Edward Conard

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  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
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When will it be over?: An introduction to viral reproduction numbers, R0 and Re

AI Summary. The basic reproduction number (R0) measures how many new cases one infected person causes in a fully susceptible population, with values above 1 implying exponential spread, while the effective reproduction number accounts for immunity and interventions like social distancing. Estimates of COVID-19's R0 averaged 2.65, implying 62% immunization for herd immunity.

Jeffrey K Aronson, Jon Brassey, Kamal R Mahtani University of Oxford
Date Posted:
May 9, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Viral spread metrics: Mean COVID R0=2.65 requires 62% immunity to halt growth. R0>1 = exponential spread. At R0=2, need 50% immune; at R0=5, need 80%. Re tracks real-time transmission post-intervention

How do viral reproduction numbers determine the immunity needed for herd immunity?

Core argument: COVID-19 estimates of the basic reproduction number R0 varied widely, with a mean of 2.65, implying that 62% of the population must be immunized to reach herd immunity.

Understanding viral reproduction numbers, R0 and Re, is crucial for predicting the trajectory of an epidemic and informing policy decisions. R0, the basic reproduction number, indicates the average number of cases one infected individual will cause in a fully susceptible population. If R0 > 1, the infection spreads exponentially; if R0 < 1, it will eventually die out. Re, the effective reproduction number, reflects the current state of an epidemic, accounting for immunity and interventions like social distancing. For instance, if R0 = 2, 50% of the population needs immunization to achieve herd immunity; if R0 = 5, this rises to 80%. During the COVID-19 pandemic, estimates of R0 varied widely, with a mean of 2.65, suggesting that 62% immunization is needed for herd immunity. These metrics guide strategies such as suppression and mitigation to control viral spread and minimize economic impact.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. COVID-19 estimates of the basic reproduction number R0 varied widely, with a mean of 2.65, implying that 62% of the population must be immunized to reach herd immunity.
  2. The basic reproduction number R0 measures the average cases one infected person causes in a fully susceptible population, with infection spreading exponentially when R0 > 1 and dying out when R0 < 1.
  3. Herd immunity thresholds scale with R0: an R0 of 2 requires 50% immunization while an R0 of 5 requires 80%, and the effective reproduction number Re accounts for immunity and interventions such as social distancing.

“…Remember George Box’swise wordsabout models: “All models are wrong but some models are useful”. Or as he put it elsewhere, less dramatically but morespecifically:“Models, of course, are never true, but fortunately it is only necessary that they be useful. For this it is usually needful only that they not be grossly wrong”….”

Jeffrey K Aronson, Jon Brassey, Kamal R Mahtani, "“When will it be over?”: An introduction to viral reproduction numbers, R0 and Re," Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine, Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, University of Oxford, April 14, 2020, https://www.cebm.net/covid-19/when-will-it-be-over-an-introduction-to-viral-reproduction-numbers-r0-and-re/

When will it be over?”: An introduction to viral reproduction numbers, R0 and R

The UK Government is regularly reviewing the current lockdown measures, as it is required to do every 3 weeks, by law. With the peak of the pandemic yet to arrive in the UK, it seems certain that the current measures will continue. So when will the UK lockdown end?

On 30 March 2020, Sir Patrick Vallance, the Government’s Chief Scientific Officer, gave an indication of how this decision may be guided, saying that Britain’s lockdown was having a “very big effect” on the R0, bringing it down “below one”.

The figure to which he was referring is the basic reproduction number (or reproductive ratio) of a virus, called R0 (R nought or R zero). And it is important to know how to interpret it.

We include some definitions in the box at the end.

The basic reproduction number

The basic reproduction number is defined as the number of cases that are expected to occur on average in a homogeneous population as a result of infection by a single individual, when the population is susceptible at the start of an epidemic, before widespread immunity starts to develop and before any attempt has been made at immunization. So if one person develops the infection and passes it on to two others, the R0 is 2.

If the average R0 in the population is greater than 1, the infection will spread exponentially. If R0 is less than 1, the infection will spread only slowly, and it will eventually die out. The higher the value of R0, the faster an epidemic will progress.

R0 is estimated from data collected in the field and entered into mathematical models. The estimated value depends on the model used and the data that inform it.

R0 is affected by:

the proportion of susceptible people at the start and the density of the population;
the infectiousness of the organism;
the rate of disappearance of cases by recovery or death, the first of which depends on the time for which an individual is infective;

The denser the population, the more people are susceptible, and the more infective the virus, the larger R0 will be for a given virus; the faster the rate of removal of infected individuals, by recovery or death, the smaller R0 will be.

The zero in “R zero” means that it is estimated when there is zero immunity in the population, even though not everyone will necessarily be susceptible to infection, although that is the usual assumption. In an epidemic with a completely new virus, the earlier the measurements are made the nearer the calculated value is likely to be to the true value of R0, assuming high-quality data. For this reason, it is better to talk about the transmissibility of the virus at the time that it is measured, using a different symbol, Re, the effective reproduction number.

The effective reproduction number, Re

The effective reproduction number, Re, sometimes also called Rt, is the number of people in a population who can be infected by an individual at any specific time. It changes as the population becomes increasingly immunized, either by individual immunity following infection or by vaccination, and also as people die.

Re is affected by the number of people with the infection and the number of susceptibles with whom infected people are in contact. People’s behaviour (e.g. social distancing) can also affect Re.

The number of susceptibles falls as people die or become immunized by exposure. The sooner people recover or die, the smaller the value of Re will be at any given time.

Unfortunately, the symbol R0 is often used in publications when Re is meant. This can be confusing.

Herd immunity

Initial reports suggested that one of the UK Government’s strategies in tackling the pandemic was to allow the virus to spread within the community, in a controlled way, so that immunity, so-called herd immunity, could develop across the population. However, the health secretary, Matt Hancock, later said that this was not part of the UK response to the virus. In contrast, other countries, such as Sweden, have responded to the pandemic in ways that avoid full lockdown. The problem with leaving people to catch the infection spontaneously, leading to herd immunity, is that the death rate would increase as a result. For example, on 10 April, the number of confirmed cases in Sweden was 9685 with 870 deaths (9.0%), compared with Norway with 6219 confirmed cases and 108 deaths (1.7%) and Denmark with 5830 confirmed cases and 237 deaths (4.4%).

R0 predicts the extent of immunization that a population requires if herd immunity is to be achieved, the spread of the infection limited, and the population protected against future infection. To prevent sustained spread of the infection the proportion of the population that has to be immunized (Pi) has to be greater than 1 − 1/R0. The relation between Pi and 1 - 1/R0 is shown in Figure 1.

For example, if R0 = 2, immunization needs to be achieved in 50% of the population. However, if R0 = 5 the proportion rises steeply, to 80%. Beyond that the rise is less steep; an increase in R0 to 10 increases the need for immunization to 90%. Measles has an R0 greater than 10, which is why immunization of a large proportion of the population is so important in preventing the disease.

Thus, if R0 is 10, a child with measles will infect 10 others if they are susceptible. When other children become immune the infected child who encounters 10 children will not be able to infect them all; the number infected will depend on Re. When immunity is 90% or more the chances that the child will meet enough unimmunized children to pass on the disease falls to near zero, and the population is protected.

When will it be over?: An introduction to viral reproduction numbers, R0 and Re: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Figure 1. The relation between the basic reproduction number of a virus, R0, and the proportion of the population that needs to be immunized to achieve herd immunity; note the steep rise of the curve at values of R0 between 1 and 5; three examples are shown: R0 =2, proportion = 50%, R0 = 5, proportion = 80%; R0 = 10, proportion = 90%; the inset shows a linearization of the main graph, generated by plotting P against 1/R0

At any time, Re = R0 × (1 - Pi), where Pi is the proportion of the population who are immune at that time. This is illustrated in Figure 2.

When will it be over?: An introduction to viral reproduction numbers, R0 and Re: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Figure 2. The relation between R0 and Re at different levels of population immunity

For example, immunization of 50% of the population (blue line) will bring Re down below one only if R0 was no greater than 2; in contrast immunization of 90% of the population (brown line) will bring Re down to 1 or less for all values of R0 up to 10.

How R0 is estimated

A typical epidemiological model by which R0 is estimated is based on three factors: individual Susceptibility to the infection, the rate at which infections actually occur (Infectivity), and the rate of Removal of infection from the population, by either recovery or death. This is the so-called S-I-R model.The model involves the solution of simultaneous linear differential equations and was described as long ago as 1927 by W. O. Kermack and A. G. McKendrick. A version of their model is shown in Figure 3.

When will it be over?: An introduction to viral reproduction numbers, R0 and Re: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Figure 3. A version of the model described by Kermack & McKendrick (Proc Roy Soc A 1927; 115: 700-21); data can be entered into the model and the different rates at which events occur and the basic or effective reproduction numbers calculated

However, many other methods have been used, including both statistical models and simple calculations. The former range from methods such as the Reed-Frost stochastic model, developed by Lowell J. Reed and Wade Hampton Frost in 1928, similar to a method that was already being developed by H E Soper and which he described in 1929, to the IDEA method, first described by Fisman and colleagues in 2013. Of the methods involving simple mathematical calculation of R0, one that is commonly used involves the following equation: R0 = βS/γ, where β is the transmission rate, S is the number of susceptibles at the start of the epidemic, and γ is the removal rate. There are many other variants of a similar nature.

When will it be over?: An introduction to viral reproduction numbers, R0 and Re: Extended Excerpt Image 4


Figure 4 shows a comparison of estimated values of R0 for a range of viruses, summarized from a variety of published sources. The graph shows how variable estimated values of R0 can be from virus to virus. However, the numbers should be interpreted with caution, since the quality of data on which they were based will have varied from study to study, the data will have been taken at different times during the course of the spread of the virus (e.g. compare influenza in Spring and Autumn 1918), and the models used will have been different. It should also be clear from the graph, although the mortality data are not shown, that R0 is not related to the case fatality rate.

Figure 4. Estimated values of R0 in different viral infections, culled from a variety of published sources

What is the R0 of SARS-CoV-2?

Estimates of the R0 of SARS-CoV-2 vary widely. Figure 5 shows nine estimates, all from studies in China or South Korea. The mean estimate of R0 is 2.63 (95% CI = 1.85,3.41). From a wider survey of 16 published estimates, the mean estimate is 2.65 (1.97, 3.09). In both cases, the range is 0.4-4.6.

When will it be over?: An introduction to viral reproduction numbers, R0 and Re: Extended Excerpt Image 5


Figure 5. Nine estimates of R0 in studies for which information was given about the time over which the measurements were made, from 1 December (day 1) to 6 March (day 97); the data are from studies in mainland China (red), Wuhan (black), Shenzhen (blue), and South Korea (green); the results show the large degree of variability in mean estimates, attributable to variations in the quality of the data and the models used; however, five of the results cluster around 2.6

This means that in order to protect us against future epidemics, herd immunity of around 62% will be needed, taking the mean estimate across all these studies. Taking the highest value (4.6), 78% immunization will be needed, and it would be wise to aim for at least that. When a test for neutralizing antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 and a vaccine are available, we shall be able to tell to what extent the population has been immunized by exposure and vaccination.

In the UK, one of the key findings that influenced the Government’s decision to start the lockdown was the model presented by the Imperial College COVID-19 response team. The model explores the effect of two strategies (a) suppression, by which interventions are instituted to bring Re to below 1, and (b) mitigation, by which strategies are instituted to reduce the impact of the epidemic, but not interrupt viral transmission completely, thus reducing Re, but not necessarily below 1. The model assumed an R0 of about 2.4 and predicted that, in the absence of any control measures, 81% of the UK population would become infected, with over half a million deaths. However, this number could be reduced to under 50,000 (and possibly under 6000 deaths) with a suite of suppression strategies in place. Little wonder, given these figures, that the UK government swiftly began the lockdown.

It is important to note that the value of R0 varies considerably in the models used in the COVID-19 pandemic. One systematic review reported that the mean of 29 reported values of R0 from 21 studies was estimated at 3.32 (2.81-3.82), with a range of 1.9 to 6.49; all the included studies were from China. In a statement on 23 January, 2020 about the outbreak of COVID-19 the World Health Organization (WHO) gave a preliminary R0 estimate of 1.4-2.5.

Interpreting the news

The Chinese data suggest little change in the reproduction numbers measured at various times over the last 3 months. So when you read a report that the reproduction number (Re) has fallen below 1, which should be cause for rejoicing, be cautious. The calculated value depends on the quality of the data, which may be poor, and the epidemiological model used, which may distort the outcome. Remember George Box’s wise words about models:

“All models are wrong but some models are useful”.

Or as he put it elsewhere, less dramatically but more specifically:

“Models, of course, are never true, but fortunately it is only necessary that they be useful. For this it is usually needful only that they not be grossly wrong”.

Definitions
Some definitions of terms used in this article are given below.
Immunity to a viral infection is the state of being non-susceptible to it, by virtue of being able to produce neutralizing antibodies when challenged by it; such antibodies may be produced by prior exposure or by immunization following vaccination.
Herd immunity is a form of protection from an infectious disease that results when a large enough proportion of the population has become immune, conferring indirect protection from infection on individuals who are not themselves immune.
Vaccination against a viral infection is the administration of a vaccine to an individual with the intention of immunizing that individual or boosting pre-existing immunity.
Immunization against a viral infection is the production of immunity to the infection by virtue of successful vaccination or exposure to the virus.

—————————————————————————————————————————

Disclaimer: the article has not been peer-reviewed; it should not replace individual clinical judgement and the sources cited should be checked. The views expressed in this commentary represent the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the host institution, the NHS, the NIHR, or the Department of Health and Social Care. The views are not a substitute for professional medical advice.

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Obamacare Dealt Yet Another Blow as Premiums Jump Again

AI Summary. The average premium in the Affordable Care Act insurance marketplaces is projected to rise 13%, according to an analysis by the health research group KFF. That increase is slightly higher than elsewhere, with consulting firms projecting roughly 10% increases for employer plans covering about 150m people and more than 10% for federal workers.

Reed Abelson and Margot Sanger-Katz New York Times
Date Posted:
November 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to a KFF analysis, the average benchmark health care premium on the Obamacare insurance marketplaces will increase 13% in 2027, compared to 10% for private insurance. This follows a 26% increase last year.

According to a KFF analysis, the average benchmark health care premium on the Obamacare insurance marketplaces will increase...

Are marketplace health premiums rising faster than employer plan premiums?

Core argument: Average premiums in the Obamacare marketplaces will rise 13% in 2027, according to an analysis by KFF that combined newly published federal prices for 30 states with state-level figures.

Obamacare premiums will rise an average of 13% in 2027, following a 26% increase in 2026. Much of the increase reflects rising medical costs, with employer-plan premiums also expected to climb about 10%. But the expiration of enhanced federal subsidies has left some Obamacare customers particularly exposed. Remaining income-based subsidies will shield most enrollees from next year’s premium increases by shifting the additional expense to taxpayers. Those ineligible for assistance—including many self-employed workers and early retirees—must absorb the full increase, sometimes after already paying over $1,000 more per month in 2026.Many customers have responded by buying cheaper coverage with higher deductibles, pushing the average deductible to nearly $4,000 this year. Having already traded down, they have less room to offset further increases. KFF estimates suggest enrollment had fallen by nearly five million by June, while a Commonwealth Fund survey indicates that the uninsured rate among working-age adults has risen.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average premiums in the Obamacare marketplaces will rise 13% in 2027, according to an analysis by KFF that combined newly published federal prices for 30 states with state-level figures.
  2. Reports by several consulting firms project that 2027 premiums for employer plans, which cover around 150 million people, could rise by about 10%, below the 13% marketplace increase.
  3. Premiums for federal workers are increasing by more than 10%.

Related Articles:

  • Saved by Medicaid: New Evidence on Health Insurance and Mortality from the Universe of Low-Income Adults — Using linked Census and tax records for 37m low-income adults, the authors estimate that state Medicaid expansions raised enrollment by 12 percentage points and cut mortality among low-income adults by 2.5%, implying a 21% reduction in the mortality hazard of new enrollees. They estimate direct budgetary costs of $5.4m per life saved and $179,000 per life-year saved.
  • A Long-Run Economic Model for Projecting the Finances of the U.S. Government and National Spending on Healthcare: Analysis of Productivity Increases and Health Sector Reform — A long-run model in which health spending, the federal budget, and capital investment are jointly determined by supply and demand projects U.S. federal debt reaching 151% of GDP in 2036 and 309% in 2056, versus the Congressional Budget Office's 120% and 175%. Rising real interest rates compound deficits and debt.
  • Will Medical Care Strangle or Save the Federal Budget? — A National Bureau of Economic Research paper projects U.S. medical spending, 18% of GDP in 2024, reaching 19%–26% of GDP by 2040, with federal medical spending consuming 45%–61% of federal revenue excluding Social Security contributions. The author argues only the low-spending path is consistent with current tax levels and other commitments.
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Will Medical Care Strangle or Save the Federal Budget?

AI Summary. A National Bureau of Economic Research paper projects U.S. medical spending, 18% of GDP in 2024, reaching 19%–26% of GDP by 2040, with federal medical spending consuming 45%–61% of federal revenue excluding Social Security contributions. The author argues only the low-spending path is consistent with current tax levels and other commitments.

David Cutler National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

From 1970 to 2010, growth in US medical spending outpaced GDP growth by ~2.4pp annually. From 2010 to 2024, that growth differential fell to just 0.3pp. If it persists, medical spending reaches only 19% of GDP by 2040; if excess spending growth reverts to 2.4pp, it reaches 26%.

How much federal revenue will medical spending consume by 2040?

Core argument: David Cutler projects U.S. medical spending reaching 26%, 22.3%, or 19% of GDP by 2040 under high, benchmark, and low scenarios, versus 18% in 2024 and 6.9% in 1970.

Figure 1 shows that in 1970, medical care was 6.9% of GDP. In 2024, it was 18%. From 1970 through around 2010; mean medical spending growth exceeded GDP growth by 2.4 pp annually. Since 2010, the growth of medical spending has exceeded the growth of GDP by only 0.3 pp annually. There is no comparable time period with anything like the sustained slowdown in spending growth since 2010. Patient cost-sharing has increased enormously [indirectly reducing overall expenditure via incentives] as shown in Figure 5. An additional role [was] played by the diffusion of cost-reducing technologies. Because they are often less invasive, second-round therapies typically have lower unit prices. [mechanism in Fgure 6]. Finally, there [are] fewer expensive new innovations than in the past. [However], recent data show an uptick in spending growth in 2024, which continued in 2025. Some of this is a result of new technologies— prime examples are GLP-1 medications and new drugs for cancer that are taken on an ongoing basis. To consider a scenario with [a reversion to] more rapid spending increases, I assume that the growth of medical spending above GDP growth after 2024 returns to the average rate realized between 1970 and 2010. This scenario is shown as the High-spending scenario in figure 1, in which medical care in 2040 rises to 26% of GDP.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. David Cutler projects U.S. medical spending reaching 26%, 22.3%, or 19% of GDP by 2040 under high, benchmark, and low scenarios, versus 18% in 2024 and 6.9% in 1970.
  2. Federal medical spending consumed 45% of “discretionary revenue”—total federal revenue less Social Security contributions—in 2024, up from 13% in 1987, and Cutler projects 61% by 2040 under the high-spending scenario.
  3. Cutler states that only the low-spending scenario is consistent with current tax levels and non-medical spending commitments, attributing the post-2010 slowdown to high-deductible plans, prior authorization, cost-reducing technology, and reduced administrative friction.

Related Articles:

  • Has the United States Bent the Health Care Cost Curve? — The authors estimate that a slowdown in US health care spending reflects technology-associated changes in health and site of care (21% of the slowdown, double that in Medicare), more elastic long-run supply (6%), market changes reducing and making demand more elastic (11–27%), improved population health (7%), and slower price growth net of upcoding (24%).
  • A Long-Run Economic Model for Projecting the Finances of the U.S. Government and National Spending on Healthcare: Analysis of Productivity Increases and Health Sector Reform — A long-run model in which health spending, the federal budget, and capital investment are jointly determined by supply and demand projects U.S. federal debt reaching 151% of GDP in 2036 and 309% in 2056, versus the Congressional Budget Office's 120% and 175%. Rising real interest rates compound deficits and debt.
  • Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis? — U.S. GDP per capita, about $87,000, is projected to reach $102,000 by 2035 with 1.8% annual productivity growth, or $110,000 with 2.7% growth. Because the healthcare sector has been slow to adopt AI, health spending is projected to rise from 18.3% of GDP to 21% under slower growth and 21.7% under faster growth.
  • Healthcare/Seniors
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The Sweet Life: The Long-Term Effects of a Sugar-Rich Early Childhood

AI Summary. The authors use the end of UK sugar rationing as a natural experiment and estimate that a sugar-rich early-childhood diet raised adult chronic inflammation, diabetes, cholesterol and arthritis, and led to less human capital, lower odds of a skilled occupation, and less wealth. They also find early exposure elevated sugar consumption across the lifespan.

Paul Gertler and Tadeja Gračner Working Paper
Date Posted:
May 12, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the end of sugar rationing in September 1953, Gertler and Gračner find that birth cohorts post-dating the policy change experience worse lifetime outcomes in many health measures as well as economic success.

Does a sugar-rich early childhood diet worsen adult health and wealth?

Core argument: Using the end of UK sugar and sweets rationing in 1953 as a natural experiment, the authors find that early-childhood exposure to a sugar-rich diet increased adult chronic inflammation, a marker of chronic disease.

We study the long-term effects of exposure to a sugar-rich diet in early childhood on health and economic well-being in later adulthood, and identify diet as a possible pathway. We exploit the end of sugar and sweets rationing in 1953 in the UK as a natural experiment inducing variation in exposure to a sugar-rich diet in early childhood. We find that the end of rationing increased the adult prevalence of chronic inflammation, an important marker of chronic disease. We also find increases in poor metabolic health; particularly diabetes, cholesterol and arthritis. Finally, we find that excessive intake of sugar also results in worse economic outcomes; specifically, in reduced human capital accumulation, a lower likelihood of having a skilled occupation, and a lower accumulation of wealth. While the effects of a sugar-rich diet early in life may have affected these outcomes directly via physiological programming, we find that a sugar-rich diet early in life elevated free sugar consumption across lifespan, consistent with evidence that life-long dietary preferences and habits form early, and that sugar may be addictive.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using the end of UK sugar and sweets rationing in 1953 as a natural experiment, the authors find that early-childhood exposure to a sugar-rich diet increased adult chronic inflammation, a marker of chronic disease.
  2. The authors find that early-childhood exposure to a sugar-rich diet raised the prevalence of poor metabolic health in later adulthood, particularly diabetes, cholesterol and arthritis.
  3. Early exposure to a sugar-rich diet is associated with worse economic outcomes — reduced human capital accumulation, a lower likelihood of holding a skilled occupation, and lower wealth accumulation — and with elevated free sugar consumption across the lifespan.

Related Articles:

  • Human Capital Spillovers and Health: Does Living Around College Graduates Lengthen Life? — Living in an area with more college graduates is associated with lower mortality even after accounting for individuals' own education, and more than half of that correlation can be explained by area differences in smoking and obesity rates. The authors find evidence for both regulatory policies such as workplace smoking bans and peer effects about the harms of smoking.
  • Comments On: “Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA” By Anne Case and Angus Deaton — Selection plausibly accounts for most or all of the widening mortality gap between US adults with and without a bachelor's degree: high school achievement measures have not risen since the early 1970s while the share earning degrees rose, and national youth survey data show non-graduates increasingly negatively selected on aptitude scores.
  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — The mortality gap between American adults with and without a four-year college degree widened across three periods—falling mortality for both with larger gains for graduates, then diverging, then rising faster for the less educated during the pandemic—reaching an 8.5-year difference in adult life expectancy. Americans with a degree, treated as a separate country, would rank just below Japan.
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Nursing Is the Surefire New Path to American Prosperity

AI Summary. US registered nurses earn a median annual wage of $93,600 versus $49,500 for all occupations, while nurses with advanced degrees, such as nurse practitioners, earn $132,050, according to the Labor Department. The Labor Department projects advanced-degree nursing employment will grow 35% over a decade, against 3% for all occupations and 5% for registered nurses.

Jeanne Whalen Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
April 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The median annual wage for a nurse in 2024 was $93,600; those with an advanced degree earned $132,050. The Labor Department forecasts that employment of nurses with advanced degrees will increase 35% btw 2024 and 2034 relative to job growth of 3%.

Is nursing one of the highest-paying, fastest-growing career paths?

Core argument: The median annual wage for U.S. registered nurses is $93,600, compared with $49,500 across all occupations, according to the Labor Department.

The median annual wage for registered nurses in the U.S. is $93,600, compared with $49,500 for all occupations, according to the Labor Department. For nurse practitioners and others with advanced degrees, it is $132,050. The Labor Department projects that employment of advanced-degree nurses will increase by 35% from 2024 to 2034, eclipsing the expected 3% growth across all occupations. Registered-nurse employment is projected to rise 5% over that period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The median annual wage for U.S. registered nurses is $93,600, compared with $49,500 across all occupations, according to the Labor Department.
  2. Nurse practitioners and other nurses with advanced degrees have a median annual wage of $132,050, according to the Labor Department.
  3. The Labor Department projects employment of advanced-degree nurses will rise 35% from 2024 to 2034, against 5% for registered nurses and 3% across all occupations.

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  • Has the United States Bent the Health Care Cost Curve? — The authors estimate that a slowdown in US health care spending reflects technology-associated changes in health and site of care (21% of the slowdown, double that in Medicare), more elastic long-run supply (6%), market changes reducing and making demand more elastic (11–27%), improved population health (7%), and slower price growth net of upcoding (24%).
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Doctor’s Office Care at Hospital Prices

AI Summary. Medicare pays hospital-owned facilities 2-3x what it pays independent physician offices for the same service, creating an incentive for hospital chains to acquire outpatient practices; the share of hospital-owned physician practices rose from 14% to 31% over six years. Equalizing payments is estimated to save $346bn-$672bn over a decade.

Bobby Jindal and Charlie Katebi Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 28, 2023
Is Database:
Database

.@BobbyJindal argues that simple reforms in Medicare billing could save patients and taxpayers somewhere between $346B and $672B over the next 10 years.

.@BobbyJindal argues that simple reforms in Medicare billing could save patients and taxpayers somewhere between $346B and...

How much would paying the same rate regardless of ownership save?

Core argument: Medicare pays hospital-owned facilities two to three times as much as independent physician offices for the same service, according to the Alliance for Site Neutral Payment Reform, creating an incentive for large hospital chains to acquire outpatient practices.

Cur­rently, Medicare pays hos­pi­tal-owned fa­cil­i­ties two to three times as much as in­de­pen­dent physi­cian of­fices for the same ser­vice, ac­cord­ing to the Al­liance for Site Neu­tral Pay­ment Re­form. This cre­ates an enor­mous in­cen­tive for large hos­pi­tal chains to ac­quire out­pa­tient prac­tices. A re­port by the Physi­cian Ad­vo­cacy In­sti­tute found that the share of hos­pi­tal-owned physi­cian prac­tices more than dou­bled, from 14% to 31%, be­tween 2012 and 2018. By 2020 more than half of physi­cians worked di­rectly for a hos­pi­tal or at a physi­cian prac­tice owned by a hos­pi­tal, ac­cord­ing to the Amer­i­can Med­ical As­so­ci­a­tion.  Re­mov­ing these per­verse in­cen­tives could save pa­tients and tax­pay­ers be­tween $346 bil­lion and $672 bil­lion over the next decade.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Medicare pays hospital-owned facilities two to three times as much as independent physician offices for the same service, according to the Alliance for Site Neutral Payment Reform, creating an incentive for large hospital chains to acquire outpatient practices.
  2. The share of hospital-owned physician practices more than doubled, from 14% to 31%, between 2012 and 2018, according to a Physician Advocacy Institute report, and by 2020 more than half of physicians worked for a hospital or hospital-owned practice, according to the American Medical Association.
  3. Removing Medicare's site-based payment differences could save patients and taxpayers between $346 billion and $672 billion over the next decade.
  • Healthcare/Seniors
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    • Government Spending

Case for Mask Mandate Rests on Bad Data

AI Summary. A widely cited epidemiological model assumed a U.S. mask-adoption rate of 49%, implying large gains from moving to 85–95%, while surveys indicated adoption had been around 80%. The author argues this outdated assumption inflated the projected benefits used to justify a mask mandate.

Phillip Magness Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
November 12, 2020
Is Database:
Database

The IHME model’s failure to update for behavioral changes led to flawed projections, undermining the case for a mask mandate.

Do outdated modeling assumptions overstate the benefits of mask mandates?

Core argument: The IHME model assumed a U.S. mask-adoption rate of 49% as of late September, implying large room for gains toward 85–95%, while more recent surveys indicate adoption has been around 80% since the summer.

The IHME [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation] model's failure to update for behavioral changes led to flawed projections, undermining the case for a mask mandate. The model erroneously assumed a U.S. mask-adoption rate of 49% as of late September, suggesting significant potential for increase to 95% or 85%. However, more recent surveys indicate that the mask-adoption rate has been around 80% since the summer. This discrepancy highlights the importance of using current data in economic modeling and policy-making, as outdated assumptions can lead to misguided decisions with significant economic implications. Accurate data is crucial for effective policy interventions, especially in public health, where behavioral changes can rapidly alter the landscape.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The IHME model assumed a U.S. mask-adoption rate of 49% as of late September, implying large room for gains toward 85–95%, while more recent surveys indicate adoption has been around 80% since the summer.
  2. The IHME model's failure to update for behavioral changes produced flawed projections that undermine the case for a mask mandate.
  3. Outdated assumptions in modeling rapidly changing behavior can lead to misguided policy decisions with significant economic implications, making current data essential to public health interventions.

IHME failed to update their model for behavioral changes"...Unfortunately, the IHME modelers’ findings contained an error that even minimal scrutiny should have caught. The projected number of lives saved, and the implied case for a mask mandate, are based on a faulty statistic. Using a months-old survey, IHME modelers assumed erroneously that the U.S. mask-adoption rate stood at only 49% as of late September, and therefore had plenty of room to increase to “universal adoption,” defined as 95%, or to a more plausible 85%. According to more recent survey findings, however, America’s mask-adoption rate has hovered around 80% since the summer...."

Phillip Magness, "Case for Mask Mandate Rests on Bad Data,"Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/case-for-mask-mandate-rests-on-bad-data-11605113310

  • Healthcare/Seniors
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