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Science is Getting Harder

AI Summary. A growing "burden of knowledge" is making scientific breakthroughs harder, with the share of recent discoveries recognized as Nobel-worthy falling from about 90% before the 1970s to about 50% by 2015 even as the numbers of scientists and publications rose. Sustaining progress appears to require escalating research spending, expertise, and collaboration.

Matt Clancy What's New Under the Sun
Date Posted:
June 28, 2022
Is Database:
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Evidence that advancing science is getting harder, driven by an increasing ‘burden of knowledge.’

Is a growing burden of knowledge making scientific breakthroughs harder?

Core argument: The share of recent discoveries recognized as Nobel-worthy fell from 90% before the 1970s to 50% by 2015, which is cited as evidence that a rising "burden of knowledge" is making scientific advances harder.

The increasing "burden of knowledge" is making scientific advancements more challenging, as evidenced by a decline in the recognition of recent discoveries as Nobel-worthy, dropping from 90% pre-1970s to 50% by 2015. Despite a rise in the number of scientists and publications, there is no corresponding increase in groundbreaking discoveries, suggesting that more time and resources are needed for significant scientific progress. This trend mirrors findings in technological innovation, where sustaining progress requires escalating R&D efforts. The growing complexity and volume of existing knowledge necessitate greater expertise and collaboration, impacting the pace and scale of new scientific breakthroughs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of recent discoveries recognized as Nobel-worthy fell from 90% before the 1970s to 50% by 2015, which is cited as evidence that a rising "burden of knowledge" is making scientific advances harder.
  2. Growth in the number of scientists and publications has not produced a corresponding increase in groundbreaking discoveries, suggesting that significant scientific progress requires more time and resources.
  3. The pattern mirrors findings in technological innovation, where sustaining progress requires escalating R&D effort, as the growing complexity and volume of existing knowledge demand greater expertise and collaboration.

Stepping back, I’m claiming that science is getting harder, in the sense that it is increasingly challenging to make discoveries that have comparable impact to the ones in the past. Diverse groups – the Nobel nominators, contemporary surveyed scientists, academics, and inventors – all seem to have an increasing preference for the work of the past, relative to the present. Prior to the 1970s, on average 90% of the time, awards went to papers published in the last twenty years. But by 2015, the ten-year moving average was closer to 50%. So recent discoveries seem to have a harder time getting recognized as Nobel-worthy, relative to a few decades ago.And looking at growth in the number of topics covered by scientists also suggests it has become harder to make forward progress. To close, I’ll add two more arguments. First, we should expect science to get harder because of the “burden of knowledge.” The basic idea is, almost as a tautology, making new discoveries requires new knowledge; otherwise the discovery would likely already have been made. Whenever new knowledge is discovered, it opens the way for new discoveries, and it may also displace or make obsolete some older knowledge. But if new knowledge does not entirely displace old knowledge, then it may be you need steadily more knowledge to make new discoveries. Unfortunately, I think we have quite good evidence this seems to be the case as a general (though probably not absolute) rule, much of it reviewed here. All else equal, if you need more and more knowledge to make a discovery of a given size, then you can probably expect discoveries of a given size to require more time or manpower to bring about. And the evidence of this post suggests that is what we have in fact observed. Second, if it’s true that innovation in other domains has in fact gotten harder (and I think it has), then to the extent scientific discovery and other forms of innovation are a similar process we shouldn’t be surprised when what applies to the former also applies to the latter. As noted at the outset of this post, if you pick some metric of technological progress, odds are that a constant rate of progress along that metric is accompanied by rising R&D effort. Why should science be so different? Each of these pieces of evidence has holes in it. But I think they are not the same holes. Stack them all up, and I think you get an argument that can begin to hold water.

Matt Clancy, “Science is getting harder,”What’s New Under the Sun, June 1, 2022, https://mattsclancy.substack.com/p/science-is-getting-harder

Science is getting harder

One of the most famous recent papers in the economics of innovation is “Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find?” by Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen, and Webb. It showed that more and more R&D effort is necessary to sustain the present rates of technological progress, whether we are talking about Moore’s law, agricultural crop yields, healthcare, or other proxies for progress. Other papers that look into this issue have found similar results. While it is ambiguous whether the rate of technological progress is actually slowing down, it certainly seems to be getting harder and harder to keep up the pace.

What about in science?

A basket of indicators all seem to document a trend similar to what we see with technology. Even as the number of scientists and publications rises substantially, we do not appear to be seeing a concomitant rise in new discoveries that supplant older ones. Science is getting harder.

Before diving into these indicators, I want to head off one potential misunderstanding. My claim is that science is getting harder, in some sense, not that science is ending or that we are on the verge of running out of ideas. Instead, the claim is that discoveries of a given “size” are harder to bring about than in the past.

Raw paper output

We’ll actually start with an indicator that shows no evidence of a slowdown though. Since scientists primarily communicate their discoveries via papers, the first place to look for evidence of increasing difficulty of making discoveries is in the number of papers scientists publish annually. The figure below, drawn from Dashun Wang and Albert-László Barabási’s (free!) book on the Science of Science compares publications to authors over the last century.

Science is getting harder: Extended Excerpt Image 1

At left, we can see the number of papers and authors per year has increased basically in lockstep over the twentieth century. Note, the axis is a log-scale, so that a straight-line indicates exponential growth. Meanwhile, at right, the blue dashed line shows that the number of papers per author has hovered around 2 for a century and rather than falling, it is actually on the rise in recent decades. (As an aside, the solid red line at right is strong evidence for the rise of teams in science, discussed more here)

So absolutely no evidence that scientists are struggling to find stuff worth writing up. But that’s not definitive evidence, because scientists are strongly incentivized to publish and what constitutes a publishable discovery is whatever editors and peer reviewers think is publishable. If fewer big discoveries are made, scientists may just publish more papers on small discoveries. So let’s take a more critical look at the papers that get published and see if there are any indicators that they contain smaller discoveries than in the past.

Nobel Prizes

Let’s start by looking at some discoveries whose importance is universally acknowledged. The Nobel prize for discoveries in physics, chemistry, and medicine is one of the most prestigious scientific prizes and has a history long enough for us to see any long-run trends. Using a publicly available database on Nobel laureates by Li et al. (2019), we can identify the papers describing research that is eventually awarded a Nobel prize, and the year these papers were published. Note several papers might be associated with any given award. For each award year, we can then ask, what share of the papers related to the discovery were published in the preceding twenty years. The results of that are presented below, though I smooth the data by taking the ten-year moving average.

Science is getting harder: Extended Excerpt Image 2

Prior to the 1970s, on average 90% of the time, awards went to papers published in the last twenty years. But by 2015, the ten-year moving average was closer to 50%.

So recent discoveries seem to have a harder time getting recognized as Nobel-worthy, relative to a few decades ago. We can also compare the importance of different discoveries that won Nobel prizes. In 2018, Patrick Collison and Michael Nielsen asked physicists, chemists, and life scientists to pick the more important discovery (in their field) from sets of two Nobel prize winning discoveries. For example, they might ask a physicist to say which is more important, the discovery of Giant Magnetoresistance (awarded the Nobel in 2007) or the discovery of the Compton effect (awarded in 1927). For each decade, they look at the probability a randomly selected discovery made in that decade would be picked by their survey respondents over a randomly selected discovery made in another decade. The results are below:1

Science is getting harder: Extended Excerpt Image 3

A few points are notable from this exercise. First, physicists seem to think the quantum revolution of the 1910s-1930s was the best era for physics and it’s been broadly downhill since then. That’s certainly consistent with discoveries today being in a sense smaller than the ones of the past, at least for physics.

In contrast, for chemistry and physiology/medicine, the second half of the twentieth century has outperformed the first half. In the Nobel prize data, within the second half of the century, there is no obvious trend up or down for chemistry and medicine. While that’s better than physics, it remains consistent with the notion that science might be getting harder. As we can see in the first figure here, the number of papers and scientists rose substantially between 1950 and 1980, which naively implies that the number of candidates for Nobel-prize winning discoveries should also have risen substantially. If we are selecting the most important discovery from a bigger pool of candidates, we should expect that discovery to be judged more important than discoveries picked from smaller pools. But that doesn’t seem to be the case.

So Nobel prize data is also consistent with the idea that discoveries today aren’t what they used to be. Whereas it used to be quite common for work published in the preceding twenty years to be recognized for a Nobel, that doesn’t happen nearly so much today. That said, an alternative explanation is that the Nobel committee is just trying to work through an enormous backlog of Nobel-worthy work which they want to recognize before the discoverers die. In this explanation, we’ll eventually see just as many awards for the work of today.

But it’s not clear to me this is how the committee is actually thinking: recent work is awarded half the time still if the committee thinks the discovery is sufficiently important. For example, Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier were awarded a Nobel for their work on CRISP-R in 2020, less than a decade after the main discoveries. And when you look specifically at the work performed in the 1980s, it doesn’t seem particularly notable, relative to work in the 40s, 50s, 60s, and 70s, despite the fact that many more papers were published in that decade.

Top Cited Papers

Still, perhaps the Nobel prize is simply too idiosyncratic for us to learn much from. Next, let’s look at another indicator of big discoveries, one which shouldn’t be biased by the sort of factors peculiar to the Nobel. This is the most top-cited papers in a given field. For example, if we look at the top 0.1% most highly cited papers of all time in a particular field, we could ask how easy is it for a new paper to join their ranks. If that has fallen over time, then that’s further evidence that today’s papers aren’t making the same contributions as yesterday’s.

On the other hand though, we might think it should get harder and harder to climb to the top 0.1%, even if discoveries are not getting smaller. After all, if discoveries are of constant size, earlier works have more time to get citations; it may not be possible for later papers to catch up, even if they are just as good. But there are also some factors that lean in the opposite direction. First, if work is only cited when relevant, then newer work should have an easier time being relevant to newer papers. Since the number of new papers grows over time, that gives one advantage to the new; they can be tailored to a bigger audience, in some sense. Second, the most esteemed papers of all time may actually stop being cited at high rates, because their contributions become part of common knowledge: it is no longer necessary to cite Newton when talking about gravity, or even Watson and Crick when asserting DNA has a double-helix shape.

So let’s proceed with seeing if there has been any change in how easy or hard it is to become a top cited paper, noting that won’t be the last piece of evidence we look at.

The closest paper I know of that looks into this is Chu and Evans (2021), which looks at the probability of a new paper ever becoming one of the top 0.1% most cited, even for just one year. But this paper does not plot this probability against time, like the previous charts: instead, it plots this probability against the size of a field, measured by the number of papers published per year. In the scatterplot below, each point corresponds to a field in a year. On the horizontal axis is the number of papers published in the fields in that year and on the vertical axis the probability a paper in that field and year is ever among the top 0.1% most cited. The colored lines are trends for each of these ten fields. Note this figure only includes papers published in the year 2000 or earlier. Since the analysis is conducted with data from 2014, every paper has more than a decade to accrue citations and get into the top 0.1%.

Science is getting harder: Extended Excerpt Image 4

The figure shows pretty clearly that as fields get bigger the probability of jumping to the top 0.1% shrinks. It used to be the case that papers had a greater than 0.1% chance of being in the top 0.1% at some point. That, itself, suggests some degree of turnover and dynamism at the top of the field. But for the largest fields, that isn’t the case anymore. Note, while this chart has the size of a field on the horizontal axis, since fields tend to get bigger every year, this also shows us trends over time: up until the year 2000, newer papers had successively lower chances of supplanting their rivals and becoming one of the top 0.1% most cited.

Another variant of this chart tells the same story. In the figure below, Chu and Evans find the top 50 most highly cited papers in each year. In red below, they then track the proportion of those papers that stay in the top 50 in the next year. As this moves up, that means fewer and fewer papers are supplanting the top 50 most cited. Again, they plot this against the size of the field rather than time, but since the two move together, it also shows what is happening over time.

Science is getting harder: Extended Excerpt Image 5

(In blue is a related measure, the year-to-year correlation of the rank of top 50 cited papers. In an appendix, they specifically show that this measure is correlated with time alone, so that there is less turnover in more recent years)

If being a top-cited paper is an indicator of large scientific impact, then the above suggests it’s harder to have a big impact than in the past.

Other interpretations are also possible though, such as the factors mentioned earlier. Alternatively, perhaps as fields grow a canon of select papers emerges, and everyone frames their work in relation to this canon, so that earlier work is perpetually cited, but citations don’t accurately capture the “size” of a new discovery. As with the factors peculiar to the Nobel prize, it might be that these two explanations can coexist. But in case there is something strange about how earlier work is necessarily canonized, let’s now turn to some indicators that cover science more broadly.

Growth in Topics

One issue with all the preceding evidence is that the quality of a research discovery is determined by how other scientists assess it: do they cite it, give it prizes, or tell us how important it is relative to alternatives. That might be the best we can do; a thorny problem in research is that evaluating the quality of research often requires the skills to do research, and most of the people with those skills are researchers. But it also means our assessment of the quality of research is tied up with any biases and blindspots a field might have about itself.

So let’s turn to a metric that isn’t based on the assessment of the scientists themselves. Rather than looking at the size of discoveries, we could instead try to chart the topics covered by a field over time. If a field is steadily spreading into new topics (from electrons to quarks to strings, for example), that suggests a field is learning new things and pushing out its frontier. On the other hand, if a field remains stuck on the same set of things (from strings to strings to strings, for example) that might be indicative that the field is struggling to make progress.

Milojević (2015) tries to get at this question by looking to the titles of published papers. Most people will probably only ever read a paper’s title, and so scientists usually try to broadcast what the paper is about with the title.2 Milojević uses the text of titles to define the topics a field is studying. Milojević identifies a topic as a string of words in a title that lies between a grammatical phrase delimiter (think.,:;) or a common English word with non-technical meaning (think “about”, “since”, “using”). When a topic has more than three words, she uses only the last three to define it. As an example, using this technique the most cited paper of all time, “Protein measurement with the Folin phenol reagent” would be construed to be about the topics “protein measurement” and “Folin phenol reagent.”

Now that Milojević has a way to define topics in a field, she then goes about counting how many distinct topics are mentioned in the titles of papers published in a given year. Analogous to the number of papers published per person, Milojević looks at the number of unique topics for every set of 10,000. In other words, the algorithm reads random paper titles until it reaches 10,000 topics, and then counts how many topics from this set of 10,000 are unique.

In 2022, Milojević updated the data from her 2015 paper as part of an OECD workshop (report forthcoming). Below is the number of unique topics studied in a random sample of 10,000 topics across all of science, by year (which Milojevic calls the cognitive extent).

Science is getting harder: Extended Excerpt Image 6

Through the twentieth century, there was a general rise in the number of unique topics studied in a given sample of scientific titles. Over 1935-1975 this rise was a bumpy one, but it looks like we mostly reverted to trend, so the overall rate of change was steady over a long horizon. But sometime since the 1970s, this upward trend has very gradually slowed to a stop, and even began to reverse slightly. If counting topics is a good way to measure the successful growth rate of a field, then this indicates fields are having a harder time growing today than in the past.

Is counting topics in this manner sensible? Carayol, Lahatte and Llopis (2019) provide some complementary evidence on the topics authors are choosing to study using a much more straight-forward data source: the keywords authors supply to publishers to describe their own papers (some other elements of this paper are also discussed here and here). Unfortunately, this data is only available for 1999-2013. Fortunately, that is precisely the period when Milojević begins to observe the sharpest decline in unique topics. So do we see a similar thing when we look at the keywords authors use to describe their papers? Yes.

In the figure below, Carayol, Lahatte, and Llopis compare the growth rate of three different things, but we are most interested in the green dashed line and the blue line. The green dashed line shows growth in the number of publications over 1999-2013 by comparing annual publication to the number published in 1999. The blue line shows the growth in the total number of unique author-supplied keywords used to describe research, again by comparing the number in a given year to the number in 1999. This figure has a log scale, so that a straight line indicates constant exponential growth.

Science is getting harder: Extended Excerpt Image 7

These two curves have begun to diverge. Whereas the growth in the total number of publications has been steady and exponential, growth in the total number of unique keywords has been slower than exponential. That seems broadly consistent with Milojević’s finding that the number of unique topics for a fixed sample size also stopped growing over this period. In other words, in terms of the number of topics being tackled by science, growth of fields is proceeding more slowly today than in the past.

Citations to Recent Papers

Another approach we could take is to compare the citations received by papers over time. If older papers made bigger discoveries than younger ones, then we might expect them to hold on longer and be more highly cited than new papers. One simple way to assess this is to look at the share of citations made in each year to new papers. A simple measure of this is the Price index (named for Derek De Solla Price, not the cost of a good), which computes the share of citations made to papers published in the last 5 years (or 10 years in some variants).

Below, Larivière, Archambault, and Gingras (2007) compute the Price index for all papers on Thompson Scientific over the period 1900-2004. They compute two versions of the index. The 20-year index divides the number of citations to papers published in the preceding 5 years by the number of citations to papers published in the preceding 20 years. The 100-year index does the same thing, but dividing by the number of citations made to papers published in the preceding century.

Science is getting harder: Extended Excerpt Image 8

I think this figure is best understood as describing two periods. From 1900-1955 there was a general increase in the share of citations made to recent work, interrupted by the two world wars. Each world war imposed big disruptions on the production of new scientific work (see the first figure in this post), which had the secondary effect of reducing the share of citations to recent work. But since 1955, the share of citations made to new work has fallen dramatically, by an amount comparable to the distortions caused by the world wars (though spread out over many decades).

Cui, Wu, and Evans (2022) document that this trend has continued until 2014, and is not driven by any single field. It appears to be an almost universal phenomenon. In the figure below, they calculate the share of (all) citations made to work published in the preceding 10 years. It’s down across the board.

Science is getting harder: Extended Excerpt Image 9

This looks pretty alarming, but there are explanations besides a sharp decline in size of discoveries. Whenever the share of something goes down, there are two possible causes: it could be the numerator goes down and/or the denominator goes up. And in this case, it’s mostly the latter. The raw number of citations to recent work doesn’t actually seem to have fallen by very much, at least, according to Larivière, Archambault, and Gingras (2007). But the total number of citations papers make has gone way up, and most of that increase has been citations to older work.

So the real question is less “why have researchers stopped citing new work” and more “why are researchers citing old work at such a high rate.” One explanation is that older work contains the bigger discoveries, and we’re still living in their shadow. But another explantion, put forward by Cui, Wu, and Evans, is simply that the scientific labor force is aging and older scientists are more familiar with older papers. Older scientists might push up the share of citations to older paper either by citing them in their own work, or by insisting on them being cited in other people’s work when they serve as peer reviewers. This age dynamic could also be a factor in the persistence of top-cited papers of the past. But whether this is about the size of discoveries or an aging scientific labor force’s preferences (and the two explanations are not mutually exclusive either), the more distant past is increasingly influential in contemporary science.

So let’s close by looking at one more data source, which is somewhat immune to some of the strategic citation factors unique to academia.

Patent Citations to Recent Papers

Patents also cite academic papers, where relevant. While patents have their own issues, one virtue is that inventors face a different set of incentives than academics. Whereas academics might cite papers or choose to work on topics that they know will be viewed favorably by their older peers, an inventor doesn’t face these constraints. In principle, they might just rely on whatever science is most useful for the purposes of getting some technology to work. Moreover, we have some good evidence science really is a useful input to technology, and that this is reflected tolerably well in citations to science. So if inventors are not citing recent science as much as in the past, that’s another indicator that recent science may be struggling to make comparable discoveries to the papers of the past.

I have not been able to find any papers that look at the extent to which patents cite recent academic research (if you know of such work, please send it my way and I can update this). Fortunately, Marx and Fuegi have a publicly available database of patent citations to academic work, which I used to put together the following figure. In each year of the following figure, I pull all citations made to academic papers by US patents whose application was filed in that year, and that was eventually granted within the next five years. I then compute the share of these citations that go to papers published in the preceding five years. Essentially, this is the Price index, discussed in the previous section, but applied to the citations of patents. I started the figure in 1975, as citations to academic papers were quite rare before then.

Science is getting harder: Extended Excerpt Image 10

This figure echoes what we see in the academic price index: citations to recent work have become increasingly less common. Unlike the academic work though, this is not entirely a story of rising citations to older work and steady citations to new work. Instead, we are actually seeing a decline in the number of citations to recent work. Among the subset of patents that cite academic work, the average number of citations to papers published in five years prior to the patent’s filing date dropped from about 4 around 2000 to under 3.5 by 2015.

The Big Picture

Stepping back, I’m claiming that science is getting harder, in the sense that it is increasingly challenging to make discoveries that have comparable impact to the ones in the past. Diverse groups – the Nobel nominators, contemporary surveyed scientists, academics, and inventors – all seem to have an increasing preference for the work of the past, relative to the present. And looking at growth in the number of topics covered by scientists also suggests it has become harder to make forward progress. To close, I’ll add two more arguments.

First, we should expect science to get harder because of the “burden of knowledge.” The basic idea is, almost as a tautology, making new discoveries requires new knowledge; otherwise the discovery would likely already have been made. Whenever new knowledge is discovered, it opens the way for new discoveries, and it may also displace or make obsolete some older knowledge. But if new knowledge does not entirely displace old knowledge, then it may be you need steadily more knowledge to make new discoveries. Unfortunately, I think we have quite good evidence this seems to be the case as a general (though probably not absolute) rule, much of it reviewed here. All else equal, if you need more and more knowledge to make a discovery of a given size, then you can probably expect discoveries of a given size to require more time or manpower to bring about. And the evidence of this post suggests that is what we have in fact observed.

Second, if it’s true that innovation in other domains has in fact gotten harder (and I think it has), then to the extent scientific discovery and other forms of innovation are a similar process we shouldn’t be surprised when what applies to the former also applies to the latter. As noted at the outset of this post, if you pick some metric of technological progress, odds are that a constant rate of progress along that metric is accompanied by rising R&D effort. Why should science be so different?

Each of these pieces of evidence has holes in it. But I think they are not the same holes. Stack them all up, and I think you get an argument that can begin to hold water.

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US Labor Productivity Increases at Fastest Pace in a Year

AI Summary. US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

Julia Fanzeres Bloomberg
Date Posted:
November 5, 2026
Is Database:
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Nonfarm business productivity grew at a 3.6% annualized rate in Q3, the fastest pace in a year. Real hourly compensation rose 1.1%, while the labor share fell to 53%, the lowest in data going back to 1947.

Is a capital spending boom lifting worker productivity?

Core argument: US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

US labor productivity accelerated in the third quarter at the fastest pace in a year, suggesting a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared. Productivity, or nonfarm business output per hour, increased at a 3.6% annualized rate after an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed Thursday. Unit labor costs — what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output — fell 0.7%, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
  2. Unit labor costs, what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output, fell 0.7% in the third quarter, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
  3. The third-quarter productivity acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared.

Related Articles:

  • Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected — The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
  • Higher Utilisation Explains The Recent Surge In Productivity Growth — Measured total factor productivity growth is estimated to come almost entirely from higher input utilisation rather than underlying efficiency gains, based on a method that infers unobserved capital and labour utilisation from movements in hours per worker. On this evidence, recent productivity gains reflect "working harder" rather than "working smarter.
  • US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits — US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
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Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected

AI Summary. The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.

Greg Jensen Bridgewater Associates
Date Posted:
October 30, 2026
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Bridgewater estimates that AI equities are pricing in ~3.5% annual productivity growth, while real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market are slightly below current levels. They conclude: “Either AI stocks or broader macro markets are very meaningfully mispriced.”

Do AI stock valuations and broader markets imply incompatible growth expectations?

Core argument: AI equities are priced for roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth, more than is estimated as needed to make US debts sustainable, and across a reasonable range of assumptions imply trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past.

Different markets are pricing very different futures; most are far from pricing an unrecognizable world. The AI boom has contributed tens of trillions of dollars of market cap in AI companies. As in any gold rush, trillions of dollars of “picks and shovels” only make sense if a great deal of gold (profits) is found. The pricing of a broader universe of AI companies tells us something about the scale of transformation that is discounted. If we calculate the incremental revenue required to sustain the valuation of AI companies and estimate how much of that can be earned by cannibalizing the revenue of existing companies, we can back out a productivity boost required to generate the rest of the incremental revenues. Today, we estimate that AI equities are discounting something like 3.5% annual productivity growth. That’s more than we estimate is needed for the US to make its debts sustainable. Across a reasonable range of assumptions, we assess AI stocks to be pricing trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past. By contrast, consensus estimates and broader markets imply a world that looks more like the recent past. Making sense of the pricing in AI stocks requires a boom in productivity and growth. Consensus estimates for growth and productivity (from economist and Fed estimates) are slightly lower than current measures, as are rates of real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. AI equities are priced for roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth, more than is estimated as needed to make US debts sustainable, and across a reasonable range of assumptions imply trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past.
  2. Consensus growth and productivity estimates from economists and the Fed, along with real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market, sit slightly below current measures, describing a world resembling the recent past.
  3. Either AI stocks or broader macro markets are very meaningfully mispriced, since the AI boom has added tens of trillions of dollars of market cap that only makes sense if a great deal of profit is found.

Related Articles:

  • No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector — Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.
  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
  • AI and Productivity — The recent pickup in US labor productivity appears driven by higher utilization of existing capital—running factories, server racks, and hotel rooms harder—rather than by firm-level efficiency gains from AI. Adoption remains too thin and the cross-sectional evidence too weak to conclude that AI-driven productivity gains are already widespread.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Growth
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector

AI Summary. Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.

Torsten Slok Apollo
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Citing flat revenue per worker, and profit margin growth for the S&P 493, Slok argues that so far, AI’s diffusion through the economy has delivered “zero financial payoff to corporate America outside of tech.”

Is artificial intelligence boosting revenue and margins outside big tech?

Core argument: Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the Magnificent 7 but flat for the S&P 493, with no signs of AI boosting productivity growth or delivering financial payoff outside the tech sector.

With no impact on the bottom line, mainstream corporate America is pulling back and starting to view token spending not as a source of growth but as a cost center that weighs on margins. VC-backed companies are spending more and more on tokens, but mainstream corporate America does not need the latest model and is unwilling to pay for it. As long as agentic AI and token spending are confined to a small part of the economy, the macroeconomic effects of AI will be very limited. The question looking ahead is whether, even as models become commoditized, mainstream corporate America can turn increasingly cheap intelligence into higher revenue growth and higher profit margins. That may be harder than it sounds. The AI story will be decided in the S&P 493, not the Mag 7, and so far, there is no evidence that revenue growth or margins are improving outside the tech sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the Magnificent 7 but flat for the S&P 493, with no signs of AI boosting productivity growth or delivering financial payoff outside the tech sector.
  2. Mainstream corporate America is pulling back from AI and treating token spending as a cost center that weighs on margins, while VC-backed companies spend increasingly more on tokens.
  3. The macroeconomic effects of AI will remain very limited as long as agentic AI and token spending stay confined to a small part of the economy.

Related Articles:

  • Circularity in AI Shows Up in Token Spending Too — Payment-data analysis finds 80% of the largest corporate AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, indicating that much token spending is funded by venture capital rather than earnings. If AI payoffs are slow, venture returns could suffer and a funding pullback could weaken demand for computing power.
  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Innovation/Research
  • Productivity

How Much Revenue Does The AI Buildout Need In 2030?

AI Summary. The authors estimate AI capital spending of $560bn in 2026 and, in a high-investment case, $3.5tn of net AI capital in service by 2030, requiring roughly $1.3tn in annual infrastructure revenue once depreciation, operating costs and a 15% return are covered. That implies 7.4x growth from current annualized revenues, with downstream revenues of $1.9–2.6tn.

William Gildea and Azeem Azhar Exponential View
Date Posted:
October 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Beginning with capex projections, Gildea/Azhar derive for their high-growth case a $1.3T annual AI-infrastructure revenue hurdle for 2030. This covers $771B of depreciation and operating costs, plus a 15% return on $3.5T of net capital in service.

How much annual revenue must AI infrastructure generate to justify investment?

Core argument: In a high investment case with $3.5tn of net AI capital in service, the authors estimate AI infrastructure must generate $1.3tn of annual revenue by 2030, requiring 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues.

We estimate AI CapEx to be $560B in 2026, 64% of the total declared by the hyperscalers. Unfinished facilities can’t generate revenue, so the investment bill and the productive asset base will grow at different speeds. [In the high investment case], by 2030 we see $3.5T of net AI capital in service. The largest component [of the revenue hurdle] is the $555B in compute depreciation. We model lifespans at the current 5-6 years. Shell depreciation and OpEx combined contribute about a further $216B to the required revenue hurdle. [Adding a 15% return on net capital brings required annual infrastructure revenue to $1.3T]. Reaching the $1.3T hurdle would represent 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues. For its customers to earn 30-50% gross margins, downstream revenues need to be $1.9-2.6T. [Editor’s note: Van Nieuwerburgh’s far larger figure of $3.7T covers mature revenues from projects completed through 2032, using commissioning capital and a 50% infrastructure operating cash-flow margin. This estimate instead charges depreciation and operating costs plus 15% on net capital in service in 2030. Different horizons and cost conventions prevent a direct comparison. Van Nieuwerburgh also has a much higher capex estimate.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In a high investment case with $3.5tn of net AI capital in service, the authors estimate AI infrastructure must generate $1.3tn of annual revenue by 2030, requiring 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues.
  2. Compute depreciation of $555bn, modeled on 5-6 year lifespans, is the largest component of the 2030 revenue hurdle, with shell depreciation and operating expenses adding about $216bn and a 15% return on net capital completing the $1.3tn total.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • What Investment Data Implies about the AI Transition — The five largest U.S. technology firms are scaling AI capital spending about 50% a year, from $155bn to a forecast $755bn. Embedding this in a two-sector model with rare productivity booms, the authors estimate AI adds roughly 5, 20, or 58pp to cumulative growth over a seven-year transition, depending on scenario.
  • Rear Window — Major cloud providers posted annual revenue growth of 37% at Amazon Web Services, 43% at Microsoft Azure and 82% at Google Cloud, with rising revenue backlogs of $514bn and $496bn respectively at Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Earnings growth appears highly contingent on continued hyperscaler capital spending and research, which rose from $460bn to $870bn.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

AI and Entrepreneurship: What is Really Happening?

AI Summary. Entrepreneurship by businesses with employees is flat or declining, including in AI-intensive information and professional services, where establishment entry has been flat or falling and young-firm employment in AI-exposed industries is falling. Applications for likely solo businesses with no employees rose steeply in those AI-intensive sectors, but self-employment as a main job is flat, suggesting side hustles.

Nathan Goldschlag Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Nathan Goldschlag finds that available federal data do not yet establish that AI is boosting entrepreneurship. “Across different cuts of the data, there is no clear evidence of AI affecting entrepreneurship, either for likely employers or nonemployers.”

Is AI driving a boom in new employer businesses?

Core argument: Business applications likely to become employer businesses were flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026, with fewer applications of the kind having the highest chance of becoming an employer business.

Employer entrepreneurship is at best rising modestly, and at worst has been falling for several years already. The number of business applications likely to become an employer business was flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026. Fewer of those applications have been the kind that have the highest chance of becoming an employer. Nonemployer entrepreneurship, or “solopreneurship,” is likely rising, but not as the main job of the solopreneurs. These are probably side hustles. Likely nonemployer business applications rose significantly in 2025 and early 2026. But the share of workers claiming to be self-employed nonemployers in their main job — in other words, business owners with no employees — is flat (though noisy). AI-intensive sectors and industries are no exception. Establishment entry in AI-intensive sectors (information and professional services) has been flat or falling in recent years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Business applications likely to become employer businesses were flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026, with fewer applications of the kind having the highest chance of becoming an employer business.
  2. Likely nonemployer business applications rose significantly in 2025 and early 2026, going vertical in the most AI-intensive sectors of information and professional services, while other sectors kept pace until early 2026 and then flattened.
  3. The share of workers reporting self-employment as nonemployers in their main job is flat, though noisy, including among workers in AI-exposed occupations in 2025 and early 2026.

Related Articles:

  • The Age Of The Solopreneur — A surge in US business formation is being driven by solo entrepreneurs, with growth in AI tool usage and in solopreneur activity in high-AI-adoption sectors suggesting artificial intelligence accounts for a meaningful portion of the increase. The authors argue AI is lowering barriers to starting and growing a business by expanding what one-person firms can do.
  • America Has Become An Entrepreneur’s Paradise — US growth in new-business applications is concentrated in professional services (up 25% over four years), retail (18%), and health care and social assistance (18%) rather than artificial-intelligence startups. The share of applications the Census Bureau deems likely to hire at least one employee has fallen to 30% from 38%.
  • Which Entrepreneurs Boost Productivity? — The authors find that a minority of entrepreneurs are "transformative" — generating disproportionate productivity gains, scoring high on IQ tests, being well-educated, and hiring research and development workers. They argue that economies with more such entrepreneurs and R&D workers sustain higher long-run productivity growth.
  • Startups
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Tech's Trillion-Dollar Internal Inconsistency

AI Summary. Wall Street analysts covering technology project the sector's operating cash flow will more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, a gain of over $1.2tn, while analysts covering the rest of the S&P 500 — technology's customers — project those firms will add far less cash flow. These sector-by-sector forecasts are internally inconsistent.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
September 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Tech analysts expect sector operating cash flow to more than double to ~$2.4T by 2028. Analysts covering other S&P 500 sectors (tech’s customers) see far less cash growth in their sectors. Slok “raises the question of who exactly will be writing all those checks to buy AI services.”

Are tech cash flow forecasts inconsistent with customers' projected growth?

Core argument: Analysts covering the tech sector expect its operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, an increase of over $1.2tn.

Wall Street equity analysts work in sector silos, and when you add up their forecasts, the numbers are internally inconsistent. The analysts covering tech expect the sector's operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4 trillion by 2028, an increase of over $1.2 trillion. Meanwhile, the analysts covering the other sectors in the S&P 500, which are tech's customers, expect those companies to add much less operating cash flow. In other words, the tech silo is betting on a future in which demand for AI and tech services explodes, while the silos covering the companies that would pay for those services see a much more modest outlook. Both cannot be right at the same time. The bottom line is that either tech's customers will generate a lot more cash than their analysts expect, or tech's cash flow forecasts are too optimistic, which raises the question of who exactly will be writing all those checks to buy AI services.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Analysts covering the tech sector expect its operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, an increase of over $1.2tn.
  2. Analysts covering the other S&P 500 sectors, which are tech's customers, expect those companies to add much less operating cash flow, leaving the combined forecasts internally inconsistent.
  3. Either tech's customers will generate much more cash than their analysts expect, or tech's cash flow forecasts are too optimistic, which raises the question of who will pay for AI services.

Related Articles:

  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • Rear Window — Major cloud providers posted annual revenue growth of 37% at Amazon Web Services, 43% at Microsoft Azure and 82% at Google Cloud, with rising revenue backlogs of $514bn and $496bn respectively at Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Earnings growth appears highly contingent on continued hyperscaler capital spending and research, which rose from $460bn to $870bn.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
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