Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
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  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
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Add Declining Immigration to Problems Weighing on the Labor Market

AI Summary. The U.S. has 2.4m fewer working-age immigrants than if pre-2017 trends had continued, about 1% of the working-age population, a shortfall that is contributing to labor shortages and wage and price pressure as employers struggle to fill vacancies. Industries with high shares of foreign-born workers show elevated job-opening rates, and long-term care employment is down 16% from 2019.

Hackman Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
April 6, 2022
Is Database:
Database

US has 2.4mm fewer working-age immigrants than if pre-2017 trends had continued, ~1% of the working-age population.

Is declining immigration worsening labor shortages and wage pressure?

Core argument: The U.S. has 2.4m fewer working-age immigrants than if pre-2017 trends had continued, a shortfall equal to roughly 1% of the working-age population.

The U.S. labor market is experiencing significant strain due to a decline in working-age immigrants, with 2.4m fewer than if pre-2017 trends had continued, representing ~1% of the working-age population. This shortfall is exacerbating labor shortages across various sectors, notably in long-term care, where employment has dropped 16% since 2019. The slowdown began during the Trump administration and worsened with pandemic-related immigration restrictions, leading to increased wage pressure and inflation as employers struggle to fill vacancies. Industries with high foreign-born worker levels face elevated job-opening rates, further highlighting the impact of reduced immigration on the economy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. has 2.4m fewer working-age immigrants than if pre-2017 trends had continued, a shortfall equal to roughly 1% of the working-age population.
  2. Long-term care employment has fallen 16% since 2019, among the sectors where the immigration shortfall is worsening labor shortages.
  3. The immigration slowdown began during the Trump administration and deepened with pandemic-related restrictions, adding wage pressure and inflation as employers struggle to fill vacancies, with industries employing many foreign-born workers showing elevated job-opening rates.

“…For several years after the 2007-09 recession, roughly a million people moved to the U.S. annually. That pace started to slow during the Trump administration and fell to a trickle after the Covid-19 pandemic started. The slowdown has left the U.S. with 2.4 million fewer immigrants of working age—about 1% of the working-age population—than if pre-2017 immigration trends had continued, according to Giovanni Peri, a labor economist at the University of California, Davis. The change is being felt as the economy rebounds and many employers struggle to replace workers who were laid off or quit since early 2020, contributing to wage pressure and inflation…”

Add Declining Immigration to Problems Weighing on the Labor Market: Extended Excerpt Image 1


As global travel rebounds, the department aims at “reintroducing appointments for the full range of nonimmigrant visas, including for tourism and business travel,” said a spokesman for the department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs. “We will do so in a manner consistent with science and public health.”

In long-term care, the outlook is especially striking. Demand for home health aides and nursing home care is increasing as baby boomers age. Over the past decade, an average 18% of the sector’s workforce has been foreign born. That is close to the national average, but a disproportionate share of those with hands-on jobs such as orderlies are foreign born, according to nursing home operators.

Employment in nursing-care facilities fell to 1.34 million in March from 1.6 million in mid-2019. While the U.S. has some visa programs to help foreign doctors or engineers immigrate, operators of long-term-care homes can’t recruit from abroad because the jobs they are filling wouldn’t qualify for any existing visa program.

A September survey by the American Health Care Association and the National Center for Assisted Living, sister trade groups, found 99% of nursing homes and 96% of assisted-living facilities reporting staffing shortages.

Because of those shortages, 58% of nursing homes and 28% of assisted-living facilities limited how many new clients they could take on. With fewer caregivers, industry officials say, people looking for homes or health aides sometimes can’t even get their calls to agencies returned.

Adam Lampert, the chief executive of Mr. Nwaokolo’s Dallas employer, Manchester Care Homes, and a sister company employing home health aides, said that African immigrants make up roughly 80% of his workforce, many referred to him through a church.

Recently, when his team has tried to recruit through employee networks, it has come up short. There are fewer new arrivals, the people likeliest to take caregiving jobs.

“We’re not trying to discriminate against citizens when we look for employees—quite the opposite,” Mr. Lampert said. “We’re just looking for people to fill the roles that we need. And time and again, we find it is the immigrant population that tends to respond to us.”

Mr. Nwaokolo said caregiving can be demanding, such as when he needs to change clients’ adult diapers or help them go to the bathroom. It can be emotionally taxing, too, particularly working with those who have dementia.

“You have to learn how to be patient,” he said. “You have to watch your anger, because sometimes they can hit you or maybe spit in your face.”

Mr. Nwaokolo, who had been working as a local health official in Nigeria, came to the U.S. in 2015 for a health conference in Boston, where he met his future wife. That meant finding a new job. He wanted to work in healthcare but knew his experience likely wouldn’t transfer. Caregiving appealed to him, he said, because all the children in his village were taught to care for their elders.

Among Mr. Nwaokolo’s colleagues at the Dallas company, many came to the U.S. on tourist visas and ended up staying, typically by marrying an American. Others were sponsored by immediate family members who are U.S. citizens.

His cousin Anthony Chidera Nwakor, who lives in Lagos, applied for a visa to the U.S. in 2019 and was rejected. He applied again last year and is still waiting for an appointment at the U.S. consulate in Lagos. “I want to come there and make some connections, maybe work or go to school,” he said.

Mr. Nwaokolo said he has received offers to work as a traveling home nurse for as much as triple the $15 an hour he currently earns. He has decided to stay put for now because he feels some loyalty to Mr. Lampert, the chief executive of Manchester Care Homes, who paid for his nursing training and has lent him money for his family’s medical care in Nigeria.

“This place is like a family to me,” Mr. Nwaokolo said.

Michelle Hackman, "Add Declining Immigration to Problems Weighing on the Labor Market,"Wall Street Journal, April 5, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/add-declining-immigration-to-problems-weighing-on-the-labor-market-11649174837

Add Declining Immigration to Problems Weighing on the Labor Market

DALLAS—In an economy where nearly every industry is short of labor, nursing homes represent an extreme. Their employment has fallen 16% since 2019, and 99% of homes said last fall they didn’t have enough staff.

Burnout and stress are leading causes, but so is a less-known contributor: fewer immigrants.

Emeka Nwaokolo, 36 years old, came to the U.S. from Nigeria for a business trip and met a woman from Dallas he eventually married. He ended up working as a manager for Manchester Care Homes, which runs a network of nursing homes around Dallas.

Over the years, he has referred other Nigerian immigrants from his church to Manchester. In the past few years, though, it has become much tougher for Nigerians to emigrate to the U.S. because of more-stringent visa screening at American consulates abroad. The situation has worsened with pandemic-related backups in immigration processing.

For several years after the 2007-09 recession, roughly a million people moved to the U.S. annually. That pace started to slow during the Trump administration and fell to a trickle after the Covid-19 pandemic started.

The slowdown has left the U.S. with 2.4 million fewer immigrants of working age—about 1% of the working-age population—than if pre-2017 immigration trends had continued, according to Giovanni Peri, a labor economist at the University of California, Davis. The change is being felt as the economy rebounds and many employers struggle to replace workers who were laid off or quit since early 2020, contributing to wage pressure and inflation.

Labor shortages stem from a wide variety of factors, including early retirement, Covid-19 sickness or fear of it, lack of child care and a desire to start a business. Additionally, Mr. Peri noted, fewer immigrants are a factor. Industries with above-average levels of foreign-born workers are likelier to have high job-opening rates.

Add Declining Immigration to Problems Weighing on the Labor Market: Extended Excerpt Image 2


San Antonio home builder Ed Berlanga used to be able to call up his framer or painter and ask if they could assemble an additional crew of two or three workers to take on a new project. “They would say, ‘I have three cousins in Mexico, I’d like to get them to come work with us,’” he said.

Now, no one is coming, Mr. Berlanga said, and he faces more competition for his subcontractors’ time as home demand booms. He is also paying more for almost every service. Paint jobs, which routinely cost him $6 a square foot before the pandemic, now cost $7.50.

The smaller number of immigrants appears to be one reason wages are growing briskly in industries where vacancies are high, from hospitality to long-term care. “The numbers suggest it’s a small contributing factor to what’s happening with wage growth,” though likely dwarfed by factors such as the opportunities low-wage employees have to switch to different lines of work, said Daniel Costa, director of immigration law and policy research at the Economic Policy Institute, a left-leaning think tank.

The slowdown in immigration began in 2017, when the Trump administration adopted a broad range of policies to curb both illegal and legal immigrants, including refugees, foreign recruits, international students and family members of American citizens.

Those already-reduced flows were then cut in half in 2020 by the onset of the pandemic and the related restrictions. The U.S. closed consulates around the world, stopped processing refugees and began turning away most adult migrants at the Southern border under a new public-health authority known as Title 42.

In the 12 months ended last June 30, about 247,000 people moved to the U.S., less than a quarter of the 2016 level and half that of 2019, according to U.S. census data. Those figures don’t distinguish between people who came to the U.S. legally and those who didn’t.

Add Declining Immigration to Problems Weighing on the Labor Market: Extended Excerpt Image 3


In five top countries where people receive green cards to work in the U. S.—Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, the Philippines and China—the fiscal year ended last September saw declines of half to two-thirds in green-card issuance from two years prior, according to Department of Homeland Security figures.

Further crimping the availability of foreign-born workers are pandemic-related delays in processing work permits for those already in the U.S. There were 1.6 million pending work-permit applications at the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services at the end of December, up from 646,000 in 2019. It takes an average of nine to 11 months to process applications, versus three to four months at the end of 2019, according to government data.

Guito Tatawho fled violence in Haiti and now lives in Indianapolis, received a work permit in 2017 as part of his asylum application and became certified as a commercial truck driver. In 2020 he bought his own truck and began working for an Illinois trucking company, where he estimates he made $7,000 a month after truck payments.

When he applied to renew his work permit in February 2021, the immigration agency didn’t get to his case before his permit—and driver’s license—expired in August.

“I’m sitting at home right now doing nothing,” Mr. Tata said in February. “My truck is just parked somewhere. I’m losing money.”

On March 18, some seven months after the expiration, he finally got his new work permit.

A spokesman for the immigration agency said it couldn’t comment on an individual case but is aware of unprecedented processing delays and is working to fix them. Last week, the Biden administration said it plans to make expired work permits valid for many immigrants who rely on them.

The administration, in a move it said was to address labor shortages, this year made 55,000 additional visas available for temporary seasonal employers such as landscapers, hotels and ski resorts, nearly doubling the total available.

A political backlash to the administration’s handling of illegal immigration at the Southern border this year has made officials reluctant to take bigger steps to increase legal immigration, according to people familiar with the administration’s thinking.

About a fifth of consulates still aren’t processing most visas, and even those that are open are buried under a backlog of 7.5 million applications, according to State Department data.

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Workforce
    • Immigration
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Showing 218 database articles primarily about Business Cycle

3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. The direct lending market is roughly $2tn, or about 3% of total US household and business debt outstanding, compared with mortgages accounting for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Is direct lending too small to threaten the financial system?

Core argument: The direct lending market totals roughly $2 trillion, about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The direct lending market totals roughly $2 trillion, about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses.
  2. Mortgages accounted for about 60% of total US household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006, compared with direct lending's roughly 3% share.

Related Articles:

  • JPMorgan Marking Down Loan Portfolios Of Private Credit Groups — JPMorgan has marked down the value of certain loans in private credit funds' portfolios that serve as collateral for the funds' borrowing from the bank, limiting how much it will lend against them. Unlike most banks, which require triggers such as missed interest payments, JPMorgan reserves the right to revalue those assets at any time.
  • Data Update 7 for 2026: Debt and Taxes — The author argues that companies are collectively over-investing in artificial intelligence and that markets will correct when that belief dissipates. Because debt, particularly private credit, now finances much of this investment, the author contends a correction would spread beyond equity holders and produce a banking-style crisis driven by non-bank lenders.
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

AI Summary. An analysis of Federal Reserve data found the top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending, up from 48.5% the prior quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989. Spending by the bottom 80%, those making under roughly $175,000, has merely kept pace with inflation.

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Are top earners accounting for a record share of consumer spending?

Core argument: The top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989, according to Mark Zandi's analysis of Federal Reserve data.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989, according to Mark Zandi's analysis of Federal Reserve data.
  2. Consumers in the bottom 80% of the income distribution, making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic, according to Moody's Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi.

Related Articles:

  • The U.S. Economy Depends More Than Ever on Rich People — Moody's Analytics estimates the top 10% of earners account for 49.7% of all U.S. consumer spending, a record in data going back to 1989, up from about 36% three decades ago, with their spending alone equal to almost one-third of gross domestic product.
  • To Understand America Today, Study the Zero-Sum Mindset — Younger generations in the United States and other rich countries hold more zero-sum views than older ones, a pattern researchers link to growing up amid slower economic growth and lower mobility. People who have surpassed their parents, or whose families rose over generations, are less likely to think in zero-sum terms.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

AI Summary. Regrouping US college majors to match Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science and engineering to humanities and social sciences, the same ratio as in China. The author argues America's building slowdown reflects structural economic shifts—urbanization reached 70% by 1960 and 85% by 2020, shifting needs toward maintenance—rather than a lawyerly culture.

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Does America's building slowdown reflect structural shifts rather than lawyerly culture?

Core argument: Regrouping US college majors according to Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences, the same ratio as in China when management is grouped with science/engineering in both.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Regrouping US college majors according to Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences, the same ratio as in China when management is grouped with science/engineering in both.
  2. US urbanization rose from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, then grew more incrementally to 85% by 2020, with America's breakneck building phase winding down by the 1960s.
  3. The US building and investment slowdown that began after the 1970s may owe more to structural economic shifts than to lawyers, qualifying Dan Wang's contrast between China's engineering state and America's lawyerly society.

Related Articles:

  • Industrial Colossus: China vs 1950s America — China's growth in its share of global manufacturing has slowed from roughly 1.5 percentage points per year in the early 2010s to just over 0.5 percentage points annually, about one-third the earlier pace. The author argues China's share of global manufacturing is likely near its peak.
  • The Real China Model — China generates more electricity annually than the United States and European Union combined, having added capacity equivalent to the United Kingdom's total supply each year. Electricity makes up nearly 30% of China's energy use, versus 22% in the US and 21% globally, and its share is growing about 6% a year.
  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Housing production intensity has fallen substantially, especially in fast-growing Sunbelt markets once known for building, converging toward the low rates long seen on the coasts and in declining industrial centers. The authors argue incumbent-controlled regulation explains the weakening link between high prices, high demand areas, and new construction.
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth

How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

AI Summary. About a sixth of America's 2% real GDP growth over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment and data centres, and one estimate puts the artificial intelligence boom's total contribution to growth at 40%. Average electricity bills rose 7%, attributed in part to data-centre demand, while housebuilding and non-AI business investment slumped and real consumption flatlined.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Is the AI investment boom crowding out the rest of the economy?

Core argument: Roughly a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres; one estimate puts the AI boom's contribution at 40% once grid upgrades and software intellectual property are included.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Roughly a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres; one estimate puts the AI boom's contribution at 40% once grid upgrades and software intellectual property are included.
  2. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid.

Related Articles:

  • Honey, AI Capex is Eating the Economy — Capital spending on AI data centers is around 20% of railroads' peak spending as a share of GDP and is rising quickly, having already surpassed the dot-com era peak in telecom investment. Unlike long-lived rail infrastructure, data centers are short-lived assets requiring frequent hardware replacement, and the capital is being reallocated from other sectors.
  • Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Programming — The four largest US hyperscalers spent $440bn on capital expenditure and research in 2024, with $596bn projected for 2025, a 35% increase, leaving large gaps between AI spending and AI revenues. These firms account for more than half of all capital expenditure growth in the US equity market.
  • The AI Boom’s Hidden Risk to the Economy — Net income at Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft rose 73% to $91bn in a quarter two years on, while their combined free cash flow fell 30% to $40bn, as heavy AI investment absorbs cash these firms once recycled into financial markets. That spare cash previously helped hold down long-term interest rates despite large federal deficits.
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Is it Over?

AI Summary. Benchmark scores show only modest capability gains in the latest large language model releases compared with the larger jump seen two generations earlier, alongside a broader convergence in performance across competing AI models. Commentators attribute this to inherent limits of the technology and the exhaustion of new training data, raising doubts that the spending on AI hardware is justified.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

Are AI capability gains slowing enough to question hardware spending?

Core argument: GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment with the release, which seemed in some ways a step back, and benchmarks show only modest capability gains since the significant improvement delivered by version 4 two years earlier.

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment with the release, which seemed in some ways a step back, and benchmarks show only modest capability gains since the significant improvement delivered by version 4 two years earlier.
  2. Benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in AI model capabilities, with commentary attributing this to inherent limitations of large language model technology and exhaustion of new training data.
  3. Companies appear to be spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs producing a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from, and the entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

Related Articles:

  • Honey, AI Capex is Eating the Economy — Capital spending on AI data centers is around 20% of railroads' peak spending as a share of GDP and is rising quickly, having already surpassed the dot-com era peak in telecom investment. Unlike long-lived rail infrastructure, data centers are short-lived assets requiring frequent hardware replacement, and the capital is being reallocated from other sectors.
  • Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Programming — The four largest US hyperscalers spent $440bn on capital expenditure and research in 2024, with $596bn projected for 2025, a 35% increase, leaving large gaps between AI spending and AI revenues. These firms account for more than half of all capital expenditure growth in the US equity market.
  • AI’s $600B Question — Comparing spending on AI chips to historical railroad construction overlooks that high-fixed-cost, low-marginal-cost businesses without monopoly or oligopoly power tend to see prices competed down to marginal cost, and that semiconductors continually improve in cost versus performance, unlike physical infrastructure. Speculative frenzies accompany technology, but the payoff will take a long time.
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

AI Summary. Household and banking sector leverage in the US have declined significantly since 2008, while corporate leverage has moved sideways and federal government leverage has risen significantly. On this measure, the US private sector is in strong financial shape.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Is the US private sector in strong financial shape?

Core argument: US household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have both declined significantly since 2008, leaving the US private sector in what the author characterizes as incredibly good shape.

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have both declined significantly since 2008, leaving the US private sector in what the author characterizes as incredibly good shape.
  2. US federal government leverage has increased significantly since 2008, moving in the opposite direction from the deleveraging in the household and banking sectors.
  3. US corporate leverage has moved sideways since 2008, neither declining like household and banking leverage nor rising like federal government leverage.

Related Articles:

  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.
  • The Long-Term Budget Outlook: 2025 to 2055 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the 10-year Treasury note interest rate will average 3.8% over 2025–2055, close to its 3.7% average over the prior three decades, with the inflation-adjusted rate averaging 1.5%. It assesses that long-run rates are largely set by structural factors including demographics, saving and investment behavior, and federal debt.
  • Our Thoughts on Large US Deficits and Their Impact on Bond Yields — Total borrowing in the US is about average despite high government deficits, as high public borrowing has contributed to the need for higher interest rates that have depressed private sector borrowing. Risk premiums on long-dated debt look about average, with no market signs that economic or debt limits are currently being hit.
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  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
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