Manufacturing vs Services

Research comparing manufacturing and service industries through employment, wages, productivity, trade exposure, technology, and regional change. Coverage examines the shift toward services and the continuing role of tradable production.

AI Summary. The authors find China's tariff cuts after joining the World Trade Organization exceeded the norm of reciprocity, which raised aggregate real incomes in the United States and the rest of the world through better terms of trade while amplifying the China Shock. They estimate this shifted employment from tradable to non-tradable sectors abroad.

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.@ChadBown and team find that China’s tariff reductions in its WTO accession exceeded reciprocity norms, increasing real incomes but driving an incremental 4% decline in labor demand for tradable goods in the rest of the world.

Did one-sided tariff cuts raise incomes while amplifying trade shocks?

Core argument: China's tariff reductions after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity, under which exchanged tariff cuts leave relative world prices between countries unchanged.

When countries exchange tariff cuts that abide by reciprocity, relative world prices (the terms of trade between them) do not change. We find the tariff reductions China implemented after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity. This deviation from reciprocity increased aggregate real incomes in the United States and in the rest of the world through improvements in their terms of trade, but it also amplified the magnitude of the China Shock. Figure 2 presents the percentage change in employment in the tradable sector and in the non-tradable sector in the rest of the world due to the movement in the terms of trade resulting from the actual changes in tariff between China and the rest of the world from 1990-2007. We find that China exceeding reciprocity resulted in employment shifting from the tradable sector to the nontradable sector in the rest of the world.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's tariff reductions after its WTO accession exceeded the norm of reciprocity, under which exchanged tariff cuts leave relative world prices between countries unchanged.
  2. China's deviation from reciprocity raised aggregate real incomes in the United States and the rest of the world through improvements in their terms of trade, while also amplifying the magnitude of the China Shock.
  3. Terms-of-trade movements from the actual tariff changes between China and the rest of the world from 1990 to 2007 shifted employment in the rest of the world from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector.

AI Summary. The authors find that the shift of US economic activity away from manufacturing, where sales and employment concentration is higher on average than in other sectors, pushes measured concentration down, with a modest effect nationally and a large one locally. Using Economic Census data, they document that local employment concentration at the county-by-industry level fell while local sales concentration rose.

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Between 1992 and 2017 the shift from manufacturing to the service sector reduced local employment concentration, even as national concentration rose. @davidautor @johnvanreenen

How does the shift away from manufacturing affect measured business concentration?

Core argument: Using near-population data from the Economic Censuses, the authors document that the Herfindahl index of local employment concentration, measured at the county by six-digit NAICS industry cell level, fell between 1992 and 2017 even as local sales concentration rose.

The structural transformation of economic activity in the US and other advanced economies is well known. What has potentially escaped attention is that this force pushes concentration downward due to the simple fact that both sales and employment concentration are greater in manufacturing on average than other sectors. At the national level, this de-concentrating effect is modest. It looms large at the local level, however, offsetting by half the effect of rising sales concentration within sectors and more than fully offsetting the effect of rising employment concentration within county by industry cells. National industrial concentration in the U.S. has risen sharply since the early 1980s, but there remains dispute over whether local geographic concentration has followed a similar trend. Using near population data from the Economic Censuses, we confirm and extend existing evidence on national U.S. industrial concentration while providing novel evidence on local concentration. We document that the Herfindhahl index of local employment concentration, measured at the county by- NAICS six-digit-industry cell level, fell between 1992 and 2017 even as local sales concentration rose.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using near-population data from the Economic Censuses, the authors document that the Herfindahl index of local employment concentration, measured at the county by six-digit NAICS industry cell level, fell between 1992 and 2017 even as local sales concentration rose.
  2. Structural transformation pushes concentration down because sales and employment concentration are on average greater in manufacturing than in other sectors, an effect that is modest nationally but large locally.
  3. At the local level, the de-concentrating effect of structural transformation offsets half of rising within-sector sales concentration and more than fully offsets rising employment concentration within county-by-industry cells.

AI Summary. US labor productivity in tradable industries such as manufacturing, research and development, and finance has diverged from non-tradable sectors, reaching roughly $185,000 of value-added per employee and growing nearly 3% annually, versus about 0.57% annually in non-tradable sectors like government, healthcare, and construction.

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@MichaelSpence, tradable US sectors saw productivity rise to ~$185,000 per employee, growing at nearly 3% annually, while non-tradable sectors averaged just 0.57% growth since 1998.

Is US productivity growth diverging between tradable and non-tradable sectors?

Core argument: US tradable-sector productivity reached roughly $185,000 in value-added per employee by 2021, growing at nearly 3% annually since 1998, nearly double the level of non-tradable industries.

Since 1998, labor productivity in the US tradable sector has diverged significantly from the non-tradable sector, with per-employee value-added in tradable industries nearly doubling that of non-tradable ones by 2021. Tradable sectors, including manufacturing and services like R&D and finance, saw productivity rise to ~$185,000 per employee, growing at nearly 3% annually. In contrast, non-tradable sectors such as government, healthcare, and construction experienced sluggish growth, averaging just 0.57% per year. This disparity highlights the challenges faced by large-employment sectors with low productivity growth, exacerbated by labor shortages and skills gaps. Addressing these issues through skill acquisition and technology adoption is crucial for balanced economic growth, as demand for services like healthcare and construction remains strong. Without targeted interventions, the US risks uneven growth and missed opportunities for broader economic benefits.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US tradable-sector productivity reached roughly $185,000 in value-added per employee by 2021, growing at nearly 3% annually since 1998, nearly double the level of non-tradable industries.
  2. Non-tradable sectors including government, healthcare, and construction averaged productivity growth of just 0.57% per year, despite their large employment shares.
  3. Labor shortages and skills gaps compound the productivity divergence, and skill acquisition and technology adoption in low-productivity, high-demand sectors such as healthcare and construction are needed for balanced US growth.

Michael Spence and Belinda Azenui note that labor productivity between the tradable and non-tradable sectors started to diverge in 1998, and by 2021 per-employee value-added in tradable sectors was nearly double the non-tradable sectors.

“…Value-added per employee is a measure of labor productivity. In America’s tradable sector, it has risen steadily over the last two decades in both manufacturing and services, reaching roughly $185,000 (in chained 2012 dollars) in 2021. Over the same period, productivity growth in this sector averaged nearly 3%. The non-tradable economy is just 0.57% per annum over the last 20 years. This reflects below-average productivity levels and, in most cases, low-to-moderate productivity growth in the large-employment sectors. There was not always a large gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. On the contrary, as the chart shows, labor productivity was about $100,000 across the economy in 1998. But by 2021, after more than two decades of steady divergence, per-employee value-added in the tradable sector was nearly double the level in the non-tradable sector….”

Michael Spence and Belinda Azenui, "American's Widening Productivity Gap,"Project Syndicate, February 6, 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-productivity-growth-non-tradable-sectors-labor-shortages-by-michael-spence-and-belinda-azenui-2023-02

America’s Widening Productivity Gap

MILAN/GRANVILLE, OHIO - The United States has a productivity problem, though one would never know it from looking only at the industries producing goods and services that are traded internationally. Because these goods and services account for only one-third of GDP and slightly over 20% of employment, as is typical for a developed economy, it is important also to consider the non-tradable sector that comprises the remaining two thirds of the economy.

The economy’s tradable sector comprises agriculture, forestry, fishing, and manufacturing - the production of goods, as either final or intermediate products - which in 2021 accounted for one-third of tradable value-added. The tradable sector also includes services such as research and development, consulting, information, and much of finance. Taken together, services account for about two-thirds of tradable value-added - a share that has increased over the last two decades.

Value-added for a firm or industry is calculated by subtracting purchased inputs like energy and intermediate products - excluding labor and capital - from total sales in dollars. It can be understood as the value created by the combination of labor and capital. That value is then captured as income for the labor (forming the upper limit on the average compensation of employees in the sector) and returns for the owners of the capital.

Value-added per employee is thus a measure of labor productivity. And, in America’s tradable sector, it has risen steadily over the last two decades in both manufacturing and services, reaching roughly $185,000 (in chained 2012 dollars) in 2021. Over the same period, productivity growth in this sector averaged nearly 3%. If this had been true of the non-tradable part of the economy - including large-employment sectors such as government, health care, traditional retail, accommodation and food service, education, and construction - nobody would have to be worried about productivity.

There is no good way to measure government productivity, because markets do not price the value created by services that are generally not sold. For accounting purposes, value-added for the government is measured by the costs of labor and capital, the assumption being that democratic collective-choice mechanisms will eliminate services whose costs exceed the perceived benefits. But that approach does not provide much insight into productivity: the fact that value-added per government employee has grown very slowly - by 0.25%, on average, over two decades - just means that, on average, labor and capital costs grew at roughly the same pace as employment.

For the rest of the non-tradable economy, however, we can measure productivity growth, and the results - based on industry-specific data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for employment and real value-added (in billions of chained 2012 dollars) - are very different than the tradable picture and far from rosy: just 0.57% per annum over the last 20 years. This reflects below-average productivity levels and, in most cases, low-to-moderate productivity growth in the large-employment sectors.

For example, in 2021, hospitality employs 12 million people, has value-added per employee of $41,355 - less than one-third of the $130,000 national average - and productivity growth of 0.26%. The health-care and social-assistance sector employs 20 million people, with value-added per employee of $73,624 and productivity growth of 0.71%. For construction, the figures are 7.6 million, $87,425, and -1.21%, respectively.

There was not always a large gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. On the contrary, as the chart shows, labor productivity was about $100,000 across the economy in 1998. But by 2021, after more than two decades of steady divergence, per-employee value-added in the tradable sector was nearly double the level in the non-tradable sector.

American's Widening Productivity Gap: Extended Excerpt Image 1


By definition, there is no external supply or demand in non-tradable sectors, and thus no external competition or specialization. These sectors must therefore be supplied by domestic and even local entities. Put simply, the supply and demand side must match.

Today, however, many non-tradable parts of the economy - including all the large-employment ones - are experiencing labor shortages. This is partly because factors like stress, safety issues, low compensation, and lack of flexibility are driving workers away from these jobs. But skills gaps are also playing a role. Given this, removing barriers to the acquisition of higher-level skills and incomes is a critical component of any structural-transition agenda.

Demand for health care, hospitality, and construction services is not going to drop. So, labor-supply constraints may lead to higher wages and higher prices, raising incomes and measured labor productivity to some extent. But more must be done to boost productivity growth in low-productivity sectors, thereby mitigating supply constraints, which population aging is set to exacerbate.

Digital technologies have been an important driver of productivity growth in rapidly expanding industries. Given recent breakthroughs in robotics and artificial intelligence, there is every reason to believe this will continue. But progress in high-end services and manufacturing alone is not enough. These powerful technologies must also be applied in low-value-added, low-wage, and low-productivity-growth parts of the economy.

Given labor-supply constraints and economic shocks - linked, for example, to climate change and geopolitics - the case for productivity-boosting interventions is clear. Unless policymakers use a combination of investment and incentives to reverse negative productivity trends, the US will achieve modest growth, at best. Worse, the growth that it does attain will be highly uneven, excluding many from its benefits.

AI Summary. US manufacturing employment has surpassed the peak set during the previous business cycle for the first time since the late 1970s, reaching just under 13m workers, the most since 2008. The large manufacturing productivity gains of the 1990s and 2000s appear to have given way to output growth requiring more hiring.

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The 13M Americans working in the manufacturing sector in January surpassed the peak set during the previous business cycle in February of 2020, a first since the 1970s. This growth has been accompanied by a decline in real output per hour worked. @foxjust

Is the recovery in US manufacturing jobs durable?

Core argument: US manufacturing employment surpassed its prior business-cycle peak in May 2022, the first time this has happened since the late 1970s, according to revised 2022 payroll data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.

For the first time since the late 1970s, US employment in manufacturing has surpassed the peak set during the previous business cycle. This happened in May 2022, according to the revised 2022 payroll jobs data released last week by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. As of January 2023, the sector employed just short of 13 million Americans on a seasonally adjusted basis, the biggest number since November 2008. The huge manufacturing productivity gains of the 1990s and 2000s appear to have given way to a situation where producing more stuff actually requires hiring more workers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US manufacturing employment surpassed its prior business-cycle peak in May 2022, the first time this has happened since the late 1970s, according to revised 2022 payroll data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
  2. US manufacturing employed just short of 13 million Americans on a seasonally adjusted basis as of January 2023, the largest number since November 2008.
  3. The large manufacturing productivity gains of the 1990s and 2000s appear to have given way to a situation in which producing more output requires hiring more workers.

AI Summary. Labor productivity in America's tradable sector, covering manufacturing and services, grew nearly 3% a year over two decades to roughly $185,000 of value-added per employee, while the non-tradable economy excluding government grew 0.57% a year. Productivity was about $100,000 across both sectors at the start of that period.

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Michael Spence and Belinda Azenui note that labor productivity between the tradable and non-tradable sectors started to diverge in 1998, and by 2021 per-employee value-added in tradable sectors was nearly double the non-tradable sectors. @ProSyn

Is tradable-sector productivity growing far faster than the non-tradable economy?

Core argument: Value-added per employee in America's tradable sector reached roughly $185,000 in chained 2012 dollars in 2021, nearly double the level in the non-tradable sector.

Value-added per employee is a measure of labor productivity. In America’s tradable sector, it has risen steadily over the last two decades in both manufacturing and services, reaching roughly $185,000 (in chained 2012 dollars) in 2021. Over the same period, productivity growth in this sector averaged nearly 3%. The non-tradable economy [net government] is just 0.57% per annum over the last 20 years. This reflects below-average productivity levels and, in most cases, low-to-moderate productivity growth in the large-employment sectors. There was not always a large gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. On the contrary, as the chart shows, labor productivity was about $100,000 across the economy in 1998. But by 2021, after more than two decades of steady divergence, per-employee value-added in the tradable sector was nearly double the level in the non-tradable sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Value-added per employee in America's tradable sector reached roughly $185,000 in chained 2012 dollars in 2021, nearly double the level in the non-tradable sector.
  2. Labor productivity growth over the last two decades averaged nearly 3% annually in the tradable sector versus 0.57% in the non-tradable economy net of government.
  3. Labor productivity stood at about $100,000 across the American economy in 1998, with the tradable and non-tradable sectors diverging steadily over the following two decades.

Michael Spence and Belinda Azenui note that labor productivity between the tradable and non-tradable sectors started to diverge in 1998, and by 2021 per-employee value-added in tradable sectors was nearly double the non-tradable sectors.

Description automatically generated “…Value-added per employee is a measure of labor productivity. In America’s tradable sector, it has risen steadily over the last two decades in both manufacturing and services, reaching roughly $185,000 (in chained 2012 dollars) in 2021. Over the same period, productivity growth in this sector averaged nearly 3%. The non-tradable economy [net government] is just 0.57% per annum over the last 20 years. This reflects below-average productivity levels and, in most cases, low-to-moderate productivity growth in the large-employment sectors. There was not always a large gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. On the contrary, as the chart shows, labor productivity was about $100,000 across the economy in 1998. But by 2021, after more than two decades of steady divergence, per-employee value-added in the tradable sector was nearly double the level in the non-tradable sector….”

Michael Spence and Belinda Azenui, “American’s Widening Productivity Gap,” Project Syndicate, February 6, 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-productivity-growth-non-tradable-sectors-labor-shortages-by-michael-spence-and-belinda-azenui-2023-02?barrier=accesspaylog

America’s Widening Productivity Gap

MILAN/GRANVILLE, OHIO – The United States has a productivity problem, though one would never know it from looking only at the industries producing goods and services that are traded internationally. Because these goods and services account for only one-third of GDP and slightly over 20% of employment, as is typical for a developed economy, it is important also to consider the non-tradable sector that comprises the remaining two thirds of the economy.

The economy’s tradable sector comprises agriculture, forestry, fishing, and manufacturing – the production of goods, as either final or intermediate products – which in 2021 accounted for one-third of tradable value-added. The tradable sector also includes services such as research and development, consulting, information, and much of finance. Taken together, services account for about two-thirds of tradable value-added – a share that has increased over the last two decades.

Value-added for a firm or industry is calculated by subtracting purchased inputs like energy and intermediate products – excluding labor and capital – from total sales in dollars. It can be understood as the value created by the combination of labor and capital. That value is then captured as income for the labor (forming the upper limit on the average compensation of employees in the sector) and returns for the owners of the capital.

Value-added per employee is thus a measure of labor productivity. And, in America’s tradable sector, it has risen steadily over the last two decades in both manufacturing and services, reaching roughly $185,000 (in chained 2012 dollars) in 2021. Over the same period, productivity growth in this sector averaged nearly 3%. If this had been true of the non-tradable part of the economy – including large-employment sectors such as government, health care, traditional retail, accommodation and food service, education, and construction – nobody would have to be worried about productivity.

There is no good way to measure government productivity, because markets do not price the value created by services that are generally not sold. For accounting purposes, value-added for the government is measured by the costs of labor and capital, the assumption being that democratic collective-choice mechanisms will eliminate services whose costs exceed the perceived benefits. But that approach does not provide much insight into productivity: the fact that value-added per government employee has grown very slowly – by 0.25%, on average, over two decades – just means that, on average, labor and capital costs grew at roughly the same pace as employment.

For the rest of the non-tradable economy, however, we can measure productivity growth, and the results – based on industry-specific data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for employment and real value-added (in billions of chained 2012 dollars) – are very different than the tradable picture and far from rosy: just 0.57% per annum over the last 20 years. This reflects below-average productivity levels and, in most cases, low-to-moderate productivity growth in the large-employment sectors.

For example, in 2021, hospitality employs 12 million people, has value-added per employee of $41,355 – less than one-third of the $130,000 national average – and productivity growth of 0.26%. The health-care and social-assistance sector employs 20 million people, with value-added per employee of $73,624 and productivity growth of 0.71%. For construction, the figures are 7.6 million, $87,425, and -1.21%, respectively.

There was not always a large gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. On the contrary, as the chart shows, labor productivity was about $100,000 across the economy in 1998. But by 2021, after more than two decades of steady divergence, per-employee value-added in the tradable sector was nearly double the level in the non-tradable sector. Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated By definition, there is no external supply or demand in non-tradable sectors, and thus no external competition or specialization. These sectors must therefore be supplied by domestic and even local entities. Put simply, the supply and demand side must match.

Today, however, many non-tradable parts of the economy – including all the large-employment ones – are experiencing labor shortages. This is partly because factors like stress, safety issues, low compensation, and lack of flexibility are driving workers away from these jobs. But skills gaps are also playing a role. Given this, removing barriers to the acquisition of higher-level skills and incomes is a critical component of any structural-transition agenda.

Demand for health care, hospitality, and construction services is not going to drop. So, labor-supply constraints may lead to higher wages and higher prices, raising incomes and measured labor productivity to some extent. But more must be done to boost productivity growth in low-productivity sectors, thereby mitigating supply constraints, which population aging is set to exacerbate.

Digital technologies have been an important driver of productivity growth in rapidly expanding industries. Given recent breakthroughs in robotics and artificial intelligence, there is every reason to believe this will continue. But progress in high-end services and manufacturing alone is not enough. These powerful technologies must also be applied in low-value-added, low-wage, and low-productivity-growth parts of the economy.

Given labor-supply constraints and economic shocks – linked, for example, to climate change and geopolitics – the case for productivity-boosting interventions is clear. Unless policymakers use a combination of investment and incentives to reverse negative productivity trends, the US will achieve modest growth, at best. Worse, the growth that it does attain will be highly uneven, excluding many from its benefits.

AI Summary. A 10% increase in Amazon's wages is associated with a 2.6% average wage increase among other employers in the same local markets, alongside a 0.8 percentage point decrease in employment probability. Amazon's turnover exceeds 100% at many facilities, and its pay and sign-on bonuses have pushed competitors such as Walmart and Target to adjust pay scales.

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Amazon’s turnover rate exceeds 100% in many facilities, driving up wages across industries. A 10% wage increase in 2018 led to a 2.6% average wage increase among other employers in the same markets @SebastianHerrera

Does one large employer set wages for low-skilled workers across industries?

Core argument: A 10% increase in Amazon's wages in 2018 was associated with a 2.6% average wage increase among other employers in the same local labor markets.

Amazon's role as a wage-and-benefits setter for low-skilled workers is evident as its turnover rate surpasses 100% in many facilities, driving up wages across industries. A 10% increase in Amazon's wages in 2018 led to a 2.6% average wage increase among other employers in the same markets, highlighting its influence. Despite raising wages to $15 an hour, Amazon's impact on overall employment levels was mixed, with a 0.8 percentage point decrease in employment probability. The company's aggressive hiring and compensation strategies, including sign-on bonuses and higher hourly rates, have forced competitors like Walmart and Target to adjust their pay scales. This dynamic has contributed to wage inflation and reshaped labor standards, particularly in regions with significant Amazon presence. As Amazon continues to expand, its influence on wage-setting and labor market dynamics is expected to grow, affecting both regional job markets and broader economic conditions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 10% increase in Amazon's wages in 2018 was associated with a 2.6% average wage increase among other employers in the same local labor markets.
  2. Amazon's move to $15 an hour had a mixed effect on overall employment levels, accompanied by a 0.8 percentage point decrease in employment probability.
  3. Amazon's turnover rate exceeds 100% in many facilities, and its sign-on bonuses and higher hourly rates have pushed competitors including Walmart and Target to adjust their pay scales.

“…As companies across the U.S. fight to find workers, Amazon is emerging as a de facto wage-and-benefit setter for a large pool of low-skilled workers. Business experts have long researched what is known as the Amazon effect in disrupting traditional retailers. Now Amazon’s every move is causing ripple effects well beyond the retail space in local markets throughout America, including on inflation, regional job markets and labor standards, according to an examination of federal labor data and interviews with economists, researchers, local employment officials and current and former Amazon employees….“If they are not leading, they are reinforcing it,” said Lynn Reaser, a professor at Point Loma Nazarene University and longtime economist at financial institutions that include Bank of America Corp. “Everyone is comparing job offers, and they always have Amazon as a benchmark.” Even Amazon’s own internal employee challenges ripple through the market. The company’s turnover rate has exceeded more than 100% across many of its facilities, according to an analysis by The Wall Street Journal….A 10% increase in Amazon’s advertised hourly wages in 2018 led to an average increase of about 2.6% among other employers in labor markets where Amazon is located, according to a paper this year by researchers from the University of California, Berkeley and Brandeis University. Amazon’s influence on wage increases had a big effect because a large fraction of similar jobs then were below $15 an hour, researchers concluded. In comparison, when Walmart and Target Corp. announced $9 starting pay in 2015, the effect was smaller because there was a larger fraction of employers that were already at or above that pay level. Walmart in September raised its minimum wage to $12 an hour. At the same time, the researchers found Amazon’s increase in pay failed to raise overall employment levels and actually led to a small decline. While some employers that raised wages hired additional workers, others cut back on employment or hours. In Amazon’s case, the company’s increase to $15 an hour led to an average decrease in “probability of employment” by 0.8 percentage point, the paper says. Other research showed similar results….”

Sebastian Herrera, "Amazon Emerges as the Wage-and-Benefits Setter for Low-Skilled Workers Across Industries,"Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-emerges-as-the-wage-and-benefits-setter-for-low-skilled-workers-across-industries-11638910694

Amazon Emerges as the Wage-and-Benefits Setter for Low-Skilled Workers Across Industries

Max Ramirez knew he had a problem when he found out about the truck.

About two years ago, Amazon.com Inc. employees rigged a vehicle to carry a makeshift billboard advertising starting pay of roughly $16 an hour. They drove the truck all over the small Texas city where Mr. Ramirez helps run a rival warehouse operation.

Within a few months, a handful of the employees at his company, mattress manufacturer Serta Inc., had decamped to Amazon. “We had no choice but to compete,” he said. The company raised its starting pay by roughly $2 to about $15 an hour and has since raised it about another dollar, he said.

As companies across the U.S. fight to find workers, Amazon is emerging as a de facto wage-and-benefit setter for a large pool of low-skilled workers. Business experts have long researched what is known as the Amazon effect in disrupting traditional retailers. Now Amazon’s every move is causing ripple effects well beyond the retail space in local markets throughout America, including on inflation, regional job markets and labor standards, according to an examination of federal labor data and interviews with economists, researchers, local employment officials and current and former Amazon employees.

The nation’s second-largest private employer is planning mock fulfillment centers in high schools to plant the seeds of future careers, sending recruiters to local fairgrounds and bombarding job boards with promises of large sign-on bonuses and pay—in some cases nearly triple the federal minimum wage.

The effect is magnified because Amazon churns through hundreds of thousands of employees each year, creating an even more voracious appetite for labor that often compels the company to push up compensation or improve recruitment in other ways—especially during peak times such as the holiday shopping period now under way.

“Amazon has the economies of scale,” said Jesse McCree, a workforce development official in Harrisburg, Pa., an area of the country where Amazon is competing heavily with other large logistics and warehouse companies. “They are influencing the market because of scale and name recognition and can afford to pay more than the smaller guys. As they go, even the big companies are going to pay attention.”

Similar effects are evident in areas near Austin, Los Angeles, Cincinnati and Louisville, Ky., according to a Journal review of local data and interviews with employers and workforce officials.

At produce distributor Castellini near Cincinnati, Chief Executive Brian Kocher can’t get away from Amazon. The company has wrapped job advertisements around cars, buses and billboards. And recently, when Mr. Kocher went to play his favorite Solitaire game on his iPhone, Amazon ads popped up there, too.

Castellini in the past year has raised wages three times, with its pay now starting around $16 an hour. Since many of its employees in the area are Spanish speakers, Castellini has recently focused on hiring and promoting managers who speak the language to better connect with workers. The company also implemented $750 bonuses for any employee who refers family and friends to work there.

Amazon has had a significant impact on the area since 2017, when the company struck a deal with the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport to open a $1.5 billion air hub. Paul Verst, chief executive of Verst Logistics, which provides warehousing, transportation and packaging services for clients such as manufacturers and consumer-goods companies, said construction costs have risen by at least $30 a square foot to a range of about $90 to $100 due to increased demand for building space.

Mr. Verst recently gave employees a $3-an-hour raise to compete with Amazon. Starting pay now ranges from $16 to $19 an hour. He said his family-owned company aims to retain employees by connecting with them personally. He signs a birthday card for each worker. Tenures for many workers have averaged 10 to 15 years, he said. Still, the company has lost a handful of employees to Amazon, which has advertised pay of $20 or more an hour and $1,000 sign-on bonuses in the area.

“It was for economic reasons that they left,” he said.

There have been about two job openings for every unemployed person in Cumberland County, the Harrisburg-area county where several Amazon facilities are located. Warehouse competitors include pet food retailer Chewy Inc., United Parcel Service Inc. and food and agriculture giant Cargill Inc.

Wage wars in the area have been fierce ever since Amazon raised its starting pay nationally by several dollars to $15 an hour in 2018, local officials said. Much of the battle for hourly employees has played out near a stretch of the area’s Interstate 81 highway, where companies have erected billboard after billboard advertising sign-on bonuses and “immediate openings.”

On occasion, Chewy workers have left the company to work at Amazon almost immediately after receiving new training, according to a former area manager. During the Covid-19 pandemic, a period when Amazon hired workers as aggressively as any company in modern history, Cargill was at times so short of employees that it flew workers in from other locations, according to the company. Both Chewy and Cargill now advertise pay near $20 an hour in the area.

Employee turnover in Cumberland County rose after Amazon’s arrival spurred competition among local firms for workers. Three years ago, around the time when Amazon bumped its starting pay to $15 an hour, wages for warehouse employees in Cumberland averaged from $10.50 an hour to $12.50 an hour. Now, they range between $15 to $21 an hour, according to the Cumberland Area Economic Development Corporation.

“Amazon is the standard-bearer,” said Zach Pasquariello, a former Chewy area manager in the region. “Chewy was always following in Amazon’s footsteps and trying to do what Amazon does, but we were always a little bit behind.” Chewy declined to comment.

Job openings across the U.S. outnumber the people who are unemployed, Labor Department figures have shown, demonstrating an unusual tightness in the labor market that has seen a sharp rise in wages. How much of this is due to Amazon’s influence is difficult to pinpoint, due to limited data and the unique influence of the pandemic.

But as Amazon’s footprint has grown rapidly across the country, the potential for the company to influence wages or other market dynamics has increased, economists say. Amazon, which had around 1.4 million total employees at the end of September, hires hundreds of thousands of people every year, putting it on pace to surpass Walmart Inc. as the nation’s largest employer in a matter of years.

“If they are not leading, they are reinforcing it,” said Lynn Reaser, a professor at Point Loma Nazarene University and longtime economist at financial institutions that include Bank of America Corp. “Everyone is comparing job offers, and they always have Amazon as a benchmark.”

Even Amazon’s own internal employee challenges ripple through the market. The company’s turnover rate has exceeded more than 100% across many of its facilities, according to an analysis by The Wall Street Journal.

Amazon has recorded higher injury rates than the national average, and its speedy delivery requirements can quickly burn workers out. The company has faced lawsuits, union challenges and government intervention related to the treatment of its workforce, which has pushed it to introduce new safety measures such as body mechanics training for employees and vows from its top leaders to better listen to workers.

Amazon has said it is working to better understand the needs of its employees and has opposed unions because it prefers to negotiate with workers directly. The company also has said that many of the people it adds are re-hires, demonstrating that many workers return to the company after having earlier left.

Amazon’s wage increases pass through to workers outside the company, researchers have found, as many employers raise their own pay to combat churn. In September, Amazon announced that its starting wage now averages $18.32 an hour, an amount that’s nearly triple the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour.

To fight off Amazon, competitors have tried to offer lighter workloads, more flexible schedules, bonus pay and other perks. But Amazon is rolling out new plans to compete in those areas as well.

Amazon wants to use its size and scale to make its jobs as flexible as possible, J. Ofori Agboka, an Amazon senior human-resources executive, said in an interview. Having hundreds of thousands of employees makes it easier to offer workers different work hours, a perk many have requested, he said. Amazon recently broadened a program that allows some employees to switch schedules and pick their own work hours, or cancel a shift at the last minute. The company also offers a child-care network to employees and flexible hours for a few weeks for employees transitioning back to work.

“What does flexibility mean for each employee, and how can we meet that?” Mr. Agboka said.

Candidates are now essentially being hired on the spot, Mr. Agboka said, with many workers able to see their start date less than half an hour after beginning an application online. Amazon is also working to fix common retention issues, he said, such as employees who are dismissed after a minor incident like missing work due to an emergency.

It is too early to know how well some of Amazon’s new initiatives to increase flexibility will be felt in the labor force, but its pay increases are already having a widespread impact.

LaShay Moran, who lives near Louisville, joined Amazon during its current hiring spree. Ms. Moran, 42, left her job at auto parts distributor Premier Performance LLC in part because Amazon offered more money—$17.50 an hour versus $16 at Premier—and a $3,000 sign-on bonus.

“Everybody knows what it is,” she said of Amazon’s name recognition.

A 10% increase in Amazon’s advertised hourly wages in 2018 led to an average increase of about 2.6% among other employers in labor markets where Amazon is located, according to a paper this year by researchers from the University of California, Berkeley and Brandeis University.

Amazon’s influence on wage increases had a big effect because a large fraction of similar jobs then were below $15 an hour, researchers concluded. In comparison, when Walmart and Target Corp. announced $9 starting pay in 2015, the effect was smaller because there was a larger fraction of employers that were already at or above that pay level. Walmart in September raised its minimum wage to $12 an hour.

At the same time, the researchers found Amazon’s increase in pay failed to raise overall employment levels and actually led to a small decline. While some employers that raised wages hired additional workers, others cut back on employment or hours. In Amazon’s case, the company’s increase to $15 an hour led to an average decrease in “probability of employment” by 0.8 percentage point, the paper says. Other research showed similar results.

In response to its overall effect on employment, Amazon has previously pointed to the billions it has invested in infrastructure and the amount of jobs it creates.

In San Marcos, Texas, Amazon established its first fulfillment center in 2016 and soon approached the nearby Texas State University as the area’s largest employer.

Other warehouse operators in the area quickly felt the company’s presence. Amazon advertised on radio stations hundreds of miles away and attracted workers from competitors in short order.

Amazon staffs more than 4,500 workers in three facilities throughout the surrounding Hays County, and a fourth site recently opened that will employ at least hundreds more. The company has added more than 2,000 employees during the Covid-19 pandemic, according to local data.

Worker churn has been high at the facilities. Turnover in Hays County, which is located southwest of Austin, swelled to 101% in 2017, the first full year Amazon operated there. The rate plunged to 68% by 2019, according to a Journal analysis. That decrease happened after Amazon reduced the number of employees at the San Marcos warehouse, according to the Greater San Marcos Partnership, a local business group.

Since Amazon raised its starting pay in 2018, wages in the San Marcos area are also up substantially. Pay for employees in the warehouse and storage industry in Hays County grew by 12.7% in the two years after Amazon’s move to $15, compared with 4.3% in the two years preceding it, according to labor market research firm Emsi Burning Glass.

Walmart and others matched and sometimes exceeded Amazon’s pay at their facilities to stay competitive, said Jason Giulietti, president of the Greater San Marcos Partnership. A large sign recently hung from a Walmart distribution center south of Amazon’s San Marcos facility advertising pay of up to $20 an hour.

At lighting manufacturing giant Signify, which has a warehouse in Hays County, plant manager Haiver Montenegro said he competes with Amazon using flexible schedules, including usually not requiring employees to work on weekends.

“If we were just to compete with hourly rates with Amazon, we would never get there,” he said. “The biggest discussion around resources in this area has to be around what an employer has to offer as a whole package.”

Still, he is short about 15 production associates, with roughly 120 manufacturing employees at the warehouse, according to the company. Signify recently raised starting wages there to around $15 an hour in part because of Amazon’s wage hikes, and he is considering putting up job advertisements on billboards for the first time.

Ed Comment: This is why I'm skeptical of monopsony. Amazon's high productivity is setting the wages of less productive employers. Low offshore wages makes it difficult for rural workers to sell their labor to domestic urban markets. Amazon changes that. It creates work for lesser skilled workers where urban retail worker are more sophisticated ---ie presentable housewives vs unseen warehouse/factory workers who don't need to be able to interact with customers effectively. It turns high-skilled workers with low productivity into lower skilled workers with high productivity. And it arbs rents by moving retail jobs out of cities or at least into lower rent districts. I see enormous shipments being sorted in rent-free double -parked spaces along Madison Ave. I'm surprised the city doesn't insist they move that traffic-jamming sorting into paid-for empty retail space.

AI Summary. About 60% of US manufacturing workers are nonproduction workers, who earn a 14% wage premium over comparable workers in other sectors, while the premium for production workers has fallen from over 10% in the 1980s to about 4%. The decline is attributed to the loss of manufacturing production jobs putting downward pressure on wages.

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Manufacturing wage premiums have diverged btw production and nonproduction workers. Nonproduction workers enjoy a 14% wage premium, while production workers’ premium has declined to 4% since 2003.

Does the manufacturing wage premium still hold for production workers?

Core argument: Manufacturing production workers' wage premium has fallen from over 10% in the 1980s to 4% since 2003, a decline attributed to the loss of manufacturing production jobs exerting downward pressure on wages.

The manufacturing sector continues to offer good wages, but the benefits are unevenly distributed between production and nonproduction workers. Approximately 60% of manufacturing workers are nonproduction workers, who enjoy a 14% wage premium compared to other sectors. In contrast, the wage premium for production workers has decreased significantly, from over 10% in the 1980s to just 4% since 2003. This decline is attributed to the loss of manufacturing production jobs, which has exerted downward pressure on wages. The disparity in wage premiums has implications for recruiting manufacturing workers and suggests a need for targeted public investment in training programs. The broad-based decline in production-workers' wage premiums highlights challenges in maintaining competitive wages for this demographic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Manufacturing production workers' wage premium has fallen from over 10% in the 1980s to 4% since 2003, a decline attributed to the loss of manufacturing production jobs exerting downward pressure on wages.
  2. Nonproduction workers, who make up roughly 60% of manufacturing employment, earn a 14% wage premium relative to other sectors.
  3. The divergence in manufacturing wage premiums between production and nonproduction workers carries implications for recruiting manufacturing workers and suggests a need for targeted public investment in training programs.

"...Does manufacturing still offer “good wages”? The short answer to this question is yes, but not as broadly as in the past. It depends on a worker’s occupation within the sector. Approximately three out of every five manufacturing workers are nonproduction workers, who typically earn an hourly wage that is 14 percent higher than they would receive if they worked in another sector. The wage premium for production workers, on the other hand, is smaller. While this premium was 10 percent or higher throughout the 1980s, it has been no more than 4 percent since 2003. The fact that the manufacturing wage premium is small for production workers, including those with no more than a high school diploma, undermines one of the reasons governments provide special assistance to manufacturers...A manufacturing wage premium is the average percentage difference between the wage a worker earns in manufacturing and the wage similar workers earn in industries other than manufacturing. Using standard wage regressions, we find that, between 1979 and 2018, the manufacturing wage premium declined much more for production workers (such as machine operators) than for nonproduction workers (such as managers or administrative assistants). As a result, the production-workers’ wage premium was 4 percent during 2015 to 2018, while the nonproduction-workers’ wage premium was 14 percent. The decline in the production-workers’ wage premium is broad based, both demographically and geographically. We argue that this decline was most likely caused by the loss of manufacturing production jobs, which put downward pressure on wages for this work. The decline in manufacturing wage premiums has important implications for the difficulties associated with recruiting manufacturing workers and for public investment in training for manufacturing jobs...."

Joel Elvery and Julianne Dunn, "Manufacturing Wage Premiums Have Diverged between Production and Nonproduction Workers," Federal Reserve Bank Of Cleveland, November 9, 2021, https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/regional-policy-reports/rpr-20211109-manufacturing-wage-premiums-have-diverged-between-production-and-nonproduction-workers.aspx

AI Summary. Manufacturing's share of employment fell 11.7 percentage points (658k jobs) in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's industrial hub, despite Germany's persistent trade surpluses, compared with an 8.1 percentage point decline (341k jobs) in Ohio amid US trade deficits. The author argues this suggests common factors such as labor-saving technology and productivity gains, rather than trade balances alone, drive the decline.

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Germany’s trade surplus didn’t shield its industrial hub from manufacturing job losses. North Rhine-Westphalia’s manufacturing employment fell 11.7% points, mirroring Ohio’s decline, despite Germany’s trade surplus.

Do trade surpluses prevent manufacturing employment from declining?

Core argument: Manufacturing employment in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's industrial hub with 17.9m people, fell 11.7 percentage points between 1992 and 2020, a loss of 658k jobs, despite Germany's persistent trade surpluses over that period.

Despite Germany's persistent trade surpluses from 1992 to 2020, manufacturing employment in North Rhine-Westphalia, its industrial hub, fell by 11.7 percentage points, losing 658k jobs, mirroring Ohio's decline of 8.1 percentage points and 341k jobs despite the US's trade deficit. Both regions, with populations of 17.9m and 11.7m respectively, illustrate that the decline in manufacturing employment is not solely driven by trade balances. Instead, common factors such as labor-saving technologies and productivity improvements are likely responsible, reducing the need for manufacturing workers. This trend highlights the limitations of focusing on trade balances to protect manufacturing jobs, as technological advancements continue to reshape the labor market across high-income economies.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Manufacturing employment in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's industrial hub with 17.9m people, fell 11.7 percentage points between 1992 and 2020, a loss of 658k jobs, despite Germany's persistent trade surpluses over that period.
  2. Ohio, with a population of 11.7m, saw manufacturing employment fall 8.1 percentage points and shed 341k jobs from 1992 to 2020 despite the US running trade deficits, a decline similar to North Rhine-Westphalia's.
  3. The parallel declines in North Rhine-Westphalia and Ohio suggest manufacturing employment losses are not driven solely by trade balances, with labor-saving technologies and productivity improvements the likely common causes, limiting what trade-balance policy can do to protect manufacturing jobs.

Adam Posen draws a parallel between Ohio and North Rhine-Westphalia a comparable region in Germany, "...manufacturing employment as a share of total employment has been steadily declining in all high-income economies, even those with strong export sectors and trade surpluses, like Germany. State-level data provide a more complete picture. Germany persistently recorded trade surpluses in goods between 1992 and 2020, but manufacturing employment as a share of total employment in its industrial heartland has fallen at a similar rate to that in the United States, which recorded a trade deficit in goods in that time frame. Manufacturing employment in North Rhine-Westphalia, an industrial hub in western Germany that has recently been reinventing itself as a high-tech and services center, fell as a share of total employment by 11.7 percentage points across the period, losing 658 thousand jobs. In Ohio, a Midwestern state in the United States with a similar manufacturing history, manufacturing employment as a share of total employment dropped by 8.1 percentage points, or 341 thousand jobs. Both states are heavily populated. Ohio's population is 11.7 million and North Rhine-Westphalia's is 17.9 million. The parallel trends observed in both regions suggest the decline is driven by forces other than trade balances or policy. Common factors, including increased use of labor-saving technologies and improvements in productivity, may be responsible as more efficient technologies reduce the need for manufacturing workers...."

Adam Posen, "Despite Germany's trade surplus, manufacturing employment share of total employment has fallen in its industrial hub at a similar rate as in Ohio," Peterson Institute For International Economics, October 6, 2021, https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/despite-germanys-trade-surplus-manufacturing-employment-share-total-employment

Despite Germany's trade surplus, manufacturing employment share of total employment has fallen in its industrial hub at a similar rate as in Ohio

Despite Germany's trade surplus, manufacturing employment share of total employment has fallen in its industrial hub at a similar rate as in Ohio: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Large trade deficits are often blamed for the protracted decline in manufacturing employment in the United States. Critics claim cheap imports from low-wage countries erode the competitiveness of US producers, driving American manufacturing plants and jobs abroad. However, manufacturing employment as a share of total employment has been steadily declining in all high-income economies, even those with strong export sectors and trade surpluses, like Germany.

State-level data provide a more complete picture. Germany persistently recorded trade surpluses in goods between 1992 and 2020, but manufacturing employment as a share of total employment in its industrial heartland has fallen at a similar rate to that in the United States, which recorded a trade deficit in goods in that time frame. Manufacturing employment in North Rhine-Westphalia, an industrial hub in western Germany that has recently been reinventing itself as a high-tech and services center, fell as a share of total employment by 11.7 percentage points across the period, losing 658 thousand jobs. In Ohio, a Midwestern state in the United States with a similar manufacturing history, manufacturing employment as a share of total employment dropped by 8.1 percentage points, or 341 thousand jobs. Both states are heavily populated. Ohio's population is 11.7 million and North Rhine-Westphalia's is 17.9 million.

The parallel trends observed in both regions suggest the decline is driven by forces other than trade balances or policy. Common factors, including increased use of labor-saving technologies and improvements in productivity, may be responsible as more efficient technologies reduce the need for manufacturing workers. The regional histories demonstrate the futility of fixating on trade balances to protect manufacturing jobs, a policy course that is doomed to fail while ignoring long-standing injustices.