Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
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Could AI’s Leading Men Become As Powerful As Ford Or Rockefeller?

AI Summary. Research on "transformative entrepreneurs" argues that turning inventions into long-run growth depends on tycoons who control and popularize new technologies. An analysis of 11 American technological waves over 150 years, scoring leaders by company revenue, employment, market value, corporate control, and personal wealth, ranks Henry Ford as the most powerful.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
April 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

An Economist analysis concludes that history suggests “prosperity requires tycoons,” as transformational entrepreneurs have played a decisive role in diffusing new technologies and are “a necessary condition of innovation.”

How powerful are today's AI tycoons compared with past industrial titans?

Core argument: John D. Rockefeller's peak wealth equalled roughly 1.5% of American GDP, and Elon Musk may be richer still depending on how his wealth is calculated, though The Economist's ranking places Henry Ford as the most powerful mogul America has seen.

A paper by Ufuk Akcigit points to the crucial role of so-called “transformative entrepreneurs” in turning inventions into long-run economic growth. In short, prosperity requires tycoons. To understand how the AI magnates compare with business titans through history, The Economist examined 11 technological waves in America over the past 150 years, from railways to the internet. For each, we picked the top five people responsible for the control, distribution and popularisation of that technology. We quantified the power of each by looking at the revenue, employment and market value of their companies at their peak, as well as a subjective assessment of the degree of corporate control held by the tycoon, along with their personal wealth. Riches alone would not capture the full extent of a tycoon’s power. At his peak the wealth of John D. Rockefeller, founder of Standard Oil, was equivalent to around 1.5% of American GDP. Mr. Musk may be richer still, depending on how his wealth is calculated. By our ranking, however, Henry Ford is the most powerful mogul America has seen so far.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. John D. Rockefeller's peak wealth equalled roughly 1.5% of American GDP, and Elon Musk may be richer still depending on how his wealth is calculated, though The Economist's ranking places Henry Ford as the most powerful mogul America has seen.
  2. The Economist examined 11 American technological waves over the past 150 years, from railways to the internet, picking the top five people responsible for each technology's control, distribution and popularisation.
  3. The Economist quantified each tycoon's power using the revenue, employment and market value of their companies at their peak, plus a subjective assessment of corporate control and personal wealth, since riches alone would not capture a tycoon's full power.

Related Articles:

  • Transformative and Subsistence Entrepreneurs: Origins and Impacts on Economic Growth — Only 17% of firms are "transformative" entrepreneurs, defined as those hiring a research-and-development worker at some point; higher IQ and educational attainment strongly predict transformative entrepreneurship, though the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur overall declines with IQ. The authors argue education subsidies address financial constraints more effectively than uniform startup or research subsidies.
  • Which Entrepreneurs Boost Productivity? — The authors find that a minority of entrepreneurs are "transformative" — generating disproportionate productivity gains, scoring high on IQ tests, being well-educated, and hiring research and development workers. They argue that economies with more such entrepreneurs and R&D workers sustain higher long-run productivity growth.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Politics
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
Previous articleApril 17, 2026A Tax Revolt Is Under Way In AmericaAccording to Gallup polling, the share of Americans who think the income taxes they pay are “fair” is near a record low. Politicians are responding; btw 2020 and 2026, the vast majority of US states cut personal income taxes.Next articleApril 20, 2026Tracking the Impact of AI on the Labor MarketAn index of dissimilarity of occupational mix between college grads aged 20–24 and those 25–34 showed a modest uptick in March relative to November 2022, but remains within its historical range, suggesting at most a modest labor market effect from AI.
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How Americans Voted in 2026

AI Summary. Estimates of US voter behavior combine interviews with 26,706 voters nationally, re-interviews with more than 7,000 voters after they cast ballots, precinct- and county-level results, validated turnout for 44% of voters, and state voter registration files.

Nate Cohn New York Times
Date Posted:
November 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Relative to the 2024 presidential vote, the NYT’s preliminary estimates show the 2026 House margin among white non-college voters (39% of the electorate) moving 14pp toward Democrats, and among nonwhite non-college voters (18%) moving 23pp. Among the main age, race, gender and education groups, the largest shift was among 18–29-year-olds (12% of voters), at 32pp.

How are estimates of voter behavior constructed?

Core argument: The New York Times’ Voter Trends estimates of how Americans voted in 2026 draw on interviews with 26,706 voters nationally conducted as part of The Times/Siena Poll, which forms the basis of its understanding of who voters backed.

Times Voter Trends relies on extensive, detailed data from the following sources. Our estimates will get even better as we get more data. Interviews with 26,706 voters nationally as part of The Times/Siena Poll. This data forms the basis of our understanding about who voters cast a ballot for. Re-interviews with more than 7,000 voters nationally after they cast their ballot. Recontacting poll respondents after they vote helps us better understand turnout and late shifts. Granular results from precincts and townships nationally. We collect the most detailed election results from as many states as possible to understand voting patterns in different communities. In areas without precinct-level results, we use precinct-level estimates from The Needle and county-level results from The Associated Press. Validated turnout for 44% of voters nationally. We will never know who everybody voted for, but knowing specifically who voted gives our estimates additional precision. Voter files for every state and district. The voter file is a list of all registered voters that is our starting point for The Times/Siena Poll and these estimates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The New York Times’ Voter Trends estimates of how Americans voted in 2026 draw on interviews with 26,706 voters nationally conducted as part of The Times/Siena Poll, which forms the basis of its understanding of who voters backed.
  2. The Times re-interviewed more than 7,000 voters nationally after they cast ballots, which it says helps it better understand turnout and late shifts, and validated turnout for 44% of voters nationally to add precision to its estimates.
  3. The Times uses granular precinct and township results where available, and in areas without precinct-level results relies on precinct-level estimates from The Needle and county-level results from The Associated Press.

Related Articles:

  • The Fastest-Growing Metros Are Also Electoral Tossups — Classifying metropolitan areas by the vote margin between the two major presidential candidates, job growth is weakest on average in strongly Democratic-leaning metros and healthiest in closely divided "purple" metros. The authors caution that representation is determined by states and congressional districts rather than metro areas, and voters weigh more than economics.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections — An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
  • Politics

Now You Can See Everything

AI Summary. Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won, putting an estimated 37.5 GW of planned capacity at risk of a pause and another 15 GW subject to conditions such as grid cost-sharing, water limits, and ended tax incentives. The 37 GW expected in 2027, 75% already under construction, is largely unaffected.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
November 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Before the election, 96 GW of data center capacity was expected to come online in 2028. Based on the positions of incoming governors, Cembalest estimates 37.5 GW may be subject to a “pause” and another 15 GW to “conditions,” together more than half of the total.

Are local ballot measures putting planned data center capacity at risk?

Core argument: Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with North Dakota the only exception, and based on those results 37.5 GW of planned capacity may face a “pause” and another 15 GW conditions.

The biggest market issue may be AI over the medium term; nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with only exception in North Dakota. What we’re now watching: governor imposed constraints on new builds. This is not an issue for the 37 GW expected to be delivered in 2027, 75% of which is under construction. It’s more an issue for the 96 GW expected in 2028. Based on election results, 37.5 GW may be subject to a “pause” with another 15 GW subject to “conditions”. While pauses are the more impactful outcome, conditions can be onerous: requiring data centers to pay grid costs to protect ratepayers, ending tax incentives, imposing water limits, setting requirements for onsite backup power, mandating labor requirements and banning non-disclosure agreements during permitting (most of which seem sensible to me). If the data center buildout starts to slow at some point, upgrading to better NVIDIA chips might be the only way to generate more tokens.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with North Dakota the only exception, and based on those results 37.5 GW of planned capacity may face a “pause” and another 15 GW conditions.
  2. The 37 GW of data center capacity expected in 2027, 75% of which is under construction, is less exposed to local opposition than the 96 GW expected in 2028.
  3. Conditions imposed on data centers can include paying grid costs to protect ratepayers, ending tax incentives, water limits, onsite backup power requirements, labor mandates, and bans on non-disclosure agreements during permitting.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • Global Views: Downside Growth Risks — The growth boost from the artificial intelligence boom is projected to peak around late 2026 or early 2027, with AI investment as a share of GDP slowing and the estimated 0.4pp wealth-effect lift to US consumer spending fading. Across US nonmanufacturing industries, AI adoption shows a statistically significant negative correlation with employment growth and positive correlation with unemployment.
  • Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected — The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
  • Politics
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Who Sees Themselves as Working Class?

AI Summary. Survey data indicate 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans. Identification is highest among blue-collar workers at 77%, versus 61% in other occupations, and ranges from 52% of Asian adults to 62% of White adults.

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Do most Americans identify as working class across income and education levels?

Core argument: 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.
  2. Workers in blue-collar occupations identify as working class at a rate of 77%, compared with 61% of those in other occupations.
  3. About 62% of White and 59% of Hispanic adults view themselves as working class, as do roughly 54% of Black and 52% of Asian adults.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Inequality

The Rise of Anger: Emotions and Policy Views

AI Summary. An analysis of X (formerly Twitter) posts finds that the share of sentences expressing anger rose among both Democratic- and Republican-affiliated users, with Republicans starting from a higher baseline of about 38% versus 27% for Democrats and reaching roughly 50%. The increase was larger among Democrats, narrowing the partisan gap.

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Is anger rising among partisans on social media?

Core argument: Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.
  2. Democratic-affiliated X users start with anger in about 27% of sentences, then rise sharply after the 2016 election by much more than Republicans, narrowing the partisan gap by 2019.
  3. Both partisan anger series plateau from 2019 to 2022, with Democratic anger declining slightly after Biden's election while remaining well above pre-2016 levels.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
  • Politics

The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile

AI Summary. US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

Do highly educated, lower-income voters identify as very liberal?

Core argument: In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.
  2. Composite CES data show only 19% of Americans with bachelor's degrees or higher had household incomes of $60,000 or below, while DSA survey respondents were twice as likely to fall into that category.
  3. US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" are those with postgraduate degrees and household incomes of $30,000 to $60,000 per year, an unusual pairing since education and income are usually substantially positively correlated.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • Politics

America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade

AI Summary. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Has American confidence in capitalism and democracy declined?

Core argument: Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.
  2. Only 12% of Americans say democracy is working very or extremely well, 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics, and 35% are fairly sure the nation offers good jobs and the American dream.
  3. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the Democratic share, and nearly half said America stands above all other countries, compared with 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Related Articles:

  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • Politics
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