Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
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Consolidated Advantage: New Organizational Dynamics of Wage Inequality

Clem Aeppli Washington Center For Equitable Growth
Date Posted:
March 10, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Workplace-occupation wage sorting drives inequality: 1999-2017 correlation doubles, explains 67% of wage gap growth. Key trend: High/low-wage jobs increasingly cluster in corresponding workplaces.

Between 1999 and 2017, wage inequality in the US labor market has been driven by the increasing consolidation of high-wage occupations within high-wage workplaces, while low-wage occupations have become concentrated in low-wage workplaces. This trend accounts for two-thirds of the rise in wage inequality, as the correlation between workplace and occupation pay premiums doubled from 0.14 to 0.28. High-paying workplaces, which once employed low-skill workers in roles like unionized manufacturing, now predominantly employ high-skill professionals. Meanwhile, low-paying service workplaces have seen a reduction in high-paying roles such as doctors and teachers. This shift is not due to firm turnover or outsourcing but rather new bases of workplace pay premiums, with professionals and managers increasingly benefiting from these premiums over blue-collar workers. The data highlights a significant organizational shift affecting wage distribution across industries.

Nathan Wilmers and Clem Aeppli, "Consolidated Advantage: New Organizational Dynamics of Wage Inequality," Washington Center For Equitable Growth, March 2021https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/consolidated-advantage-new-organizational-dynamics-of-wage-inequality/

Consolidated Advantage: New Organizational Dynamics of Wage Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 1


One line that might be worth noting/quoting, “…Specifically, high-paying jobs for workers in low and middle premium occupations—those that previously offset consolidated inequality—have faced wage cuts. Previously, blue collar workers in manufacturing, mining, utilities, and transportation were often able to extract above-market pay…”

Findings explained (see two charts), “…Figure 2 shows the main results from these models. While in the one-way models both between workplace and between-occupation variance increase over time (see Figure A.8 in the appendix), in the two-way model they remain fairly steady across all years. Neither rising variance in occupation premiums nor rising variance in workplace premiums alone explains much of the increasing inequality trend. The residual variance component, a combination of workplace-specific occupation premiums and within-job inequality, does not change over time. Instead, it is the covariance that increases sharply from 1999 to 2017. The increase in covariance accounts for almost two-thirds of the total growth in inequality, whereas the small increases in variance in workplace premiums and occupation premiums account for only about 12 percent and 23 percent, respectively. Figure 3 shows that this increase in covariance is due to a rise in correlation between workplace fixed effects and occupation fixed effects, which doubles from 0.14 to 0.28 between 1999 and 2017. Workplace and occupation have become increasingly consolidate…”

Here is the dataset, “…restricted-use microdata from 1999-2017 from the Occupational Employment Statistics Survey (OES), collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The OES is fielded to provide official annual estimates of occupational wages and employment levels (BLS 2008). The OES surveys around 400,000 establishments per year, sampled from the population of private and public sector workplaces.3 The survey is administered to employers, managers and human resource managers. Each respondent is asked to report all occupations employed in their establishment and to indicate the number of employees in each occupation who receive pay in each of 12 pay intervals.The data include no information about individual worker characteristicsbeyond pay, occupation and establishment information. The OES is thus useful for studying occupation- and workplace-related pay changes, but we cannot adjust for individual characteristics like education, race or gender. This limitation of the data means that the occupation and workplace premiums we estimate should be interpreted as broadly summarizing pay effects due to skill, education, and other characteristics correlated with occupation and workplace…”

In practical terms this means, "...A privatizing, low-paying mental health clinic may substitute lower-paid social workers in for psychologists...An assembly job, low in the ranking of occupation or skill, can either be similarly low in the workplace premium ranking, at a low-paying supplier, or benefit from employment at a large, unionized corporation, with pay premiums even for low-level employees..... As workers are increasingly employed in jobs matching high or low premiums across workplace and occupation, fewer workers are in jobs defined by mismatched and offsetting premiums. It is this consolidated inequality, rather than rising variance in pay premiums associated with occupation or with workplace alone, that is the dominant source of rising inequality over the last two decades...."

Core finding, “…The two main sources of inequality in the US labor market—occupation and workplace—have increasingly consolidated. Workers benefiting from employment at a high-paying workplace are increasingly those who already benefit from membership in a high-paying occupation. Drawing on occupation-by-workplace data, we show that two-thirds of the rise in wage inequality since 1999 can be accounted for not by occupation or workplace inequality alone, but by their increased consolidation. This consolidation is not attributable to firm turnover or to how occupations have shifted across a fixed set of high paying firms (as in outsourcing). Instead, consolidation has resulted from new bases of workplace pay premiums. Workplace premiums associated with teams of professionals have increased, while premiums for previously high-paid blue-collar workers have been cut. Yet the largest source of consolidation is bifurcation in the social sector, whereby some previously low-paying but high-professional share workplaces, like hospitals and schools, have deskilled their jobs, while others have raised pay. Broadly, the results demonstrate an understudied way that organizations affect wage inequality: not by directly increasing variability in workplace or occupation premiums, but by consolidating these two sources of inequality….”

What this looks like in terms of categorization, “… we divide workplaces into different groups according to their starting level of occupation and workplace premiums. We define starting groups of workplaces by crossing 3 categories from each of the workplace premiums and average occupation premiums. The crossed tertiles define sets of workplaces that track substantive differences in industry and occupation composition. For the cell lowest in workplace pay premiums and in average occupation premiums, the most common industries are accommodation, food service and retail. These workplaces employ cooks, food service workers and sales clerks. In contrast, establishments with low average occupation premiums and high workplace premiums commonly employ production, transportation and administrative support workers. These establishments are typically in manufacturing, warehousing and transportation industries. Among high occupation premium establishments, those with low workplace premiums are predominantly healthcare and social services, professional and technical services and education. These establishments employ managerial and professional employees like doctors, social workers and teachers. However, they pay relatively little. In contrast, workplaces in the high occupation and high workplace premium cell are in professional and technical industries, healthcare and finance….”

Their data seems consistent with the superstar firms hypothesis, where employees at the high wage firms make more than their peers at low wage firms. Paper argues/shows that over the past 20 (1999-2017) years high paying jobs are increasingly concentrated in high paying workplaces, and low paying jobs are increasingly concentrated at low paying workforces"....Specifically, we argue that recent increases in wage inequality are accounted for by increased correlation between occupation pay premiums and workplace pay premiums. High-paying workplaces once employed low-skill workers in circumstances ranging from unionized manufacturing assembly jobs to maintenance and food service positions at large corporate headquarters. Moreover, previously many members of high-paying occupations—like doctors, teachers, and psychiatrists—worked in low-paying service workplaces. In this paper, we show that these cases of offsetting mismatch between occupation and workplace premiums have become more rare...."

New report from Nathan Wilmers and the Washington Center for Equitable Growth (using restricted BLS data) provides evidence (implicitly) that higher skilled workers are increasingly working to provide services to other higher skilled workers, "... organizations have consolidated occupation and workplace inequalities.... we show how workplace sources of premiums for blue collar workers and penalties for pink collar service organizations have been supplanted by higher pay for already-highly paid teams of managers and professionals. The net result is that it is professionals and managers, not blue collar workers, who now benefit from workplace premiums..."

Ed Comment, “…I think he conflates two issues: the migration of skilled workers to skilled companies and the outsourcing of non-mission critical lower-skilled workers. I agree low-skilled workers used to benefit somewhat pay-wise from working for companies with high-skilled workers. But companies gradually wised up about where and how they make their profits. Information and IT helped accelerate this. So this arbitrage would have gradually diminished (as it has) regardless of the first trend. In other words, I wouldn’t blame the first trend for the second. And the second trend reduced misallocation/inefficiency, which is a good thing. Misallocation/inefficiency merely redistribute resources and suboptimize incentives, which makes the pie smaller. There are some misallocations I might tolerate—e.g., constraining the supply of low-skilled workers to increase their wages (subsequently redistributing income). And, yes, it would slow growth. But, I see it as a logical policy choice. …especially in rich welfare state like ours that won’t tolerate low incomes and where lower-skilled voters have the predominate share of the vote and are too clueless not to do extraordinary damage to themselves/ourselves with good and not-so-good intentions….”

  • Wages/Income
  • Productivity
    • Workforce Reorganization
      • High vs Low Skill
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
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Showing 127 database articles primarily about Wages/Income

How Many Big Macs Does Your Salary Buy?

AI Summary. U.S. workers earn the most Big Macs annually (10,215), but Swiss workers lead on an hourly basis at 7 Big Macs per hour versus the U.S. at 6, reflecting longer American working hours rather than higher hourly wages.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The Economist’s venerable Big Mac Index is indicative of significantly higher after-tax, PPP-adjusted wages for American workers than for their French and German counterparts.

Does working longer hours mask stagnant American wage growth?

Core argument: American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.

On an annual basis, America continues to top our McWages rankings. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year; Switzerland and Australia are in second and third place, respectively. But American working hours are supersized, too. On an hourly basis, Switzerland comes out on top: the average worker there earns the equivalent of seven Big Macs an hour, compared with America’s six. Australia ranks third, at five burgers for every hour worked.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.
  2. Switzerland leads all nations in hourly McWage purchasing power at seven Big Macs per hour, with Australia third at five, demonstrating that top annual earnings and top hourly compensation do not always coincide.

Related Articles:

  • The Big Mac Index At 40 — Global currency misalignments are at their widest since the mid-1990s, driven by post-2021 U.S. inflation, an undervalued Chinese currency, and a weakening Japanese yen that has made consumer goods cheaper in Japan than in China.
  • Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — The gap in hours worked between Americans and non-Americans has narrowed by half since the 1990s, driven by declining U.S. work hours as expanded government health benefits reduced the need to work, while rising wages and lower barriers to employment increased hours worked in other advanced economies.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce

US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits

AI Summary. Corporate profit margins have expanded ~250 basis points over the past year, approaching all-time highs, as 23% profit growth far outpaced 8% growth in corporate value added. Labor's share of income is hitting new lows, confirming that margin expansion—not faster economic growth—is the primary driver of record profit levels.

Abiel Reinhart J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

US corporate profit margins rose ~250bp y/y in Q2 and are approaching an all-time high. Reinhart notes that tech and communications services drove ~58% of recent S&P 500 profit growth, even as the sectors have been “steadily losing employment since late 2022.”

Are record corporate profits driven by growth or margin expansion?

Core argument: Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) were very robust in both 2Q (41% [annual rate]) and over the last year (23%). Excluding post-recession spikes, we haven’t seen a year this strong since the mid-2000s. Higher margins [were] the key driver [of profit growth], as 23% y/y domestic profit growth was far in excess of the 8% increase in corporate value added. Profit margins (pre-tax profits divided by value added) increased close to 250bp over the last year, and are approaching all-time highs, whereas the labor share is hitting new lows.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Related Articles:

  • US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt — U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
  • Wages/Income
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Politics
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
  • Workforce

Consumer Checkpoint: The Great Convergence

AI Summary. Spending and wage growth have largely converged across income groups, with lower- and middle-income households posting after-tax wage growth of 5.2% and 4.2% year-over-year, narrowing a previously wide gap — though the top 5% of earners continue to outpace all others.

David Michael Tinsley, Joe Wadford, Liz Everett Krisberg, Vanessa Cook, et al. Bank of America
Date Posted:
August 11, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Over the last two years, after-tax wage growth for the top 5% has outpaced the rest of the distribution. BofA internal data show after-tax wage growth for the lowest income tercile has surpassed that of the top 5% for the first time since December 2024.

Are lower-income households finally catching up in wage growth?

Core argument: The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.

We have discussed the “K-shaped” divide between higher- and lower-income households’ spending and wage growth. But since May, our data has shown a significant narrowing in this gap. As of July, spending and wage growth have largely converged across income cohorts, with the exception of the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace the rest. A similar dynamic was evident in discretionary spending. In our view, one factor behind the narrowing spending growth gap is stronger after-tax wage growth. For lower- and middle-income households, after-tax wage growth rose to 5.2% YoY and 4.2% YoY, respectively, in July.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.
  2. After-tax wage growth for lower-income households reached 5.2% YoY in July versus 4.2% for middle-income households, with stronger after-tax gains identified as a primary driver of narrowing discretionary spending gaps across cohorts.

Related Articles:

  • What the World Cup Revealed About America — U.S. households with retirement savings and home equity have been insulated from inflation, as $15tn in annual spending by 45 million such households—driven by wealth gains rather than income—has sustained GDP growth well above rates seen in comparable economies.
  • K-Shaped Economy? — Using internal Stripe payment data, Tedeschi finds that spending growth of households in low-income zip codes has outpaced that of households in high-income…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
  • Wages/Income
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Income Shocks and Intrahousehold Dynamics: Evidence from a Guaranteed Income Experiment

AI Summary. Guaranteed income transfers reduce total household earnings by more than the transfer amount, as other household members—particularly partners—work fewer hours and are less likely to advance in their jobs.

Elizabeth Rhodes, David Broockman, Eva Vivalt, Patrick Krause, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
August 10, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In a randomized guaranteed-income experiment, giving one adult a transfer of $1,000/month for two years cut the other household members’ income by ~$1,700/year. Partners worked less and advanced less at work, while schooling and training among others rose.

Does guaranteed income reduce household work effort beyond the transfer amount?

Core argument: Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant income and total household income by approximately $1,700 per year, a reduction driven by lower earnings among other household members rather than collective income gains.

Figure 4 summarizes treatment effects on the standardized family-level indices. The transfers’ effects reshaped the income and employment of other household members. The gap between participant income and total household income fell by about $1,700 per year (s.e. $800). The decline appears to reflect lower earnings among other household members. Effects on employment outcomes are consistent with this interpretation. Partner promotions and transitions to better jobs decrease significantly, but these effects are very small in magnitude. Partner hours and employment show more meaningful declines but are not significant in the unconditional analysis. Several other measures provide supporting evidence of negative effects on labor supply. Net transfers—the value given [to extended family] minus the value received—increased by roughly $135 per year. Estimates for household stability, decision-making, and the division of labor cluster near zero.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant income and total household income by approximately $1,700 per year, a reduction driven by lower earnings among other household members rather than collective income gains.
  2. Guaranteed income transfers reduced partner labor supply, with statistically significant declines in promotions and job transitions, though effect sizes were small.
  3. partner hours and employment showed larger but statistically insignificant declines.

Related Articles:

  • The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Parenting and Children — A randomized experiment giving 1,000 parents an unconditional $1K/month over 3 years found essentially no differences in family outcomes; treated children…
  • The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Consumption and Household Balance Sheets: Experimental Evidence from Two US States — An experiment giving 1,000 individuals $1k per month for 3 years raised spending on housing as well as consumption, but also increased indebtedness, suggesting…
  • The Employment Effects of a Guaranteed Income: Experimental Evidence from Two U.S. States — Giving low income individuals $12,000/year for 3 years resulted in reduced market income of $1,500/year, due to a 2ppt reduction in labor force participation…
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
    • Unemployment/Participation

The Impact of AI on the U.S. Labor Market

Sania Edlich and Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
July 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A difference-in-differences design finds 6.7% slower real-wage growth in AI-exposed occupations since 2023 than in low-exposure ones, with no detectable job loss. The largest effects were for the lowest quartile (-10.7%) and service occupations (-24.3%).

We examine the wage and employment effects of AI adoption across U.S. occupations using observed usage data from the Anthropic Economic Index rather than the theoretical exposure measures that dominate prior work. Using a difference-in-differences design with occupation and year fixed effects across 321 matched occupations from 2015 to 2025, we find that high-exposure occupations experience a 6.7% decline in real wage growth post-2023 with no detectable employment effects. The effect is concentrated among the lowest earners: service workers face a 24.3% decline and the bottom wage quartile a 10.7% decline, while top earners show no significant effect.Today, 5.8 million workers are affected, but as AI adoption deepens across corporate America, this figure is likely to grow substantially, with significant implications for income inequality and labor market policy in the years ahead. Only 321 of roughly 800 BLS occupations were matched, and the post-2023 period may be partially confounded by post-pandemic labor market dynamics. [Editor’s note: Figure 3 shows both wage and employment growth and decline among high-exposure workers, but the exposure measure combines automated and augmentative use, and thus cannot distinguish substitution from complementarity.]

Related Articles:

  • AI and the Fable of the ATMs — ATM’s reduced demand for tellers per bank branch, but this was offset by an increased number of branches due to deregulation. Kedrosky notes, “aggregate…
  • Looking for the Ladder — The downtick in hiring in AI-exposed occupations started 6 months prior to the release of ChatGPT, and is “perfectly” aligned with the start of Fed rate hikes…
  • Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox — Aging societies face structural labor shortages that create permanent incentives to automate, making demographics a long-run driver of AI deployment. Technology-producing economies benefit twice: by offsetting domestic labor scarcity and by exporting automation solutions to every other aging society.
  • Wages/Income
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Unemployment/Participation

Cognitive Ability in Labor and Capital Markets

AI Summary. Higher cognitive ability predicts both higher capital income and higher investment returns, with the return advantage reflecting skill rather than risk-taking, as high-ability individuals earn better risk-adjusted returns while holding lower-risk portfolios.

Spencer Bastani, Kristina Karlsson, Jonas Kolsrud and Daniel Waldenström Uppsala University
Date Posted:
July 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Cognitive ability positively predicts capital as well as labor income, with the capital-income gradient ~3x as large in % terms. This reflects both higher saving rates and higher risk-adjusted returns, neither fully explicable by earnings.

Does cognitive ability generate superior investment returns independent of risk?

Core argument: Cognitive ability’s capital income gradient is 3x steeper than labor income gradient in log specifications, driven by higher saving rates.

We document three results. First, cognitive ability predicts capital income. Figure 2 plots mean log income and mean income rank against the nine cognitive ability scores reporting test performance on a 1–9 scale, with both series normalized to zero at the lowest score. In the log specification (Panel a), the capital income gradient is roughly three times steeper than the labor income gradient. In the rank specification (Panel b), the ordering reverses: the labor income gradient is steeper, because the heavy right tail of capital income compresses rank differences. Figure 3 provides a complementary perspective, plotting average cognitive ability across percentiles of the labor and capital income distributions. [The relationship between ability and rank flattens at the top of the labor distribution but strengthens at the top of the capital distribution.] Second, the capital-income gradient is only partially explained by labor income: a decomposition shows that ability is associated with higher saving rates and investment returns through channels beyond labor income. Third, the investment return channel is consistent with skill rather than risk compensation, as high-ability individuals earn higher risk-adjusted excess returns while holding portfolios with lower systematic risk.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Cognitive ability’s capital income gradient is 3x steeper than labor income gradient in log specifications, driven by higher saving rates.
  2. High-ability individuals earn higher risk-adjusted excess returns while holding lower-risk portfolios, indicating skill-based rather than risk-based compensation in capital markets.
  3. Ability-income associations persist across genders and remain largely unexplained by education, occupation, or family background, suggesting intrinsic cognitive factors drive.

Related Articles:

  • Cognitive Skills Beyond Childhood — Data from a British birth cohort followed since 1958 show that cognitive skills early in life predict wages at age 50 better than cognitive skills at age 50…
  • Steeper At The Top: Cognitive Ability and Earnings in Finland and Norway — The top-earning men in Finland and Norway score 1 standard deviation higher in cognitive ability than median earners. The ability curve is steepest at the top…
  • Toward An Understanding Of The Returns To Cognitive Skills Across Cohorts — Wage returns to cognitive skill have declined for white men who took the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) in 1997 relative to 1979, driven primarily by a…
  • Wages/Income
  • Education
    • Test Scores
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
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