Edward Conard

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  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Why Is The Japanese Yen Falling?

AI Summary. The author argues that Bank of Japan bond buying holds Japanese long-term government bond yields artificially below levels justified by the country's gross government debt, pushing risk premia into the currency instead and driving the yen lower. On this view, yen depreciation will continue until yields are allowed to rise far more, forcing fiscal consolidation.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
December 26, 2025

While Japan’s long-term yields have risen, they have not risen enough to stabilize the Yen. Brooks argues that this implies “markets think risk of a debt crisis is rising sharply.”

Does central bank bond buying push risk premia into the currency?

Core argument: The author argues that Japan's 30-year government bond yields remain far too low relative to its gross government debt as a share of GDP because the Bank of Japan continues to buy government debt on a massive scale.

The vertical axis in the chart shows the 30-year government bond yields that go into the rate differential. The horizontal axis plots gross government debt in percent of GDP. While it’s true that the interest differential has moved a lot in favor of the Yen, it’s also true that - given Japan’s monstrous level of government debt - longer-term yields are still much too low relative to where they would be if the BoJ weren’t still a massive buyer of government debt. This bond buying is keeping yields artificially low, which should really be much higher due to risk premia. Because these risk premia aren’t allowed to show up in the bond market, they show up in the Yen instead, which is the reason it keeps falling. Here’s the uncomfortable truth: Japan’s longer-term yields have been rising, but - on a risk-adjusted basis - that rise isn’t nearly enough to stabilize the Yen. Another way to say this: markets think risk of a debt crisis is rising sharply. Yen depreciation won’t stop until yields are allowed to rise far more, forcing the government to pursue fiscal consolidation and bring down debt. Japan needs to stop being in denial.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The author argues that Japan's 30-year government bond yields remain far too low relative to its gross government debt as a share of GDP because the Bank of Japan continues to buy government debt on a massive scale.
  2. Because risk premia are suppressed in Japan's bond market by central bank buying, the author contends those premia show up in the Yen instead, driving its continued depreciation.
  3. The author argues Yen depreciation will not stop until Japanese yields are allowed to rise far more, forcing the government into fiscal consolidation and debt reduction, and that markets see the risk of a debt crisis rising sharply.

Related Articles:

  • Japan Raises Interest Rates To Highest Level In 30 Years — The Bank of Japan raised its policy rate by 0.25 percentage points to around 0.75%, a three-decade high, and signalled readiness to continue tightening if conditions allow. The 10-year Japanese government bond yield rose 0.05 percentage points, passing 2% to its highest level since 1999, while the yen weakened to ¥156.77 per dollar.
  • The Global Debt Crisis Builds — Long-dated forward yields such as 10-year and 20-year forwards are near their highs even as the Federal Reserve cuts rates, with the gap between those forwards and 10-year yields widening, which the author reads as a worsening buyers' strike for longer-dated government debt. Italy, France, the UK, Japan and Germany all show elevated long-term forward yields.
  • The Race Between Asset Supply and Asset Demand — The authors estimate that demand for assets has outpaced supply by roughly 400% of GDP versus 100%, making rising asset demand the leading contributor to falling interest rates. They project that debt sustainability requires fiscal consolidation exceeding 10% of GDP, though debt could reach 250% of GDP without raising interest rates.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy
Previous articleDecember 26, 2025Anatomy of US InequalityInequality within 186 distinct US ethnic groups accounts for 96% of total income variation, while between-group inequality contributes only 4%, largely constant across time and regions. For 6 broad ethnic categories, within variation is 97% of the total.Next articleDecember 29, 2025The Unexpected Winner of Rising American Tariffs Is Mexico~85% of Mexico’s exports remain tariff-free under the USMCA, allowing Mexican firms to capture ~25% of the drop in the US-China trade deficit, according to USTR. In the first 11 months of 2025, Mexican manufacturers’ exports to the US rose almost 9% y/y.
Showing 103 database articles primarily about Fiscal Deficits

Projections of Deficits and Debt Under Alternative Scenarios for Interest Rates and the Budget

AI Summary. The Congressional Budget Office projects that if interest rates rose to 1 percentage point above its baseline, federal debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP by 2056, 47 percentage points above baseline, with primary deficits averaging 2.3% of GDP and annual growth 0.1 percentage point slower.

CBO Staff Congressional Budget OffIce
Date Posted:
September 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database

If interest rates rise 1pp above CBO’s current extended baseline (a mean rate of 4% over 2026–2056), CBO projects federal debt held by the public will be 222% of GDP in 2056, versus 175% under the current baseline.

How much would higher interest rates raise projected federal debt?

Core argument: CBO projects that under a scenario in which interest rates rise to 1 percentage point above its extended baseline, debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points above the extended baseline.

Under a scenario in which interest rates increased until they were 1 percentage point higher than in CBO’s extended baseline, primary deficits—that is, deficits excluding net outlays for interest—would average 2.3% of GDP over the 2026–2056 period, 0.2 percentage points larger than in the extended baseline. Debt held by the public would grow to 222 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points larger than in the extended baseline. Average annual GDP growth over the 2026–2056 period would be 0.1 percentage point slower than in CBO’s extended baseline, and the average interest rate on federal debt would be 0.7 percentage points higher.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. CBO projects that under a scenario in which interest rates rise to 1 percentage point above its extended baseline, debt held by the public would reach 222% of GDP in fiscal year 2056, 47 percentage points above the extended baseline.
  2. Primary deficits, which exclude net outlays for interest, would average 2.3% of GDP over 2026–2056 in CBO’s higher-interest-rate scenario, 0.2 percentage points larger than in its extended baseline.
  3. Under CBO’s higher-interest-rate scenario, average annual GDP growth over 2026–2056 would be 0.1 percentage point slower and the average interest rate on federal debt 0.7 percentage points higher than in its extended baseline.

Related Articles:

  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence? — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
  • Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong? — An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Estimated Fiscal Reaction Functions and the Calculation of Sustainable Government Net Debt Limits for the US and 24 Other OECD Countries

AI Summary. Estimated sustainable government net debt limits across 25 OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest-rate and growth assumptions (221% for the US) and 214% under current rates (186% for the US). If interest rates rise systematically with debt, the model yields no solution for the US, UK, France, Italy, Greece, and Japan.

Mark Warshawsky American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
September 21, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Warshawsky calculates the US has a sustainable net debt limit, “the lowest level of debt at which a country can no longer service its sovereign debt and must effectively default,” of 186% of GDP, which he forecasts will be reached in ~15 years under current policy and economic conditions.

How high can government debt rise before it becomes unsustainable?

Core argument: Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.

Using historical, current, and dynamic interest rate-to-economic growth differentials, countries’ sustainable debt limits are calculated on a net of central bank holdings of government debt basis. Sustainable net debt limits average 234% of GDP for these countries assuming historical rates and economic growth (221% for the US), 214% assuming (higher) current interest rates and economic growth (186% for the US). If, however, interest rates were to rise systematically with debt according to conservative assumptions, there is no model solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US, given their current high debt levels; the average sustainable limit is 178% for the other countries. A reasonable conclusion to draw for the US is that the fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term. A major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon, as interest rates rise, unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls will result.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sustainable net debt limits across the US and 24 other OECD countries average 234% of GDP under historical interest rate–growth differentials and 221% for the US, falling to 214% on average and 186% for the US under current, higher interest rates and growth.
  2. If interest rates rise systematically with debt under conservative assumptions, the model yields no solution for France, Greece, Japan, Italy, the UK, and the US given their current high debt levels, while the average limit for the remaining countries is 178%.
  3. A reasonable conclusion is that the US fiscal path under current policy and trends with rising interest rates is not sustainable in the short to intermediate term, and a major fiscal consolidation package will be needed soon unless significantly higher inflation or capital controls result.

Related Articles:

  • Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong? — An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.
  • How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence? — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
  • Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis? — U.S. GDP per capita, about $87,000, is projected to reach $102,000 by 2035 with 1.8% annual productivity growth, or $110,000 with 2.7% growth. Because the healthcare sector has been slow to adopt AI, health spending is projected to rise from 18.3% of GDP to 21% under slower growth and 21.7% under faster growth.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Soaring Bond Yields, Gaping Deficits and Towering Debts: What Could Go Wrong?

AI Summary. An analysis of 22 rich countries estimates that if each refinanced its entire debt at current five-year bond yields, Britain would need the largest primary surplus to stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio, about 1.5%, followed by Italy at 1.4%, France at 1.2% and America at 1%.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 17, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Refinancing the entire US debt stock at the current five-year borrowing rate, on current growth forecasts, would require a primary surplus of 1% of GDP to hold the debt ratio stable, a fiscal consolidation of 4.7pp. In October 2025, it would have required 2.3pp.

How much belt tightening would rich countries need to stabilize debt?

Core argument: The Economist calculates that Britain would need the largest primary surplus of 22 rich countries, about 1.5% of GDP, to hold its debt-to-GDP ratio stable if it replaced its entire debt stock at today’s five-year yields.

The Economist calculated what would happen if rich countries had to replace their entire debt stocks at today’s five-year bond yields, using IMF forecasts for nominal growth. Out of 22 countries, Britain would need to run the largest primary surplus, of about 1.5% of GDP, merely to keep its debt-to-GDP ratio stable. Italy and France are next, needing surpluses of 1.4% and 1.2%, respectively. America is not far behind, requiring one of 1%. Japan can run a deficit of 0.8% since its growth is estimated to outpace the interest rate on its debt. America is running a primary deficit of nearly 4% of GDP, meaning significant belt tightening of nearly five percentage points of GDP is needed to stabilise its debt ratio at today’s borrowing costs. The situation is deteriorating fast as a result of persistent deficits and surging yields. Just a year ago America required an adjustment of more than two percentage points less than it does today.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Economist calculates that Britain would need the largest primary surplus of 22 rich countries, about 1.5% of GDP, to hold its debt-to-GDP ratio stable if it replaced its entire debt stock at today’s five-year yields.
  2. America requires a primary surplus of 1% of GDP to stabilise its debt ratio at today’s borrowing costs while running a primary deficit of nearly 4%, implying belt tightening of nearly five percentage points of GDP, by The Economist’s calculation.
  3. Japan can run a primary deficit of 0.8% of GDP and still keep its debt burden stable because its growth is estimated to outpace the interest rate on its debt, while Italy and France need surpluses of 1.4% and 1.2%.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t — Two market-based measures suggest the safety premium investors pay to hold US Treasuries has compressed toward zero and at times reversed: the spread between top-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries after stripping out default risk, and the gap between currency-hedged foreign G10 government yields and Treasury yields at the same maturity, where longer-maturity comparisons now favor foreign bonds.
  • The United States Capital Structure — Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
  • How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence? — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy

US 30-Year Bonds Erase Gains From Treasury’s Buyback Surprise

AI Summary. US Treasuries erased nearly all gains that followed the Treasury Department's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, with the 30-year yield rising above 5.27% and the 10-year touching 4.71%. The reversal signals the move has done little to ease concern about surging government debt.

Michael MacKenzie and Alice Gledhill Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
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The 30-year yield rose ~7bps to as much as 5.27%, and the 10-year yield hit 4.71%, erasing “almost all” the gains that followed Treasury’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds.

Do bigger bond buybacks ease concerns about surging government debt?

Core argument: The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.

US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, signaling the move has done little to alleviate the angst about the surging government debt that has pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades. The 30-year yield on Thursday rose over seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, where it was just ahead of the US Treasury Department’s announcement early Wednesday, before paring the gain. The 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US 30-year Treasury yield rose more than seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, returning to where it stood just ahead of the Treasury Department's buyback announcement, before paring the gain.
  2. US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration's surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, suggesting the move has done little to alleviate angst about surging government debt.
  3. The US 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025, as angst over government debt pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades.

Related Articles:

  • Bessent Boosts Debt Buybacks After Climb in Treasury Yields — The US Treasury announced it is at least doubling the size of its liquidity support buyback operations for government debt maturing in 10 to 30 years, following long-dated yields reaching their highest levels in years. Yields on the longest bond fell nearly 10 basis points to 5.185%.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • The United States Capital Structure — Because Social Security and Medicare benefits are politically untouchable, retirees effectively hold the most senior claim on US government resources while Treasury bondholders hold the riskiest one. On this argument, bondholders absorb adverse fiscal shocks through surprise inflation, financial repression, or both.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

A Long-Run Economic Model for Projecting the Finances of the U.S. Government and National Spending on Healthcare: Analysis of Productivity Increases and Health Sector Reform

AI Summary. A long-run model in which health spending, the federal budget, and capital investment are jointly determined by supply and demand projects U.S. federal debt reaching 151% of GDP in 2036 and 309% in 2056, versus the Congressional Budget Office's 120% and 175%. Rising real interest rates compound deficits and debt.

Mark Warshawsky American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
July 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Warshawsky projects US debt-to-GDP will be 151% in 2036, well above CBO’s 120% projection, as higher real rates and a dynamic Baumol cost-disease effect will increase healthcare spending relative to GDP in an aging economy.

Does modeling health spending and interest rates jointly raise debt projections?

Core argument: The model projects U.S. federal debt-to-GDP at 151% in 2036, 218% in 2046, and 309% in 2056, above CBO's 120% in 2036 and 175% in 2056.

The Congressional Budget Office makes certain simplifying assumptions on health care spending, and is based on current law. By contrast, in the model presented in this paper, these variables are simultaneously determined by supply and demand, based on logical functional forms and parameter estimates from the literature or empirical analysis, and the model is based on current policy. This approach better reflects real economic relationships—between health care spending, the federal budget, and investment in capital—and changing underlying conditions, especially demographics. Within the next twenty or so years, the model predicts that federal government debt will grow significantly beyond historical experience, to be judged unsustainable because the real interest rate exceeds real economic growth. Debt-to-GDP will be 151% in 2036, 218% in 2046, and 309% in 2056, compared to CBO’s 120% in 2036 and 175% in 2056. Real interest rates rise for several decades, ratcheting interest payments, deficits, and debt in a vicious cycle.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The model projects U.S. federal debt-to-GDP at 151% in 2036, 218% in 2046, and 309% in 2056, above CBO's 120% in 2036 and 175% in 2056.
  2. The model judges the projected debt path unsustainable because the real interest rate exceeds real economic growth, with real rates rising for several decades and ratcheting up interest payments, deficits, and debt.
  3. Unlike CBO's current-law projections with simplifying assumptions on health care spending, the model determines these variables simultaneously through supply and demand under current policy, using functional forms and parameter estimates from the literature or empirical analysis.

Related Articles:

  • Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis? — U.S. GDP per capita, about $87,000, is projected to reach $102,000 by 2035 with 1.8% annual productivity growth, or $110,000 with 2.7% growth. Because the healthcare sector has been slow to adopt AI, health spending is projected to rise from 18.3% of GDP to 21% under slower growth and 21.7% under faster growth.
  • How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence? — The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a permanent 0.5 percentage point increase in annual productivity growth would lower publicly held federal debt after 30 years by 39% of GDP, offsetting roughly half the projected rise from 101% of GDP to 175%. Higher revenue and slower spending growth outweigh higher interest costs.
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the federal deficit will grow from $1.9tn (5.8% of GDP) to $3.1tn (6.7%) over a decade, above the 3.8% averaged over the past 50 years, with rising net interest costs driving much of the increase. Federal debt held by the public is projected to rise from 101% to 120% of GDP.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Intergovernmental Grants to School Districts and Educational Outcomes During the COVID-19 Pandemic

AI Summary. The authors find no statistically significant evidence that $190bn in federal emergency K-12 school aid mitigated pandemic learning loss or raised district spending. Districts qualifying for additional funds saw local revenues fall by $907 per pupil over three years, about 8% of pre-pandemic average, roughly 80% from property taxes.

Jeffrey Clemens, Philip Hoxie and Stan Veuger National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Exploiting a discontinuity in K-12 public school districts’ qualification for Covid emergency funding (ESSR), Clemens et al find that the funds did not mitigate learning loss. To a large extent, local districts used them to lower property taxes.

Do federal emergency education grants reduce student learning loss?

Core argument: Districts crossing the 5% poverty cutoff for additional ESSER funds saw local revenues fall an estimated $907 per pupil over three years, about 8% of the pre-COVID average.

Emergency funding for K-12 public schools was an important component of recession spending packages during COVID, involving $190 billion in additional expenditure. We see no evidence that ESSER funds helped to mitigate learning loss, at least in the short run. We find no statistically significant evidence that districts increased expenditures in SY 2021 or SY 2022. We do find evidence that districts that qualified for additional ESSER funds had statistically significant reductions in local revenues that were in excess of their ESSER funds. This pass-through of federal funds may partially explain why ESSER had minimal impacts on learning loss for districts around the 5% poverty threshold. Our estimates suggest that over the three years, crossing the qualification cutoff for additional ESSER funds is associated with a $907 per pupil decrease in local revenues, or about 8% of the pre-COVID average. We show the decline in local revenues as an event study in Figure 3, which includes a flat pre-COVID trend in local revenues per pupil across the qualification threshold. In Table 5,Column 5 [], we can see that about 80% of the revenue decline came from decreases in revenues from property taxes, [which fell] by $718 per pupil across the 3 years. The findings apply specifically to districts in the neighborhood of the 5% poverty threshold for qualifying for additional ESSER funds.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Districts crossing the 5% poverty cutoff for additional ESSER funds saw local revenues fall an estimated $907 per pupil over three years, about 8% of the pre-COVID average.
  2. About 80% of that local revenue decline came from property taxes, which fell by $718 per pupil across the three years.
  3. The authors find no evidence that ESSER emergency K-12 funding, totaling $190 billion, mitigated learning loss in the short run, and no statistically significant increase in district expenditures in SY 2021 or SY 2022.

Related Articles:

  • Aid for Incumbents: The Electoral Consequences of COVID-19 Relief — Using congressional representation as an instrument — an extra senator or representative per million residents predicts roughly $1,000 more aid per capita — the authors estimate that federal pandemic relief strongly predicts incumbent performance in state-wide elections.
  • What Do States Do with Fiscal Windfalls? Evidence from the Pandemic — The authors estimate that for every $1,000 per capita of federal pandemic aid committed to state and local governments, state revenues and expenditures each rose by roughly the same amount, with $379 going to general government spending and $72 to pension contributions. They find no statistically significant increases in healthcare, education, or infrastructure spending.
  • Spatial Spillovers and the Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence from Pandemic-Era Federal Aid for State and Local Governments — The authors estimate that each $878,000 in federal assistance to state and local governments created or preserved one state or local job-year, with about a third of the effect driven by spillovers from other states. Their confidence intervals rule out a cost below $428,000 per job-year, implying weaker employment support than during the global financial crisis.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • K-12
      • Test Scores
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