Young Adults without College Education See Uneven Jobs Recovery

WSJ notes, "...Most Americans don’t want the government to pit one race against another. In the last two years voters in two of America’s most liberal states—Washington and California—voted down ballot initiatives that would have repealed bans on racial preferences. A 2019 Pew survey found that 73% of Americans believe race should not be a factor in college admissions...."

The Editorial Board, "‘Equity’ for Asian-Americans in Practice,"Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/equity-for-asian-americans-in-practice-11612395057

Equity’ for Asian-Americans in Practice

President Biden last week singled out Asian-Americans as he issued executive orders devoted to “advancing racial equity.” They include an order banning federal use of terms such as “Wuhan virus,” and another requiring the Justice Department to better track hate crimes against Asian-Americans. In pushing these measures Mr. Biden prefers to speak of promoting “equity” rather than equal treatment.

On Wednesday the Justice Department showed us why when it dropped its lawsuit against Yale University over its race-based admissions. Under former Attorney General Bill Barr, Justice had charged that Yale’s racial preferences violate the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Justice acted even before the Senate has confirmed a new Attorney General or head of the Civil Rights Division.

A similar but private suit against Harvard continues, this one brought by Students for Fair Admissions. But it’s likely the government will soon withdraw its supporting brief that scores Harvard for “systematically disfavoring Asian-American applicants.”

So Asian-Americans will be watching. While many will be relieved to see the government rejecting terms such as “China flu,” many also appreciate the real and present harm when America’s most competitive colleges and universities reject their children based on their race no matter their other qualifications.

“I am totally shocked by the Biden DOJ’s hasty decision to drop the Yale lawsuit, only eight days after President Biden signed an executive order claiming to combat anti-Asian discrimination,” says the president of the Asian American Coalition for Education, Yukong Zhao.

This is what “equity” means in practice. Traditionally racial justice meant an insistence that every American be treated equally without regard to race. But the Democratic left, with Mr. Biden’s support, has adopted critical race theory from the universities. The theory attributes every disparity between the races to “systemic racism,” whether or not there’s evidence of specific acts of discrimination. The Biden Administration’s policy goal now is to dictate the racial outcomes that progressives want—even if it means discriminating by race to get them.

Dropping the Yale suit is a blow to equality under the law. But Students for Fair Admissions, which lost its Harvard suit at the First Circuit Court of Appeals in November, has always recognized that its best chance for a victory against racial bias in admissions is at the Supreme Court. Meantime, the group says it will file its own suit against Yale.

Most Americans don’t want the government to pit one race against another. In the last two years voters in two of America’s most liberal states—Washington and California—voted down ballot initiatives that would have repealed bans on racial preferences. A 2019 Pew survey found that 73% of Americans believe race should not be a factor in college admissions.

The Biden Administration has signaled in promoting “equity” that it has abandoned fair and equal treatment. This will lead to further social division and resentment, as it has in every society that has practiced favoritism by race. The resulting injustice and confusion will continue until the Supreme Court stops ducking the issue and rules against racial favoritism once and for all.

Tax Policy Center analysis finds differences in spending per pupil btw white and non-white students is small.

"...To examine spending patterns across different populations of students, we compared average per pupil spending across districts weighted by the number of students in each racial or ethnic group. In general, differences in spending per pupil in districts serving nonwhite and white students are very small. In 1972, the ratio of nonwhite to white spending was.98; this trend had reversed by 1982, as spending per pupil for nonwhite students was slightly higher than for white students in most states and in the United States as a whole and has been for the past 20 years (figure 2). Table 2 presents spending per pupil figures for 2002 weighted by the number of students in each subgroup...."

They also finds that differences in spending per pupil have diminished over past 40 years:

".... Differences in spending per pupil have diminished over the past 38 years in the aftermath of court cases, but significant variation still exists. Further, there is little evidence that these efforts have directly affected student achievement. There has been some closing of test score gaps between black and Hispanic students and white students and greater availability of AP courses. States are moving beyond equalization to ensure that each student receives an adequate education...."

Although 22% of Germans work part time vs only 15% in the US 20.7/(116.5 + 20.7)https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/part-time-employment

Simonetta Longhi, “Racial Wage Differentials In Developed Countries,” Institute Of Labor Economics, June 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Living_conditions_in_Europe_-_income_distribution_and_income_inequality

Elise Gould, "Stark Black-White Divide In Wages Is Widening Further," Economic Policy Institute, February 27, 2019, https://www.epi.org/blog/stark-black-white-divide-in-wages-is-widening-further/

Jeff Spross, "The Unexpected Truth About Americans' Work Hours," The Week, February 26, 2018, https://theweek.com/articles/756859/unexpected-truth-about-americans-work-hours

"Real Median Household Income By Race And Hispanic Origin: 1967 to 2017," U.S. Census Bureau, Accessed June 23, 2020, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2018/demo/p60-263/figure1.pdf

BLS Staff, "Labor Force Characteristics By Race And Ethnicity, 2018," U.S. Bureau Of Labor Statistics, October 2019, https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2018/home.htm

"United States Part Time Employment," Trading Economics, Accessed June 23, 2020, https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/part-time-employment

OECD, "Hours Worked," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Accessed June 23, 2020, https://data.oecd.org/emp/hours-worked.htm

https://theweek.com/articles/756859/unexpected-truth-about-americans-work-hours

on average black men ages 25 to 55 worked about 1250 hours a year in 2018 vs 1750 for white men 1250/1750 =.714 40.3 median black income/.714 = 56.4/68.1 median white income = 82.8% …suggests the black/white wage gap after adjusting or gov benefits might be closer to 15%, although more household headed by women (who earn less than men on average) among blacks pushes the estimate the other way

https://www.epi.org/blog/stark-black-white-divide-in-wages-is-widening-further/

https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/365/pdfs/racial-wage-differentials-in-developed-countries.pdf

Asian 81.3/61.4 = 1.32 x 1.28 = 1.70

White 68.1/61.4 = 1.11 x 1.28 = 1.42!

Note Hispanics earn 50.5 divided by 61.4 = 82% x 1.28 = 1.05 times average German

2017 dollars 40.3 median black household income/ 68.1 white not Hispanic median household income = 59.2%. Average household income is 61.4. so 40.3/61.4 = 66% x 1.28 = 84% = us black/german. German minorities earning about 15% less than Germans so German minorities and US minorities earn about the samehttps://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/365/pdfs/racial-wage-differentials-in-developed-countries.pdfandhttps://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2018/demo/p60-263/figure1.pdf

Us worforce 78% white - (89% white Hispanic x 17% of workforce is Hispanic =15%) = 63% + 6% Asian = 69% white or Asian = 31% not white or Asianhttps://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/2018/home.htm

Although the us average would be less than the white us average: 31% (approximates blacks and Hispanics) x 75% x X + 69% x X = 50.3; 0.92X=50.3; X= 54.5 x.75 = 40.9/39.4 = 1.04 us black disposable income vs German.

1.28 times the US black/white of 75% =.96 US black disposable income vs German disposable income,

Although part-time is probably lower for 25 to 55 yea olds, since older Germans work more than older Americans

.78 x.85= 66% fulltime German vs.85 x 80 = 68% full time Americans ages 24 to 55

Sahil Chinoy, "Quiz: Let Us Predict Whether You’re a Democrat or a Republican,"New York Times, August 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/08/opinion/sunday/party-polarization-quiz.html

Quiz: Let Us Predict Whether You’re a Democrat or a Republican

Tell us a few details about you and we’ll guess which political party you belong to. It shouldn’t be that simple, right? We’re all complex people with a multiplicity of identities and values. But the reality is that in America today, how you answer a handful of questions is very likely to determine how you vote.

This quiz, based on recent surveys with more than 140,000 responses, presents a series of yes-or-no questions to predict whether someone is more likely to identify as a Democrat or a Republican. It captures divisions that should make you worried about the future of American democracy.

Are you black, Hispanic or Asian?

The first question is the most important: It’s about race. Asking whether someone is black, Hispanic or Asian cleaves the electorate into two groups. Those who answer “yes” lean Democratic; the others are split roughly evenly between the parties. Among those who are not black, Hispanic or Asian (mostly white people), the second most important question is whether the person considers religion important. If they answer “yes,” they are probably Republican.

It’s not just race and religion, though. Party allegiances are now also tied to education, gender and age. Americans have sorted themselves more completely and rigidly than any time in recent history.

This identity-based polarization threatens to make politics “less about what the government should do and more about what it means to be an American,” write John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck in their book, “Identity Crisis.” And while President Trump did not precipitate this shift, he exploits and reinforces it with racist and xenophobic rhetoric.

Racial and religious groups aren’t monolithic, and one lesson from this project is that identities can intersect in intricate and unexpected ways. But today’s charged political climate is in large part explained by how neatly demographics divide Democrats and Republicans.

When identity aligns with party, politics gets more vicious

Sorting has occurred on both sides, but the Republican Party has tended more toward homogeneity: whiter, more Christian and more conservative. Democrats are a far more diverse party. So although the term “identity politics” is often wielded to criticize the Democrats for focusing on race and gender, Republicans are typically more susceptible to appeals based on their shared identity than Democrats, according to research by Julie Wronski and Lilliana Mason, political scientists at the University of Mississippi and the University of Maryland, College Park.

Polarization has encouraged more straight-ticket voting: Once, a voter might have chosen the Republican presidential candidate but a Democrat for the Senate, but now one’s whole ballot tends to align with one’s presidential preference. Polarization has also made voters hesitant to support politicians willing to cooperate with the other side, contributing to legislative gridlock.

Worse, the alignment of party preferences with personal identities has fostered ugly, tribal politics. It’s easier to demonize the opposing side when they look nothing like you. Voters today like their own party less than ever, but are motivated by their even stronger dislike of the other party. “It doesn’t paint a pretty picture,” Dr. Wronski said.

Can a religious, white Republican Party survive?

The partisan gap between black and white voters is the most durable and powerful split in modern American politics. Soon after President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act in 1964, he remarked, “I think we just delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come.” He wasn’t wrong. Afterward, the Republicans courted racist white voters by opposing school and housing integration.

Among white people, religion is the most stable and important determinant of party choice. But the way religion shapes party attachment has changed. Today, the best way to sort the population of white voters is not by which religion they belong to, but by how religious they are.

The number of religious white Americans is plummeting. In the long term, that spells disaster for Republicans. “I don’t think the Republican Party right now has a sustainable business model,” said Alan Abramowitz, a political scientist at Emory University.

The party knows this. Or at least it should. After Republicans lost the 2012 election, the party leadership commissioned a report on how to move forward. One answer was clear: appeal to nonwhite and less conservative voters. But in the years since, the Republicans — led by Mr. Trump — have doubled down on white identity politics and seem to believe that their path to a majority is through gerrymandering, voter suppression or attempts to skew the census.

The relationship between education and party has flipped

College-educated white people have left the Republican Party over the past decade, but higher-income voters are, as ever, disproportionately Republican. Wealthier people tend to be more educated, too, but now these forces push in opposite directions. That complicates the traditional relationship between Democrats and the white working class.

For decades, working-class people voted for Democrats, but recently, the difference in party affiliation between the white working class and other white people has evaporated. This trend, experts say, might make it difficult for the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee to mobilize voters by appealing to working-class identity.

Some political scientists have attributed the emergent “diploma divide” to less educated white voters’ racial resentment. Dr. Sides, Dr. Tesler and Dr. Vavreck argue that during Barack Obama’s presidency, less-educated white people who may not have followed politics began to link the Democrats to progressive attitudes toward race and fled the party as a result. Even education is, in a sense, a proxy for opinions about race, the brightest line in today’s partisan conflict.

Women aren’t a voting bloc

A person’s gender is not especially good at predicting party affiliation — at least not on its own. When combined with age and marital status, though, it becomes more relevant. Seventy percent of millennial women identify with or lean toward the Democrats, according to a 2018 report from the Pew Research Center, and about 57 percent of unmarried women leaned Democratic in a 2015 Pew report.

The partisan gender gap developed in the 1980s as men drifted toward the Republican Party; it widened in the 2016 Trump versus Clinton election. Much like racial resentment explains support for Mr. Trump, researchers have found that “hostile sexism” — measured by asking questions like whether someone believes women seek to control men — is increasingly dividing the parties.

As issues like sexual assault gain prominence in the national political conversation, the combination of gender with other characteristics like age and marital status helps predict whether a voter describes himself or herself as a feminist — and that directly relates to party affiliation. Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans to say the country needs more work to achieve gender equality.

Partisanship can turn violent

Parties don’t just matter in elections. They affect how people identify, not just the other way around. Some people adjust their religious habits to better match their partisanship: For example, Republicans in search of other Republicans might start attending church more often. Put another way, people aren’t just sorting themselves into parties. Parties are sorting people, too, making cultural and racial rifts wider and harder to bridge.

And because partisan identities tend to be deeply held, political events rarely shake adults’ party preferences, which means the resentment from identity-based polarization probably isn’t going to spontaneously dissolve. In fact, it might get worse. Dr. Abramowitz writes in his book “The Great Alignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump” that polarizing forces — increased racial diversity, the waning influence of religion and the rise of partisan media — are “far from spent.”

Nathan Kalmoe, a political scientist at Louisiana State University, has examined political parties during the most divided period in American history: the Civil War. In his book “With Ballots & Bullets: Partisanship & Violence in the American Civil War,” he demonstrates how newspapers and party leaders encouraged citizens to fight by exploiting their partisan identities, fueling a war that killed 750,000 people.

Though America isn’t facing a civil war right now, he writes, “the country is in an uncomfortably similar position today,” with “racial-religious-partisan alignments, political demonization, rhetoric rejecting fair elections, and even language encouraging violence from prominent leaders, including the president.”

Americans, he says, haven’t fully appreciated the potential of party conflict — inflamed by social sorting and impetuous leadership — to devolve into “organized mass violence.” Partisanship, he says, “has extremes that we haven’t recognized.”