Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
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  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Cyclical Worker Flows: Cleansing vs. Sullying

Henry Hyatt National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
May 24, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Worker churn from low to high productivity firms decreases during recessions, impacting overall productivity dynamics. @HenryHyatt highlights the complex interplay btw economic cycles and worker reallocation.

During recessions, worker churn from low to high productivity firms decreases, impacting overall productivity dynamics. High-productivity firms typically grow by hiring workers from less productive firms, with job-to-job flows contributing 0.1 log points to productivity growth each quarter. However, this procyclical movement slows during downturns, leading to a collapse of the productivity job ladder and a sullying effect. Conversely, nonemployment flows increase, as low-productivity firms see a rise in separations and a decline in hires, resulting in a cleansing effect. This dynamic causes productivity growth to initially slow but eventually improve as low-productivity firms contract or exit. The cleansing effect peaks early in recessions, while the sullying effect persists into recovery phases, highlighting the complex interplay between economic cycles and worker reallocation.

Haltiwanger you wanted added.

New Haltiwanger finds that during recession the churn of the workforce changes, the flow of workers moving from low productivity firms to higher productivity firms downticks and there is an uptick in exits from the labor force from workers employed in low productivity firms.

Core finding, “…We find that in expansions high-productivity firms grow faster primarily by hiring workers away from lower-productivity firms. The rate at which job-to-job flows move workers up the productivity ladder is highly procyclical. Productivity growth slows during recessions when this job ladder collapses. In contrast, flows into nonemployment from low productivity firms disproportionately increase in recessions, which leads to an increase in productivity growth. We thus find evidence of both sullying and cleansing effects of recessions, but the timing of these effects differs. The cleansing effect dominates early in downturns but the sullying effect lingers well into the economic recovery…”

John Haltiwanger, Henry Hyatt, Erika McEntarfer and Matthew Staiger, "Cyclical Worker Flows: Cleansing vs. Sullying," National Bureau Of Economic Research, May 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w28802

Impact on productivity, “…Figure 4(a) presents the decomposition of productivity growth into components attributable to poaching and nonemployment flows and shows clear evidence of the cleansing and sullying effects of recessions. On average, worker reallocation through poaching flows contributes 0.1 log points to overall productivity growth each quarter (all statistics on productivity changes are quarterly and have not been annualized). This is a substantial contribution to the overall quarterly average rate of productivity growth of 0.33 when aggregating our micro data.30 However, during recessions there is clear evidence of a sullying effect. In 2006:1 the poaching contribution is 0.13 log points but this declines to 0.02 by 2009:2. In contrast, worker reallocation through nonemployment tends to be a drag on productivity growth, on average, decreasing productivity by 0.67 log points each quarter.31 However, during recessions there is evidence of a cleansing effect since during those times nonemployment flows yield declines in the employment share of low-productivity firms. In 2006:1, the nonemployment component is -0.1 log points but increases to 0.08 in 2009:1. The figure illustrates the staggered nature of these effects in which the cleansing occurs at the outset of the recession-when unemployment rate is rising most rapidly-and the sullying effect peaks relatively further on into the downturn-which the unemployment rate is highest. In addition, the sullying effect lingers well into the recovery…”

Key Evidence, "... The average net employment growth of high-productivity firms is 0.33 percent per quarter with net poaching (the rate at which job-to-job moves reallocate workers to high-productivity firms) averaging 0.27 percent per quarter. In other words, during the 1998-2015 period, job-to-job moves of workers from less-productive employers account for most (80 percent) of the net employment growth of high-productivity firms. The results of the decomposition are also striking for the less productive firms in the industry. In Figure 1(b), low-productivity firms grew at a rate of 0.14 percent per quarter on average from 1998-2015, which is slower than the high-productivity firms. Low-productivity firms lose -0.34 percent employment per quarter from workers “voting with their feet” and moving to firms ranked higher in firm productivity distribution. The positive growth rate for less productive firms is entirely due to strong hiring from nonemployment.In other words, in a typical quarter less productive firms recruit from the pool of unemployed individuals to replace workers moving to better firms. This is also consistent with job ladder models of the labor market. In job ladder models, it is the search and matching frictions that support the presence of low-productivity firms that primarily hire from nonemployment. The patterns of hires and separations in Figure 1 are instructive for understanding the differences in the cyclical dynamics of job-to-job and nonemployment worker flows. Poaching hires and separations both decline for high-productivity firms in contractions with the decline in poaching hires larger so that net poaching declines significantly. Hires from nonemployment decline sharply for low-productivity firms in contractions accompanied by a surge in separations so that net employment growth declines sharply for low-productivity firms. There are similar qualitative patterns for hires from and separations to nonemployment for high-productivity firms but the magnitudes are smaller...."

Cyclical Worker Flows: Cleansing vs. Sullying: Extended Excerpt Image 1


"...To more clearly see how worker flows reallocate workers across the productivity ladder, we decompose the average overall net job flow differential between high- and low-productivity groups into the net poaching differential and the net flows from nonemployment differential... Figure 2 also shows pronounced cyclical patterns that differ across the components of net job flows. We quantify the nature of that variation in Table 2. Table 2 presents the results from regressions where each component of the differential growth rate (net job flows, net poaching flows, and net nonemployment flows) is regressed on a cyclical indicator and a time-trend..."

Bottomline, "... we find evidence of large differences in productivity across firms within the same industry. We also find that more productive firms in the same industry are more likely to grow and less productive firms more likely to contract and exit. The dispersion of productivity across firms is large in magnitude contributing to a high pace of reallocation of workers across firms. Using a decomposition of net job flows into those accounted for by job-to-job flows and those accounted for net flows from nonemployment, we find that much of the overall reallocation of employment from less productive to more productive firms is accounted for by job-to-job flows. The pace at which workers move up the productivity job ladder is highly procyclical. The collapse of the productivity job ladder is consistent with a sullying effect of recessions. In recessions, we find that the reallocation of workers away from less productive firms via nonemployment flows increases. This occurs through a spike in separations to nonemployment along with a decline in hires from nonemployment at low productivity firms. Thus, we also find evidence that this component of reallocation is consistent with a cleansing effect of recessions. The timing of the cleansing and sullying effects differs across stages of the cycle. The cleansing effect peaks relatively early in a downturn coincident with the relatively early spike in separations. The sullying effect peaks later in a downturn but lingers into the early stages of a recovery when unemployment is falling but remains well above trend. Our findings are robust to using a direct measure of productivity based on relative differences in revenue per worker across firms within the same industry and an alternative measure of firm performance based on using the AKM firm premium. Since the AKM firm premium abstracts from worker heterogeneity, this robustness suggests our results are not being driven by variation in the patterns of sorting of heterogeneous workers across heterogeneous firms over the cycle. This is not to suggest that the latter is unimportant but rather that there may be additional effects of cleansing and sullying from sorting above and beyond those we have quantified..”

  • Wages/Income
  • Comparisons
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      • High vs Low Skill
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Previous articleMay 24, 2021Estimating Spillovers from Publicly Funded RD: Evidence from the US Department of EnergyUS Department of Energy’s SBIR program shows significant R&D spillovers: every patent by grant recipients leads to 3 more by other inventors, 60% of which occur within the US.Next articleMay 24, 2021Household Debt Overhang Did Hardly Cause a Larger Spending Fall during the Financial Crisis in the UKUK data shows changes in debt-to-income ratios had a bigger impact on household consumption than absolute debt levels, rejecting the debt-overhang hypothesis.
Showing 127 database articles primarily about Wages/Income

How Many Big Macs Does Your Salary Buy?

AI Summary. U.S. workers earn the most Big Macs annually (10,215), but Swiss workers lead on an hourly basis at 7 Big Macs per hour versus the U.S. at 6, reflecting longer American working hours rather than higher hourly wages.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The Economist’s venerable Big Mac Index is indicative of significantly higher after-tax, PPP-adjusted wages for American workers than for their French and German counterparts.

Does working longer hours mask stagnant American wage growth?

Core argument: American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.

On an annual basis, America continues to top our McWages rankings. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year; Switzerland and Australia are in second and third place, respectively. But American working hours are supersized, too. On an hourly basis, Switzerland comes out on top: the average worker there earns the equivalent of seven Big Macs an hour, compared with America’s six. Australia ranks third, at five burgers for every hour worked.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.
  2. Switzerland leads all nations in hourly McWage purchasing power at seven Big Macs per hour, with Australia third at five, demonstrating that top annual earnings and top hourly compensation do not always coincide.

Related Articles:

  • The Big Mac Index At 40 — Global currency misalignments are at their widest since the mid-1990s, driven by post-2021 U.S. inflation, an undervalued Chinese currency, and a weakening Japanese yen that has made consumer goods cheaper in Japan than in China.
  • Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — The gap in hours worked between Americans and non-Americans has narrowed by half since the 1990s, driven by declining U.S. work hours as expanded government health benefits reduced the need to work, while rising wages and lower barriers to employment increased hours worked in other advanced economies.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce

US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits

AI Summary. Corporate profit margins have expanded ~250 basis points over the past year, approaching all-time highs, as 23% profit growth far outpaced 8% growth in corporate value added. Labor's share of income is hitting new lows, confirming that margin expansion—not faster economic growth—is the primary driver of record profit levels.

Abiel Reinhart J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

US corporate profit margins rose ~250bp y/y in Q2 and are approaching an all-time high. Reinhart notes that tech and communications services drove ~58% of recent S&P 500 profit growth, even as the sectors have been “steadily losing employment since late 2022.”

Are record corporate profits driven by growth or margin expansion?

Core argument: Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) were very robust in both 2Q (41% [annual rate]) and over the last year (23%). Excluding post-recession spikes, we haven’t seen a year this strong since the mid-2000s. Higher margins [were] the key driver [of profit growth], as 23% y/y domestic profit growth was far in excess of the 8% increase in corporate value added. Profit margins (pre-tax profits divided by value added) increased close to 250bp over the last year, and are approaching all-time highs, whereas the labor share is hitting new lows.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Related Articles:

  • US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt — U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
  • Wages/Income
  • GDP
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Consumer Checkpoint: The Great Convergence

AI Summary. Spending and wage growth have largely converged across income groups, with lower- and middle-income households posting after-tax wage growth of 5.2% and 4.2% year-over-year, narrowing a previously wide gap — though the top 5% of earners continue to outpace all others.

David Michael Tinsley, Joe Wadford, Liz Everett Krisberg, Vanessa Cook, et al. Bank of America
Date Posted:
August 11, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Over the last two years, after-tax wage growth for the top 5% has outpaced the rest of the distribution. BofA internal data show after-tax wage growth for the lowest income tercile has surpassed that of the top 5% for the first time since December 2024.

Are lower-income households finally catching up in wage growth?

Core argument: The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.

We have discussed the “K-shaped” divide between higher- and lower-income households’ spending and wage growth. But since May, our data has shown a significant narrowing in this gap. As of July, spending and wage growth have largely converged across income cohorts, with the exception of the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace the rest. A similar dynamic was evident in discretionary spending. In our view, one factor behind the narrowing spending growth gap is stronger after-tax wage growth. For lower- and middle-income households, after-tax wage growth rose to 5.2% YoY and 4.2% YoY, respectively, in July.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.
  2. After-tax wage growth for lower-income households reached 5.2% YoY in July versus 4.2% for middle-income households, with stronger after-tax gains identified as a primary driver of narrowing discretionary spending gaps across cohorts.

Related Articles:

  • What the World Cup Revealed About America — U.S. households with retirement savings and home equity have been insulated from inflation, as $15tn in annual spending by 45 million such households—driven by wealth gains rather than income—has sustained GDP growth well above rates seen in comparable economies.
  • K-Shaped Economy? — Using internal Stripe payment data, Tedeschi finds that spending growth of households in low-income zip codes has outpaced that of households in high-income…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
  • Wages/Income
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Income Shocks and Intrahousehold Dynamics: Evidence from a Guaranteed Income Experiment

AI Summary. Guaranteed income transfers reduce total household earnings by more than the transfer amount, as other household members—particularly partners—work fewer hours and are less likely to advance in their jobs.

Elizabeth Rhodes, David Broockman, Eva Vivalt, Patrick Krause, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
August 10, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In a randomized guaranteed-income experiment, giving one adult a transfer of $1,000/month for two years cut the other household members’ income by ~$1,700/year. Partners worked less and advanced less at work, while schooling and training among others rose.

Does guaranteed income reduce household work effort beyond the transfer amount?

Core argument: Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant income and total household income by approximately $1,700 per year, a reduction driven by lower earnings among other household members rather than collective income gains.

Figure 4 summarizes treatment effects on the standardized family-level indices. The transfers’ effects reshaped the income and employment of other household members. The gap between participant income and total household income fell by about $1,700 per year (s.e. $800). The decline appears to reflect lower earnings among other household members. Effects on employment outcomes are consistent with this interpretation. Partner promotions and transitions to better jobs decrease significantly, but these effects are very small in magnitude. Partner hours and employment show more meaningful declines but are not significant in the unconditional analysis. Several other measures provide supporting evidence of negative effects on labor supply. Net transfers—the value given [to extended family] minus the value received—increased by roughly $135 per year. Estimates for household stability, decision-making, and the division of labor cluster near zero.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant income and total household income by approximately $1,700 per year, a reduction driven by lower earnings among other household members rather than collective income gains.
  2. Guaranteed income transfers reduced partner labor supply, with statistically significant declines in promotions and job transitions, though effect sizes were small.
  3. partner hours and employment showed larger but statistically insignificant declines.

Related Articles:

  • The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Parenting and Children — A randomized experiment giving 1,000 parents an unconditional $1K/month over 3 years found essentially no differences in family outcomes; treated children…
  • The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Consumption and Household Balance Sheets: Experimental Evidence from Two US States — An experiment giving 1,000 individuals $1k per month for 3 years raised spending on housing as well as consumption, but also increased indebtedness, suggesting…
  • The Employment Effects of a Guaranteed Income: Experimental Evidence from Two U.S. States — Giving low income individuals $12,000/year for 3 years resulted in reduced market income of $1,500/year, due to a 2ppt reduction in labor force participation…
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
    • Unemployment/Participation

The Impact of AI on the U.S. Labor Market

Sania Edlich and Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
July 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A difference-in-differences design finds 6.7% slower real-wage growth in AI-exposed occupations since 2023 than in low-exposure ones, with no detectable job loss. The largest effects were for the lowest quartile (-10.7%) and service occupations (-24.3%).

We examine the wage and employment effects of AI adoption across U.S. occupations using observed usage data from the Anthropic Economic Index rather than the theoretical exposure measures that dominate prior work. Using a difference-in-differences design with occupation and year fixed effects across 321 matched occupations from 2015 to 2025, we find that high-exposure occupations experience a 6.7% decline in real wage growth post-2023 with no detectable employment effects. The effect is concentrated among the lowest earners: service workers face a 24.3% decline and the bottom wage quartile a 10.7% decline, while top earners show no significant effect.Today, 5.8 million workers are affected, but as AI adoption deepens across corporate America, this figure is likely to grow substantially, with significant implications for income inequality and labor market policy in the years ahead. Only 321 of roughly 800 BLS occupations were matched, and the post-2023 period may be partially confounded by post-pandemic labor market dynamics. [Editor’s note: Figure 3 shows both wage and employment growth and decline among high-exposure workers, but the exposure measure combines automated and augmentative use, and thus cannot distinguish substitution from complementarity.]

Related Articles:

  • AI and the Fable of the ATMs — ATM’s reduced demand for tellers per bank branch, but this was offset by an increased number of branches due to deregulation. Kedrosky notes, “aggregate…
  • Looking for the Ladder — The downtick in hiring in AI-exposed occupations started 6 months prior to the release of ChatGPT, and is “perfectly” aligned with the start of Fed rate hikes…
  • Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox — Aging societies face structural labor shortages that create permanent incentives to automate, making demographics a long-run driver of AI deployment. Technology-producing economies benefit twice: by offsetting domestic labor scarcity and by exporting automation solutions to every other aging society.
  • Wages/Income
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
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Cognitive Ability in Labor and Capital Markets

AI Summary. Higher cognitive ability predicts both higher capital income and higher investment returns, with the return advantage reflecting skill rather than risk-taking, as high-ability individuals earn better risk-adjusted returns while holding lower-risk portfolios.

Spencer Bastani, Kristina Karlsson, Jonas Kolsrud and Daniel Waldenström Uppsala University
Date Posted:
July 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Cognitive ability positively predicts capital as well as labor income, with the capital-income gradient ~3x as large in % terms. This reflects both higher saving rates and higher risk-adjusted returns, neither fully explicable by earnings.

Does cognitive ability generate superior investment returns independent of risk?

Core argument: Cognitive ability’s capital income gradient is 3x steeper than labor income gradient in log specifications, driven by higher saving rates.

We document three results. First, cognitive ability predicts capital income. Figure 2 plots mean log income and mean income rank against the nine cognitive ability scores reporting test performance on a 1–9 scale, with both series normalized to zero at the lowest score. In the log specification (Panel a), the capital income gradient is roughly three times steeper than the labor income gradient. In the rank specification (Panel b), the ordering reverses: the labor income gradient is steeper, because the heavy right tail of capital income compresses rank differences. Figure 3 provides a complementary perspective, plotting average cognitive ability across percentiles of the labor and capital income distributions. [The relationship between ability and rank flattens at the top of the labor distribution but strengthens at the top of the capital distribution.] Second, the capital-income gradient is only partially explained by labor income: a decomposition shows that ability is associated with higher saving rates and investment returns through channels beyond labor income. Third, the investment return channel is consistent with skill rather than risk compensation, as high-ability individuals earn higher risk-adjusted excess returns while holding portfolios with lower systematic risk.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Cognitive ability’s capital income gradient is 3x steeper than labor income gradient in log specifications, driven by higher saving rates.
  2. High-ability individuals earn higher risk-adjusted excess returns while holding lower-risk portfolios, indicating skill-based rather than risk-based compensation in capital markets.
  3. Ability-income associations persist across genders and remain largely unexplained by education, occupation, or family background, suggesting intrinsic cognitive factors drive.

Related Articles:

  • Cognitive Skills Beyond Childhood — Data from a British birth cohort followed since 1958 show that cognitive skills early in life predict wages at age 50 better than cognitive skills at age 50…
  • Steeper At The Top: Cognitive Ability and Earnings in Finland and Norway — The top-earning men in Finland and Norway score 1 standard deviation higher in cognitive ability than median earners. The ability curve is steepest at the top…
  • Toward An Understanding Of The Returns To Cognitive Skills Across Cohorts — Wage returns to cognitive skill have declined for white men who took the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) in 1997 relative to 1979, driven primarily by a…
  • Wages/Income
  • Education
    • Test Scores
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    • Inequality
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