Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
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The Chart that Explains Work in America

AI Summary. Since 1982, real growth in the median U.S. wage has trailed growth at both the top and bottom of the wage distribution, with higher and lower percentiles outperforming the middle.

Cardiff Garcia and Ben Glasner Agglomerations
Date Posted:
October 9, 2026

Garcia and Glasner document the striking observation that inequality across the wage distribution rose mainly during the long overall wage stagnations of 1982–1996 and 2001–2014. Wage growth was both faster and more broadly shared in 1996–2001 and 2014–2020.

Has median wage growth lagged both the top and bottom?

Core argument: Real growth of the median U.S. wage has trailed growth at both the higher and lower ends of the wage distribution since 1982.

Figure 4 zooms into the First Long Wage Stagnation from December 1982 to 1996: negative growth for the 10th percentile wage and hardly any growth for the three middle wage categories. Meanwhile the 90th percentile wage climbed away from all the others despite itself growing by less than 1% a year. Figure 5 shows the more recent Second Long Wage Stagnation. The median wage averaged just 0.36% growth per year. And because the growth of the 75th and 90th percentile firmly outpaced the growth of the others, wage inequality climbed sharply. From 2015 through the start of 2020, wages climbed all across the distribution, [while] the widening between the 90th percentile wage and the other wages slowed. The escape from wage stagnation once again arrived as the labor market continued tightening. In the late 1990s boom, the median wage climbed an annualized 2.6%. The eras in which the median wage climbed at the steepest angle were those in which all the other wages climbed with it. [Finally], real growth of the median wage has trailed behind the growth of the other wage categories since 1982.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Real growth of the median U.S. wage has trailed growth at both the higher and lower ends of the wage distribution since 1982.
  2. Figure 10 presents three wage ratios: the 90th percentile to the median, the 90th percentile to the 10th, and the median to the 10th.

Related Articles:

  • Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy — A 1pp lower birth rate 20 years earlier is associated with 22 log points higher output per worker 20 years later and 29 log points higher after 40 years, about 0.73pp faster annual growth. The authors find lower birth rates are also associated with more labor-saving patents, larger high-tech shares, and higher productivity growth.
  • The Pig In The Python: US Decennial Labor Flows And Economic Opportunity, 1910–2040 — The surge of baby boomers, women, and immigrants entering the US labor force between 1960 and 1980 was difficult for the economy to absorb, and young workers' wages fell sharply after peaking in the early 1970s. The author argues those entrants kept occupying jobs and suppressing demand for new workers until retirement.
  • The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Labor Market — Labor market tightness produced an unexpected compression in the US wage distribution, with disproportionate wage growth at the bottom reducing the college wage premium and reversing nearly 40% of the rise in 90-10 wage inequality since 1980. The authors attribute this in part to increased competition for low-wage workers.
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
Previous articleOctober 9, 2026AI’s Insensitivity To Interest Rates Is A Problem for the FedSløk warns the rate-insensitive AI buildout has triggered unbalanced growth in the US economy by crowding out capital, electricity, and labor from vulnerable sectors like housing and autos.Next articleOctober 9, 2026There's Good News About Incomes. No One Seems to Believe ItReal median household income and real wages have risen since the mid-2010s, as real GDP per capita grew 1.9% annually over the past decade. Average real weekly earnings have grown since 2010, after falling substantially between 1973 and 1990.
Showing 132 database articles primarily about Wages/Income

What Six Years of Inflation Mean for the Midterms

AI Summary. US consumer prices have risen almost 29% over the past six years, about 3x the pace of the prior six years, and on average prices have risen faster than wages over that period.

Owen Tucker-Smith Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
October 8, 2026
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Inflation outpaced real year-over-year average hourly earnings growth in the 5 months through August.

Have prices risen faster than wages over the past six years?

Core argument: U.S. consumer prices, as measured by the consumer-price index, have risen almost 29% over the past six years, about three times the pace of the preceding six years.

Overall prices, as measured by the consumer-price index, have risen almost 29% in the past six years. During the six years before that, prices crept up at a third of that pace. Over the past six years, prices have, on average, risen faster than wages. The trend has been pronounced recently: In both July and August, inflation outpaced average hourly wage growth.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. consumer prices, as measured by the consumer-price index, have risen almost 29% over the past six years, about three times the pace of the preceding six years.
  2. Prices have on average risen faster than wages over the past six years, with inflation outpacing average hourly wage growth in both July and August.

Related Articles:

  • Sticky Wage Norms and the Real Wage Cost of Unexpected Inflation — Firms set nominal wage increases by round-number rules—about 42% of increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number—and these rules rose only from about 2.7% to 3.5% as inflation peaked near 7%, contributing to falling real wages for job stayers.
  • Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections — An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
  • The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly — Variation in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index that inflation and unemployment cannot explain is strongly correlated with growth in consumer borrowing costs, such as mortgage and car loan rates. The authors estimate that including interest payments and homeownership costs in the consumer price index would raise measured inflation from 3% to 9%.
  • Wages/Income
  • GDP
    • Inflation
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Not Tech, Not Wall Street

AI Summary. The authors estimate that more than half of the rise in the top 1% income share since 1985 — 5.8 of 10.5 percentage points — flowed through pass-through businesses, counting roughly 3m wealthy private business owners with average net worth near $25m running law firms, dealerships, and medical practices.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
September 21, 2026
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More than half the increase in the top 1% income share since 1985 flowed through pass-through businesses to ~ 3mm private business owners with a mean net worth of ~$25mm.

Did most of the top 1% income gain come from private businesses?

Core argument: Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick find that 5.8 of the 10.5 percentage-point rise in the U.S. top 1% income share since 1985 flowed through pass-through businesses, more than half of the increase.

The income that lifted America's top 1% did not come mainly from tech or Wall Street, according to Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick. More than half of the rise in the top 1% income share since 1985, 5.8 of 10.5 percentage points, flowed through pass-through businesses. Zidar and Zwick, counted roughly 3 million wealthy private business owners, with average net worth near $25 million, running law firms, car dealerships, medical practices, commercial contractors and regional restaurant chains, the kind of businesses that make their owners wealthy and well known in their own communities without ever making them nationally famous.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick find that 5.8 of the 10.5 percentage-point rise in the U.S. top 1% income share since 1985 flowed through pass-through businesses, more than half of the increase.
  2. Zidar and Zwick count roughly 3 million wealthy private business owners with average net worth near $25 million, running law firms, car dealerships, medical practices, commercial contractors and regional restaurant chains.
  3. The income that lifted America’s top 1% did not come mainly from tech or Wall Street, according to Zidar and Zwick, but from businesses whose owners are well known locally without becoming nationally famous.

Related Articles:

  • What’s Missing in the Fed’s Data about Ultrarich Portfolios — The Federal Reserve's Distribution of Financial Accounts defines "private business" narrowly as proprietor's equity in noncorporate, nonfinancial businesses, excluding S-corporations, other private corporations, and private equity and hedge fund partnerships, which are lumped into "corporate equities." The Survey of Consumer Finances instead shows private business is roughly 45–50% of top 0.1% wealth.
  • They’re Rich but Not Famous—and They’re Suddenly Everywhere — An analysis of Federal Reserve data estimates about 430,000 U.S. households are worth $30m or more, including roughly 74,000 worth at least $100m, with growth in the number of very rich households outpacing overall population growth over recent decades. Nearly 72% of the top 0.1%'s wealth consists of corporate equities, mutual fund shares, and private businesses.
  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US distribution is non-wage income, primarily profits from closely-held, mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries owned by working-age individuals. The authors find private business profit falls by three-quarters after an owner retires or dies prematurely, indicating most top earners are "working rich" deriving income from human capital.
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Family Income Continues to Grow in 2025 Data

AI Summary. Census data show the number of U.S. families with inflation-adjusted incomes above $150,000 grew from under 3m in 1967 to over 31m in 2025, while families earning under $75,000 fell by almost 3m in absolute terms. The share of families with multiple earners has not increased much over that period.

Jeremy Horpedahl Economist Writing Every Day
Date Posted:
September 17, 2026
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In 1967, just 5.5% of American families had an inflation adjusted income of $150,000 or more. In 2025, 35.7% did. During that timeframe, the share of families with a real income less than $75,000 declined from 63.4% to 32.8%.

Are more American families reaching higher inflation-adjusted income levels?

Core argument: The number of U.S. families with incomes above $150,000 in 2025 inflation-adjusted dollars rose from fewer than 3 million in 1967 to over 31 million in 2025, according to Census data.

In 1967 there were fewer than 3 million families with incomes over $150,000 (in 2025 inflation-adjusted dollars). By 2025, that had grown to over 31 million families. If we look at the highest income threshold in this Census data — over $200,000 — the number of families has grown from just 1 million in 1967 to over 20 million in 2025. And there are fewer lower-income families too: the number of families under $75,000 shrunk, not just as a proportion of the total but even in absolute terms by almost 3 million families from 1967 to 2025. Of course, some of these families do have more earners than in 1967, though we shouldn’t overstate that too much. Using other data from Census, we can see that the share of families with multiple earners hasn’t increased much since 1967, and especially hasn’t since the mid-1990s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The number of U.S. families with incomes above $150,000 in 2025 inflation-adjusted dollars rose from fewer than 3 million in 1967 to over 31 million in 2025, according to Census data.
  2. Families earning over $200,000, the highest income threshold in the Census data, grew from about 1 million in 1967 to over 20 million in 2025.
  3. Families with incomes under $75,000 declined by almost 3 million in absolute terms from 1967 to 2025, while Census data show the share of families with multiple earners has not increased much since 1967, and especially not since the mid-1990s.

Related Articles:

  • Income in the United States: 2025 — Median U.S. household income rose 2.6% to $87,460, the highest level on record in data going back to 1967. Median income increased 3% for White households, 2.9% for non-Hispanic White households, and 4.8% for Black households, while changes for Asian and Hispanic households were not statistically significant.
  • The Middle Class Is Shrinking Because of a Booming Upper-Middle Class — Analyses showing a shrinking middle class typically use relative income thresholds that rise with median income, so they can register decline even when living standards rise across the distribution. Using an absolute definition, the authors find the core middle class shrank because the upper-middle class grew from 10% of families to 31%, doubling its income share.
  • Who Sees Themselves as Working Class? — Survey data indicate 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans. Identification is highest among blue-collar workers at 77%, versus 61% in other occupations, and ranges from 52% of Asian adults to 62% of White adults.
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Income in the United States: 2025

AI Summary. Median U.S. household income rose 2.6% to $87,460, the highest level on record in data going back to 1967. Median income increased 3% for White households, 2.9% for non-Hispanic White households, and 4.8% for Black households, while changes for Asian and Hispanic households were not statistically significant.

Melissa Kollar and Zach Scherer U.S. Census Bureau
Date Posted:
September 16, 2026
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Real US median household income increased 2.6% year over year in 2025 to a record high of $87,460.

Has median U.S. household income reached its highest level on record?

Core argument: Median U.S. household income reached $87,460 in 2025, up 2.6% from $85,210 in 2024 and the highest on record in data dating back to 1967.

In 2025, median household income was $87,460, an increase of 2.6% from the 2024 estimate of $85,210. Household income in 2025 was the highest on record dating back to 1967. For all demographic characteristics of the householder the median household income estimates in 2025 were either higher than the 2024 estimates or were not statistically different from 2024. Median household income increased by 3% for White households, 2.9% for non-Hispanic White households, and 4.8% for Black households. Median income did not change significantly for Asian or Hispanic households.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Median U.S. household income reached $87,460 in 2025, up 2.6% from $85,210 in 2024 and the highest on record in data dating back to 1967.
  2. Median household income rose 4.8% for Black households, 3% for White households, and 2.9% for non-Hispanic White households in 2025, while Asian and Hispanic households saw no statistically significant change.
  3. Across all demographic characteristics of the householder, 2025 median household income estimates were either higher than or not statistically different from 2024 estimates.

Related Articles:

  • Income in the United States: 2024 — U.S. median household income was $83,730, not statistically different from the prior year's $82,690, according to Census Bureau estimates. Across most demographic subgroups, median household income was higher or not statistically different from the prior year, with the exception of Black households, which saw a decline.
  • US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits — US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
  • The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era — The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Sticky Wage Norms and the Real Wage Cost of Unexpected Inflation

AI Summary. Firms set nominal wage increases by round-number rules—about 42% of increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number—and these rules rose only from about 2.7% to 3.5% as inflation peaked near 7%, contributing to falling real wages for job stayers.

Erik Hurst, Christina Patterson, Nela Richardson, and Ye Liv Wang University of Chicago
Date Posted:
September 10, 2026
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ADP microdata from 2016–25 suggest firms set wages according to “wage norms” ~ invariant to inflation. The 2020–21 inflation surge mechanically reduced real wages. By the end of 2025, 34% of incumbent workers’ real wages were lower than in 2020.

Do round-number wage rules cause real wages to fall during inflation?

Core argument: Roughly 42% of all nominal wage increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number.

Roughly 42% of all nominal wage increases below 6% were within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number [Figure 6]. Figure 9 plots the employment-weighted average modal wage change across firms (solid line) alongside inflation rate (dashed line) from 2016 through 2025. In the pre-pandemic period, firm-level wage rules were relatively stable at a median of 2.7%, modestly above the rate of inflation. Beginning in 2021, inflation rose sharply, peaking at approximately seven percent in 2022. The average modal wage change also rose, reaching a peak of 3.5% in 2022 and 2023. By 2025, the median firm had a wage rule granting increases of three percent, roughly in line with inflation. The stickiness of firms’ wage rules in the face of inflationary pressure contributed to the systematic fall in real wages for job stayers. Evidence from Belgium [which has strong wage indexation], suggests that declining real wages, rather than inflation itself, helps explain the persistence of depressed consumer sentiment during the 2021–2024 period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Roughly 42% of all nominal wage increases below 6% fell within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number.
  2. Firm-level wage rules held near a median of 2.7% before the pandemic, and the employment-weighted average modal wage change peaked at 3.5% in 2022 and 2023 while inflation peaked near 7% in 2022; by 2025 the median firm granted 3%.
  3. The stickiness of firms' wage rules amid inflationary pressure contributed to a systematic fall in real wages for job stayers, and evidence from Belgium, which has strong wage indexation, suggests falling real wages rather than inflation helps explain depressed consumer sentiment in 2021–2024.

Related Articles:

  • Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections — An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
  • Real Wages Start To Shrink In Developed Countries — US annual inflation of 3.8% outpaced average hourly earnings growth of 3.6%, leaving prices rising faster than pay for the first time in two years, while Eurozone workers face a fresh energy-driven setback. JPMorgan attributes the real wage decline to Middle East conflict and expects growth to resume if energy prices retreat.
  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The share of US national income paid to workers fell 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching a post-war low. The authors find this decline stems mainly from changes within industries rather than shifts in activity across sectors, following cyclical patterns seen in earlier recessions.
  • Wages/Income
  • GDP
    • Inflation
  • Politics
  • Workforce

How Many Big Macs Does Your Salary Buy?

AI Summary. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year, the most of any country, followed by Switzerland and Australia. On an hourly basis, Switzerland leads at seven Big Macs per hour, ahead of America's six and Australia's five, reflecting longer American working hours.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
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The Economist’s venerable Big Mac Index is indicative of significantly higher after-tax, PPP-adjusted wages for American workers than for their French and German counterparts.

Which country's workers can buy the most Big Macs?

Core argument: The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year, topping the McWages rankings, with Switzerland second and Australia third.

On an annual basis, America continues to top our McWages rankings. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year; Switzerland and Australia are in second and third place, respectively. But American working hours are supersized, too. On an hourly basis, Switzerland comes out on top: the average worker there earns the equivalent of seven Big Macs an hour, compared with America’s six. Australia ranks third, at five burgers for every hour worked.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year, topping the McWages rankings, with Switzerland second and Australia third.
  2. On an hourly basis Switzerland leads, with the average worker earning the equivalent of seven Big Macs an hour, compared with six in the United States and five in Australia.
  3. American working hours are longer, which shifts the United States from first place on annual McWages to second on an hourly basis.

Related Articles:

  • The Big Mac Index At 40 — The Big Mac index, which compares burger prices across countries converted into dollars, shows currency misalignments in either direction at their widest since the mid-1990s, with American inflation, an undervalued Chinese yuan, and a falling yen cited as contributors. Big Mac prices also reflect domestic supply and demand for nontradeable goods.
  • Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — About half of the 1990s gap between American and European hours worked had reversed by the end of the 2010s. The authors estimate US hours per person declined after the 2000s because of rising benefits for the non-employed—especially health benefits like Medicaid—while non-US hours rose with higher wages and lower work costs.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
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