Edward Conard

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Pentagon to Take Stake in Rare-Earth Company, Challenging China’s Control

AI Summary. Under a deal with the largest U.S. rare earths miner, the Defense Department will take a 15% stake, commit billions of dollars to investment and output purchases, and guarantee a price floor for rare earth minerals and magnets. The agreement calls for a new magnet factory, expected online in 2028, at a scale far exceeding current U.S. magnet production.

Jon Emont Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 10, 2025

The Defense Department is taking a 15% stake in MP Materials, the US’s largest rare earths miner. In exchange, DoD will guarantee a price floor, protection against the possibility that China will flood the market with minerals, depressing world prices.

The Defense Department is taking a 15% stake in MP Materials, the US’s largest rare earths miner. In exchange, DoD...

Can government stakes and price floors build U.S. rare-earth production?

Core argument: The Defense Department will take a 15% stake in MP Materials, America's largest rare earths miner, and commit billions of dollars to investing in the company and purchasing its output.

MP Materials America’s largest rare earths miner has reached a deal under which the Defense Department will take a 15% stake in the company. The government is committing to spending billions of dollars investing in MP Materials and purchasing its output. The deal calls for MP Materials to build a new factory to make rare-earth magnets at a scale that vastly exceeds current U.S. magnet production. It is expected to come online in 2028. In its deal with MP Materials, the Department of Defense is guaranteeing a price floor for rare earth minerals and magnets. That means the company is protected against a scenario in which China fully withdraws its restrictive export policies and the minerals flood into the market, lowering global prices.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Defense Department will take a 15% stake in MP Materials, America's largest rare earths miner, and commit billions of dollars to investing in the company and purchasing its output.
  2. MP Materials will build a rare-earth magnet factory at a scale that vastly exceeds current U.S. magnet production, expected to come online in 2028.
  3. The Defense Department is guaranteeing a price floor for rare earth minerals and magnets, protecting MP Materials if China fully withdraws its restrictive export policies and the minerals flood the market, lowering global prices.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Weaponisation of Rare Earths is a New Kind of Trade War — China's export controls on rare earth materials and magnets threatened to halt production across the auto industry, the largest manufacturing sector in most advanced economies, and forced Washington to negotiate on tariffs. Despite China's well-known dominance of rare earth production, Western governments and companies have not developed alternative suppliers.
  • China Found World’s Pain Point on Trade – and Will Use It Again — China's export permitting system for rare earths and other critical minerals is detailed enough that Beijing is developing a granular understanding of where every kilogram it produces ends up and why. Bottlenecks emerged as China slowed approvals for magnets containing even minuscule amounts of seven rare earths, alongside limits on sales of the raw elements.
  • China Fast Tracks Rare Earth Export Licences for European Companies — China has agreed to fast-track rare earth export licence approvals for some European companies after its export controls on the critical minerals disrupted global supply chains and slowed deliveries for manufacturers of goods from cars to washing machines. China's commerce minister urged the European Union to facilitate trade in high-tech products to China.
  • Security
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    • Investment
Previous articleJuly 10, 2025America’s Cultural Crossroads: Enduring Discontent, Rising Disconnection, and an Uncertain FutureAmerica remains a high-trust society, though Americans with fewer friends report lower trust levels. 79% of Americans with at least 6 friends say strangers would help them if their car broke down, relative to 58% of respondents with no friends.Next articleJuly 11, 2025The Fiscal FutureWith outsized economic growth and spending cuts unlikely solutions to unsustainable US debt, and rapid money creation and default highly undesirable ones, Mankiw suspects the most likely solution is the US will levy a “broadly shared” VAT = 4% of GDP.
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Iran: Severe Stress Now, More Risk If Conflict Returns

AI Summary. Iranian consumer price inflation has reached roughly 90% year-over-year, above prior peaks near 50%, while the rial has weakened to nearly 3m per US dollar on the open market and crude exports have fallen from about 1.8m barrels per day to essentially zero. Lost oil revenue means fewer dollars entering the country, pushing the currency lower and import prices higher.

Torsten Slok Apollo
Date Posted:
November 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Since the start of the US-Iran war, the price level in Iran has risen 90% y/y, the rial has weakened to 3mm per USD, and oil exports have collapsed to essentially zero.

How does an oil export collapse drive currency weakness and inflation?

Core argument: Iranian consumer price inflation has surged to roughly 90% YoY, well above the prior peaks of around 50% reached in 2019–20 and 2022, with the pace of acceleration increasing sharply since the conflict began.

Inflation is at 90%. Iranian consumer price inflation has surged to roughly 90% YoY, well above the previous peaks of around 50% seen in 2019-20 and 2022. Inflation had already been climbing before the conflict, but the pace of acceleration has increased sharply since it began. The rial exchange rate is in free fall. On the open market, the rial has weakened to nearly 3 million per US dollar. The currency spent most of the last decade trending gradually lower, but the move has turned near-vertical since the conflict began. A weaker rial raises the cost of imports, which feeds directly into inflation. Oil exports have collapsed. Crude exports, Iran’s main source of foreign currency, have fallen from roughly 1.8 million barrels per day to essentially zero. Iran has been through a similar episode before when exports dropped from over 2.5 million b/d in 2018 to very low levels through 2019-21 under sanctions, and only recovered gradually afterward. This time the fall is steeper and faster. Lost oil revenue means fewer dollars flowing into the country, which pushes the rial lower, which in turn drives import prices and inflation higher.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Iranian consumer price inflation has surged to roughly 90% YoY, well above the prior peaks of around 50% reached in 2019–20 and 2022, with the pace of acceleration increasing sharply since the conflict began.
  2. Iran’s rial has weakened to nearly 3 million per US dollar on the open market, a near-vertical move since the conflict began after a decade of gradual decline, raising import costs that feed directly into inflation.
  3. Iran’s crude exports, its main source of foreign currency, have fallen from roughly 1.8 million barrels per day to essentially zero, a steeper and faster drop than the decline from over 2.5 million b/d in 2018 under sanctions.

Related Articles:

  • Choking Iran’s Economy Is the Least Bad Way to End the War — Iran's economy is on track for its largest annual contraction since the mid-1980s, with inflation above 50% — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — and food and other necessities costing double a year earlier. Its currency has fallen to a record low of about 1.85m rials per dollar on the black market.
  • Saudi Budget Deficit More Than Doubles as War Hurts Oil Finances — Saudi Arabia posted a quarterly budget deficit of 84bn riyals ($22.4bn), about 145% larger than the prior quarter, as oil receipts fell almost 40% to roughly 116bn riyals amid disruptions from the US-Iran war. Non-oil revenues fell around 7% and overall spending dipped 8%.
  • What Millions Of Data Points Reveal About US Inflation — An alternative inflation gauge tracking millions of prices across 87% of the consumer price basket puts headline inflation at 4.4% versus the official 3.7%, but its trimmed mean at 2.2%. The data indicate price increases are concentrated in energy, airfares, and computers rather than broad-based, with tariffs producing one-time increases.
  • Security
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Defense Spending: Macroeconomic Consequences and Trade-Offs

AI Summary. Peacetime defense spending booms—when the two-year average of defense outlays rises 1pp of GDP—are followed by sizable increases in real GDP, government consumption, investment, and the capital stock, with a short-lived rise in inflation. Imports accelerate while exports are broadly unchanged, widening current account and trade deficits.

Hippolyte Balima, Jared Bebee, Colombe Ladreit, Andresa Lagerborg, et al. International Monetary Fund
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

An IMF report notes defense spending booms are associated with an increase in TFP “over longer horizons, consistent with evidence showing that the R&D component of defense spending can boost innovation and crowd in private R&D spending.”

How do defense spending booms affect output, inflation, and productivity?

Core argument: Peacetime defense spending booms, defined as a 1pp of GDP rise in the two-year moving average of defense spending, are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP, a short-lived rise in inflation, and a roughly 9% increase in government consumption within three years.

Defense spending booms [periods when the two-year moving average of defense spending increases 1pp of GDP] in peacetime are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP and by a short-lived rise in inflation. Consistent with a large share of the stimulus being allocated to personnel and operating expenses, government consumption rises by about 9% within three years. Total investment shows a comparable positive response, reflecting both higher public investment in defense equipment and infrastructure and increased private investment, particularly in defense-related industries. Turning to the external sector, stimulus-driven demand leads to wider external imbalances, as both the current account and trade balance deteriorate. Imports accelerate—reflecting leakages from defense spending and stronger demand for foreign goods—while exports remain broadly unchanged. Defense spending booms are associated with a subsequent increase in the stock of capital, in line with the documented boost to investment, and an increase in total factor productivity, which may be explained by changes in capacity utilization and learning by necessity, as firms adapt to surging demand by improving productivity when facing capacity constraints. Total factor productivity [loses] its statistical significance once capacity utilization is controlled for. However, defense spending booms are followed by greater total factor productivity over longer horizons, consistent with evidence showing that the R&D component of defense spending can boost innovation and crowd in private R&D spending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Peacetime defense spending booms, defined as a 1pp of GDP rise in the two-year moving average of defense spending, are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP, a short-lived rise in inflation, and a roughly 9% increase in government consumption within three years.
  2. Defense spending booms widen external imbalances, with both the current account and trade balance deteriorating as imports accelerate on leakages from defense spending and stronger demand for foreign goods while exports remain broadly unchanged.
  3. Defense spending booms are associated with a subsequent increase in the capital stock and in total factor productivity, though the productivity effect loses statistical significance once capacity utilization is controlled for, while greater total factor productivity follows over longer horizons.

Related Articles:

  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
  • The Cold War and the U.S. Labor Market — The authors estimate that declining U.S. military procurement spending from the 1950s to the 1990s explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing employment and just under 10% of the rise in top-decile income inequality. They argue Cold War procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers and helped sustain tight labor markets for low-skill workers.
  • Will Higher Defence Spending Boost The European Economy? — Defense spending typically has a fiscal multiplier below one, meaning each euro spent raises GDP by less, so it is not a short-term growth strategy. One estimate holds that extra military spending worth 1% of GDP could lift output up to 2% long term if concentrated on research and development.
  • Security
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The Cold War and the U.S. Labor Market

AI Summary. The authors estimate that declining U.S. military procurement spending from the 1950s to the 1990s explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing employment and just under 10% of the rise in top-decile income inequality. They argue Cold War procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers and helped sustain tight labor markets for low-skill workers.

Ilyana Kuziemko, Donato Onorato and Suresh Naidu National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
March 31, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Defense spending played a major role in sustaining tight labor markets for low-skill workers following the Second World War. Drops in procurement spending between the 1950s and the 1990s explain between 18 and 30% of the decline in manufacturing employment.

How much did falling military procurement drive manufacturing decline and inequality?

Core argument: The authors estimate the 1950s–1990s decline in U.S. military procurement spending explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under 10% of the rise in top-ten inequality.

We have shown that in the decades immediately following World War II, the Cold War was a major factor sustaining tight labor markets. On the labor demand side, military procurement increased demand for manufacturing workers and put downward pressure on the share of income flowing to the richest households. We can explain roughly between 18 and 30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under ten percent of the rise in top-ten inequality by the 1950s to 1990s decline in procurement spending. We thus conclude that Cold War procurement—while under-studied in the modern, quantitative economics literature on inequality—played a major role in sustaining tight labor markets for low-skill workers in the decades immediately after World War II and creating political coalitions in support of hawkish foreign policy and military expenditure. Figure 8 panel (a) shows that manufacturing employment is highly sensitive to defense spending, consistent with our state-year evidence. As is well known, manufacturing booms during World War II, but, less discussed, plummets in the years between World War II and Korea. After bouncing back during Korea, it slowly declines alongside the declining defense share of GDP until both series experience an uptick during Vietnam. Overall, the relationship remains highly significant even after taking out a linear time trend and dropping the World War II period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate the 1950s–1990s decline in U.S. military procurement spending explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under 10% of the rise in top-ten inequality.
  2. The authors conclude that Cold War military procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers, pressured the share of income flowing to the richest households downward, and sustained tight labor markets for low-skill workers after World War II.
  3. U.S. manufacturing employment booms in World War II, plummets before Korea, rebounds during Korea, then declines alongside the defense share of GDP until an uptick during Vietnam, a relationship that remains highly significant after removing a linear time trend.

Related Articles:

  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
  • The Old Economy Begins To Take Its Revenge — The author argues that capital rotates between the financial economy's asset-light booms and the physical economy, with commodity capacity constraints and the use of critical materials as geopolitical leverage now making returns on physical investment more attractive. In this view, higher interest rates reflect the better returns and capital spending needed to expand production capacity.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
  • Security
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    • Government Spending
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    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment
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    • Unemployment/Participation

The First 36 Hours of War Consumed Over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli Munitions

AI Summary. The authors estimate replacing two destroyed U.S. radars would take five to eight years and $1.1bn for one and 12–24 months and $50m–$75m for the other, making supply-chain fragility and replacement timelines a greater constraint than materials cost. Both systems require gallium, of which China controls 98% of global supply.

Macdonald Amoah, Morgan Bazilian, and Jahara Matisek Foreign Policy
Date Posted:
March 6, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A Colorado School of Mines analysis of the munitions used in the first 36 hours of the war estimates the “mineral bill” and highlights the current and target timelines to replenish these systems, noting critical minerals “cannot be surged.”

Do replacement timelines constrain radar rebuilding more than materials cost?

Core argument: The first 36 hours of the war consumed over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli munitions, and two advanced U.S. radars were destroyed: the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain.

Beyond the sheer volume of munitions, the loss of high-value assets introduces another layer of complexity. The destruction of two advanced U.S. radars, the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain, highlights a problem where the total weight of the “mineral bill” is less of a concern than the extreme fragility of the supply chain and the extensive timelines for replacement. Per our analysis, for the AN/FPS-132, it will take five to eight years for Raytheon to build a new radar at a cost of $1.1 billion. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin will require at least 12 to 24 months and an estimated $50 million to $75 million to replace the AN/TPS-59, based on the original Bahrain Foreign Military Sales contract adjusted for inflation. The biggest issue for the defense industrial base will be sourcing the 77.3 kilograms of gallium needed for both systems, a material for which China controls 98% of the global supply. This is not to mention the 30,610 kilograms of copper that will also be needed, a commodity facing surging demand from the technology sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The first 36 hours of the war consumed over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli munitions, and two advanced U.S. radars were destroyed: the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain.
  2. By the authors' analysis, replacing the AN/FPS-132 will take Raytheon five to eight years at a cost of $1.1 billion, while Lockheed Martin needs at least 12 to 24 months and an estimated $50 million to $75 million for the AN/TPS-59.
  3. Sourcing the 77.3 kilograms of gallium needed for both radars is, by the authors' assessment, the biggest issue for the defense industrial base, since China controls 98% of global supply; the systems also require 30,610 kilograms of copper.

Related Articles:

  • Why China Keeps Winning The Trade War — Governments seeking supply-chain leverage face limited visibility into their own supply chains, and China's rare earth licensing requirements for multinationals may be partly intended to give Beijing that visibility and allow more precise targeting of future restrictions. Effective measures must impose asymmetric costs, and keeping foreign manufacturers dependent on drip-fed supply is central to Beijing's strategy.
  • China Hatches Plan to Keep U.S. Military From Getting Its Rare-Earth Magnets — China is designing a "validated end-user" system that would fast-track rare-earth and other restricted material export approvals for U.S. firms while excluding companies tied to the U.S. military. The arrangement would let China ease export flows while keeping the materials away from U.S. military suppliers.
  • How U.S. Defense Industry Dodged a Rare-Earth Shortage After China’s Curbs — A decades-old stockpile of samarium nitrate held at a chemical plant in France was refined into usable metal, allowing a U.S. maker of samarium-cobalt magnets to source the rare-earth material outside China. Samarium processed outside China costs 5–8x as much, and the French plant had stopped separating rare-earth elements as uneconomical.
  • Security
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How Russia’s Fatalities Compare With Ukraine’s

AI Summary. A model estimates Russian casualties in the full-scale Ukraine war at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, equivalent to roughly one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 killed or severely wounded. One estimate puts Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 with 100,000–140,000 dead—lower in absolute terms but a higher share of its population.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
February 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The Economist estimates one in 25 Russian men btw the ages of 18 and 49 have been killed or wounded in Ukraine since 2022. CSIS estimates Ukrainian casualties at one in 16. Russian losses are escalating; today it is “losing more men than it can recruit.”

How do Russian and Ukrainian war casualties compare?

Core argument: The Economist's model puts Russian casualties at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, implying that one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the full-scale war began.

Our model suggests that Russian casualties are now between 1.1m and 1.4m, of whom 230,000-430,000 are dead. That would mean one in 25 Russian men between the ages of 18 and 49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the start of the full-scale war. There are too few reliable estimates of Ukrainian deaths to construct a similar meta-estimate. One single estimate, published on January 27th by CSIS, a think-tank, put total Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 as of December, including 100,000-140,000 dead. Though much lower than Russia’s casualties in absolute terms, as a share of its population it is higher—equivalent to about one in 16 Ukrainian men aged 18-49 before the war. These figures exclude civilian deaths, for which reliable data are scarcer still. Ukrainian losses appeared heaviest early in the war: American officials estimated that 70,000 soldiers had already been killed by August 2023. Russia’s campaign, by contrast, has only grown bloodier. Some estimates suggest that it is now losing roughly 1,000 soldiers a day. Our modelling shows that as many may have died in the past year as in the first three combined. It is losing more men than it can recruit.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Economist's model puts Russian casualties at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, implying that one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the full-scale war began.
  2. CSIS estimated total Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 as of December, including 100,000–140,000 dead, a lower absolute figure than Russia's but a higher share of population, equivalent to about one in 16 prewar Ukrainian men aged 18–49.
  3. Some estimates put Russia's losses at roughly 1,000 soldiers a day, and The Economist's modelling suggests as many may have died in the past year as in the first three combined, more men than Russia can recruit.

Related Articles:

  • Russian War Spending May Be Maxed Out — Despite large increases in value-added, excise, income, and social insurance taxes, deficits financed roughly two-thirds of the rise in Russia's consolidated budget spending, including more than 80% of the federal spending increase. Russian government debt remains very low relative to national income, yet officials plan slower nominal spending growth and no additional military and national security spending in ruble terms.
  • Russians Shun Putin’s Plea for More Babies as Population Shrinks — Russia's population decline has accelerated, with births falling 3.4% to 1.22m — the lowest level in roughly 25 years — while deaths rose 3.3% to 1.82m, according to Russia's Federal Statistics Service. The decline is attributed in part to Russia's war on Ukraine, though detailed mortality data has been classified and war deaths enter the statistics with long delays.
  • The Russian Paradox: So Much Education, So Little Human Capital — Russia is an exception to the global correspondence between educational attainment and human capital, combining an advanced educational profile with strikingly poor health outcomes and only weak contributions to knowledge production and skills-intensive service exports. World Health Organization estimates put male life expectancy at age 15 near that of the world's least developed countries.
  • Security
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

Drones Are Key to Winning Wars Now. The U.S. Makes Hardly Any.

AI Summary. China's DJI accounts for about 70% of commercial drones sold globally, and industry experts estimate its output far exceeds that of any other manufacturer, with capacity in the millions of drones a year. About 500 US companies manufacture drones, producing fewer than 100,000 annually, according to an industry association.

Farah Stockman New York Times
Date Posted:
July 14, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

China’s DJI can manufacture millions of drones a year; about 500 American drone manufacturers are collectively building fewer than 100,000 drones annually.

China’s DJI can manufacture millions of drones a year; about 500 American drone manufacturers are collectively...

Does China outproduce the US in drone manufacturing?

Core argument: DJI accounts for about 70% of all commercial drones sold globally for hobby and industrial uses such as aerial photography, package delivery and weather research, with industry experts estimating its output far exceeds that of any other drone manufacturer.

DJI accounts for about 70% of all commercial drones sold globally for hobby and industrial use, such as aerial photography, package delivery and weather research. The company declined to share market data, but industry experts estimate that DJI’s output far exceeds that of any other drone manufacturer. “No one even comes close,” said Bobby Sakaki, chief executive of UAS NEXUS, a drone industry consultant. “DJI can make millions of drones per year. That is a hundred times more than anybody in the United States can make.” About 500 companies manufacture drones in the United States, producing fewer than 100,000 a year, according to Ryan Carver, communications manager for the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International, a nonprofit organization of industry professionals.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. DJI accounts for about 70% of all commercial drones sold globally for hobby and industrial uses such as aerial photography, package delivery and weather research, with industry experts estimating its output far exceeds that of any other drone manufacturer.
  2. About 500 U.S. companies manufacture drones and together produce fewer than 100,000 a year, according to Ryan Carver of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International.
  3. Bobby Sakaki, chief executive of drone industry consultant UAS NEXUS, says DJI can make millions of drones per year, a hundred times more than any manufacturer in the United States can make.

Related Articles:

  • China Made Millions of Drones. Now It Has to Find Uses For Them — China accounts for 70-80% of global commercial drone supply and 79% of approved drone patents globally, according to industry analysts and a patent study. The Civil Aviation Administration of China projects the low-altitude economy, which includes flying cars, will grow fivefold to $490bn by 2035.
  • Ukraine Drone Strikes Hit Nuclear Bombers Deep Inside Russia — Ukraine used drones smuggled into Russia aboard trucks and released remotely from mobile wooden structures to strike strategic airfields as distant as eastern Siberia. An official in Ukraine's Security Service said more than 40 Russian aircraft, including Tu-95 and Tu-22 M3 long-range bombers and A-50 surveillance planes, were damaged, with losses assessed at at least $2bn.
  • A US Drone Maker Tries to Take Back the Country’s Skies — US drone maker Skydio has produced 45,000 drones in total, while Chinese rival DJI likely makes that many every few weeks — a scale gap that matters because production costs fall predictably with cumulative output. The Pentagon's Defense Innovation Unit says that at attrition rates observed in Ukraine, the US military would exhaust its entire drone supply in five days.
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