How does supply-chain visibility give China leverage in trade disputes?
Core argument: China's rare earth licensing requirements, which oblige multinationals to apply for access, may be partly intended to give Beijing greater visibility into supply chains and thus more precise targeting of future restrictions.
Beijing, Brussels and Washington are all searching for the most efficient and asymmetric ways to gum up their adversaries’ supply chains. One challenge these governments face is knowledge. It’s no secret that manufacturers struggle to understand the depths of their own supply chains. There can be dozens of transactions between a raw material and a finished good. Governments have even less visibility. China’s rare earth measures — which require multinationals to apply for licences — may be partly intended to provide Beijing with more supply chain visibility. This implies more precise targeting of any future restrictions. A second challenge is finding measures with asymmetric costs. For the world’s three largest economies, the only measures that provide real leverage are those that induce far higher costs on their rival than themselves. The Covid-19 pandemic was supposed to have forced the world’s procurement managers to shift from a “just in time” model to a “just in case” one better prepared for disruption. But as China drip feeds rare earths to desperate manufacturers abroad, “just in time” is central to Beijing’s strategy to keep global multinationals hooked on its supply.


