Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
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The Demand For Protection and the Persistently High Rates of Gun Violence Among Young Black Males

AI Summary. Murder rates for young Black males are roughly 10x those for white males, with 97% of these murders involving guns, and surveys spanning four decades indicate young Black males carry guns mainly for protection against others who are armed. The authors argue this creates a high-gun-carrying equilibrium that requires large reductions in the perceived benefits of carrying to reverse.

William Evans National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 25, 2022
Is Database:
Database

Young black males carry guns primarily for protection, creating a high-gun carry equilibrium that is difficult to reverse.

Does carrying guns for protection sustain high gun violence rates?

Core argument: Murder rates for young black males run roughly 10 times those of white males, with 97% of these murders committed with guns.

The murder rates for young black males are approximately 10 times higher than those for white males, with 97% of these murders involving guns. Surveys over four decades indicate that young black males carry guns primarily for protection against others who are armed, creating a high-gun carry equilibrium that is difficult to reverse. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that large reductions in the perceived benefits of carrying a gun are necessary to shift back to a low-gun equilibrium. The murder rate for black males aged 15-24 increased by 39.7% from 2019 to 2020, driven largely by gun violence, which rose by 34%. The persistence of this high-gun equilibrium suggests that policy interventions must be substantial and targeted to effectively reduce gun violence in this demographic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Murder rates for young black males run roughly 10 times those of white males, with 97% of these murders committed with guns.
  2. The murder rate for black males aged 15–24 rose 39.7% from 2019 to 2020, driven largely by gun violence, which rose 34%.
  3. Surveys spanning four decades indicate young black males carry guns mainly for protection against others who are armed, producing a high-gun-carry equilibrium that requires large reductions in the perceived benefits of carrying to reverse.

why is the level of violence in the young black male population so high…The murder rates for black men are roughly 10 times higher than the rate for white men in most years…. and how has this level of violence persisted for so long?..The violence in this population is driven by guns. As we outline below, by the end of our sample, 97 percent of murders of young black males are via guns, a rate substantially larger than the rate for the general population. Surveys spanning nearly forty years suggests that young black males carry guns at high rates primarily as protection against others who are also armed...With so many people carrying weapons, disagreements are settled with deadly consequences…To derive specific predictions from our model, we specialize to the case where the two dimensions of a person’s type follow a bivariate normal distribution. If the average instrumental value of carrying a gun is low, gun carry rates are also low. As that value increases, the equilibrium carry rate shifts dramatically. The problem is that returning to a low-gun equilibrium among non-criminals is difficult. The situation can be understood as a coordination failure. Most non-criminals would be better off if everyone stopped carrying guns, but getting there is difficult without a coordinating device. Hence, gun violence persists.The comparative statics are troubling. Once a high gun carry equilibrium is reached, large drops in the benefits of carrying a gun are necessary to revert to a low gun equilibrium. Furthermore, an important asymmetry prevails. The equilibrium gun carry rate, and (by implication in our model) the level of danger and violence, is much more sensitive to changes in the average instrumental value of a gun than its average defensive value, even though the vast majority who arm do so for perceived protection. Our reading of the existing gun policy research suggests these conclusions conflict with real-world policy options in that it has been easier for policy makers to attempt to change the costs of owning guns for non-criminals than criminals. These results suggest the problem may be particularly difficult to solve through legislative means… The homicide rate has ballooned as the COVID-19 pandemic has progressed. In Figure 1, we showed that murder rates increased by 27 percent from 2019 to 2020. Much of this was due to an increase in gun murders, which rose 34 percent compared to 9.4 percent for non-gun murders. Many urban counties have experienced substantially larger increases including Jefferson County, KY, home to Louisville (81.3 percent),Milwaukee County, WI (72.3 percent), Alameda County, CA, home to Oakland (65.2 percent), and Orleans Parish, LA, home to New Orleans (64.2 percent), just to name a few. The groups with the highest murder rates already also had the greatest change in murder rates between 2019 and 2020. Breaking the population into three age groups (15-24, 25-34, 35 and up), four races (white, black, Asian/Pacific Islander, American Indian/Alaskan Native) and 2 genders, there are 24 groups. The three groups that saw the biggest increase in murder rates were white males 15-24 (36.0 percent), black males 25-34 (38.2 percent), and black males 15-24 (39.7 percent). The preliminary data for 2021 looks even worse. Murder counts for the first six months of 2021 are up 13.9 percent over the same time period in 2020.

William Evans and Maciej Kotowski, "The Demand For Protection and the Persistently High Rates of Gun Violence Among Young Black Males,"National Bureau Of Economic Research, April 2022, https://www.nber.org/papers/w29969

“…In Figure 5, the black dashed line reports the fraction of murders of young black males from 1976 to 2019 where an offender is identified in the SHR. This has declined steadily over time from 80 to about 52 percent. In the same graph, the solid line reports the fraction of murders of young black males with known offender where at least one of the offenders is from this same demographic group. This number starts at 44 percent in 1976 rises to 70 percent in 1994 and has been near 60 percent since 2002. When we increase the age range by another decade, the fraction known offenders that are black males ages 15-34 has been hovering around between 77 and 81 percent since 1992…”

The Demand For Protection and the Persistently High Rates of Gun Violence Among Young Black Males: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Stop And Frisk

“…Third, during the height of SQF use in New York City, murders of young black males fell dramatically. In Figure 15a, we report in solid lines the murder rate for black males 15-24 and 25-34 from New York City while the dotted lines of the same color represent the same numbers for the rest of the country. The police reforms that started in New York City in 1994 occur at a time when the crack epidemic was receding and murder rates for young black males were falling. This makes it difficult to assign how much of the decline is due to SQF or other factors, like mean reversion. That said, the rates for young black males in the rest of the country retreat to their pre-crack levels and do not decline, whereas the decline is dramatic in New York City. In Figure 15b, we report the time series of murder rates in New York City and the rest of the country for everyone who is not a black male 15-34. Here, there is conflicting data on the impact of the SQF program. A result consistent with those favorable to SQF is that New York City had persistently higher murder rates than the rest of the country and starting in 1994, these murder rates drop quickly and are now below the rest of the country. The percent drop in murder rates in New York City for those that are not black males 15-34 is comparable to the drop for younger black males, the primary targets of SQF. This could mean some other policy was impacting murder rates... The model developed in section 3 suggests that once a high-gun carry equilibrium is obtained, it would take a massive reduction in the protective value of guns to return the world to a low gun equilibrium. There may have been no more targeted policing strategy for gun violence among young black males that SQF in New York City. The numbers above suggest it was especially targeted to young black males, but the low yield of arrests, guns and contraband suggest the program was not targeted to likely criminals but to a much larger group. The increased risk of sanction for carrying aweapon along with improved in community safety reduce the attractiveness of guns as a protective means to non-criminals. If we were to make the generous assumption that all of the decline in murders in New York City were attributable to SQF, then this program illustrates the degree to which jurisdictions must police in order to obtain large reduction in the protective value of guns and hence a large reduction in murders. This conclusion is consistent with the relative rigidity of equilibria with respect to changes in… Large and costly interventions along this dimension are necessary to shift outcomes…

“…For completeness, we report in Figure 3 the same graph for white male. The basic time series patterns are quite similar to those of black males. The startling distinction between Figures 2 and 3 is the scale.The murder rates for black men are roughly 10 times higher than the rate for white men in most years. The time series movement in the murder rate for young black males is driven almost exclusively by gun violence. In Figure 4, we report the murder rate, the gun murder rate and the non-gun murder rate for this group since 1968. The non-gun murder rate has fallen steadily since 1968. In contrast, the overall murder rate essentially follows the gun murder rate. Moreover, the fraction of murders attributable to guns is now much higher than 50 years ago, climbing from about three-quarters of murders in 1968 to 98 percent in 2020..”

“…In Figure 2, we report the national time series from 1968 through 2020 for murder rates among black males in three age groups: 15-24, 25-34, and 35-plus. The murder rate for older black men has fallen from 98.3 in 1972 to a low of 21.2 in 2010, a drop of 78 percent. Since 2010, the murder rate in this group has edged up, but is still 63 percent below its peak and 55 percent lower than the 1968 value. The murder rate for black men in the 25-34 age category has been much more volatile, seeing peaks almost every decade. The long term trend is decidedly negative. Between 1968 and 2020, murder rates fell 26 percent. The peak (176.6 in 1972) to trough (67.7 in 2014) changes represents a 62 percent decline. The numbers for young black males follow a completely different series. Between 1978 and 1994 there was a 137 percent increase in murders, then over the next 21 years, murder rates fell by 60 percent. However, the murder rate in 2019 (77) was at about the same as it was in 1968 (81) and the rate and the rate in 2020 (108) is 33 percent higher than in 1968. This is a staggering difference compared to the rest of the country. The rate in 2020 is 17 times what it is for people not in that demographic. Although young black males are about 1 percent of the population, the fraction of murders in this group represented 17 percent of murders in 1994 and 17 percent in 2020…”

Trends in Murder Rates

“…In Figure 1, we graph the national murder rate as reported by the National Vital StatisticsData (NVSD) from 1968 through 2020.The time series was volatile for the first 23 years with peaks in 1974, 1980, and 1992. The national murder rate declined consistently from 1992 through 2015, with a substantial increase after that, especially in 2020 when murder rates for the nation rose by 27 percent, more than twice the second largest annual percent increase in the murder rate in the series. The rate in 2020 is about the same as it was in 1968 and the number for 2019 was 20 percent lower than the value in 1968. In the same graph, we also report the gun and non-gun murder rates. The variation in murders over time is driven mainly by changes in gun murders. Of the increase between 1968 and 1992, 81 percent was attributable to gun violence and of the decline from 1992 to 2015, 65 percent was due to a drop in gun murders. The murder rate for black males differs fundamentally in level and time series than the rest of the country…”

  • Poverty/Crime
  • Workforce
Previous articleApril 21, 2022Additive GrowthUS Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has grown linearly over the past 90 years, challenging the notion of a TFP slowdown.Next articleApril 26, 2022The relation between nominal and real wage growthNominal wage growth above 5% can lead to inflation, eroding real wages. Since 2001, nominal wage growth has averaged 0.7% above price inflation, never exceeding it by more than 2.5%.
Showing 72 database articles primarily about Poverty/Crime

Why America’s Prisons Are Shrinking And Racial Gaps Are Closing

AI Summary. Racial disparities in US crime, arrest, and prison admission rates have declined across offence types, driven by reductions among Black Americans. Black-White disparity in drug-offence prison admissions fell from 12x to 2.9x, attributable to a 75% drop in the Black drug admission rate, while declines for violent and property offences were smaller.

Jason Robey and Michael Light Nature Human Behaviour
Date Posted:
September 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

From their respective recent peaks in 2000 and 2006 to 2019, prison admissions for violent crime fell 20% for Whites and 43% for Blacks. Race-specific NIBRS estimates suggest actual violent crime fell 18% and 47%, respectively.

Why are racial gaps in US arrests and imprisonment narrowing?

Core argument: Black–White disparity in drug-offence prison admission rates fell from 12 to 1 in 2000 to 2.9 to 1 in 2019, attributed almost entirely to a 75% drop in the Black prison admission rate for drug offences.

From their respective peaks [2000 for whites, 2006 for blacks], prison admission rates for violent crime fell 20% for Whites and 43% for Blacks. [Because UCR crime totals do not identify offender race, the authors use the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which records offender race as reported by victims, witnesses or police, to allocate national violent-crime totals by race. NIBRS contains about three times as many violent offenders as arrestees. As a check on crimes not reported to police, they use National Crime Victimization Survey victim reports; results are similar.] [Recorded violent crime fell 18% for Whites and 47% for Blacks See Table 2]. For Whites, the decline in prison admissions is primarily a function of a decline in crime and arrests, with case processing dampening the decline. For Blacks, the decline in violent prison admissions is exclusively attributed to a 47% reduction in violent crime, as policing and case processing trends worked against an otherwise larger decline. [Arrests per crime and prison admissions per arrest both rose slightly; See Table 2].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Black–White disparity in drug-offence prison admission rates fell from 12 to 1 in 2000 to 2.9 to 1 in 2019, attributed almost entirely to a 75% drop in the Black prison admission rate for drug offences.
  2. Racial disparities in crime, arrest, and prison admission rates have declined across all offence types since about 2000, largely attributable to reductions in crime, arrests, and imprisonment among Blacks.
  3. Declining drug admissions accounted for 53% of the overall drop in Black prison admission rates, while for Whites 62% of the decline came from property offences, with violent (20%) and drug (19%) admissions contributing roughly equally.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Incarceration Rate Is About To Fall Off A Cliff — The U.S. imprisonment rate stayed below 120 per 100,000 people from the end of World War II until the mid-1970s, then doubled by 1985 and grew about 8% a year, passing 1m prisoners in 1994 and peaking in 2009 — 18 years after violent crime peaked.
  • Number of Young People Accused of Serious Crimes Surges in New York City — New York City Police Department figures show 4,858 major crimes with a minor accused or arrested in the most recent year, up 37% from 3,543 seven years earlier, with robberies and felony assaults continuing to rise. Police officials attribute the increase to a state law diverting most 16- and 17-year-old defendants from adult courts.
  • How Many Are Criminals — In the United States, between one in four and one in three Black men eventually serve prison time, compared with one in seven Hispanic men and roughly one in fifteen non-Hispanic white men. In Denmark, about 9% of men of Danish origin and 27% of men of non-Western origin have a criminal conviction by age 24.
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Workforce

Poverty in the United States: 2025

AI Summary. The official U.S. poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2%, a third consecutive annual decline and among the lowest on record, with 34.5m people in poverty. Poverty rates hit historic lows for Hispanic individuals, down 1.2 points to 13.9%, and children under 18, down 1.0 point to 13.4%.

Christina Bijou and Emily Shrider U.S. Census Bureau
Date Posted:
September 17, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to the Census Bureau, the poverty rate in the US fell .5pp in 2025 to 10.2%, one of the lowest rates on record. The poverty rate for children fell to a historical low of 13.4%. Census’s income measure does not include taxes or non-cash government transfers.

Is the U.S. poverty rate falling to record lows?

Core argument: The official U.S. poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2% in 2025, the third consecutive annual decline and one of the lowest rates on record, with 34.5 million people in poverty.

In 2025, the official poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2%, the third consecutive annual decline and one of the lowest rates on record. There were 34.5 million people in poverty in 2025. Poverty rates for Hispanic individuals and children under age 18 both fell to historic lows in 2025. Between 2024 and 2025, the poverty rate for Hispanic individuals fell 1.2 percentage points to 13.9%. The child poverty rate fell 1 percentage point to 13.4%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The official U.S. poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2% in 2025, the third consecutive annual decline and one of the lowest rates on record, with 34.5 million people in poverty.
  2. The poverty rate for Hispanic individuals fell 1.2 percentage points to 13.9% between 2024 and 2025, a historic low.
  3. The poverty rate for children under age 18 fell 1.0 percentage point to 13.4% in 2025, a historic low.

Related Articles:

  • Poverty and Dependency in the United States, 1939–2023 — Extending a consistent poverty measure back to 1939, the authors estimate US absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, driven by growth in market income rather than government transfers net of taxes. Poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty than before.
  • Evaluating the Success of the War on Poverty since 1963 Using an Absolute Full-Income Poverty Measure — The authors estimate that an absolute full-income poverty measure, which counts a fuller set of income sources and adjusts thresholds only for inflation, fell from 19.5% to 1.6%, versus an official decline to 10.5%. They also find relative poverty reductions modest and government dependence more than doubled among working-age adults.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

An Extra Point for Attendance: The Impact of High School Varsity Athletics on Absenteeism

AI Summary. High school varsity athletes are absent about 1.37 percentage points less often than non-athletes over the school year, nearly 20% lower, after controlling for factors linked to both sports participation and attendance. Athletes' absence rates fall further while their sport is in season, which the authors argue suggests participation itself improves attendance.

Nat Malkus and Sam Hollon American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
April 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The absentee rate of Indiana high school students, ~23% of whom played a varsity sport, was ~20% lower for those who participated in varsity athletics than for non-athletes. The effect was stronger when an athlete’s particular sport was in season.

Does playing high school varsity sports reduce student absenteeism?

Core argument: High school varsity athletes' absence rate across the school year was 1.37 points lower than non-athletes', a reduction of almost 20%, after controlling for factors that matter for both sports participation and attendance.

We find that varsity sports participation is strongly associated with better student attendance, and we argue it is plausible that varsity sports participation causes better attendance. When we control for a number of factors that we know matter for both sports participation and attendance, we continue to find that varsity athletes are absent less often than their peers across the entire year. Across the school year, athletes’ absence rate was 1.37 points lower than non-athletes’. That’s a reduction of almost 20%. The broad pattern shown in Table 1 is that students from more advantaged groups were more likely to participate in varsity sports and less likely to be absent from school. It’s thus no surprise that, in the raw data, there is an association between playing varsity sports and having good attendance (Figure 3). But is that because students who attend school more reliably are more likely to play sports or because playing sports leads to better attendance? One way to tease out the answer is to compare varsity athletes' attendance during their sports seasons with their attendance the rest of the year. Not only do varsity athletes have lower annual absence rates—especially unexcused absences—than non-athletes, but [Figure 3 and Figure 4] show that their absence rates fall further when their sport is in season, [which suggests at least some causal effect].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. High school varsity athletes' absence rate across the school year was 1.37 points lower than non-athletes', a reduction of almost 20%, after controlling for factors that matter for both sports participation and attendance.
  2. Varsity athletes' absence rates fall further when their sport is in season, which the authors argue suggests at least some causal effect of participation on attendance.
  3. Students from more advantaged groups were more likely to play varsity sports and less likely to be absent, producing an association in the raw data between varsity participation and good attendance.

Related Articles:

  • The Benefits of Scholastic Athletics — Using longitudinal data with extensive controls for family background, ability, and personality, the authors estimate that college varsity athletes from disadvantaged backgrounds—including women and men from low-income families and Black men—earn more after graduation than comparable non-athletes. The authors conclude that participation in college sports promotes social mobility, with no evidence of adverse outcomes.
  • Long COVID for Public Schools: Chronic Absenteeism Before and After the Pandemic — Nationwide chronic absenteeism — the share of students missing at least 10% of a school year — rose from 15% in 2018 to 28% in 2022, and although rates improved in 2023, they remained 75% above the pre-pandemic baseline. Chronic absenteeism is associated with lower standardized test scores, with the highest rates in lower-achieving, higher-poverty districts.
  • The Latest Chronic Absenteeism Numbers — Chronic absenteeism—students missing 10% or more of the school year—rose from 15% of K–12 students before the pandemic to 28%, then eased to 26% in the first full post-pandemic school year. Data from eight states show continued declines, including New Mexico's drop from 40% to 33%, but rates remain well above pre-pandemic levels.
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • K-12

Sports Betting Across Borders: Spatial Spillovers, Credit Distress, and Fiscal Externalities

AI Summary. The authors estimate that state legalization of sports betting raises average quarterly betting spending per person by about $46 from a pre-legalization mean of $2.50, with spillover spending in nearby counties where betting is illegal. Three years later, median credit scores are one point lower and delinquency rates 0.31 percentage points higher.

Jacob Goss and Daniel Mangrum Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
March 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database

After the legalization of sports betting in 2018, delinquency rates on a wide range of consumer debts rose, increasing .31pp as of 2025. The delinquency rate for the ~3% of the population that were new gamblers increased by ~10pp driven by those under 40.

How does legalizing sports betting affect spending and consumer credit?

Core argument: State legalization of sports betting raises average quarterly betting spending per person by roughly $46 from a pre-treatment mean of $2.50 and lifts the share of the population with any sportsbook spending by 3.1 percentage points.

Exploiting the staggered roll-out of state-level legalization following the 2018 Murphy v. NCAA decision, we use an extended two-way fixed effects (ETWFE) framework that separately estimates direct treatment effects and cross-border spillover effects. Our first-stage estimates establish that legalization dramatically increases betting activity: average quarterly spending per person rises by roughly $46 from a pre-treatment mean of $2.50, and the share of the population with any sportsbook spending in a quarter increases by 3.1 percentage points. The effects on average spending grow continually over time with no clear evidence of saturation, suggesting the market for mobile sports betting continues to mature years after legalization. At the same time, substantial betting activity occurs in counties where sports betting is not legal but which lie near a legal state, with spillover effects on total spending roughly 14% of the direct effect for counties within 15 miles of a legal state, declining monotonically with distance and approaching zero by 60 miles. These spillovers have real consequences for consumer financial health. Three years after legalization, median credit scores are one point lower and overall delinquency rates increase by 0.31 percentage points following legalization. [Under-40 auto loan delinquency increases by half a percentage point and credit card delinquency by one percentage point, driving the overall increase in delinquency.] Since only about 3.1% of the population takes up betting after legalization, these intent-to-treat estimates would imply that those who are induced to bet due to legalization experience delinquency increases of 10 percentage points.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. State legalization of sports betting raises average quarterly betting spending per person by roughly $46 from a pre-treatment mean of $2.50 and lifts the share of the population with any sportsbook spending by 3.1 percentage points.
  2. Three years after legalization, median credit scores are one point lower and overall delinquency rates rise by 0.31 percentage points, with under-40 auto loan delinquency up half a percentage point and credit card delinquency up one percentage point.
  3. For counties within 15 miles of a legal state, spillover effects on total spending are roughly 14% of the direct effect, declining monotonically with distance and approaching zero by 60 miles.

Related Articles:

  • The Case for Prohibiting Vice — A record 62m Americans used marijuana in a single year, 17m of them daily or near daily, while half of American men now hold sports-betting accounts, up from almost zero seven years earlier. The author argues vice and addiction undermine citizens' capacity for free action, justifying state regulation beyond individual-harm criteria.
  • Americans Increasingly See Legal Sports Betting As A Bad Thing For Society and Sports — Survey data show 43% of U.S. adults say legalized sports betting is a bad thing for society, up from 34% three years earlier, and 40% say it is bad for sports, up from 33%. The largest shift came among men under 30, 47% of whom now call it bad for society versus 22% earlier.
  • From Sports to AI, America Is Awash in Speculative Fever. Washington Is Egging It On — Speculation now extends beyond stocks, bonds and property to crypto, valued at roughly $4tn, and sports betting, where Americans wagered $150bn in a year, up 24%, according to the American Gaming Association. Gold, traditionally a hedge against bubbles, itself looks bubbly, and working-class investors are flocking to these markets.
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Politics

New York City Government Services: Services for the Unsheltered

AI Summary. New York City's unsheltered population rose 26% from 3,588 to 4,504, while spending on services for that population more than tripled from $102m to nearly $368m. That spending grew from just under 5% to nearly 9% of total Department of Homeless Services outlays.

Thomas DiNapoli New York State Comptroller
Date Posted:
March 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

In 2025 New York City spent $81,705 per “street” homeless person, up 262% from 2019 whose numbers increased 26% during that period. This does not include spending on “sheltered” homeless, who are ~97% of the homeless population.

Has tripling spending on unsheltered services reduced the unsheltered population?

Core argument: New York City spending on services for the unsheltered rose 262%, from $102 million in FY 2019 to nearly $368 million in FY 2025, while the unsheltered population grew 26%, from 3,588 to 4,504.

New York City’s unsheltered population increased from 3,588 in FY 2019 to 4,504 in FY 2025 — a 26% increase from pre-pandemic levels. In that time, spending on services for this population has more than tripled, growing from $102 million in FY 2019 to nearly $368 million in FY 2025 (a 262% increase). Its share of spending has also increased, from just under 5% to nearly 9% of total Department of Homeless Services (DHS) spending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. New York City spending on services for the unsheltered rose 262%, from $102 million in FY 2019 to nearly $368 million in FY 2025, while the unsheltered population grew 26%, from 3,588 to 4,504.
  2. Services for the unsheltered climbed from just under 5% to nearly 9% of total New York City Department of Homeless Services spending between FY 2019 and FY 2025.

Related Articles:

  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • The Clock Now Ticks on Zohran Mamdani — New York City's share of the nation's millionaires has fallen 30% since 2010 and major banks have expanded in Dallas and Atlanta as finance's share of city employment shrank. The author argues a proposed city tax plan would leave remaining high earners paying 60% of taxes.
  • Supply and The Mam — New York City has the highest combined city-state personal tax rate in the US and the highest all-in corporate income tax rate at 17.4%, and the highest industrial, retail and multifamily property taxes per square foot among ten major cities. New York State ranks first in tax collections per capita.
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Workforce

Poverty and Dependency in the United States, 1939–2023

AI Summary. Extending a consistent poverty measure back to 1939, the authors estimate US absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, driven by growth in market income rather than government transfers net of taxes. Poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty than before.

Richard Burkhauser and Kevin Corinth National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
February 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 1939 and 1963, the % of Americans below LBJ’s absolute poverty line (3× the cost of a minimal meal plan), fell from 48.5 to 19.5, driven by rising market income. Post-1964, most (for non-blacks, all) drops were the result of transfers, not earnings.

Did market income or government transfers drive the largest poverty declines?

Core argument: Absolute poverty in the United States fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, a 29 percentage point reduction that occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs such as SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits.

The major innovation of this paper is to extend a comprehensive and consistent measure of poverty back to 1939, exploiting a quarter century of data before the War on Poverty began. From 1939-1963, absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5%, a 29 percentage point reduction. This pre-war progress provides important context for previously documented success in reducing poverty afterwards, since it occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs like SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits. During that 1939–1963 period, it was the growth of market income rather than government transfers net of taxes that reduced poverty rates. In fact, poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty was declared than in the 24 years before, even when applying the same initial poverty rate to both periods. Our results do not imply that poverty would have necessarily continued to fall at the same rate after 1963 in the absence of the War on Poverty. A pre versus post comparison is conflated by contemporaneous macroeconomic and social changes, such as slower economic growth in the post-1963 period. Conversely, any claim that the War on Poverty was necessary for poverty to decline should be accompanied by an attempt to understand why it had already been falling in the quarter century before it was declared.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Absolute poverty in the United States fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, a 29 percentage point reduction that occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs such as SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits.
  2. From 1939 to 1963, growth of market income rather than government transfers net of taxes reduced poverty rates, according to a poverty measure extended consistently back to 1939.
  3. Poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty was declared than in the 24 years before, even applying the same initial poverty rate to both periods, though the authors note the comparison is conflated by contemporaneous macroeconomic and social changes, including slower post-1963 growth.

Related Articles:

  • Evaluating the Success of the War on Poverty since 1963 Using an Absolute Full-Income Poverty Measure — The authors estimate that an absolute full-income poverty measure, which counts a fuller set of income sources and adjusts thresholds only for inflation, fell from 19.5% to 1.6%, versus an official decline to 10.5%. They also find relative poverty reductions modest and government dependence more than doubled among working-age adults.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Government Benefit Programs Already Do A Lot To Help Low Income Families — For a two-adult, three-child family, existing taxes and government benefits bring take-home resources to about $58,000 with no earnings, $79,000 with $20,000 of earnings, and $90,000 with $80,000 of earnings plus $15,000 in employer health premiums. A $75,000 gap in earnings and work-related benefits narrows to $11,000 in take-home pay.
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Workforce
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