Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube
  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
  • Mentions 488
  • Primary focus 189
For whatever topics you select (currently: Politics):
Choose search scope

Your importance filter 'Database' shows fewer articles.

Remove filters to see full article counts

A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election

AI Summary. A report on 2020 election data finds the Democratic presidential share of Latino voters fell 8 percentage points and of Black voters 3 points relative to 2016, while rising 1 point among non-college white voters and 4 points among college-educated whites. Non-college whites still made up 44% of voters.

Andrew Prokop Vox
Date Posted:
September 10, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Biden Share Of Latino Vote Declined 8pp From Clinton’s, Share Of Black Vote Declined 3pp, Biden Gained 1pp Relative To Clinton With Non-College Whites, 4pp With College Whites.

Did Democratic support shift across racial and education groups between elections?

Core argument: Biden's share of Latino voters fell 8 percentage points from Clinton's 2016 performance, and his share of Black voters fell 3 points, according to the report on 2020 election data.

The 2020 election data reveals nuanced shifts in voter demographics, challenging oversimplified racial narratives. Biden's share of Latino votes fell by 8pp [percentage points] from Clinton's 2016 performance, while his share of Black votes decreased by 3pp. Conversely, Biden gained 1pp with non-college white voters and 4pp with college-educated whites. These shifts highlight the evolving dynamics within the electorate, where non-college whites, despite declining as a share, still comprised 44% of voters in 2020. Biden's ability to slightly improve among this group was crucial, as they remain a significant portion of the electorate, especially in swing states. Meanwhile, the increase in Latino turnout underscores their growing electoral influence, despite Biden's reduced support. These demographic changes underscore the complexity of building a stable electoral coalition in a diversifying America.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Biden's share of Latino voters fell 8 percentage points from Clinton's 2016 performance, and his share of Black voters fell 3 points, according to the report on 2020 election data.
  2. Biden gained 4 points among college-educated white voters and 1 point among non-college white voters, who made up 44% of the 2020 electorate despite declining as a share.
  3. Latino turnout rose even as Biden's support among Latino voters declined, illustrating the complexity of assembling a stable electoral coalition in a diversifying America.

Vox write up of Catalist data (note report attached)“…Biden’s share of votes by Latinos decreased by 8 percentage points compared to Hillary Clinton’s, and his share of votes by Black people decreased by 3 percentage points. Biden’s share of white voters without a college degree improved about 1 percentage point as compared to Clinton. Biden’s share of white voters with a college degree improved by about 4 percentage points from Clinton’s….”

Andrew Prokop, "A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election,"Vox, May 10, 2021, https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/2021/5/10/22425178/catalist-report-2020-election-biden-trump-demographics

A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election

In the days and weeks after presidential election results come in, commentators attempting to figure out what happened with voter demographics are often in a fog — forced to rely on unreliable exit polls. More rigorous analysis simply takes longer.

Now, Catalist, a Democratic data firm, has put out a report on “What Happened in 2020,” authored by Yair Ghitza and Jonathan Robinson, which makes a serious attempt to answer that question. The report is superior to the exit polls because it’s based in their research for what’s known as a “voter file.” Basically, they’ve put together a large database of turnout information about actual voters, assembled from state or local records about who actually showed up.

That information has its limits — it’s a secret ballot, so we don’t know who specific people voted for. But this information can be supplemented with precinct-level vote results, census information, and survey findings. The Catalist authors put all this together to estimate how different demographics voted. Some of their general findings about what changed since 2016:

Biden’s share of votes by Latinos decreased by 8 percentage points compared to Hillary Clinton’s, and his share of votes by Black people decreased by 3 percentage points.
Biden’s share of white voters without a college degree improved about 1 percentage point as compared to Clinton.
Biden’s share of white voters with a college degree improved by about 4 percentage points from Clinton’s.

But the report doesn’t just look at the narrow question of what changed in each group; it helps us understand the two parties’ coalitions as a whole. For instance, it drives home the fact that the non-college white population, while declining as a share of the electorate, remains quite large (they were about 44 percent of all voters in 2020), and Trump won 63 percent of them. And though Biden performed worse among Black voters than Clinton or Obama, he still won about 90 percent of that group.

One note here is that, for the sake of allowing easy year-to-year comparisons, these percentages are calculated by looking only at votes cast for either the Democratic or Republican nominees, rather than for third-party candidates. This is called the two-way vote share — Catalist’s report focused on this metric, so all of this article’s references to demographic vote percentage will use it as well.

The non-college white vote: Joe Biden’s underrecognized electoral achievement

Much attention has been paid to the shift of white college-educated voters toward Biden and Latino voters toward Trump in 2020, which makes sense — as a table from Catalist shows, those were particularly dramatic shifts.

A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election: Extended Excerpt Image 1


But it’s also worth dwelling on a shift that didn’t happen in 2020 but could have been crucial — it looks like Trump did not continue to gain among white voters without a college degree. According to Catalist’s report, 36 percent of these voters supported Clinton, a 4-point drop from Obama’s performance in 2012. But Democrats did not continue to hemorrhage these voters in 2020 — Biden actually improved slightly, winning 37 percent of them.

This was crucial to Biden’s success for two main reasons. First, white non-college voters continue to make up a very large chunk of the electorate. Catalist estimates that their share of the electorate has been shrinking, but they still were 44 percent of all voters in 2020. And second, they make up an even larger share of the electorate in some key swing states.

A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election: Extended Excerpt Image 2


So the fact that Biden avoided Democrats’ recent trend of losing more and more white voters without a college degree was actually quite important in his victory. If he had won, say, 34 percent of them instead of the 37 percent he did win, he very well might not be president right now.

Furthermore, the shorthand of punditry often says Democrats win because of a coalition of nonwhite and college-educated white voters. But the below chart makes the point that non-college whites actually still make up an estimated 32 percent of overall votes cast for Biden. In comparison, Black and Latino voters together also comprised 32 percent of the overall votes for Biden. More than half the Trump coalition, in contrast, is comprised of non-college-educated white voters (and Trump’s coalition is 85 percent white overall).

A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Simply put, there are a lot of white people in the United States of America, and a lot of them vote. And there’s no reason to just assume that Hillary Clinton’s performance among this group was the floor for how low Democrats can fall. As a comparison, in 2016 Trump’s share of the college-educated white vote dropped 4 points from Romney’s share of it in 2012 — and then, in 2020, it dropped another 4 points. But, per Catalist’s report, Biden averted further declines among non-college whites and slightly improved on Clinton’s performance.

Latino voters: Biden’s better-recognized problem

Biden’s worsened performance among Latino voters as compared to past Democratic nominees has been much discussed since the election, and Catalist puts some numbers on just what happened there — the group estimates that Hillary Clinton won 71 percent of Latino voters in 2016, but Biden won 63 percent in 2020. This 8-point drop is the most dramatic shift in a four-year period among the major racial or ethnic groups seen in Catalist’s data.

This comes in the context of a massive increase in Latino turnout overall — while turnout was up across the board, it was particularly up among Latino (and Asian) voters, in what’s just an incredible increase in a four-year period.

A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election: Extended Excerpt Image 4


This turnout increase meant the Latino share of the electorate continued its trend of growth — Latino voters were 7 percent of the electorate in 2012, 9 percent in 2016, and 10 percent in 2020.

The turnout surge also raises a question — did Trump improve because previously voting Latinos switched from backing Democrats to backing Republicans, or were his gains mainly among new voters? Catalist doesn’t provide a definitive answer, but the authors say, “we see suggestive evidence that both of these factors played some role.”

In contrast to claims that Democrats’ worsening performance with Latinos was mainly concentrated among Cuban Americans in Florida, the report finds that the decline was broader — but that the drops were smaller in key states that Biden barely won, like Arizona and Georgia.

A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election: Extended Excerpt Image 5


“Mexicans are the largest Latino subgroup in most states across the country, and highly Mexican areas also showed a drop (6 points), albeit smaller than Cuban areas,” the authors write. “Puerto Rican, Dominican, and areas with other dominant groups were in the middle (8-9 point drop), close to the national average” drop among Latinos.

A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election: Extended Excerpt Image 6


If Democrats don’t find a way to reverse these declines, they’ll have a difficult time competing in Florida and Texas. But if this becomes a longer-term trend it could also imperil the party’s recent strength in Nevada and their very recent gains in Arizona.

Black voters’ support is crucial for Democrats — is it dropping?

Biden won an estimated 90 percent of the two-way vote among Black voters in 2020 — which is both an overwhelming win, and the worst performance for a Democrat among Black voters in over a decade. Clinton won 93 percent of the two-way vote among Black voters in 2016, and Obama won 97 percent in 2012.

The authors make that point that despite this drop, “Black voters are key to Democratic success” — without the large majorities of Black voters Biden won, he couldn’t have been competitive nationally or in key Electoral College states like Georgia, Pennsylvania, or Michigan.

Furthermore, the report estimates that turnout among Black voters increased from 2016 by 14 percent, a higher rate of increase than among white college voters (13 percent) or white non-college voters (11 percent). So it can be true both that Biden did worse than Clinton among Black voters and that Black voters remain a core pillar of the Democratic coalition.

White college-educated voters have moved toward Democrats (but many still vote for Trump)

So how does Joe Biden win if he barely improves on Clinton’s performance among non-college-educated white voters and does worse than she did among Black, Latino, and Asian voters?

It’s because of those gains among white voters with a college degree — where he built on and expanded the improvement Clinton had made. In 2012, Obama won an estimated 46 percent of these voters, in 2016 Clinton won 50 percent of them, and in 2020, Biden won 54 percent of them.

A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election: Extended Excerpt Image 7


White college-educated voters made up about 28 percent of the electorate in 2020 — about as much as all nonwhite voters combined. So winning college-educated whites by 54 to 46 percent matters a great deal.

Further, according to the report, about 58 percent of white women with a college degree voted for Biden (compared to 55 percent voting for Clinton in 2016 and 50 percent voting for Obama in 2012).

A new report complicates simplistic narratives about race and the 2020 election: Extended Excerpt Image 8


“The dominant takeaway, from our data and others, is that white college graduates and white suburban voters have turned solidly against Donald Trump’s Republican party,” the authors write.

This is true as far as the trend goes, and it’s one of the most important factors explaining why Biden won and Clinton didn’t. However, it’s also important to stress that 46 percent of college-educated whites still did vote for Trump. Democrats don’t exactly dominate among this group just yet, and it remains to be seen whether their gains here will prove durable.

One overall takeaway from the report, though, is that an electoral majority is often a fragile thing these days. Lose a few points among a few groups and it could slip from your grasp. And some apparent trends continue from one election to the next — while others can surprisingly reverse

  • Politics
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
    • Liberal/Conservative
    • Race
    • Skill Level
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
Previous articleSeptember 10, 2021A Momentous Shift Is Taking Shape in the Labor MarketLow-skilled wage growth has outpaced high-skilled wages growth for last three months, a new record, according to the Atlanta Federal Reserve’s Wage Tracker @JohnAuthersNext articleSeptember 13, 2021Financial crises: A surveyFinancial crises often result from a combination of the crisis itself & pre-existing imbalances in credit & asset prices. Credit-to-GDP ratios often exceed 150% & asset prices can inflate beyond historical norms, creating bubbles that are vulnerable to bursts.
Showing 189 database articles primarily about Politics
Currently filtering by:
  • Remove 'Database'

How Americans Voted in 2026

AI Summary. Estimates of US voter behavior combine interviews with 26,706 voters nationally, re-interviews with more than 7,000 voters after they cast ballots, precinct- and county-level results, validated turnout for 44% of voters, and state voter registration files.

Nate Cohn New York Times
Date Posted:
November 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Relative to the 2024 presidential vote, the NYT’s preliminary estimates show the 2026 House margin among white non-college voters (39% of the electorate) moving 14pp toward Democrats, and among nonwhite non-college voters (18%) moving 23pp. Among the main age, race, gender and education groups, the largest shift was among 18–29-year-olds (12% of voters), at 32pp.

How are estimates of voter behavior constructed?

Core argument: The New York Times’ Voter Trends estimates of how Americans voted in 2026 draw on interviews with 26,706 voters nationally conducted as part of The Times/Siena Poll, which forms the basis of its understanding of who voters backed.

Times Voter Trends relies on extensive, detailed data from the following sources. Our estimates will get even better as we get more data. Interviews with 26,706 voters nationally as part of The Times/Siena Poll. This data forms the basis of our understanding about who voters cast a ballot for. Re-interviews with more than 7,000 voters nationally after they cast their ballot. Recontacting poll respondents after they vote helps us better understand turnout and late shifts. Granular results from precincts and townships nationally. We collect the most detailed election results from as many states as possible to understand voting patterns in different communities. In areas without precinct-level results, we use precinct-level estimates from The Needle and county-level results from The Associated Press. Validated turnout for 44% of voters nationally. We will never know who everybody voted for, but knowing specifically who voted gives our estimates additional precision. Voter files for every state and district. The voter file is a list of all registered voters that is our starting point for The Times/Siena Poll and these estimates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The New York Times’ Voter Trends estimates of how Americans voted in 2026 draw on interviews with 26,706 voters nationally conducted as part of The Times/Siena Poll, which forms the basis of its understanding of who voters backed.
  2. The Times re-interviewed more than 7,000 voters nationally after they cast ballots, which it says helps it better understand turnout and late shifts, and validated turnout for 44% of voters nationally to add precision to its estimates.
  3. The Times uses granular precinct and township results where available, and in areas without precinct-level results relies on precinct-level estimates from The Needle and county-level results from The Associated Press.

Related Articles:

  • The Fastest-Growing Metros Are Also Electoral Tossups — Classifying metropolitan areas by the vote margin between the two major presidential candidates, job growth is weakest on average in strongly Democratic-leaning metros and healthiest in closely divided "purple" metros. The authors caution that representation is determined by states and congressional districts rather than metro areas, and voters weigh more than economics.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections — An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
  • Politics

Now You Can See Everything

AI Summary. Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won, putting an estimated 37.5 GW of planned capacity at risk of a pause and another 15 GW subject to conditions such as grid cost-sharing, water limits, and ended tax incentives. The 37 GW expected in 2027, 75% already under construction, is largely unaffected.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
November 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Before the election, 96 GW of data center capacity was expected to come online in 2028. Based on the positions of incoming governors, Cembalest estimates 37.5 GW may be subject to a “pause” and another 15 GW to “conditions,” together more than half of the total.

Are local ballot measures putting planned data center capacity at risk?

Core argument: Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with North Dakota the only exception, and based on those results 37.5 GW of planned capacity may face a “pause” and another 15 GW conditions.

The biggest market issue may be AI over the medium term; nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with only exception in North Dakota. What we’re now watching: governor imposed constraints on new builds. This is not an issue for the 37 GW expected to be delivered in 2027, 75% of which is under construction. It’s more an issue for the 96 GW expected in 2028. Based on election results, 37.5 GW may be subject to a “pause” with another 15 GW subject to “conditions”. While pauses are the more impactful outcome, conditions can be onerous: requiring data centers to pay grid costs to protect ratepayers, ending tax incentives, imposing water limits, setting requirements for onsite backup power, mandating labor requirements and banning non-disclosure agreements during permitting (most of which seem sensible to me). If the data center buildout starts to slow at some point, upgrading to better NVIDIA chips might be the only way to generate more tokens.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with North Dakota the only exception, and based on those results 37.5 GW of planned capacity may face a “pause” and another 15 GW conditions.
  2. The 37 GW of data center capacity expected in 2027, 75% of which is under construction, is less exposed to local opposition than the 96 GW expected in 2028.
  3. Conditions imposed on data centers can include paying grid costs to protect ratepayers, ending tax incentives, water limits, onsite backup power requirements, labor mandates, and bans on non-disclosure agreements during permitting.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • Global Views: Downside Growth Risks — The growth boost from the artificial intelligence boom is projected to peak around late 2026 or early 2027, with AI investment as a share of GDP slowing and the estimated 0.4pp wealth-effect lift to US consumer spending fading. Across US nonmanufacturing industries, AI adoption shows a statistically significant negative correlation with employment growth and positive correlation with unemployment.
  • Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected — The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
  • Politics
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Who Sees Themselves as Working Class?

AI Summary. Survey data indicate 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans. Identification is highest among blue-collar workers at 77%, versus 61% in other occupations, and ranges from 52% of Asian adults to 62% of White adults.

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Do most Americans identify as working class across income and education levels?

Core argument: 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.
  2. Workers in blue-collar occupations identify as working class at a rate of 77%, compared with 61% of those in other occupations.
  3. About 62% of White and 59% of Hispanic adults view themselves as working class, as do roughly 54% of Black and 52% of Asian adults.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Inequality

The Rise of Anger: Emotions and Policy Views

AI Summary. An analysis of X (formerly Twitter) posts finds that the share of sentences expressing anger rose among both Democratic- and Republican-affiliated users, with Republicans starting from a higher baseline of about 38% versus 27% for Democrats and reaching roughly 50%. The increase was larger among Democrats, narrowing the partisan gap.

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Is anger rising among partisans on social media?

Core argument: Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.
  2. Democratic-affiliated X users start with anger in about 27% of sentences, then rise sharply after the 2016 election by much more than Republicans, narrowing the partisan gap by 2019.
  3. Both partisan anger series plateau from 2019 to 2022, with Democratic anger declining slightly after Biden's election while remaining well above pre-2016 levels.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
  • Politics

The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile

AI Summary. US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

Do highly educated, lower-income voters identify as very liberal?

Core argument: In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.
  2. Composite CES data show only 19% of Americans with bachelor's degrees or higher had household incomes of $60,000 or below, while DSA survey respondents were twice as likely to fall into that category.
  3. US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" are those with postgraduate degrees and household incomes of $30,000 to $60,000 per year, an unusual pairing since education and income are usually substantially positively correlated.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • Politics

America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade

AI Summary. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Has American confidence in capitalism and democracy declined?

Core argument: Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.
  2. Only 12% of Americans say democracy is working very or extremely well, 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics, and 35% are fairly sure the nation offers good jobs and the American dream.
  3. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the Democratic share, and nearly half said America stands above all other countries, compared with 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Related Articles:

  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • Politics
© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms