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White House Unveils Ban On US Investment In Chinese Tech Sectors

AI Summary. The US will ban certain American investments in China's quantum computing, advanced chips, and artificial intelligence sectors, and require companies to notify the government of other investments in those areas, aiming to block the Chinese military's access to US technology and capital. Private equity and venture capital firms are most affected.

Demetri Sevastopulo Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 10, 2023

The Biden administration is limiting American investment in China’s quantum computing, advanced chips, and artificial intelligence sectors.

The Biden administration is limiting American investment in China’s quantum computing, advanced chips, and artificial...

Will the US ban investment in Chinese quantum, chip, and AI sectors?

Core argument: President Biden's executive order will ban some US investment into China's quantum computing, advanced chips, and artificial intelligence sectors, as part of efforts to stop the Chinese military from accessing American technology and capital.

The Biden administration will ban some US investment into China’s quantum computing, advanced chips, and artificial intelligence sectors, as it boosts efforts to stop the Chinese military from accessing American technology and capital. The new executive order unveiled by President Joe Biden on Wednesday will come into force next year and will also require companies to notify the government of other investments in the three Chinese sectors. The action will largely affect private equity and venture capital firms as well as US investors in joint ventures with Chinese groups.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. President Biden's executive order will ban some US investment into China's quantum computing, advanced chips, and artificial intelligence sectors, as part of efforts to stop the Chinese military from accessing American technology and capital.
  2. The executive order takes effect next year and will require companies to notify the US government of other investments in the three Chinese sectors.
  3. The investment restrictions will largely affect private equity and venture capital firms along with US investors in joint ventures with Chinese groups.

Related Articles:

  • US Adds 36 Chinese Companies to Trade Blacklist — The US Commerce Department added 36 Chinese companies to its "entity list" trade blacklist, requiring American firms to obtain hard-to-get licenses to export critical technologies to them. The move extends US efforts to slow China's development of advanced chips and military technologies such as hypersonic weapons.
  • China Fears Japan’s Chipmaking Curbs Go Further Than US Restrictions — Japan has said it intends to restrict exports of 23 types of chipmaking equipment, aligning with US and Dutch export controls that could limit China's access to cutting-edge chips. Chinese industry executives who reviewed the draft rules say they could restrict China's semiconductor manufacturing more than US measures do.
  • The Rise & Fall of Foreign Direct Investment in China — Net foreign direct investment into China has been negative for four consecutive quarters, as foreign investors shifted from reinvesting earnings from their Chinese operations to repatriating them. Whether this reflects cash management or signals a future slowdown in foreign direct investment is unclear, but the repatriation of profits is negative for China's currency.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Trade (not deficits)
Previous articleAugust 10, 2023More Than 40% of Japanese Women May Never Have ChildrenJapan’s National Institute of Population and Social Security Research projects that 42% of adult Japanese women may never have children at the higher end of their range.Next articleAugust 10, 2023How China Became A Car-Exporting JuggernautChinese car exports are surging; China is now exporting more than 10,000 cars a day.
Showing 93 database articles primarily about China

Surging Export Similarity is Fueling Advanced Economy Trade Tensions With China

AI Summary. An index of how closely China's export basket resembles that of advanced economies fell from 2007 to 2013 as advanced economies cut basic manufactures such as wood and textiles, then rose steeply, driven by greater similarity in chemicals and machinery. Greater overlap signals greater potential for trade conflict.

Benn Steil and Yuma Schuster Council On Foreign Relations
Date Posted:
October 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database

China’s export basket increasingly overlaps with that of advanced economies. By CFR’s measure, the export similarity index has risen ~6pp since 2007, driven by growing overlap in chemicals since 2016 and in machinery and transport equipment, notably EVs, since 2023.

Are Chinese and advanced economy exports becoming more alike?

Core argument: The advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures lowered the export similarity index with China by about two points by 2009, and combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013.

The index measures how closely China’s export basket resembles that of the advanced economies. Broadly, the more similar the baskets become relative to 2007, the greater the potential for immediate trade conflict. The index fell from 2007 to 2013, as the advanced economies reduced wood, textiles, and other basic manufactures as a share of their exports. The orange bars show the advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures, which lowered the index by about two points by 2009—and, combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013. That downward tug, however, is no longer enough to offset upward pressures elsewhere. Those pressures have been in two categories—in chemicals since 2016, and machinery since 2023. As shown by the black line, they have driven the steep rise in the index value.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The advanced economies’ retreat from basic manufactures lowered the export similarity index with China by about two points by 2009, and combined with their retreat from electronics, slightly more by 2013.
  2. Upward pressures in chemicals since 2016 and machinery since 2023 have driven a steep rise in the index measuring how closely China’s export basket resembles that of the advanced economies.
  3. The more China’s and the advanced economies’ export baskets resemble each other relative to 2007, the greater the potential for immediate trade conflict, and the downward tug from advanced-economy exits from basic manufactures no longer offsets upward pressures elsewhere.

Related Articles:

  • How to Fight an Economic War — China earned about $3.4bn from exporting rare-earth elements and magnets in a year, while the U.S. Geological Survey estimates a 30% disruption to U.S. supply of the rare-earth element neodymium alone would cut U.S. GDP by 2.2%, over $600bn. This asymmetry gives Chinese export controls their leverage.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026 — The authors argue China's official growth figures are inconsistent with ten consecutive quarters of deflation, estimating that real GDP is around 11% below official levels, with most of the adjustment in investment. That would imply a drop of roughly 9 percentage points in China's share of global investment, helping explain its export surge.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)

China’s Growth Machines

AI Summary. The United States generates almost twice as much economic output per dollar invested as China, the opposite of what would be expected from a mature developed economy versus a fast-growing economy catching up. The gap points to overexuberance in Chinese investment.

Robin Rivaton and Ben Southwood Works In Progress
Date Posted:
October 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The US generates ~2x as much output per dollar of capital as China. Rivaton and Southwood argue that relentless competition among Chinese subnational governments, who account for ~85% of public expenditure, drives industrial growth at the cost of reduced capital efficiency.

Does China get less economic output per dollar invested than America?

Core argument: The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.

Overexuberance is visible in economic data. Interest rates that banks pay to depositors are capped, giving banks artificially cheap capital. Entrepreneurs may be backed to attempt extremely unlikely, borderline schemes. The capital efficiency ratio measures how much output a country gets out of the capital stock it has invested – how many dollars of GDP a country can buy with a dollar of investment. The United States gets almost twice as much economic output out of every dollar it invests as China does, precisely the opposite of what we would expect from a developed country with a mature economy versus a rapidly growing country playing catch up.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The United States obtains nearly twice as much GDP from every dollar invested as China does, measured by the capital efficiency ratio of output to invested capital stock.
  2. China’s capital efficiency inverts the expected pattern, in which a rapidly growing catch-up economy would extract more output per dollar of investment than a mature developed economy.
  3. Overexuberance is visible in Chinese macroeconomic data, with China’s investment generating less economic output per dollar than that of the United States.

Related Articles:

  • The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism — About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
  • Xi’s Superpower Ambitions Fuel a Dangerous Debt Spiral in China — China's credit to the nonfinancial sector—corporate, government and household borrowing—topped 300% of gross domestic product, 60 percentage points above its end-2019 level and larger than in the US, according to the Bank for International Settlements. The International Monetary Fund estimates broad Chinese government debt, including local financing vehicles, reached 127% of GDP, up from 98% in 2020.
  • Is China’s High-Quality Investment Output Economically Viable? — China's technological progress and infrastructure do not refute claims of overinvestment, since overinvestment often produces real physical assets and technological gains yet still counts as overinvestment when it generates less real value than the resources, subsidies, and transfers it consumes. When such losses are capitalized, assets are carried above their real economic value.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Growth
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Who Loses from China’s Export Gains?

AI Summary. A projection estimates China gains about $1.13tn in annual export value by 2030 relative to baseline while the rest of the world loses about $5.1tn, including $2.25tn for the G7. The authors attribute the net global decline to trade shifting toward Chinese goods whose export prices keep falling.

Charles Austin Jordan and Logan Wright Rhodium Group
Date Posted:
September 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

China’s share of global exports by volume is on track to rise from 20% in 2025 to 28% by 2030. Yet China’s rising export share may depress the total value of global exports as lower-priced Chinese goods displace more expensive exports from other countries.

Do China's export share gains reduce global export values?

Core argument: The projection has China gaining roughly $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses about $5.1 trillion.

The net result of our projection would suggest that China gains around $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses around $5.1 trillion, with the G7 accounting for $2.25 trillion of those potential losses alone. This implies that China’s export share gains effectively destroy overall global trade values relative to the status quo due to continued declines in export prices. Regardless of which assumptions are used, China’s export share gains appear to reduce global total potential export values, because trade patterns are shifting toward Chinese goods that are declining in price.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The projection has China gaining roughly $1.13 trillion in annual export value by 2030 relative to the baseline scenario, while the rest of the world loses about $5.1 trillion.
  2. The G7 accounts for $2.25 trillion of the projected $5.1 trillion in export value losses borne by countries outside China.
  3. China’s export share gains appear to reduce global total potential export values regardless of the assumptions used, because trade patterns shift toward Chinese goods whose prices continue to decline.

Related Articles:

  • The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism — About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
  • China Is Making Trade Impossible — Interviews with Chinese economists, technologists and business leaders yielded no clear answer to what products China would want to buy from the rest of the world in future, beyond commodities, luxury goods and higher education. The author argues China sees nothing it cannot eventually make better and cheaper itself, undermining trade as a two-way exchange.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)

The Export Wave Is Cresting

AI Summary. China's export boom shows signs of cresting, with year-over-year growth leveling off at roughly 24-27% in US dollar terms, and memory chips now the biggest single swing factor for exports. Total export growth is expected to converge toward the recent trend for non-artificial-intelligence products of about 5-7%.

Andrew Batson Gavekal
Date Posted:
September 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Andrew Batson argues that as the memory-chip price cycle’s impact on Chinese export growth fades, export growth in renminbi terms in 2027 “will most likely converge toward the recent trend for products outside the AI complex, which is around 5–7%.”

Is China's export boom leveling off toward slower growth?

Core argument: China’s export growth has leveled off over the past three months at roughly 24–27% year-on-year in US dollar terms and 18–20% in renminbi terms, a sign the export wave is cresting.

China’s latest extraordinary export wave is showing signs of cresting. The headline YoY growth of exports has leveled off over the past three months, staying around 24-27% in US dollar terms and 18-20% in renminbi terms. The boom in exports of products associated with investment in artificial intelligence is certainly not over, but current super-high growth rates will probably slow in coming months. Memory chips are now the biggest single swing factor for exports, and prices for some products have recently leveled off after their massive surge. While the ebb and flow of memory prices is difficult to forecast, growth of total exports in 2027 will most likely converge toward the recent trend for products outside the AI complex, which is around 5-7%. Semiconductor cycles have limited implications for China’s vast range of other exports, which are still very competitive in global markets.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China’s export growth has leveled off over the past three months at roughly 24–27% year-on-year in US dollar terms and 18–20% in renminbi terms, a sign the export wave is cresting.
  2. Memory chips are the biggest single swing factor for China’s exports, with prices for some products leveling off after a massive surge and super-high AI-related growth rates likely to slow in coming months.
  3. Total Chinese export growth in 2027 will most likely converge toward the recent 5–7% trend for products outside the AI complex, which remain very competitive in global markets.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Share Of Global Container Exports Soars To 40% — China accounted for 40% of global container exports on a three-month rolling average, up 2.5 percentage points in nine months, according to the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. The chamber's president argues this shows global trade imbalances are growing faster than expected.
  • Understanding Global Imbalances — The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.
  • The Year of the Trojan Fire Horse: China’s Imbalanced Economy and Unrelenting Mercantilism — About 30% of Chinese industrial companies are unprofitable "zombies" kept alive by subsidies far larger than those elsewhere, rather than exiting amid falling industrial producer prices. Countries with large increases in manufactured imports from China also saw slowdowns in domestic manufacturing, including declining manufacturing shares of output across most of Southeast Asia.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)

Who Will Win The War Of Neo-Mercantilists?

AI Summary. China's manufacturing export surplus is around 2% of world GDP, roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran, while domestic demand has stalled. Unexplained negative net income of about $125bn on its $4tn in net foreign assets, versus an expected $100bn surplus, supports the argument that the renminbi is about 30% undervalued.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Martin Wolf estimates that under reasonable assumptions, China should be earning ~$100B annually on her $4T of foreign assets. Yet, China shows an unexplained negative net income of around $125bn on its net foreign asset position.

Is China's currency undervalued as its export surplus hits record levels?

Core argument: China's manufacturing export surplus stands at roughly 2% of world GDP, described as roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran, while exports surge and domestic demand stalls.

China’s macroeconomics are very different from those obtained before the global financial crisis and, even more so, before the end of its property boom. Exports are surging, but domestic demand has stalled. China's export surplus in manufacturing is now around 2% of world GDP, which is “roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran.” Most importantly, China shows an unexplained negative net income of around $125bn on its net foreign investments. But it should, on reasonable assumptions about the income it earns on its $4tn in net foreign assets, have a surplus of some $100bn. As a result, Brad Setser argues, the renminbi is by now some 30% undervalued. China’s policies look unavoidably threatening to much of the world. If a major trading partner runs huge and persistent trade and current account surpluses, everyone else has to run offsetting deficits. This leads to the shrinkage of sectors specialising in producing tradable goods and services, as well as huge domestic financial deficits.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's manufacturing export surplus stands at roughly 2% of world GDP, described as roughly twice the largest surplus Japan ever ran, while exports surge and domestic demand stalls.
  2. China reports an unexplained negative net income of about $125bn on its net foreign investments, though reasonable assumptions about returns on its $4tn in net foreign assets imply a surplus near $100bn.
  3. Brad Setser argues the renminbi is some 30% undervalued; persistent Chinese trade and current account surpluses require offsetting deficits elsewhere, shrinking sectors producing tradable goods and services and producing large domestic financial deficits.

Related Articles:

  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — Neo-mercantilism is thriving in both China, which pairs infant-industry promotion with large trade surpluses, and in a United States focused on external deficits and protecting domestic markets. The author argues this will likely fracture the world economy, and that a new multilateral treaty could include a mechanism to combat large structural trade surpluses.
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — Stronger Chinese growth driven by export-oriented manufacturing may not produce net positive spillovers: for every 1pp export-driven boost to China's GDP, other economies may see a 0.1–0.3pp drag, with high-tech producers such as Europe and Japan facing greater pressure. Cheaper Chinese goods continue to exert a disinflationary impulse.
  • China’s Economy: Rightsizing 2025, Looking Ahead to 2026 — The authors argue China's official growth figures are inconsistent with ten consecutive quarters of deflation, estimating that real GDP is around 11% below official levels, with most of the adjustment in investment. That would imply a drop of roughly 9 percentage points in China's share of global investment, helping explain its export surge.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Growth
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)

China’s Trade Surplus With EU Hits Record as Tensions Intensify

AI Summary. China's trade surplus with the European Union reached a record, rising 27% year-on-year to $32.9bn in a single month, with its surplus with Germany more than doubling while falling 81% with France. Over the first half of the year, Chinese exports to the bloc rose 17% to $312.3bn while imports rose 9% to $135.6bn.

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
Date Posted:
July 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database

China’s trade surplus with the European Union increased 27% y/y to $32.9B in June. China’s surplus with Germany more than doubled.

Is China's trade surplus with the European Union reaching record levels?

Core argument: China's trade surplus with the EU rose 27% from a year earlier to $32.9 billion in June, with exports to the bloc reaching a record, according to Chinese customs data.

China’s trade surplus with the European Union climbed to a fresh high, keeping the issue of growing imbalances high on the agenda as the bloc weighs new measures to shield local industries. With exports to the EU soaring to a record, China’s surplus with the bloc rose 27% from a year earlier to $32.9 billion in June, according to Chinese customs data released on Tuesday. The country’s surplus with Germany more than doubled year-on-year while plunging 81% with France. For the first half of the year, China imported $135.6 billion of goods from the EU, up 9% from a year earlier. Meanwhile its exports amounted to $312.3 billion during the period, a gain of 17%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China's trade surplus with the EU rose 27% from a year earlier to $32.9 billion in June, with exports to the bloc reaching a record, according to Chinese customs data.
  2. China exported $312.3 billion of goods to the EU in the first half of the year, up 17%, while importing $135.6 billion from the bloc, up 9%.
  3. China's surplus with Germany more than doubled from a year earlier while its surplus with France fell 81%, as the EU weighs new measures to shield local industries.

Related Articles:

  • The Real Problem With Global Trade — Asia's $1.5tn trade surplus is larger as a share of world output than at any point since 1945 and is the only large surplus in the global economy. Exchange rates have a meaningful impact on trade balances: China's surplus reached about 10% of its output amid renminbi depreciation, then fell below 2% after a 40% real appreciation.
  • Understanding Global Imbalances — The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.
  • China Shock 2.0 The Cost Of Germany’s Complacency — An analysis published by Bloomberg attributes roughly 40% of Germany's shortfall in economic output to lost export markets, another 40% to higher energy prices, and the remaining 20% to weak domestic demand, bureaucracy and other factors. The author argues German politics overemphasizes bureaucracy while China's pressure on the country's industrial base erodes export demand.
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)
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