Edward Conard

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Deaths of Despair

Steve Sailer Taki Magazine
Date Posted:
May 6, 2020
Is Database:
Database

White deaths of despair line up with Native American and Russian experience.

In 2017, 158,000 Americans died from deaths of despair, including suicide, overdoses, and alcoholic liver disease, reflecting a troubling trend among working-class white Americans. This mirrors the experiences of Native Americans and Russian men post-Cold War, who faced similar declines in life expectancy. Economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton highlight that the decline in white lifespans since the late 1990s went largely unnoticed until 2015, despite its severity. The introduction of OxyContin in the mid-1990s and subsequent opioid crisis symbolize broader economic failures impacting the white working class. While Russian life expectancy has rebounded since 2005, the U.S. continues to grapple with this epidemic. The data suggests a complex interplay of economic, social, and health factors contributing to these deaths, underscoring the need for comprehensive policy interventions to address the root causes of despair in these communities.

Steve Sailer, “Deaths of Despair,” Taki Magazine, May 6, 2020, https://www.takimag.com/article/deaths-of-despair/

Deaths of Despair

In 2017, 158,000 Americans died from what we call deaths of despair: suicide, overdoses, and alcoholic liver disease and cirrhosis. This is the equivalent of three full 737 MAXs falling out of the sky every day, with no survivors.

The new book Deaths of Despair: And the Future of Capitalism by economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton attempts to explain their important discovery—the declining lifespans of working-class white Americans since the turn of the century—by way of a strained analogy with the social chaos that African-Americans unleashed upon themselves as soon as the civil rights struggle was won for them in the 1960s:

What happened to inner-city African Americans after midcentury is, we shall argue, a foreshadowing of our account of whites in the 21st century….

But the more I study the White Death of the past two decades, the more I am instead reminded of the tragic trajectory of a now much less publicized American race, Native Americans. Like American Indians, working-class white Americans seem to be living, and dying, like a defeated people, quietly offing themselves with so little to-do that nobody even noticed what was happening to working-class white lifespans for the first fifteen years of this century.

Indians used to be admired by whites for having put up a strong fight for over 250 years, in contrast to blacks, who were relatively easy to dominate. But in this century, whites have lost interest in Indians, who also seem to have lost interest in themselves as the other Indians have come to play a much larger role in American life.

Human beings have always concocted rationalizations for why they deserve privilege. For most of history, a common explanation of why you should be privileged was that your ancestors were warriors and conquerors who had defeated their foes.

In 21st-century America, however, the new fashion for asserting your claim to privilege is that you come from a long line of victims and losers. By intention, this leaves white Americans, the descendants of the men who won The Big One and went to the Moon, psychically dispossessed in their own native land.

Another obvious analog to the White Death in America is how Russian men drank themselves into an early grave during their defeat in the Cold War. Case and Deaton note in passing that life expectancy for Russian males declined by 7.3 years between 1987 and 1994. But since 2005, Russian life expectancy has rebounded.

As the US suffers from its epidemic of deaths, Russia appears to have overcome its own.

It’s worth remembering that the main reason the media paid attention to Case and Deaton’s paper in November 2015 demonstrating that white lifespans had been falling since the end of the 1990s was because Deaton had won the (quasi) Nobel Prize for economics just the month before. This horrible trend had been happening for fifteen years with virtually no news coverage. As Case and Deaton explain, they were shocked to discover in 2014 the life-shortening trends besetting whites.

“As White Privilege became a preoccupation of the press, whites increasingly shot themselves, or drank themselves to death, or overdosed on synthetic or natural opioids.”

Back in 2014-2015, the mainstream media were instead obsessed with proving that the police were racistly gunning down blacks in vastly larger numbers than their propensity toward violence would warrant. In truth, though, blacks only comprise about 30% of all victims of police shootings, while committing 57% of gun homicides. That’s not, by the way, because cops particularly want to kill more whites than blacks. It appears to be mostly because suicide-by-cop is much more of a white thing than a black thing.

In contrast to whites these days, African-Americans in the late 1960s, when they started to overdose and murder each other in ever larger numbers, were a triumphant race, celebrated all over the world for their soul. The black murder rate accelerated in 1964, the year of the landmark Civil Rights Act, and grew higher into the mid-1970s, then peaked during the gangsta-rap/crack era of the early 1990s, then soared again during the Great Awokening in the two years after Ferguson. In other words, blacks seem to shoot each other the most precisely when they are encouraged by whites to feel best about themselves.

The obvious difference between what happened to whites in the early 21st century and what blacks did in the last 35 years of the 20th century is that whites grew more suicidal while blacks grew more homicidal.

Case and Deaton admit that their conceit that whites are following the path of inner-city blacks can’t explain why suicide rates for blacks are so much lower than for whites (not to mention American Indians):

But in deaths from suicide, the parallel breaks down. African Americans are much less likely to kill themselves than are white Americans; their suicide rates in midlife have changed little in the past fifty years and are currently about a quarter of those for whites.

From the 1960s onward, it became increasingly unfashionable to criticize blacks, but trendy to criticize whites. Not surprisingly, blacks reacted to this new dispensation with increasing exuberance, while whites became more depressed and withdrawn. As black egos expanded after their civil rights victories, they increasingly shot each other in knuckleheaded beefs. Meanwhile, as White Privilege became a preoccupation of the press, whites increasingly shot themselves, or drank themselves to death, or overdosed on synthetic or natural opioids.

In Case and Deaton’s view the White Death, which got rolling after the Sackler family’s Purdue Pharma introduced OxyContin in the mid-1990s, symbolizes the failures of Milken Era capitalism that let down the white American working class:

Our main argument in this book is that the deaths of despair reflect a long-term and slowly unfolding loss of a way of life for the white, less educated, working class.

Curiously, however, they insist that immigration can’t possibly be considered even one of the causes for the declining prosperity of white Americans without college degrees since the 1970s. Although they repeatedly allude to the golden age of the American working class during the low-immigration 1945-1973 era, they refuse to admit that there might have been a causal link from the low supply of workers to the high price of labor.

And yet, in the central story line of the White Death, opioids, immigration plays a major role. As reporter Sam Quinones documented in his book Dreamland, as American authorities started to rein in OxyContin prescriptions, addicts switched to Mexican black tar heroin peddled by Mexican dealers seeded by the cartels throughout the American heartland.

Then, the Mexican cartels switched to buying the chemical precursors of ultra-potent fentanyl from Wuhan, China. The fentanyl smuggling business went gangbusters until 2020, when the coronavirus locked down Wuhan and the Trump Administration finally cracked down on travel across the Mexican border.

In Case and Deaton’s book, though, they start their discussion of why immigration hasn’t hurt native workers by asserting their Intersectional Pokémon Points:

One of us is a first-generation immigrant.

That would be Edinburgh-born Angus Deaton, or as the Princeton U. website refers to him, “Professor Sir Angus Deaton.” Wikipedia explains:

In 1983, he left the University of Bristol for Princeton University. He is currently the Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of International Affairs and Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (WWS) and the Department of Economics at Princeton. Since 2017, he holds a joint appointment with the University of Southern California where he is the Presidential Professor of Economics. He holds both British and American citizenship.

Like the man said, he is a “a first-generation immigrant.”

The book goes on to explain that Sir Angus’ wife, Anne Case, Professor of Economics at Princeton,

…was born in America, but her ancestors came from Ireland to northeastern Pennsylvania in the middle of the nineteenth century, and her family remains influenced by their national and religious heritage.

So don’t think of Professor Case as just a plain white American: The Cases have only been here for 170 years!

The two economists go on to explain that while it might seem like the law of supply and demand suggests that a certain amount of immigration is bad for native workers’ wages, that is only in the short run. In the long run, the economy could adjust to a short burst of immigration. But then it briefly occurs to them that advocates of immigration, such as themselves, don’t want immigration to ever stop, which defeats their logic about immigration not being so bad in the long run:

Yet if each wave is followed by another wave, the economy may never get the chance to fully adjust, and the wages of the less educated could be permanently lower, at least until the immigration stops.

Indeed.

But at that point, Case and Deaton’s crimestop kicks in and they stop pondering the implications of their own runaway train of thought.

Deaths of Despair isn’t a bad book, but it’s constantly derailed by political correctness keeping them from pursuing their own interesting ideas. For example, why do blacks have shorter life expectancies in America than whites?

For African Americans, there is widespread agreement that the worse outcomes, like so many other important outcomes, are tied to long-standing discrimination, as well as to poorer access to high-quality medical care. The superior longevity of Hispanics over non-Hispanic whites has been much researched but not fully explained. It is worth noting that other groups, such as Asian Americans, do better still, better than either Hispanics or whites.

That would seem pretty interesting, but Case and Deaton then largely drop other races besides white and black at that point. “We do not try to tell a coherent story for,” they admit.

They never return to trying to learn anything from the quite different life-expectancy trends of the five main races in the U.S. My impression is that the developments are:

(1) Asians increasingly live, as comedienne Ali Wong says, forever.
(2) Hispanics live much longer than you’d expect.
(3) Whites die increasingly early.
(4) Blacks were living longer until Black Lives Matter encouraged them to start shooting each other again.
(5) American Indians are in free fall, except that old Native Americans tend to live a long time.

I don’t know what all this means, but surely five data points are more useful than restricting yourself to just two? After all, you’ve already won a Nobel Prize: How much do you still have to fear from the enemies of science?

Steve Sailer’s review of Deaton new book. His five takeaways, Asians increasingly live a long time, Hispanics are living longer, whites are dying early, backs were living longer but that’s changing due to crime and American Indians are in “freefall”

Ed Comment:The angus book sounds silly. I think oxy deaths were caused by the unsupervised introduction of oxy and not by despair. We will learn from our mistakes (while the party you support stupidly legalizes marijuana and lets the criminals go) but we already lost a generation of addicts and won’t get them back.

“…the more I study the White Death of the past two decades, the more I am instead reminded of the tragic trajectory of a now much less publicized American race, Native Americans. Like American Indians, working-class white Americans seem to be living, and dying, like a defeated people, quietly offing themselves with so little to-do that nobody even noticed what was happening to working-class white lifespans for the first fifteen years of this century. Indians used to be admired by whites for having put up a strong fight for over 250 years, in contrast to blacks, who were relatively easy to dominate. But in this century, whites have lost interest in Indians, who also seem to have lost interest in themselves as the other Indians have come to play a much larger role in American life…..Another obvious analog to the White Death in America is how Russian men drank themselves into an early grave during their defeat in the Cold War. Case and Deaton note in passing that life expectancy for Russian males declined by 7.3 years between 1987 and 1994. But since 2005, Russian life expectancy has rebounded. As the US suffers from its epidemic of deaths, Russia appears to have overcome its own…. For example, why do blacks have shorter life expectancies in America than whites? For African Americans, there is widespread agreement that the worse outcomes, like so many other important outcomes, are tied to long-standing discrimination, as well as to poorer access to high-quality medical care. The superior longevity of Hispanics over non-Hispanic whites has been much researched but not fully explained. It is worth noting that other groups, such as Asian Americans, do better still, better than either Hispanics or whites.That would seem pretty interesting, but Case and Deaton then largely drop other races besides white and black at that point. “We do not try to tell a coherent story for,” they admit. They never return to trying to learn anything from the quite different life-expectancy trends of the five main races in the U.S. My impression is that the developments are: (1) Asians increasingly live, as comedienne Ali Wong says, forever. (2) Hispanics live much longer than you’d expect. (3) Whites die increasingly early. (4) Blacks were living longer until Black Lives Matter encouraged them to start shooting each other again. (5) American Indians are in free fall, except that old Native Americans tend to live a long time….”

  • Demographics
  • Comparisons
    • Historical
    • Other Comparison
    • Race
  • Workforce
    • Poverty/Crime
Previous articleMay 5, 2020How to escape the trap of excessive debtRising inequality in the US has led to a savings glut among the top 1% and dissaving among the bottom 90%, creating economic fragility. To escape this debt trap, shift income distribution to foster sustainable demand or consider equity financing for housing and businesses.Next articleMay 7, 2020The Inside Track to Elite Colleges: Not Just White and WealthyAt Selective Colleges White Students Have Higher SAT Scores Than Black And Hispanics.
Showing 102 database articles primarily about Demographics

Falling Fertility: The Changing Value of Freedom, Fulfillment, and Family

AI Summary. Across wealthy countries, intended fertility and ideal family size fell over the past decade as children came to be seen as constraining freedom rather than conferring status or fulfillment.

Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros Onofri National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Does freedom from family obligations now outweigh the fulfillment children provide?

Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].

Related Articles:

  • The Rise of Female Autonomy and the Decline of Fertility: The Role of Mismatch — In countries where women perform significantly more household and care work than men, fertility rates are substantially lower; nations with near-equal domestic labor splits average fertility rates around 1.7, while those with gaps exceeding 3 hours daily average rates below 1.4.
  • Babies and the Macroeconomy — .@PikaGold notes countries with birth rates now below 1.3 saw “rapid growth in GDP per capita after a long period of stagnation or decline” as women’s new…
  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The world’s 2024 total fertility rate (TFR) was likely ~2.17, below the replacement rate of 2.21, notes Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, intensifying…
  • Demographics
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

Terra Incognita: The Economics of a Shrinking World

AI Summary. Global fertility has fallen below replacement level, meaning population will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then decline, driven by large existing generations masking the underlying shortfall in births.

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick Norrick University of Pennsylvania
Date Posted:
August 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

Will declining birth rates eventually shrink the global economy?

Core argument: Global fertility has fallen below replacement level as of 2026, ending humanity’s ability to sustain long-run population stability without a reversal in trends.

In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global fertility has fallen below replacement level as of 2026, ending humanity’s ability to sustain long-run population stability without a reversal in trends.
  2. Population momentum—driven by large cohorts of women now in peak childbearing years—will sustain growth for roughly 30 more years before world population peaks at approximately 9 billion around 2056 and begins declining.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The world’s 2024 total fertility rate (TFR) was likely ~2.17, below the replacement rate of 2.21, notes Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, intensifying…
  • Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come — Nicholas Eberstadt warns that depopulation will stress families as smaller families “become ever less able to bear weight—even as the demands that might…
  • The Wealth of Working Nations — Japan achieved GDP growth per working-age adult of 31.9% between 1998 and 2019, slightly faster than the US at 29.5%. @King_ofSweden
  • Demographics
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Science
    • Global Warming
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

Americans Are Done With Being Put in Racial Boxes

AI Summary. Intermarriage across racial and ethnic lines is rising across all major demographic groups in the United States, producing a growing share of the population that does not fit neatly into any single government-defined racial or ethnic category.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:
July 21, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

Is the traditional racial classification system becoming obsolete?

Core argument: Post-1960s immigration from Asia and Latin America is the primary driver of rising U.S. demographic diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White population share.

The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Post-1960s immigration from Asia and Latin America is the primary driver of rising U.S. demographic diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White population share.
  2. Intermarriage rates among Hispanic and Asian Americans exceed those of Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, expanding a multiracial population that no single government racial category can accurately capture.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — The 2023 OECD Survey of Adult Skills reveals the US has ~ 3 low-scorers for every high-scorer. Germany has nearly 3X as many high-scorers per low-scorer as the…
  • Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States — European immigrants who arrived with nearly no wealth converged to similar wealth levels as earlier European settlers within a few generations, while Black, Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican households remained substantially behind, indicating that initial wealth gaps do not uniformly predict long-run inequality across all groups.
  • America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide — The US foreign-born population reached 51.4mm, or 15.4% of the population in 2024, Nicholas Eberstad notes, surpassing the prior peak of 14.8% set in 1890.
  • Demographics
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Immigration

The Pig In The Python: US Decennial Labor Flows And Economic Opportunity, 1910–2040

AI Summary. A surge in labor force entrants during the 1970s created a persistent worker glut that suppressed wages and hiring demand for decades, as the oversupply remained embedded in the workforce until retirement rather than dissipating at entry.

Steven Ruggles Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Date Posted:
July 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

Does a one-time labor surge create permanent wage pressure?

Core argument: Baby-boom labor-force entry during 1960–1980 suppressed young-worker wages, which declined sharply after peaking in 1973, reducing economic opportunity for new.

Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Baby-boom labor-force entry during 1960–1980 suppressed young-worker wages, which declined sharply after peaking in 1973, reducing economic opportunity for new.
  2. Cumulative labor-market entries over five decades as a % of working-age population drives employment competition that persists decades after initial.
  3. Female labor-force participation expansion and immigration during 1960–1980 created a sustained worker glut that stifled demand for new employment until.

Related Articles:

  • Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy — Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29…
  • Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox — Aging societies face structural labor shortages that create permanent incentives to automate, making demographics a long-run driver of AI deployment. Technology-producing economies benefit twice: by offsetting domestic labor scarcity and by exporting automation solutions to every other aging society.
  • Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish? — Eberstadt finds as of the summer of 2025 ~7mm American men 25–54 were not in the labor force. Despite record high prime age female LFP, ~3.5mm prime age women…
  • Demographics
  • Workforce
    • Immigration
    • Unemployment/Participation
    • Wages/Income

Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy

Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, Keelan Beirne and Andrew Scott National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Figure 3 traces out how GDP per worker evolves following a 1pp increase in birth rates at t−20. Since cohorts born at t−20 (e.g., 1970) do not enter the working-age population until t = 0 (e.g., 1990), we should observe no response before t = 0; [indeed] the estimated coefficients are ~0 and statistically insignificant before t = 0. Beginning at t = 0, however, higher birth rates are associated with lower GDP per worker, and the negative effects grow progressively larger over time. For example, a 1pp lower birth rate at t−20 is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points higher by t+40. The latter corresponds to roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval. We find that lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents and a growing share of high-tech industries across countries and US commuting zones [Figure 11]. They are also predictive of higher TFP growth across countries and US industries and increased patenting in ICT and broader automation technology classes. Using cross-country variation in WWII-era military and civilian deaths, we present suggestive evidence that the positive growth effects of falling birth rates are primarily driven by the scarcity of younger workers rather than by reductions in population per se [Figure 14]. [Editor’s note: the paper does not grapple with the fiscal consequences of an aging population.]

Related Articles:

  • Can A Depopulating America Still Flourish? — Eberstadt finds as of the summer of 2025 ~7mm American men 25–54 were not in the labor force. Despite record high prime age female LFP, ~3.5mm prime age women…
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Btw 1985-2021 the capital intensity of the American economy was relatively flat as a rise in intangible investment was offset by a decline in tangible…
  • America Is Missing The New Labor Economy – Robotics Part 1 — While higher US labor costs create a greater incentive to automate, @dylan522p argues China is the only country currently positioned to achieve full-scale…
  • Demographics
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Workforce

What Demographic Prediction Can and Cannot Achieve

AI Summary. Population forecasts are dominated by model choice, not parameter uncertainty, with model selection accounting for up to 98% of output variance across projections. Different modeling approaches produce wildly divergent outcomes—from under 4bn to over 15bn people by 2075—making demographic projections tools for exploring possibilities rather than reliable predictions.

Samuele Lo Piano, Marta Kuc-Czarnecka, Roger Pielke, and Andrea Saltelli Social Science Research Network
Date Posted:
May 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

How much do demographic models actually predict versus explore?

Core argument: Model choice accounts for 98% of output variance in 2050 global population projections, driving divergent forecasts ranging from 4–25 billion.

We explore demographic predictions by propagating all plausible choices that can be made during the analysis through the modelling process. This approach involves navigating the so-called ’garden of forking paths’—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators were to examine the same problem. For this, we now abandon [the Chinese government mathematician] Song Jian’s ‘historic’ model and turn to models currently in use: the Cohort-Component and UN WPP models, the Lee-Carter model and the Lotka-Volterra model. Note that in standard use, these tools are used in isolation, see e.g. the FAO’s How to Feed the World in 2050, resting on a single UN WPP population trajectory shielding the reader from the compounding effect of their uncertainty. Unsurprisingly, the exercise capturing the modelling of the modelling process for global population projections to 2050 and 2075 reveals distinct characteristics regarding the sensitivity and projection outcomes of the different models. Once abandoned the straitjacket of Song’s approach, uncertainty is free to manifest itself. The overall uncertainty distributions of the projected populations show a wide range of possible outcomes, reflecting the inherent uncertainties in demographic projections.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Model choice accounts for 98% of output variance in 2050 global population projections, driving divergent forecasts ranging from 4–25 billion.
  2. Song Jian’s optimization model converges to 700 million people by 2080 across all parameter variations (670–700 million range), demonstrating structural.
  3. Global fertility declined from 5 children per woman in 1950 to 2.1 currently, with no rebound in countries where rates.

Related Articles:

  • The Demographic Future of Humanity: Facts and Consequences — The world’s 2024 total fertility rate (TFR) was likely ~2.17, below the replacement rate of 2.21, notes Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, intensifying…
  • World Depopulation: Prospects and Implications — Nicholas Eberstadt @AEIecon argues that given its relatively high fertility rate relative to both East Asia and Europe, the US is primed to be the…
  • Take the Under — .@RogerPielkeJr argues that more realistic projections of global population and GDP growth suggest that “even partial future policy successes could more easily…
  • Demographics
  • Science
    • Global Warming
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
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