Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
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Pandemic Hangover: 11 Trillion in Corporate Debt

AI Summary. U.S. nonfinancial firms issued $1.7tn in bonds in a single year amid historically low interest rates, bringing total corporate debt to $11.2tn, roughly half the size of the U.S. economy. The borrowing let companies replace lost pandemic revenue and refinance at lower costs, though the Federal Reserve describes vulnerabilities from business debt as elevated.

Sam Goldfarb Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
June 18, 2021
Is Database:
Database

US non-financial firms issued $1.7 trillion in bonds in 2020, with total corporate debt reaching $11.2 trillion by March 2021, about half the size of the US economy.

Does record corporate borrowing at low rates leave elevated debt vulnerabilities?

Core argument: U.S. nonfinancial firms issued $1.7tn in bonds in 2020, nearly $600bn above the previous record, driven by historically low interest rates.

In 2020, nonfinancial firms in the U.S. issued $1.7 tn in bonds, nearly $600 bn more than the previous record, driven by historically low interest rates. By March 2021, total corporate debt reached $11.2 tn, about half the size of the U.S. economy. This surge in borrowing allowed companies to weather the pandemic by replacing lost revenue and refinancing older debt at lower costs. However, the Federal Reserve noted that vulnerabilities from business debt remain elevated, raising concerns about potential risks in future economic downturns. While some companies have begun reducing their debt, the overall elevated debt levels pose a challenge for long-term economic growth and stability.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. nonfinancial firms issued $1.7tn in bonds in 2020, nearly $600bn above the previous record, driven by historically low interest rates.
  2. Total U.S. corporate debt reached $11.2tn by March 2021, about half the size of the U.S. economy, after borrowing let companies replace lost revenue and refinance older debt at lower costs.
  3. The Federal Reserve noted that vulnerabilities from business debt remain elevated, raising concerns about risks in future economic downturns even as some companies have begun reducing debt.

"...After a brief spike, interest rates on corporate debt plummeted to their lowest level on record, bringing a surge in new bonds. Nonfinancial companies issued $1.7 trillion of bonds in the U.S. last year, nearly $600 billion more than the previous high, according to Dealogic. By the end of March, their total debt stood at $11.2 trillion, according to the Federal Reserve, about half the size of the U.S. economy...."

Pandemic Hangover: 11 Trillion in Corporate Debt: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Sam Goldfarb, "Pandemic Hangover: $11 Trillion in Corporate Debt,"Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/pandemic-supercharged-corporate-debt-boom-record-11623681511

Before the pandemic, U.S. companies were borrowing heavily at low interest rates. When Covid-19 lockdowns triggered a recession, they didn’t pull back. They borrowed even more and soon paid even less.

After a brief spike, interest rates on corporate debt plummeted to their lowest level on record, bringing a surge in new bonds. Nonfinancial companies issued $1.7 trillion of bonds in the U.S. last year, nearly $600 billion more than the previous high, according to Dealogic. By the end of March, their total debt stood at $11.2 trillion, according to the Federal Reserve, about half the size of the U.S. economy.

That torrent of inexpensive money has benefited all types of businesses. It helped cruise operators, airlines and movie theaters weather the pandemic by replacing some lost revenue with cash raised from bond sales. It allowed thriving businesses to stock up on cash and to save money by refinancing older debt. And it permitted companies that were struggling before the pandemic to ease the threat of bankruptcy by issuing new long-term debt.

“It’s been surprising that the cost of debt has come down as much as it has,” said Dan Schlanger, chief financial officer of Crown Castle International Corp., a cell tower owner that has been issuing bonds with progressively lower interest rates to fund capital projects and pay off debt. “We’ve enjoyed the period of time we’re in.”

The question now is whether companies have merely delayed a reckoning. Debt-laden companies withstood last year’s recession far better than many had feared. But it was in many ways a unique shock to the economy, more akin to a natural disaster than a typical recession. For all their current enthusiasm, many CFOs and investors acknowledge that businesses could still be punished in a normal downturn that raises borrowing costs for a longer period and does more serious damage to household finances.

In a May report, the Federal Reserve noted that, by one measure, investors had rarely been compensated any less for the risk of holding corporate bonds, even as stock valuations were in line with historical averages. The report concluded that “vulnerabilities arising from business debt remain elevated.”

Some of the biggest borrowers during the pandemic, according to figures from financial-data provider FactSet, have been those hurt most by it. Carnival Corp, the world’s largest cruise operator, had around $33 billion of total debt as of Feb. 28, almost triple what it had near the end of 2019. Boeing Co's total debt more than doubled during the pandemic, to $64 billion, while Delta Air Lines Inc.’s doubled to around $35 billion.

With cruises canceled around the world, raising money early last year wasn’t easy for Carnival. Chief Financial Officer David Bernstein said he spent two weeks in March 2020 to try to put together a bond sale, only for debt investors to balk because the company wasn’t also planning to issue more stock.

It took him another 10 days working nearly around the clock to put together a deal that included a stock offering. In early April last year, Carnival issued $4 billion of secured bonds with an 11.5% interest rate—a level typically associated with businesses with rock-bottom credit ratings—along with $500 million of stock and about $2 billion of convertible bonds.

“Somehow I managed to raise $6.5 billion,” Mr. Bernstein said. “I was amazed.”

From then on, though, as investor demand for corporate debt rebounded, borrowing money got easier. Carnival sold bonds or obtained loans from investors five more times over the next 10 months, finally issuing $3.5 billion of unsecured bonds in February at a 5.75% rate. In April, Mr. Bernstein said Carnival had raised enough money to last until it resumes full operations.

Pandemic Hangover: 11 Trillion in Corporate Debt: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Interest rates on corporate debt have declined in fits and starts since the 1980s, generally tracking short-term rates set by the Fed and U.S. government bond yields.

Several factors account for the decline. Low inflation is one. Also, economic growth has trended lower over the decades, limiting how high the Fed can raise rates without tipping the economy into a recession.

During the 2008-09 financial crisis, the Fed cut its benchmark federal-funds rate to near zero for the first time and started buying large quantities of U.S. Treasurys and mortgage-backed securities in an effort to boost the economy.

Investors seeking higher yields subsequently piled into riskier assets, ushering in an era of supersize debt sales.

The pandemic pushed the prevailing trends to extremes. The Fed again cut the federal-funds rate to zero and resumed purchasing Treasurys. It also broke new ground by buying corporate bonds, bolstering investor confidence.

After setting a record last year, overall corporate bond issuance remains robust this year, and higher-risk, speculative-grade bonds are now on pace to set their own record.

For many companies that weren’t thrown into crisis by the pandemic, the booming bond market has provided an opportunity to slash interest expenses.

At the start of 2020, the average investment-grade corporate bond yielded 2.84%, a rough indication of the interest rate companies with solid credit ratings would have to pay on new bonds. At the peak of pandemic fears, it rose to about 4.6%, but by the end of last year it had fallen to an all-time low of 1.74%. Companies rushed to try to lock in those low borrowing costs.

AT&T Inc which as of March 31 had more outstanding debt than any other nonfinancial company, is one such company. In recent months, it announced deals to shed media and pay-TV assets that it said would reduce net debt by more than $50 billion.

It spent much of last year trying to take advantage of the bond boom to reduce interest expenses and push out debt maturities. In one deal, it issued $11 billion of bonds with maturities ranging from 7.5 years to 40.5 years to pay back bonds maturing over the next five years. In April, it said it had reduced its first-quarter interest expense by $150 million from the year-earlier period.

In June of 2020, Crown Castle, the cell tower operator, issued $2.5 billion of new bonds with maturities as long as 30 years, which enabled it to pay down bonds due in this year and next. And this year, it issued more bonds at its lowest ever interest rates.

Mr. Schlanger, the CFO, said the company can use interest savings to increase its profit margin, or it can pass them on to customers, which include the major U.S. wireless carriers. “Anytime we can take advantage of a market like this to either make more money or lower the cost to our customers, we’re more than happy to do so,” he said.

By the end of last year, investors had worked up such an appetite for corporate bonds that they were willing to lend large sums to companies with near rock-bottom triple-C credit ratings. This year, triple-C bond issuance is running 35% above the previous record, according to LCD, a unit of S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Community Health Systems Inc, one of the country’s largest for-profit hospital operators, has been struggling with the challenges of serving patients outside major cities, and with the fallout from a problematic acquisition. At the end of last year, it was poised to burn through more than $600 million of cash in 2021, according to Moody’s Investors Service.

Undeterred, investors have snapped up a series of secured bond offerings from the hospital chain since December, enabling it to both reduce its interest expense and extend its debt maturities.

Chief Financial Officer Kevin Hammons said overall market conditions were a big help, enabling the company to take “a more aggressive approach in doing things quicker than we otherwise may have done.” He also attributed the successful offerings to improved earnings in the second half of last year and progress executing new strategies, which have involved selling underperforming hospitals.

Last month, Moody’s upgraded Community Health’s credit rating to just above its equivalent of a triple-C rating, citing the impact of its recent refinancing deals and improved operating performance.

Not everyone thinks it is good for the economy over the long term for struggling companies to have such an easy time refinancing debt. Torsten Slok, the former chief economist for Deutsche Bank Securities who is now chief economist at the asset-management firm Apollo Global Management, wrote last year that one consequence of persistent low interest rates is that it “keeps more unproductive firms alive, which ultimately lowers the long-run growth rate of the economy.”

Some analysts say investors are willing to accept such low interest rates on corporate bonds not only because of the brightening economic outlook but because of the Fed’s aggressive response to the pandemic, which they think could to be repeated in future recessions.

Others are doubtful that even if the Fed announced that it would buy corporate bonds again, it would provide the same jolt to the market it did last year. They say that the normal risks of debt still apply, and that corporate bond investors could face significant losses in the next economic downturn.

Scott Kimball, a portfolio manager and co-head of U.S. fixed income at BMO Global Asset Management, said he doesn’t expect debt to be a problem in the near term, but that it could start causing headaches for businesses and investors in a few years when companies have to start thinking about refinancing some of the bonds they recently issued. Then, he said, “in the next recession, it’s going to be a major issue.”

One encouraging fact for investors is that many companies didn’t add debt over the past year to buy back stock, increase dividends or otherwise juice returns for shareholders. They borrowed money on an emergency basis, and could be in position to pay down debt once that emergency is over.

Mr. Bernstein, Carnival’s CFO, said the company will reduce its debt in coming years by paying off bonds and loans as they come due, using cash generated from operations. The goal, he said, is to reclaim the same investment-grade ratings that the company had before the pandemic.

Boeing has said it will make debt reduction a priority once its cash flow becomes more normal.

Some companies that borrowed money in the pandemic have already started to pay it back.

Delta has said it expects to return to its investment-grade profile within two years. It paid down a $1.5 billion loan in March and said in April that it would repay $850 million of additional debt by the end of this quarter.

The retailer Target Corp. issued $2.5 billion of bonds in March 2020 when state and local governments were issuing lockdown orders. Its earnings, though, actually improved during the pandemic, and in October, the company paid down roughly $1.8 billion of its bonds before their maturity dates.

Similarly, food distributor Sysco Corp. issued $4 billion of bonds in March of last year to bolster its cash holdings. Since last September, it has reduced its debt by roughly $3 billion, including the early repayment of roughly $700 million of its bonds.

“What we’re seeing is corporations make an active attempt to improve their balance sheets,” said Matt Brill, senior portfolio manager and head of North American investment grade at the asset manager Invesco Ltd. “And as long as we’re seeing that, we’re not going to be concerned.”

Still, he added, “there is certainly an elevated level of debt that needs to be repaid.”

  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
Previous articleJune 18, 2021The Pay Is Generous, the Work NonexistentIn 19 states, unemployed families of four with two jobless parents can receive benefits equivalent to a $100,000 annual salary, highlighting a significant work vs. welfare trade-off. @CaseyBMulliganNext articleJune 18, 2021The Fed Is Optimistic About the Recoveryand Unsure What That Means for RatesThe Fed projects Americans’ real GDP at end of 2023 to be 2.6% higher than pre-pandemic forecasts, reflecting optimism about economic recovery. @MattKleinBarron
Showing 114 database articles primarily about Savings Glut/Trade Deficit

How To Buy A Trade Surplus

AI Summary. Regression evidence suggests governments can buy current account surpluses: raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30, while issuing $1 of domestic-currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets raises it by roughly $0.50-$0.60. Combining a fiscal surplus with foreign-currency investment, as Norway and Singapore do, yields about $0.80 per $1.

Joseph Gagnon and Nishtha Agrawal Peterson Institute For International Economics
Date Posted:
July 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Using annual data for 146 countries from 1985 – 2024, Gagnon and Agrawal find that a $1 increase in a country’s cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit is associated with a 22–38¢ increase in its current-account deficit, with most of the estimates ~30¢.

Can governments buy current account surpluses with fiscal and currency policy?

Core argument: Regression results suggest that raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30.

Table 1 presents regression results. The evidence strongly suggests that governments can buy current account surpluses. Raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by $0.30 [Table 1, first row]. Issuing $1 of domestic currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets (foreign exchange intervention) raises the current account anywhere from $0.20 to $1.00, with a value around $0.50 to $0.60 most plausible [Rows 2 though 5]. NOF is Net Official Flows, and NOS is the stock of net official foreign assets. The most powerful policy, as exemplified by Norway and Singapore, is to run a fiscal surplus and invest the proceeds in foreign-currency assets. In that case, $1 buys a current account surplus of around $0.80 or so. The results are supported by annual panel regressions of current accounts and cross-country stock regressions of cumulated current accounts or stocks of net foreign assets. The estimated effects in the panel regressions may be biased down slightly by incomplete modeling of lagged effects.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Regression results suggest that raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by about $0.30.
  2. Issuing $1 of domestic currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets is estimated to raise the current account by $0.20 to $1.00, with $0.50 to $0.60 most plausible.
  3. Combining a fiscal surplus with investment of the proceeds in foreign-currency assets, as Norway and Singapore do, is estimated to buy a current account surplus of around $0.80 per $1.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Global Imbalances — The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.
  • The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities — Taxing capital inflows would weaken the dollar but could raise domestic interest rates and depress investment, harming long-term growth, while an interest rate cut absent recession would be inflationary and erode any real depreciation needed to durably improve the trade balance. Fiscal restraint could weaken the dollar and reduce the trade deficit.
  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — Neo-mercantilism is thriving in both China, which pairs infant-industry promotion with large trade surpluses, and in a United States focused on external deficits and protecting domestic markets. The author argues this will likely fracture the world economy, and that a new multilateral treaty could include a mechanism to combat large structural trade surpluses.
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP

Honey, Who Shrunk the U.S. Income Surplus?

AI Summary. Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets are valued at $69tn versus $41tn of U.S. holdings abroad, a gap that has been mounting for decades. With the net liability position in interest-bearing assets at -$15tn, a 1 percentage point rise in interest rates would subtract $150bn from the U.S. net investment income balance.

Matthew Higgins and Thomas Klitgaard Liberty Street Economics
Date Posted:
May 19, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The US net international investment position worsened by about $16tn between 2019 and 2025, driven by roughly $5.5tn in net inflows and $10tn in valuation losses, as higher rates hit a larger net liability stock, raising interest rate-sensitivity.

How does a growing net liability position affect U.S. investment income?

Core argument: Official estimates put the current market value of foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets at $69tn, against $41tn of U.S. holdings of foreign assets, a shortfall that has been mounting for decades.

Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets are immense, with official estimates putting their current market value at $69 trillion. U.S. holdings of foreign assets are also impressive but much smaller, at $41 trillion. The shortfall in U.S. foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities has been mounting for decades. Yet U.S. investment income receipts—in profits, dividends, and interest—comfortably exceeded income payments until recently. Payments on U.S. assets owned by foreign investors represent a servicing burden for the U.S. economy. Profits, dividends, and interest payments that would otherwise accrue to domestic investors instead flow abroad. Given the need to sell U.S. assets to finance ongoing trade deficits, this servicing burden seems likely to mount. The related buildup in the U.S. net liability position in interest-bearing assets will also make the income balance more sensitive to swings in interest rates. This increased sensitivity is already in evidence. At present, with the asset-liability gap at -$15 trillion, a 1 percentage point increase in U.S. and foreign interest rates would subtract $150 billion from the U.S. net income balance. (A 1pp fall in rates would result in a similar improvement.) Only five years ago, a 1 percentage point rise in rates would have subtracted $100 billion.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Official estimates put the current market value of foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets at $69tn, against $41tn of U.S. holdings of foreign assets, a shortfall that has been mounting for decades.
  2. With the U.S. asset-liability gap in interest-bearing assets at -$15tn, a 1 percentage point rise in U.S. and foreign interest rates would subtract $150bn from the U.S. net income balance, compared with $100bn five years ago.
  3. U.S. investment income receipts in profits, dividends, and interest exceeded income payments until recently, and the servicing burden on foreign-owned U.S. assets seems likely to mount given the need to sell U.S. assets to finance ongoing trade deficits.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Global Imbalances — The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.
  • Tariffs and “International Payments Problems” — Foreigners are accumulating more financial claims on Americans than Americans are on foreigners across direct investment, stocks, bonds, currency, deposits, and loans, and the U.S. net international investment position has moved from -20% of GDP in 2010 to -89%. Almost all of that swing reflects valuation gains on U.S. stocks rather than added borrowing.
  • Foreigners Rebuff ‘Sell America’ and Buy a Net $1.6 Trillion in Assets — Treasury Department data show overseas investors bought a net $1.55tn of long-term US financial assets, up from $1.18tn the prior year, including $720bn in equities and just under $409bn in Treasury notes and bonds. China was a net seller of $208.6bn, with its Treasury holdings ending at $683.5bn.
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Monetary Policy

Don't Blame America's Current Account Deficit On the Dollar

AI Summary. Foreign official purchases of dollars are too small to mirror the US current account deficit, and net official financial inflows have fluctuated around zero even as the deficit widened; the euro area runs a current account surplus despite the euro's reserve role. The author argues materially reducing the US fiscal deficit is the key policy prerequisite for global rebalancing.

Maurice Obstfeld Peterson Institute for International Economics
Date Posted:
April 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Noting the minimal relationship between official liabilities and the CA, Obstfeld argues that the reserve currency role of the dollar is not the cause of the trade deficit. He urges reduction in the US fiscal deficit to increase national saving.

Does the dollar's reserve role drive the US current account deficit?

Core argument: US net incurrence of liabilities to official foreign holders over 2003–25, measured as a share of GDP, is usually far too small to mirror the US current account deficit, contradicting claims that official dollar purchases feed one-for-one into it.

Critics of the dollar's global role have argued that foreign official dollar purchases (labeled US incurrence of official liabilities in the figure) feed one-for-one into US current account deficits. To illustrate the true loose relationship between these two variables, the figure shows both of them over the 2003–25 period, as percentages of GDP. US net incurrence of liabilities to official holders, reported with a minus sign as in standard balance-of-payments methodology, is usually far too small to mirror the US current account deficit. And since roughly 2014, net official financial inflows have fluctuated around zero as the current account deficit has widened. To be sure, the strong international demand for dollars may make the dollar stronger against foreign currencies than it would be otherwise, [but] while they imply a smaller current account balance, they do not necessarily imply a negative balance and certainly not a rising negative balance, especially when foreign dollar reserve holdings have been shrinking relative to global economic activity (as figure 1 also implies). The euro is the world's second reserve currency, yet the euro area has a current account surplus. Britain had surpluses up until World War I despite issuing the world's premier global currency and hosting its leading financial center. Reducing the US fiscal deficit materially and sustainably is the most important US policy prerequisite for global current account rebalancing.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US net incurrence of liabilities to official foreign holders over 2003–25, measured as a share of GDP, is usually far too small to mirror the US current account deficit, contradicting claims that official dollar purchases feed one-for-one into it.
  2. Since roughly 2014, US net official financial inflows have fluctuated around zero while the US current account deficit widened, and foreign dollar reserve holdings have been shrinking relative to global economic activity.
  3. The euro area runs a current account surplus despite the euro's status as the world's second reserve currency, and Britain ran surpluses until World War I while issuing the premier global currency and hosting its leading financial center.

Related Articles:

  • US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960 — The US goods and services trade deficit reached $901.5bn for the year, one of the largest in data going back to 1960. US companies increased imports of computers and accessories by nearly $145bn from the prior year, an acceleration in demand that reflects large-scale artificial intelligence investment.
  • The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities — Taxing capital inflows would weaken the dollar but could raise domestic interest rates and depress investment, harming long-term growth, while an interest rate cut absent recession would be inflationary and erode any real depreciation needed to durably improve the trade balance. Fiscal restraint could weaken the dollar and reduce the trade deficit.
  • Pettis on Obstfeld — Pettis argues that saving rates in China, Japan, South Korea, Germany, Russia and Saudi Arabia are driven by their own domestic policies and conditions, and in turn drive the US saving rate. He notes the US has an open capital account, deep financial markets, and limited intervention in credit allocation.
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • China
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • GDP

Understanding Global Imbalances

AI Summary. The US, China, Germany, and Japan account for roughly two-thirds of global current account imbalances, with the US deficit at 4% of GDP financed by capital inflows into dollar assets. The average duration of a surplus or deficit spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, building large net foreign asset and liability positions.

IMF Staff International Monetary Fund
Date Posted:
April 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database

As of 2024, the US, China, Germany, and Japan accounted for ~2/3 of total global imbalances (the sum of the absolute value of each economy’s current account deficit and surplus). The US CA deficit is between 0.8 and 1% of world GDP.

How persistent are global current account imbalances and which economies drive them?

Core argument: The US, China, Germany, and Japan together account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances, with the US deficit equal to 4% of GDP in 2024, financed by capital inflows and portfolio investors seeking dollar assets.

Four economies—the US, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances. The US deficit—equivalent to 4% of GDP as of 2024—has been financed by capital inflows and portfolio investors seeking dollar assets. Germany and Japan’s surpluses have been driven by high saving rates, joined by substantial surpluses in China beginning in the 2000s. Oil-exporting countries’ surpluses fluctuate with commodity prices, creating episodic contributions to global imbalances. In earlier decades, surpluses and deficits were more cyclical: countries moved in and out of surplus depending on business cycles, commodity shocks, and exchange rate movements. While there is no standard definition of persistence, the average duration of a deficit or surplus spell roughly doubled since the 1980s. Persistent surpluses over the past two decades have accumulated into very large net foreign asset positions for economies such as China, Germany, and Japan, with each holding net foreign assets equivalent to 3–3.5% of global GDP in 2024. Similarly, persistent deficits have built up into large net liability positions, most notably in the US where the NIIP stands at about -25% of global GDP in 2024, underscoring the central role of the US position in global balances (Figure 6).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The US, China, Germany, and Japan together account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances, with the US deficit equal to 4% of GDP in 2024, financed by capital inflows and portfolio investors seeking dollar assets.
  2. The average duration of a deficit or surplus spell roughly doubled since the 1980s, when countries moved in and out of surplus with business cycles, commodity shocks, and exchange rate movements.
  3. China, Germany, and Japan each held net foreign assets equivalent to 3–3.5% of global GDP in 2024, while the US net international investment position stood at about -25% of global GDP.

Related Articles:

  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — Neo-mercantilism is thriving in both China, which pairs infant-industry promotion with large trade surpluses, and in a United States focused on external deficits and protecting domestic markets. The author argues this will likely fracture the world economy, and that a new multilateral treaty could include a mechanism to combat large structural trade surpluses.
  • Debt, Deficits & Global Imbalances — Taxes or restrictions on short-term capital inflows were argued to be a more direct and potentially superior tool than tariffs for shrinking the trade deficit, since tariffs risk retaliation and supply-chain distortions. Proponents said such measures could reduce reliance on household and government borrowing to sustain employment, if paired with efforts to strengthen domestic demand and tradables capacity.
  • US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960 — The US goods and services trade deficit reached $901.5bn for the year, one of the largest in data going back to 1960. US companies increased imports of computers and accessories by nearly $145bn from the prior year, an acceleration in demand that reflects large-scale artificial intelligence investment.
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • China
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Trade (not deficits)

China’s Cheap Money Is Shaking $9.5 Trillion Global Loan Market

AI Summary. Chinese banks, funded by low-cost domestic money amid monetary easing and weak domestic credit demand, are expanding cross-border lending and undercutting global rivals for sought-after Asian borrowers. Bankers at international institutions say they are being priced out of some of these deals.

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
Date Posted:
March 5, 2026
Is Database:
Database

China’s savings glut and “monetary easing to counter slowing growth” are manifesting themselves in credit expansion overseas, as bankers seek higher yields than they can get at home amidst deflationary pressure.

Are Chinese banks undercutting global rivals in cross-border lending?

Core argument: Chinese banks, flush with low-cost funds from Beijing's monetary easing, are reshaping parts of the $9.5 trillion global loan market by extending cheaper credit across borders.

Chinese banks, flush with low-cost funds, are reshaping parts of the global loan market, underscoring how deflationary pressures in the world’s second-largest economy are increasingly influencing competition with international lenders. Much like US and European manufacturers who have long complained about being undercut by cheaper Chinese rivals, bankers at global institutions now say they’re facing the financial equivalent: being priced out of some of Asia’s most sought-after borrowers as Chinese lenders extend cheaper credit across borders. Enabled by Beijing’s monetary easing to counter slowing growth, Chinese banks are expanding overseas lending amid weakening domestic credit demand. That edge may prove even more significant as the Iran crisis threatens to upend global energy markets, raising the likelihood that major central banks will hold off easing interest rates amid mounting uncertainty.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Chinese banks, flush with low-cost funds from Beijing's monetary easing, are reshaping parts of the $9.5 trillion global loan market by extending cheaper credit across borders.
  2. Bankers at global institutions say they are being priced out of some of Asia's most sought-after borrowers by Chinese lenders, a financial equivalent of the undercutting US and European manufacturers have long complained about.
  3. Weakening domestic credit demand in China is accompanying an expansion of its banks' overseas lending, an edge that may prove more significant if the Iran crisis leads major central banks to hold off easing interest rates.

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Tariffs and "International Payments Problems"

AI Summary. Foreigners are accumulating more financial claims on Americans than Americans are on foreigners across direct investment, stocks, bonds, currency, deposits, and loans, and the U.S. net international investment position has moved from -20% of GDP in 2010 to -89%. Almost all of that swing reflects valuation gains on U.S. stocks rather than added borrowing.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
March 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The worsening of the US net international investment position – from -20% of US GDP in 2010, to -53% pre-pandemic, and to -89% as of the end of 2025Q3 – reflects valuation gains on US stocks relative to stocks in the rest of the world.

Does the deteriorating U.S. investment position reflect borrowing or stock valuations?

Core argument: The U.S. net international investment position swung from -20% of GDP in 2010 to -53% just before the pandemic and -89% as of 2025Q3, almost all reflecting valuation gains on U.S. stocks relative to foreign stock markets.

Foreigners are accumulating more financial claims on Americans than Americans are accumulating on foreigners across every single category: FDI, stocks, bonds, physical currency, deposits, and loans. Foreign official investors supposedly have been mild sellers of U.S. assets over the past 12 months, but the standard measure does not include state-affiliated institutions that operate on behalf of foreign governments. Meanwhile, the U.S. net international investment position has swung massively over the past few years, from -20% of U.S. GDP in 2010, to -53% of U.S. GDP on the eve of the pandemic to -89% as of the end of 2025Q3. Almost all of that reflects massive valuation gains on U.S. stocks relative to stock markets in the rest of the world. The good news is that actual U.S. indebtedness has not meaningfully increased, and the methods used to assign market values to FDI in the U.S. and abroad make the situation look more extreme than it is. (U.S. FDI assets in Ireland are overwhelmingly big tech and big pharma, for example, but the market value of those assets is imputed based on the performance of the maker of Kerrygold.) The bad news is that, if the current level of the NIIP is unsustainable, the easiest way for it to revert is for U.S. stock prices to fall dramatically.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. net international investment position swung from -20% of GDP in 2010 to -53% just before the pandemic and -89% as of 2025Q3, almost all reflecting valuation gains on U.S. stocks relative to foreign stock markets.
  2. Foreigners are accumulating more financial claims on Americans than Americans are on foreigners in every category — FDI, stocks, bonds, physical currency, deposits, and loans — while actual U.S. indebtedness has not meaningfully increased.
  3. Methods for assigning market values to foreign direct investment make the imbalance look more extreme than it is, since U.S. FDI assets in Ireland are overwhelmingly big tech and big pharma yet are valued using the performance of the maker of Kerrygold.

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  • The End of Privilege: A Reexamination of the Net Foreign Asset Position of the United States — The authors document that the U.S. net foreign asset position fell by 60 percentage points of U.S. gross domestic product between 2007 and 2021, even as U.S. current account deficits narrowed. They attribute this to a boom in the market valuation of U.S. corporations' non-financial assets, which mechanically raised the value of large foreign equity holdings in U.S. firms.
  • United States’ Changing Net IIP — The United States' net international investment position deficit—the gap between foreign-owned US assets and US-owned foreign assets—is the largest on record and has turned negative across all major asset categories. Because much of the liability is equity, the author argues rebalancing could come through a correction in US equity values rather than a weaker dollar.
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