Kill Zone
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VC investments in start-ups within the same sector drop by 40% after acquisitions by Google or Facebook, highlighting unique economic dynamics of digital platforms.
Sai Krishna Kamepalli, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, "Kill Zone," National Bureau Of Economic Research, May 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27146
“…Venture capitalists talk about a “kill zone” created by acquisitions, such as those by Facebook and Google, in the start-up space. This idea seems at odds not only with standard textbook economics, but with logic itself. Why should the prospect of being acquired at hefty multiples discourage new entry? In this paper we construct a simple model that rationalizes this result. In the presence of network externalities, early adopters generate an important externality: they facilitate the adoption by less sophisticated customers, helping the market converge to the platform with the superior technology.These early adopters, however, face significant switching costs, thus they will switch only if the benefit of switching is reasonable large. This benefit is given by the product of the technological difference and the time this difference will persist. Since a merger immediately transmits the superior technology to everybody, it reduces the payoff to early adoption. The prospect of mergers then reduces switching, makes it harder for entrants to acquire customers and offer network externalities for any given technological superiority, and thus reduces the price at which they can be acquired.This then reduces their incentive to innovate. We test this prediction using data on investment in startups. We show that VCs significantly reduce the number of deals and the amount of money they invest in markets near one where Facebook and Google have made a large acquisition, after the two giant digital platforms have made those acquisitions. … We collect data on the number of deals and dollar amounts invested by the venture capitalist in specific sectors, after major acquisitions by Facebook and Google are announced. We find that normalized VC investments in start-ups in the same space as the company acquired by Google and Facebook drop by over 40% and the number of deals falls by over 20% in the three years following an acquisition. In comparison, a similar calculation for other acquisitions in the software industry suggests that normalized VC investments in start-ups in the same space as the company acquired goes up (not down) by over 40 percent, while the number of deals goes up slightly in the three years following an acquisition. The software industry seems to follow the standard economic argument…..while the platform acquisitions seem very different. We consider alternative explanations of these results, including the possibility that most (if not all) the start-ups similar to the ones acquired by Google or Facebook were created with the only objective of being acquired by Google or Facebook. Thus, when a tech giant chooses another target, the potential alternatives lose their likely buyer and thus financing. To address this concern, we only look at startups that are in a similar space, but not too close to the space of the acquired ones (so that they cannot be considered perfect substitutes). Our results are if anything stronger. We also consider the possibility of the acquired start-up being a complement rather than a substitute to the incumbent platform….While an outright prohibition of acquisitions may reduce welfare, the model provides alternative welfare-improving forms of intervention. The most important message, though, is a simple one: it is dangerous to apply twentieth century economic intuitions to twenty first century economic problems. Our paper suggests one reason why….”
They suggest that platforms require new economics versus standard models as the economics of digital platforms differ from even other intangibles like software“The most important message, though, is a simple one: it is dangerous to apply twentieth century economic intuitions to twenty first century economic problems"
New Kamepalli/Rajan/Zingales observe that large tech firms acquiring smaller possible competitors (so in the way FB purchased Instagram) have reduced VC investment as the incumbent (likely) has a powerful moat that (implicitly) raises the hurdle rate discouraging new investment: “We find that normalized VC investments in start-ups in the same space as the company acquired by Google and Facebook drop by over 40% and the number of deals falls by over 20% in the three years following an acquisition. In comparison, a similar calculation for other acquisitions in the software industry suggests that normalized VC investments in start-ups in the same space as the company acquired goes up (not down) by over 40 percent, while the number of deals goes up slightly in the three years following an acquisition




The vc giants’ newfound contrition comes on the back of a gigantic tech crash. The tech-heavy nasdaq index fell by a third in 2022, making it one of the worst years on record and drawing comparisons with the dotcom bust of 2000-01. According to the Silicon Valley Bank, a tech-focused lender, between the fourth quarters of 2021 and 2022, the average value of recently listed tech stocks in America dropped by 63%. And the plunging public valuations dragged down private ones (see chart 1). The value of older, larger private firms (“late-stage” in the lingo) fell by 56% after funds marked down their assets or the firms raised new capital at lower valuations. 










Ed Comment:Add to data base on innovation, startups, and cronyism (if not others).Not sure I buy the test for rejecting the hypothesis that investments weren’t being made to be acquired by google or Facebook although I agree their choices reduce incentives to keep investing. Presumably investors are trying create an advantage and keep trying as long as they have a similar shot at success as when they chose to make the investment in the first place. As time progresses, a few successes bubble up and Google and Facebook presumably have a great deal of interest in those small handful of successes. Once they decide, the others surely face bigger obstacles. For me, the interesting/important question is how quickly they decide in the lifecycle to acquire—early, while everyone still has a chance, or late. If they can systematically build winners, you would think they would choose early. But we see so many failures, e.g., Google hangout, an independent Zoom, and still independent Evernote. If Facebook and Google are gobbling up technologies early, plenty of technologies seem to be succeeding late in the cycle regardless. If they are acquiring late, after the winners are proven, I’m not sure some decline in startup investment wouldn’t have occurred in the space regardless. I can only see the highly visible retail technologies. Obviously there are many business-to-business tech niches we don’t see. but i would guess the pattern is similar.