credits to founders whose ventures fail, an aspect often overlooked. Quantitatively, advance taxation substantially reduces founders' ownership at exit: average founder shares fall about 25% under accrual-based taxation relative to realization based taxation. At the same time, accrual taxation increases the fraction of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from around 16% to nearly 47%. Embedding these outcomes in a career-choice framework shows that the insurance value of accrual taxation partly offsets dilution costs: less risk-averse founders favor realization-based taxes, while more risk averse ones prefer accrual-based taxes. The strength of this insurance channel depends on the highly skewed distribution of entrepreneurial payoffs and the design of loss provisions under accrual-based taxation.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that average founder shares at exit fall about 25% under accrual-based capital gains taxation relative to realization-based taxation, as advance taxation forces additional share sales before exit.
  2. Accrual-based taxation raises the fraction of entrepreneurs with positive payoffs from around 16% to nearly 47%, providing insurance through tax credits to founders whose ventures fail.
  3. In the authors' career-choice framework, less risk-averse founders favor realization-based taxes while more risk-averse founders prefer accrual-based taxes, with the insurance channel's strength depending on the skewed payoff distribution and loss-provision design.

Related Articles:

  • Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II — Analysis of over 5,000 German World War II fighter pilots finds that public peer recognition was associated with higher victory scores among skilled pilots without higher mortality, while average pilots gained little in victories but died at higher rates. The authors conclude status-based awards can have uneven effects in high-risk settings.
  • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
  • Never Enough: Dynamic Status Incentives in Organizations — Data on over 5,000 German fighter pilots show performance rose markedly as pilots approached the eligibility threshold for each medal in a tiered awards ladder and slumped immediately after receiving it, with the effect repeating at each successive rung. The authors estimate the ladder added 3,000–5,000 aerial victories, 5–10% of the total.
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Growth
    • US Business Dynamism
  • Productivity
    • Incentives/Risk-Taking
    • Startups
Previous articleJuly 9, 2026Germany Strikes Deal To Buy US Tomahawk Missiles, Merz SaysBerlin has struck a deal with Washington to buy Tomahawk cruise missiles. No timeline for delivery was announced; as American production capacity remains strained.Next articleJuly 10, 2026Past Or Future Earnings? US Stocks Still Look ExpensiveRapid earnings growth has left Shiller’s CAPE at its second highest level ever – above its 1929 level. CAPE’s all-time high was in spring 2000, after which US equities lost ~ half their value.
Showing 890 database articles primarily about either GDP, Business Cycle, Financial Markets, Growth, Housing, Inflation, Savings Glut/Trade Deficit, or Trade (not deficits)

Demand-Driven Inflation

AI Summary. Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.

Domenico Giannone and Giorgio Primiceri Bookings Papers on Economic Activity
Date Posted:
October 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Giannone and Primiceri revisit the relative role of supply vs. demand shocks in generating the post-Covid inflation. Because aggregate demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic data are flat, supply shocks alone would not have generated large inflation in the absence of added demand stimulus.

Did outward demand shifts, not supply shocks alone, drive recent inflation?

Core argument: Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.

Demand and supply curve slopes are estimated from pre-pandemic data using the essentially definitional restriction that supply shocks move prices and output in opposite directions along demand curves, while demand shocks move them together along supply curves; the plotted slopes represent Bayesian posterior medians rather than uniquely identified estimates. The estimated demand curves are relatively flat in both the US and euro area [Figure 7], reflecting the central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation. With those slopes, adverse supply shifts cause large output losses but comparatively little inflation. [To successfully explain] the combination of inflation and output observed in 2022 therefore requires demand to shift outwards too. Strong demand, including unusually accommodative monetary policy [on top of strong fiscal expansion], cushioned the output losses while increasing inflation [Figure 7]. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area. That combination is suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, whereas an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output. [Figure 9].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.
  2. Explaining the 2022 combination of inflation and output requires an outward shift in demand, with strong demand — including unusually accommodative monetary policy atop fiscal expansion — cushioning output losses while raising inflation.
  3. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area, a combination suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, since an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Why Did Inflation Rise And Fall In 2021-24? Channels And Evidence From Expectations — Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.
  • Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022 — Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

The Bond Market Reckoning Has Only Begun

AI Summary. The gap between French and German 10-year government bond yields has widened at a pace matched only during the euro zone sovereign debt crisis. France and the UK have less room than the US to close deficits with tax increases, as tax revenues equal 43.9% of GDP in France and 35.3% in the UK versus 25.2% in the US.

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The spread between 10-year French OATs and German Bunds has widened at a pace seen only during the eurozone sovereign-debt crisis. John Authers warns that France “satisfies all the classic conditions for a major debt crisis.”

Do high tax burdens limit France and the UK's deficit options?

Core argument: The spread of 10-year French OATs over German Bunds has risen at a pace matched only during the worst days of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and 2012, fueling talk of a second crisis centered in Paris.

Only in the worst days of the euro zone’s sovereign debt crisis, in 2011 and 2012, has the [spread of 10-Year French OATS over German Bunds] risen so fast. Talk of a second euro-zone crisis, this time with an epicenter in Paris, is growing, and it’s easy to see why. Why is this more of a problem for France and the UK? Beyond their deficits, they also shoulder much higher tax burdens than the US. Tax revenues are 25.2% of GDP in the US, the lowest of the major developed economies - but 35.3% in the UK and 43.9% in France. It’s hard to imagine after decades of tax-cutting, but a US politician could deal with the deficit fairly easily with a tax hike. It’s not clear that option is open to French lawmakers, even if they could somehow persuade voters to go along with them. The populist politicians of left and right, who currently look well placed in next year’s presidential elections, are in any case unlikely to try.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The spread of 10-year French OATs over German Bunds has risen at a pace matched only during the worst days of the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and 2012, fueling talk of a second crisis centered in Paris.
  2. Tax revenues equal 25.2% of GDP in the US, the lowest among major developed economies, versus 35.3% in the UK and 43.9% in France, leaving American politicians more room to close the deficit with a tax hike.
  3. Populist politicians of left and right, currently well placed for France’s presidential election, are unlikely to attempt tax increases to address the deficit.

Related Articles:

  • French PM to Freeze Emmanuel Macron’s Pension Reform Until 2027 — France's prime minister said he would suspend the plan to raise the retirement age to 64 until the next presidential election, while asking parties to agree on other savings. He outlined a €30bn package of spending cuts and tax rises to cut the deficit to 4.7% of national output from 5.4%.
  • Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong? — An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
    • Taxation
  • GDP
  • Politics

Is The World Really Drowning In Debt?

AI Summary. The Institute of International Finance reports global debt as a share of output rose less than 10 percentage points between 2018 and mid-2026, peaking at 337% in early 2021 before falling 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. Inflation eroded the debt burden, as it did in the UK after the Second World War.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Wolf notes that the global debt-to-GDP ratio rose by less than 10pp btw 2018 and June 2026: after peaking at 337% in early 2021, it fell by 27pp by the end of 2023, as inflation boosted nominal GDP and eroded the value of existing debt.

Does inflation reduce the global debt burden?

Core argument: IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.

The IIF shows that between 2018 and June 2026, the rise in the ratio of global debt to output was less than 10 percentage points. The story is striking: the ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021, before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. What was this magical “debt-buster”? Good old-fashioned (and supposedly “unexpected”) inflation. This is — to put it mildly — not the first time inflation has wiped out debt. It was, to take one of countless examples, an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt. For countries able to print the money in which their debt is denominated, that is often what happens.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
  2. Between 2018 and June 2026, the IIF shows the ratio of global debt to output rose by less than 10 percentage points.
  3. Inflation has wiped out debt before, forming an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt, and often does so for countries able to print the currency in which their debt is denominated.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • Inflation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Foreign Capital Flows Into US Stocks Hit Record As Appetite For Debt Fades

AI Summary. Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US stocks and investment fund shares over 12 months, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Foreign demand for US debt securities moved in the opposite direction, falling to a net $188bn in the second quarter from $314bn in the first.

Michael Taffe and George Steer Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Foreign investors bought a record net $426B of US equities and fund shares in Q2, up 62% y/y, part of a record $942B in the 12 months through July. Overseas investors bought a net $188B of US debt securities in Q2, down from $314B in Q1.

Are foreign investors shifting from US debt into US stocks?

Core argument: Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985.

Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, accelerating a shift in overseas investment towards American stocks and away from debt. The flows represented the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985. Net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares by foreign investors jumped to $426bn in the second quarter, up 62% from the same period in 2025, and surpassing the previous quarterly record of $299bn in 2022, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Foreign demand for US debt moved in the opposite direction. Overseas investors bought a net $188bn of US debt securities in the second quarter, down from $314bn in the first.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign investors made a record $942bn in net purchases of US equities and investment fund shares in the 12 months to July, the highest rolling 12-month total in Treasury data going back to 1985.
  2. Net foreign purchases of US equities and investment fund shares reached $426bn in the second quarter, up 62% from the same period in 2025 and above the prior quarterly record of $299bn in 2022, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
  3. Overseas investors bought a net $188bn of US debt securities in the second quarter, down from $314bn in the first.

Related Articles:

  • World’s Unusually High Dollar Exposure Risks Fueling Selloff — Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure, the lowest share since at least 2015. With some of the largest holders of US assets carrying little protection against a weaker dollar, the currency is at risk of steeper declines if sentiment turns.
  • Foreign Investors Prefer US Stocks To Treasuries As Debt Worries Grow — International flows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP over a year, overtaking flows into US Treasuries at 2% of GDP for the first time this century outside brief episodes during the Covid-19 pandemic and after the global financial crisis, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit

De-reservification, Not De-dollarization

AI Summary. Much of the official-sector inflow into the U.S. now comes from investors who are not traditional reserve managers, and those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar and toward risk assets rather than Treasuries. The author argues this shift in the global investor base helps explain why Treasuries trade at a discount while the dollar retains a premium.

Brad Setser and Alex Etra Council on Foreign Relations
Date Posted:
September 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The stock of global dollar reserves has been roughly stable over the past decade. The world is not moving away from the dollar: dollar assets are shifting from official holdings of Treasurys towards private and quasi-sovereign holdings of risk assets.

Why do Treasuries trade at a discount while the dollar keeps premium?

Core argument: Most official-sector inflows into the U.S. come from investors who are not classic reserve managers, and those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar, so any real de-dollarization would likely begin among these investors.

Most of the current flow into the US from the “official” sector is coming from investors who are not classic reserve managers. Those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar, at least for now. Any real de-dollarization would likely occur first among these investors. Put differently, the dollar’s global role is increasingly as a source of returns, not a source of safety. The foreign bid, private and public, is for risk, not for Treasuries. It is currently fashionable in some circles to point to the diminution of the “convenience yield” on Treasuries even while the U.S. dollar continues to enjoy such a privilege. But the shift in the global investor base and their apparent portfolio preference for U.S. risk assets in lieu of Treasuries may help explain the divergence between the convenience yield on Treasuries and the convenience yield on the USD.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Most official-sector inflows into the U.S. come from investors who are not classic reserve managers, and those flows remain heavily tilted toward the dollar, so any real de-dollarization would likely begin among these investors.
  2. The dollar’s global role is increasingly as a source of returns rather than safety, with the foreign bid, private and public, directed at risk assets rather than Treasuries.
  3. The shift in the global investor base toward U.S. risk assets in lieu of Treasuries may help explain the divergence between the convenience yield on Treasuries and that on the dollar, and suggests the “profit dollar” is likely trading at a historical premium.

Related Articles:

  • Financial Innovation and the International Monetary System — The dollar accounts for 59% of cross-border payments messaged through SWIFT, far ahead of the euro's 14%, and its share of foreign exchange turnover has risen gradually to about 90% of the 200% total since 2010. Official holdings of U.S. Treasuries have leveled off near $4tn while foreign private holdings rose from $1tn to over $5tn.
  • Foreign Investors Prefer US Stocks To Treasuries As Debt Worries Grow — International flows into US stocks averaged 2.8% of US GDP over a year, overtaking flows into US Treasuries at 2% of GDP for the first time this century outside brief episodes during the Covid-19 pandemic and after the global financial crisis, according to Deutsche Bank analysis of US Treasury data.
  • World’s Unusually High Dollar Exposure Risks Fueling Selloff — Pension funds and insurers in Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure, the lowest share since at least 2015. With some of the largest holders of US assets carrying little protection against a weaker dollar, the currency is at risk of steeper declines if sentiment turns.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Monetary Policy

Rules Of Relevance

AI Summary. Cumulative US borrowing from the rest of the world has reached 118% of GDP since 2000 as domestic savings fell short of investment, with growing global trade volumes boosting foreign demand for Treasuries and holding down US borrowing costs. The author argues stagnating trade and narrowing deficits shrink that funding subsidy.

Jason Thomas Carlyle
Date Posted:
September 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

US cumulative foreign borrowing since 2000 has reached 118% of GDP, but the US has earned more on foreign assets than foreigners earned on US liabilities. Carlyle speculates that this “exorbitant privilege” could erode if globalization unwinds.

Does shrinking global trade raise US borrowing costs?

Core argument: Cumulative US borrowing from the rest of the world has reached 118% of GDP since 2000, as domestic savings consistently fell short of domestic investment, with effective US net borrowing costs below zero until recently.

The size of the implicit US borrowing subsidy rose with global trade volumes. The growth in trade during the period of “globalization” was driven by the rise of globally-interconnected production networks, with production processes sliced into stages and distributed across borders. Businesses at each stage of the process would both invoice and get invoiced in dollars. This [plausibly] boosted demand for Treasuries to meet dollar payment obligations and backstop foreign banking systems, which placed downward pressure on Treasury yields and cheapened broader dollar funding costs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Cumulative US borrowing from the rest of the world has reached 118% of GDP since 2000, as domestic savings consistently fell short of domestic investment, with effective US net borrowing costs below zero until recently.
  2. The implicit US borrowing subsidy grew with global trade volumes, as foreign demand for Treasuries to meet dollar payment obligations and backstop foreign banking systems pressed Treasury yields down and cheapened broader dollar funding costs.
  3. Policies that scale back US external commitments, narrow the goods trade deficit, and restrict foreign adversaries’ access to dollar clearing further reduce the foreign savings available and willing to be recycled into low-yielding US assets.

Related Articles:

  • Global Trade Imbalances: Actual Problems, Unlikely Solutions — Foreign capital flowing into the US is shifting from government purchases of US Treasury bonds toward private foreign investment in US stocks and other riskier assets. This means a share of future gains from US productivity-enhancing investment will flow to these foreign investors, who are likely more willing to sell and exit if returns worsen.
  • Honey, Who Shrunk the U.S. Income Surplus? — Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets are valued at $69tn versus $41tn of U.S. holdings abroad, a gap that has been mounting for decades. With the net liability position in interest-bearing assets at -$15tn, a 1 percentage point rise in interest rates would subtract $150bn from the U.S. net investment income balance.
  • https://www.edwardconard.com/2025/04/01/without-spending-cuts-brace-for-slow-growth/ — My Wall Street Journal Op-Ed: Without Spending Cuts, Brace for Slow Growth
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
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