Can higher defense spending quickly close Europe's accumulated military stock gap?
Core argument: European NATO members' cumulative defence spending shortfall relative to the 2% of GDP target since 2014 totals EUR850bn, with Germany's gap largest in absolute terms at above EUR200bn and Italy's about EUR150bn.
Much of the discussion about increasing defence spending in light of recent geopolitical developments fails to acknowledge that this protracted underspend has left a stock problem—a depleted stock of weapons, other hardware, and technology; but also gaps in operational capacity, full spectrum battlefield capability, and personnel. As such, while increasing defence spending today is welcome, it will only fill the “stock” gap slowly. Consider the cumulative underspend by NATO countries over the past decade relative to the 2% target and relative to US spending in % of GDP. Data provided by NATO only begins in 2014. Germany’s shortfall to 2% is largest in absolute terms and cumulates to above EUR200B, Italy about EUR150B, etc. The aggregate shortfall for Europe is EUR850B. To reach further and “catch-up” with the US spending closer to 3.5% of GDP Germany would need to spend an additional EUR550B (or EUR800B in total), Italy and France would need to spend above EUR400B in total, and so on. The aggregate shortfall for Europe since 2014 exceeds EUR2,650B.


