Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube
  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
  • Mentions 31
  • Primary focus 3
Showing 3 database articles primarily about Manufacturing vs Services
Currently filtering by:
  • Remove Manufacturing vs Services
  • Remove "primary topics only" restriction
  • Remove 'Database'
Show all 7,201 articles
For whatever topics you select (currently: Manufacturing vs Services):
Choose search scope

Your importance filter 'Database' shows fewer articles.

Remove filters to see full article counts

Local and National Concentration Trends in Jobs and Sales: The Role of Structural Transformation

David Autor, Christina Patterson and John Van Reenen National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 17, 2023

Between 1992 and 2017 the shift from manufacturing to the service sector reduced local employment concentration, even as national concentration rose. @davidautor @johnvanreenen

The structural transformation of economic activity in the US and other advanced economies is well known. What has potentially escaped attention is that this force pushes concentration downward due to the simple fact that both sales and employment concentration are greater in manufacturing on average than other sectors. At the national level, this de-concentrating effect is modest. It looms large at the local level, however, offsetting by half the effect of rising sales concentration within sectors and more than fully offsetting the effect of rising employment concentration within county by industry cells. National industrial concentration in the U.S. has risen sharply since the early 1980s, but there remains dispute over whether local geographic concentration has followed a similar trend. Using near population data from the Economic Censuses, we confirm and extend existing evidence on national U.S. industrial concentration while providing novel evidence on local concentration. We document that the Herfindhahl index of local employment concentration, measured at the county by- NAICS six-digit-industry cell level, fell between 1992 and 2017 even as local sales concentration rose.
  • Manufacturing vs Services
  • Productivity
    • Workforce Reorganization
Previous articleApril 17, 2023Singapore Asks Banks to Keep Quiet on Wealth Inflows During China BoomThe Monetary Authority of Singapore is trying to limit public discussion of Chinese capital flight as it increasingly becomes a domestic political issue in the city-state. @ftNext articleApril 18, 2023The Labor Supply Rebound from the Pandemic.@WhiteHouseCEA argues that the 0.7% decline in labor force participation since February 2020 is a function of population aging, not Covid. Prime age LFP is above pre-pandemic levels, and overall LFP is back at its pre-pandemic forecast.
Showing 2 database articles primarily about Manufacturing vs Services

Comeback in Factory Jobs Appears to Be for Real

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:
February 9, 2023
Is Database:
Database

The 13M Americans working in the manufacturing sector in January surpassed the peak set during the previous business cycle in February of 2020, a first since the 1970s. This growth has been accompanied by a decline in real output per hour worked. @foxjust

For the first time since the late 1970s, US employment in manufacturing has surpassed the peak set during the previous business cycle. This happened in May 2022, according to the revised 2022 payroll jobs data released last week by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. As of January 2023, the sector employed just short of 13 million Americans on a seasonally adjusted basis, the biggest number since November 2008. The huge manufacturing productivity gains of the 1990s and 2000s appear to have given way to a situation where producing more stuff actually requires hiring more workers.
  • Manufacturing vs Services
  • Productivity
    • Workforce Reorganization

America’s Widening Productivity Gap

Michael Spence and Belinda Azenui Project Syndicate
Date Posted:
February 6, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Michael Spence and Belinda Azenui note that labor productivity between the tradable and non-tradable sectors started to diverge in 1998, and by 2021 per-employee value-added in tradable sectors was nearly double the non-tradable sectors. @ProSyn

Value-added per employee is a measure of labor productivity. In America’s tradable sector, it has risen steadily over the last two decades in both manufacturing and services, reaching roughly $185,000 (in chained 2012 dollars) in 2021. Over the same period, productivity growth in this sector averaged nearly 3%. The non-tradable economy [net government] is just 0.57% per annum over the last 20 years. This reflects below-average productivity levels and, in most cases, low-to-moderate productivity growth in the large-employment sectors. There was not always a large gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. On the contrary, as the chart shows, labor productivity was about $100,000 across the economy in 1998. But by 2021, after more than two decades of steady divergence, per-employee value-added in the tradable sector was nearly double the level in the non-tradable sector.

Michael Spence and Belinda Azenui note that labor productivity between the tradable and non-tradable sectors started to diverge in 1998, and by 2021 per-employee value-added in tradable sectors was nearly double the non-tradable sectors.

Description automatically generated “…Value-added per employee is a measure of labor productivity. In America’s tradable sector, it has risen steadily over the last two decades in both manufacturing and services, reaching roughly $185,000 (in chained 2012 dollars) in 2021. Over the same period, productivity growth in this sector averaged nearly 3%. The non-tradable economy [net government] is just 0.57% per annum over the last 20 years. This reflects below-average productivity levels and, in most cases, low-to-moderate productivity growth in the large-employment sectors. There was not always a large gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. On the contrary, as the chart shows, labor productivity was about $100,000 across the economy in 1998. But by 2021, after more than two decades of steady divergence, per-employee value-added in the tradable sector was nearly double the level in the non-tradable sector….”

Michael Spence and Belinda Azenui, “American’s Widening Productivity Gap,” Project Syndicate, February 6, 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-productivity-growth-non-tradable-sectors-labor-shortages-by-michael-spence-and-belinda-azenui-2023-02?barrier=accesspaylog

America’s Widening Productivity Gap

MILAN/GRANVILLE, OHIO – The United States has a productivity problem, though one would never know it from looking only at the industries producing goods and services that are traded internationally. Because these goods and services account for only one-third of GDP and slightly over 20% of employment, as is typical for a developed economy, it is important also to consider the non-tradable sector that comprises the remaining two thirds of the economy.

The economy’s tradable sector comprises agriculture, forestry, fishing, and manufacturing – the production of goods, as either final or intermediate products – which in 2021 accounted for one-third of tradable value-added. The tradable sector also includes services such as research and development, consulting, information, and much of finance. Taken together, services account for about two-thirds of tradable value-added – a share that has increased over the last two decades.

Value-added for a firm or industry is calculated by subtracting purchased inputs like energy and intermediate products – excluding labor and capital – from total sales in dollars. It can be understood as the value created by the combination of labor and capital. That value is then captured as income for the labor (forming the upper limit on the average compensation of employees in the sector) and returns for the owners of the capital.

Value-added per employee is thus a measure of labor productivity. And, in America’s tradable sector, it has risen steadily over the last two decades in both manufacturing and services, reaching roughly $185,000 (in chained 2012 dollars) in 2021. Over the same period, productivity growth in this sector averaged nearly 3%. If this had been true of the non-tradable part of the economy – including large-employment sectors such as government, health care, traditional retail, accommodation and food service, education, and construction – nobody would have to be worried about productivity.

There is no good way to measure government productivity, because markets do not price the value created by services that are generally not sold. For accounting purposes, value-added for the government is measured by the costs of labor and capital, the assumption being that democratic collective-choice mechanisms will eliminate services whose costs exceed the perceived benefits. But that approach does not provide much insight into productivity: the fact that value-added per government employee has grown very slowly – by 0.25%, on average, over two decades – just means that, on average, labor and capital costs grew at roughly the same pace as employment.

For the rest of the non-tradable economy, however, we can measure productivity growth, and the results – based on industry-specific data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for employment and real value-added (in billions of chained 2012 dollars) – are very different than the tradable picture and far from rosy: just 0.57% per annum over the last 20 years. This reflects below-average productivity levels and, in most cases, low-to-moderate productivity growth in the large-employment sectors.

For example, in 2021, hospitality employs 12 million people, has value-added per employee of $41,355 – less than one-third of the $130,000 national average – and productivity growth of 0.26%. The health-care and social-assistance sector employs 20 million people, with value-added per employee of $73,624 and productivity growth of 0.71%. For construction, the figures are 7.6 million, $87,425, and -1.21%, respectively.

There was not always a large gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. On the contrary, as the chart shows, labor productivity was about $100,000 across the economy in 1998. But by 2021, after more than two decades of steady divergence, per-employee value-added in the tradable sector was nearly double the level in the non-tradable sector. Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated By definition, there is no external supply or demand in non-tradable sectors, and thus no external competition or specialization. These sectors must therefore be supplied by domestic and even local entities. Put simply, the supply and demand side must match.

Today, however, many non-tradable parts of the economy – including all the large-employment ones – are experiencing labor shortages. This is partly because factors like stress, safety issues, low compensation, and lack of flexibility are driving workers away from these jobs. But skills gaps are also playing a role. Given this, removing barriers to the acquisition of higher-level skills and incomes is a critical component of any structural-transition agenda.

Demand for health care, hospitality, and construction services is not going to drop. So, labor-supply constraints may lead to higher wages and higher prices, raising incomes and measured labor productivity to some extent. But more must be done to boost productivity growth in low-productivity sectors, thereby mitigating supply constraints, which population aging is set to exacerbate.

Digital technologies have been an important driver of productivity growth in rapidly expanding industries. Given recent breakthroughs in robotics and artificial intelligence, there is every reason to believe this will continue. But progress in high-end services and manufacturing alone is not enough. These powerful technologies must also be applied in low-value-added, low-wage, and low-productivity-growth parts of the economy.

Given labor-supply constraints and economic shocks – linked, for example, to climate change and geopolitics – the case for productivity-boosting interventions is clear. Unless policymakers use a combination of investment and incentives to reverse negative productivity trends, the US will achieve modest growth, at best. Worse, the growth that it does attain will be highly uneven, excluding many from its benefits.

  • Manufacturing vs Services
  • Productivity
    • Workforce Reorganization
      • High vs Low Skill

How much money NYC Uber, Lyft and Juno drivers can earn in a day

Kathleen Elkins CNBC
Date Posted:
February 5, 2019
Is Database:
Database

NYC ride-share drivers can earn $72,000 annually from rides, with additional income from services like Cargo and Play Octopus, totaling around $75,000 before taxes and expenses.

NYC ride-share drivers can earn $72,000 annually from rides, with additional income from services like Cargo and Play...
NYC ride-share drivers like Al Castillo can earn approximately $72,000 annually from rides, with additional income of $1,200 to $3,600 from services like Cargo and Play Octopus, totaling around $75,000 before taxes and expenses. Castillo typically works six days a week, earning about $250 daily, which translates to $1,500 weekly or $6,000 monthly. However, expenses such as gas, insurance, and maintenance can reach nearly $20,000 annually, significantly impacting net earnings. Earnings fluctuate based on factors like surge pricing during peak hours or adverse weather conditions, which can boost daily income to as much as $540. Additionally, tips contribute to income, though only 20% of passengers tip. Platform fees also affect earnings, with Uber and Lyft taking 30% of fares and Juno 16%. Earnings vary by location due to differing mileage and per-minute rates.

"...That means he could be earning about $72,000 a year from rides and between $1,200 and $3,600 a year from Cargo and Play Octopus, for a total of about $75,000. That’s before taxes, though, and doesn’t factor in expenses like gas, insurance and maintenance, which can add up to nearly $20,000 a year...."

Kathleen Elkins, "I spent a day with a full-time Uber, Lyft and Juno driver in NYC—here’s how much he earned in 9 hours,"CNBC, February 4, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/04/how-much-money-nyc-uber-lyft-and-juno-drivers-can-earn-in-a-day.html

I spent a day with a full-time Uber, Lyft and Juno driver in NYC—here’s how much he earned in 9 hours

Al Castillo, 33, drives full-time for Uber, Lyft and Juno in New York City.

He typically works six days a week, Monday through Saturday, for nine to 11 hours a day. And, as I saw when I spent a day shadowing him, he rarely takes breaks. After all, the more rides he completes, the more he gets paid, so “you want to be busy all the time,” he told me. “Our time is money.”

On this particular day, a Wednesday, Castillo worked about nine hours, 7 a.m. to 4 p.m., and earned $233 from 15 rides. Nine rides and $140 came from Lyft, while six rides and $93 came from Uber.

“That’s a good day,” he told me, especially considering he took more breaks than usual to accommodate my filming. On a normal day, he’ll bring home about $250 after 9-11 hours of work, he said.

Castillo gets paid per ride and his earnings depend on how long the trip is, how much distance he covers and whether or not there’s “surge pricing,” when demand for rides is high and prices for passengers go up. Surge pricing, or “prime time,” as Lyft calls it, tends to happen during rush hour, bad weather or if there’s a big event going on in the area.

He can also earn tips. While just 20 percent of passengers leave tips, he estimated, “it helps. Every money helps.”

The app doesn’t show how much the customer paid, Castillo told me — it just breaks down his take per ride. A mid-morning, 22-minute UberX trip earned him nearly $10: He earned a base rate (what you’re paid to start the ride) of $1.83, a time rate (what you earn per minute in your region) of $5.49 and a distance rate (what you earn per mile in your region) of $2. Total: $9.32.

Uber and Lyft both collect about 30 percent of all passenger fares, Castillo told me. Juno takes just 16 percent, but as an app it’s not as popular yet, he added. Sure enough, we didn’t get one call from Juno over the course of the day and, instead, flipped back and forth between Uber and Lyft.

Still, he has all three because, depending on what neighborhood he’s driving in, one app may be busier than the others. “People in Bed Stuy like to use Lyft,” he said. “If you’re in Queens, people like Juno.”

If Castillo earns $250 a day and works Monday to Saturday, that’s $1,500 per week, which comes out to about $6,000 a month. He earns an additional $100 to $300 per month by using Cargo, which pays him a monthly rate for selling products like snacks and headphones to passengers, and Play Octopus, which pays him to mount a tablet that offers trivia games and plays ads.

That means he could be earning about $72,000 a year from rides and between $1,200 and $3,600 a year from Cargo and Play Octopus, for a total of about $75,000. That’s before taxes, though, and doesn’t factor in expenses like gas, insurance and maintenance, which can add up to nearly $20,000 a year.

Besides expenses, a driver’s take home pay will also depend on where they’re located, as mileage and per-minute rates vary by city.

And some days, you’re going to get luckier than others, Castillo told me. On his best day, he took home $540 after nine hours of driving, thanks to surge pricing. One-fifth of that came from a single, lucrative trip to the airport: “It was snowing and it was ugly outside. It was like 5:30 or 6 p.m., peak hours. They paid me like $110.”

Another time, after completing a $20 ride, Castillo recalled, the passenger gave him “a $100 tip, because it was Christmas.”

  • Manufacturing vs Services
  • Productivity
    • Workforce Reorganization
© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms